


AMERICANS AT WAR IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

US MERCENARY FORCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST



ERIC COVEY

Eric Covey is a 2018–19 Fulbright US Scholar and visiting assistant professor in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies at the University of Abuja in Nigeria. He completed his PhD in American studies at the University of Texas at Austin in 2014 and was previously visiting assistant professor of American studies at Miami University in Ohio.

“Utterly delightful, superbly researched and beautifully written. One of this book’s many values is that it sheds light on an episode of American history that remains unknown on both sides of the Atlantic. It explores the fascinating role of mercenaries in nation- and empire-building, and it proves, yet again, that American exceptionalism is the unfailing guide of these freelance agents of the United States.”

– Anouar Majid, Vice President of Global Affairs
at the University of New England, and founding
director of the Center for Global Humanities
(Maine, USA) and the Tangier Global Forum (Morocco)

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*To contingent and adjunct faculty, who often feel invisible to colleagues
but on whose labor colleges and universities depend*

For bh and meb—A luta continua

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INTRODUCTION

While it is true to say that the United States did not in fact become a world empire until the twentieth century, it is also true that during the nineteenth century the United States was concerned with the Orient in ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern.

– Edward Said, 1978¹

Hail Columbia, happy land!
Hail, ye heroes, heav’n-born band,
Who fought and bled in freedom’s cause,
Who fought and bled in freedom’s cause,
And when the storm of war was gone
Enjoy’d the peace your valor won.

– Joseph Hopkinson, 1798²

American political commentator Bill O’Reilly made headlines in September 2014 when he proposed that the United States recruit and train a mercenary army of 25,000 soldiers to carry out policy in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. A predictable backlash followed, with many critics complaining that O’Reilly’s proposal was unwise and immoral – but not necessarily illegal.³ Yet the United States has openly employed mercenaries – private military contractors and other third parties – throughout the duration of the war on terror. And it is also worth remembering that it undertook a similar strategy in 1805 by using an American-led mercenary army to attack the city of Derna in North

Africa during the United States' war with Tripoli, an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The Tripolitan War and its conclusion at Derna, however, are but one example of a long history of US mercenary encounters with what was formerly the Ottoman Empire, now the territory of countries including Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, South Sudan, and Turkey. These mercenary encounters with the Ottoman world have largely been overlooked because of a tendency on the part of many Americans to envision the historical relationships between the United States and these places as framed by religion. Yet secular forces have also been essential to the foundations of US imperialism in Africa and the Middle East.

Take, for example, the case of three American mercenaries who swam together across the Nile to rejoin the Egyptian invasion force they had been hired to accompany into the Sudan in 1820. Several days behind the rest of the army and in no danger, the three men realized the humor in their situation and spontaneously sang out the lyrics to "Hail, Columbia," a patriotic song written for George Washington's 1789 inaugural.⁴ One of these Americans, George Bethune English, remarked this was "probably the first time that the wilds of Africa ever re-echoed a song of Liberty."⁵ English shortly thereafter returned to the United States, having spent eight years in the Ottoman world, and immediately went to work for the US Government, secretly trying to negotiate a lucrative trade treaty with the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul.⁶ These episodes in English's life link together Egypt; Washington, DC; and the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, demonstrating that one of the "ways" – to borrow from Edward Said – in which the United States was concerned with the Orient in the nineteenth century was a growing interest in economic, political, and military relations across the Ottoman world. The Ottoman world, however, does not fall entirely within the geographic and ideological bounds of the Orient and *Orientalism*.⁷ At its peak, Ottoman sovereign power extended well into Europe and, at least nominally, into central Africa; until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Ottoman possessions were spread north of the Danube, and the Sudan and Equatoria – 3,000 miles south of Istanbul – were considered distant outposts ruled by the sultan. Americans traveling across the Atlantic might encounter the Ottoman world in the Greek isles or on the shores of Lake Victoria.⁸ And while a sense of mastery over the Orient as an object of discourse – a central argument of Said's

Orientalism – was one of the outcomes of the mercenary encounters that I examine, they also produced other, more intimate relationships as a result of what Malini Johar Schueller calls “the deformative power of both particular writers and specific contexts.”⁹ For example, fifty years after English accompanied the Egyptian army into the Sudan, former Union and Confederate soldiers helped to reform and rebuild the Egyptian Army after a generation-long decline. In the process, these mercenaries produced a collection of texts that introduced US audiences to the geography of Central Africa and modern Egypt. While these mercenaries and their experiences are often treated as historical footnotes, their encounters with the Ottoman world helped to shape US culture – and the impressions they left behind continue to influence US approaches to Africa and the Middle East.

Americans at War in the Ottoman Empire demonstrates the productive nature of nineteenth-century mercenary encounters with the Ottoman world, as well as the complicated relationship between mercenaries and the state. I argue that mercenary force is a significant tool of the state, and that US imperialism in Africa and the Middle East is deeply rooted in the nineteenth-century mercenary practices that I describe. This work helps to expand awareness of the history of the United States in the Ottoman world and brings together cases that have been isolated from one another or never examined at length, in order to clarify that mercenary force is not just a legal phenomenon but also a historical and cultural one, with strong connections to nationalism and capital. Most crucially, *Americans at War in the Ottoman Empire* helps to illuminate some of the historical origins of the discourses that shape the US war on terror. Failing to account for these mercenary encounters leads to an incomplete account of both the past and the present.

I am not the first to observe the neglect of secular relations in histories of the United States and the Ottoman Empire. In 1982, A. Üner Turgay lamented that both US and Ottoman historians had largely overlooked early US–Ottoman relations. Turgay noted only one account of these relations by a Turkish historian, and observed that American accounts tended to focus on missionary and travel narratives, with little attention given to economics and virtually none to trade.¹⁰ This remains true thirty-five years later; approaches may have evolved, but the subjects remain the same. *Americans at War in the Ottoman Empire*, therefore, builds on and departs from contemporary scholarship on the role of the

United States in the Ottoman world, much of which tends to focus on missionary work or religion.¹¹ As Heather Sharkey observes of American missionary encounters with Egypt in the last half of the nineteenth century, missionaries produce “local, global, and transnational” social effects.¹² While it is true that American missionaries arrived in most parts of the Ottoman world before American mercenaries, mercenary work was nevertheless also a key site of encounter in the nineteenth century. Mercenary encounters accomplished significant work, constructing relationships between and among people, governments, and militaries. Mercenaries and missionaries differ significantly, however. As Sharkey notes, American missionaries in the Middle East enjoyed substantial protection from “the armor of British imperial power.”¹³ American mercenaries often lacked this protection – especially when they were working to undermine British power – and mercenaries’ relationships to other Western powers differed widely from case to case. Another difference between missionaries and mercenaries has to do with religious sentiment. Mercenaries, whose missions were not viewed as overtly religious, experienced the Ottoman world differently than missionaries. Likewise, mercenary figures were received differently by Ottoman authorities than missionaries. As Suraiya Faroqhi argues, it was pragmatism among elites, not religious law, that guided Ottoman foreign policy.¹⁴ So while some of the texts I examine fall within the bounds of what Timothy Marr describes as “American Islamicism,” most are more concerned with international relations and development schemes than religion or identity.¹⁵

The key figures on whom my chapters focus provide valuable gateways into US–Ottoman relations. As Erik Simpson observes, mercenary figures exhibit a kind of “transnational mobility.”¹⁶ Focusing on these “traveling figures,” rather than missionaries or religion, helps to complicate and debunk the clash-of-civilizations discourse that masks capitalism and the exercise of state power. Many commentators desire and work to sustain the fiction that present and past events demonstrate the ongoing division of the Christian and Islamic worlds.¹⁷ But the Christian and Islamic worlds were never so far apart as these writers would have readers believe. A careful analysis of the mercenary encounters that I examine demonstrates that the nineteenth-century Mediterranean was not simply an arena of competition divided between

Christians and Muslims. Rather, it was a site of struggle with multiple realms, both territorial and discursive. Each of my chapters shows Muslims and Christians working side by side. During the war with Tripoli in 1805, for example, the US-led mercenary army that attacked Derna was composed primarily of Muslims recruited in Alexandria. And in the 1870s, the mercenaries who formed the Egyptian General Staff were Christians from the United States. All these figures were able to imagine a world in which Christians and Muslims shared vital interests.

Mercenary Force and Imperialism

Historical relations between the United States and the Ottoman world and intimate relationships among Christians and Muslims are important subjects of *Americans at War in the Ottoman Empire*. Because I analyze how these encounters were negotiated through a practice I call *mercenary force*, I am also concerned with how the term *mercenary* has been fashioned and deployed. Mercenaries – often a catchall term for soldiers of fortune, filibusters, and others – are often imagined as war profiteers who operate outside the confines of state control. But to be labeled or identify as a mercenary means much more than this. In the realm of international law, for example, mercenaries and mercenarism entered the legal lexicon in opposition to states at exactly the same moment neoliberal governance was undoing states' brief – and tenuous – monopoly on violence. Mercenaries and mercenarism have, in fact, been the norm throughout the history of conflict; efforts to define a mercenary for the purposes of law have uniformly failed.¹⁸ It is also important to keep in mind that mercenary figures are not always soldiers; a wide range of behaviors can be thought of as *being mercenary* – in the sense that mercenary labor has an ambiguous relationship to the state because it is mediated and undercut by capital. For this reason – the tensions between and among states and capital – so-called mercenary narratives are often laced with patriotic and nationalist sentiments. Therefore, rather than attempt to construct a formal metric of who exactly qualifies as a mercenary or what constitutes mercenarism, I frame my argument using the term *mercenary force*.¹⁹ By choosing a term that uses *mercenary* as an adjective rather than a noun and that considers *force* – broadly construed – as the exercise of power both territorially and discursively by nations, empires, and

capital, I hope to move away from strictly legalistic debates surrounding the disembodied figure of the mercenary and jurisdiction over and responsibility for their activities.

The persistent – and largely failed – effort since the 1960s to define and regulate mercenaries and mercenarism under international law has been framed by two widely held assumptions. The first is that mercenaries are foreign to, or exist in the space between, states. But, as Gerald Horne appraises, “US foreign policy often has used ‘two tracks’ – one covert, the other overt – and mercenaries should be seen as a rudimentary element of the former.”²⁰ The second is that law alone can address this problem. But, as Cynthia Enloe explains in the context of US involvement in the southern African conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, the processes by which mercenaries are produced is political, historical, and reflect contradictions in the state system.²¹ A useful way to understand the mercenary figures whom this study examines is to place them in what Laura Doyle calls the frame of inter-imperiality, which considers the “political and historical set of conditions created by the violent histories of plural interacting empires and by interacting persons moving between and against empires.”²² These conditions – what Doyle calls a material or geopolitical field – shape the coformation of culture, economy, and the state.²³ Drawing on the work of Anne Foster, Augusto Espiritu adds that inter-imperiality need not be about conflict. It can also involve “two or more imperial powers engaged for mutual benefit in exchanges of information and personnel, defense alliances, and joint economic ventures, as well as negotiations in the disposition of conquered peoples, territories, or colonies.”²⁴ Throughout the nineteenth century, both the United States and the Ottoman Empire were undergoing significant changes and their relations with one another were mediated by mercenary force in this inter-imperial frame. Many of the figures I examine here occupy this “inter-imperial position,” from which they “negotiate both within and across empires.”²⁵ The mercenary encounters that I describe include cases in which the United States employed “foreign” mercenaries for work in the Ottoman world and others in which “Americans” were employed as mercenaries by Ottoman regional governments. Revealing the longer history of the United States in the Middle East and Africa, my historical and cultural analysis of five encounters – the Battle of Derna, George Bethune English in the

Ottoman world, literary mercenaries in Istanbul, Charles Chaillé-Long in Central Africa, and the American mission to Egypt – helps to explain the pervasiveness of mercenary force in spite of juridical efforts to eliminate it, and my conclusions trouble the distinction between legitimate state actors and mere soldiers of fortune that has been used to help draw the line between lawful and unlawful combatants in warfare: a foundational yet extraordinarily fraught component of international law.

Americans at War in the Ottoman Empire also rejects the primacy of the United States in the Ottoman world. Reflecting on the current state of scholarship on US–Ottoman relations, Emrah Şahin observes that “the current literature tends to ignore cultural reciprocity and has largely ignored evidence of Turkish agency and the potential for rewriting intercultural history with this agency in mind.”²⁶ Indeed, the United States is the junior player in the encounters that I describe here. Still, it was a partner. That the Ottoman Empire is as significant in US history as I claim might still seem like a surprising claim; even Edward Said once dismissed the possibility of any real US policy in “the East,” saying “the imaginative investment was never made either, perhaps because the American frontier, the one that counted, was a westward one.”²⁷ Said’s point is taken; looking backward, it is easy to see how westward-directed settler colonialism fueled the engine of US growth. But what cases like the ones I present here prove is that British parliamentarian Benjamin Disraeli’s claim in *Tancred* – that “the East is a career” – did not just apply to Europeans. As Said appraised, “to be interested in the East was something bright young Westerners would find to be an all-consuming passion.”²⁸ Among those Westerners were Americans, and for a time the Ottoman world was full of possibility for them, too. Operating on both the individual and national levels, mercenary force played an important role in the Mediterranean front of US commerce. For many Americans, working in the Ottoman world was a profitable career and one that could make valuable contributions to the imaginative vision of the United States. Finally, at the highest levels of government, mercenary force was seen as an important means to an end.

Although none of the mercenary encounters I write about is completely absent from the historiography of the period, few historians draw from the cultural texts produced by these encounters or associate mercenary force in these instances with the cultural and political

landscape of the United States at large. Yet mercenary narratives of encounters with the Ottoman world – including books, newspaper articles, and lectures – influenced how Americans viewed themselves, as well as how they interacted with people inside and outside the nation's border. Many of the texts I examine circulated widely, and their authors were recognized as experts on subjects ranging from Ottoman relations with Europe to the history of the Egyptian Army. Even now, these mercenary narratives continue to influence the way Americans view themselves in the world. Beginning in the 1990s, for example, American writers began to use the war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna to demonstrate an unbridgeable divide between Islam and the West. Publications of this type deny Muslims any credit for the US victory at Derna in 1805, although Muslim mercenaries accounted for most of the soldiers fighting on its behalf. Overshadowed in exceptionalist narratives that exaggerate the labor of the small number of Americans present at Derna, these Muslims are excluded from the pantheon of Americans at war.²⁹ Returning to the historical texts themselves demonstrates that contemporary accounts often have the past all wrong. As Faroghi points out, “On both the Muslim and Christian shores of the Mediterranean, there may have been many sailors, fishermen and soldiers who knew much more about the world ‘on the outside’ than the typical scholar.”³⁰ Mercenaries are representatives of this secular, commercial world and their encounters offer important insights into the relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire over the course of the nineteenth century. Their cultural work offers a stern rebuke to many contemporary chroniclers. My goal, in other words, is to attend to minor histories, as Ann Laura Stoler describes them: “structures of feeling or force that in ‘major’ history might otherwise be displaced.”³¹ Prompted by the urgent need to identify a more expansive genealogy of the role of mercenary force in US imperialism as well as US–Ottoman intimacies, I have returned to old archives to “explore the grain and read along it” – first, to challenge the popular historiographic rendering of the US history in the Levant – the eastern Mediterranean; second, to begin to understand how what I describe as “mercenary force” operated and was understood in the moment of its production.³²

By identifying the narratives produced by and about mercenary force in the Ottoman world, my analysis expands our understanding of the history of US imperialism. Raymond Williams observes that while

US imperialism has been strongly identified with “external investment and penetration and control of markets,” it also remains true that “imperialism, like any word which refers to fundamental social and political conflicts, cannot be reduced, semantically, to a single proper meaning.”³³ Recent scholarship in the field of American studies continues a long tradition of studying the 1898 war with Spain, often seen as the inaugural moment of US empire, while extending the timeline of the nation’s aspirations and efforts for empire farther back in time. A generation of scholars has examined the significance of the 1848 war with Mexico, in the process uncovering a tangled dependence of continental and overseas imperialism – the interweaving of the foreign and domestic.³⁴ The shape of the empire imagined in the mercenary narratives that I examine has much in common with this entanglement, as well as the “commercial empire that would not involve the incorporation of vast territories or large populations” as described by Shelley Streeby in *American Sensations*.³⁵ During the first half of the nineteenth century, US mercenary force in the Ottoman world was primarily oriented toward securing commerce in the Mediterranean, first by challenging North African claims to Mediterranean shipping lanes and second by establishing equal commercial footing with European merchants in Ottoman ports. In the second half of the century, mercenary force established a significant management role for Americans from the United States in Egyptian imperialism in Africa. None of the mercenaries I examine imagined the planting of American colonies or the incorporation of distant territories or peoples into the United States; they simply wanted to increase American commerce and US influence in the Ottoman world. Efforts overseas were imagined to have benefits that accrued “at home.”

Scholars have also demonstrated that US imperialism does not simply operate through formal mechanisms of state, but through cultural forms as well. Jill Lepore, for instance, locates the dehumanizing language of US imperialism deep in Americans’ Puritan roots. Yet the wars with the Wampanoag, Mexico, and Spain are all clear manifestations of imperial desire expressed through violence – wars that were recognized as such at the time. The mercenary encounters that I describe are less formal, more loosely organized manifestations of US imperialism – the United States never went to war with the Ottoman Empire. Besides the war with Tripoli, which the United States treated as politically distinct from the

Ottoman Porte, none of my cases focus on wars in which the United States was engaged.³⁶ The American mercenaries who appear in Chapters 4 and 5 were directly and tangentially involved in armed conflict, but they were working for the Egyptian Government at the time.³⁷ This is not to say that violence is not a constant presence throughout the mercenary narratives that I examine. Even when no one is shouldering a rifle, people are being marginalized and hostile representations are being crafted. It is in this realm – representation – that mercenary force makes many of its contributions to the culture of US imperialism that Amy Kaplan has described in “Left Alone with America.”³⁸ In this essay, Kaplan argues that denial and absence are central to the narrative production of US imperialism. I argue that denial and absence – the United States was not really involved in the Ottoman world except for the presence of American missionaries – continue to obscure mercenary force and the origins of US imperialism in Africa and the Middle East.

Imperialism is often only associated with states or empires. But, building on the work of John Hobson and other theorists, scholars understand that modern imperialism is also connected to capital.³⁹ As Hannah Arendt explains, “the central political idea of imperialism” is that expansion should be the “a permanent and supreme aim of politics.”⁴⁰ But Arendt further notes that “imperialism is not empire building.” What Arendt means, in the context of the relation of capitalist elites to nation-states, is that imperialism overflows the bounds of the nation even as it draws the state into its endeavors.⁴¹ In some ways, it is this “overflowing” of empire that results in legal and cultural anxieties about mercenary figures who appear out of place. Yet, as Kaplan observes, imperialism and empire are not always distinct but rather “at work in varied configurations throughout the history of US imperialism.”⁴² Each of my five case studies, therefore, illuminates how certain kinds of labor in the service of imperialism and empire, to expand the influence of the United States or American capitalists, have been cast as mercenary – that is, falling outside the legal and cultural boundaries of the state – while also tracing out how mercenary narratives work to obscure the connections between capital and the state or, conversely, to recover certain racialized bodies and their labor in the service of nationalism.

Finally, while it is important to read along the grain to unsettle and reveal what has been said and unsaid about US mercenary force in the

Ottoman world, it is also important to read across disciplines and archives in order to challenge received orthodoxy. Lisa Lowe explains that this practice “unsettles the discretely bounded objects, methods, and temporal frameworks canonized by a national history invested in isolated origins and independent progressive development.”⁴³ Decentering the nation-state as the primary agent of history in American studies is of course important, and I am also keenly interested in challenging the typical periodization of US history, which is organized around the US Civil War. To take seriously the admonitions of global and transnational American studies means recognizing that US history crosses any of the borders that are set for it.⁴⁴ For many of the Americans who worked as mercenaries in Egypt during the 1870s, it was their service in the Ottoman world that defined them, not the four years they spent engaged in war with their countrymen; for them, it was not necessarily combat but professional work that constituted their most important contributions to the United States. Their service in Egypt is often more closely related to the service they provided in the years leading up to the Civil War – especially in western exploration and the war with Mexico – than it is to their labor in the sectional conflict that divided the nation for four years. For example, Charles Stone, whom I introduce in Chapter 5, was a successful officer before the US Civil War and again in Egypt. But he spent much of the Civil War trying to clear his name after being accused of negligence in 1861. Stone rarely finds his way into analyses of US history because his career straddles the great divide of the Civil War. Likewise, the war with Tripoli and the Greek Revolution are rarely seen as important lessons in US history; I argue that these wars are, in fact, foundational to the present spatial configuration of US imperialism.

CHAPTER 1

MEMORY AND EXCEPTIONALISM AT THE BATTLE OF DERNA, 1805

Wars have been defining episodes in American history. For more than 200 years, Americans have gone to war to win their independence, expand their national boundaries, define their freedoms, and defend their interests around the globe.

– Smithsonian Curatorial Staff, 2004¹

On July 4, 1950, three platoons of US Marines marched through the streets of the coastal town of Derna, Cyrenaica, and assembled on a hill just above the town. On the eve of Libyan independence, the Marines were in North Africa as a visual display of Western power, invited by the British colonial administrators of Cyrenaica to commemorate the Battle of Derna, an 1805 clash that concluded the short war between the United States and Tripoli, an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The next day, 8,000 miles away, US forces fought their first battle of the Korean War. In Derna to commemorate an old war in Africa rather than fight a new one in Asia, the Marines who marched through the old city demonstrate that Cold War exceptionalism – anticommunist imperialism – frequently depended on the Battle of Derna for its script. In fact, the war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna have a long trajectory as important lessons in US history, and both continue to be invoked to figure US exceptionalism.² The assault on and short occupation of Derna is said to hold particular significance

because it was the first time the US flag was raised over a territory outside of North America. But the Battle of Derna is also significant because the US victory depended almost entirely on the labor of North African Muslims, a fact that is often brushed aside. If these mercenaries are recalled at all, it is as a “motley crew” – or worse.³ In nearly every historiographic account produced for more than 200 years, these mercenaries have been set in deep contrast to William Eaton – “America’s Lawrence” – who organized and helped to lead the assault on Derna.

In this chapter I argue that the 1805 encounter at Derna – mercenary force obscured and maligned – has been remembered in the United States as a strategic precedent and justification for US interventions overseas; historical narratives of this encounter with the Ottoman world have also simultaneously reinforced the racial, gender, and sexual logics on which US empire depends by minimizing the labor performed by Muslim mercenaries on behalf of the United States. These mercenaries, who accounted for the great majority of the US-led force, are denied any productive role in the history of US empire. Here, I situate historical and cultural representations of the Battle of Derna as examples of what Marita Sturken and others have called *technologies of memory*, products that “embody and generate memory and that are implicated in the power dynamics of memory’s production.”⁴ In the case of Derna, these generative devices range from historiographical accounts and newspaper articles to documentary films and military-service journals. The power of these representations to shape attitudes and foreign policy is significant. As Sturken observes, “the way a nation remembers a war and constructs its history is directly related to how that nation further propagates war.”⁵ How historical and cultural producers remember Derna, then, shapes how the United States approaches Derna – and the whole of Libya – in the present. Indeed, the representations that I examine labored to sustain US imperialism in Libya and elsewhere at significant points in US history, performing, as Christina Klein has described, “a hegemonic function to the extent that they legitimate a given distribution of power, both within and beyond the borders of the nation.”⁶ This productive capacity of memory is possible, as Susan Sontag establishes, because what we call collective or national memory is actually an instructional device. Filtered through the variety of technologies of memory that this chapter examines, the Battle of Derna stipulates; it places demands on the present.⁷

This chapter begins with a summary of the 1801–05 war between Tripoli and the United States, including its causes and events. Following this summary, I examine a selection of texts representing the Battle of Derna from four distinct periods of historical and cultural memory. First, I locate memory of the Battle of Derna in poems and periodicals across the nineteenth century, invoked as a backdrop for political tension and the sectional crisis. Early commemorations of the Battle of Derna emphasized Eaton and focused on US military exceptionalism and manliness as their central lesson. Second, I probe representations of the Battle of Derna in historiographical texts and newspaper articles from the period from 1930 to 1945. Beginning in the 1930s with the expansion of Italian and German militarism in Europe, the Battle of Derna was remembered as a historic precedent for the exercise of US power overseas. Accounts of the battle helped to justify the United States' entry into World War II and provided a convenient script for the arrival of US forces in North Africa in 1942. Third, I analyze Cold War accounts of the battle, including films such as *Tripoli* (1950) and *The Naval Wars with France and Tripoli* (1953). After World War II, the Battle of Derna remained a useful device for sustaining a militarized posture; commemorations of it reflect US Cold War policy in North Africa. Finally, I conclude by investigating representations of the Battle of Derna in the wake of the Cold War and during the war on terror, including journalistic histories and novels that use the war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna as an origin story to explain the United States' historical experience in the Islamic world. These commemorations were particularly important in the formation of the US attitudes and approaches to the world that produced grave consequences for Muslims worldwide after 2001.

The War with Tripoli, 1801–05

In the United States, writers and historians generally refer to the war with Tripoli as the First Barbary War; the 1815 war with Algeria is labeled the Second Barbary War. This naming convention calls to mind the wars' geographical and chronological proximity; they fell only ten years apart, and both took place on the Mediterranean coast of Africa west of Egypt, known throughout the English-speaking world as the Barbary Coast since the seventeenth century. The Barbary, however, is

not merely a geographic signifier but rather an Orientalist trope with a life of its own, far away from the reality of everyday life in North Africa. This trope superseded a longer, more complicated history of European–North African relations in the early modern era and became enshrined in the historiography of the nineteenth century following the French occupation of Algiers in 1830.⁸ As Godfrey Fisher appraised in 1957, the Barbary became “a legend to satisfy the racial and religious prejudices, the chauvinism, conscious rectitude, and imperialistic impulse of the late nineteenth century.”⁹ It remains true in the United States, as Fisher observed of British historiography, that North Africans have “all too often been reduced to the role of defendants, who are offered no opportunity of replying to a variety of charges which are neither clearly defined nor supported by specific proof.”¹⁰ Rather than survey the long history of the “Barbary Coast” assemblage in the United States – or the well-established genre of “Barbary captivity narrative” – this chapter confines itself to representations of the war that began in 1801 and was recognized as such by both political polities who were involved in it, and to the Battle of Derna, a military operation that took place in 1805.¹¹

Lately, it has become fashionable in the United States – amid the intensified Islamophobia of the present historical moment – to characterize the war with Tripoli as a struggle against Islamic pirates rather than against a legitimate political foe.¹² However, the conflict with Tripoli, an Ottoman province under local dynastic rule, is better understood as a rejection by the United States of territorial claims made by a North African state beyond its coastline. Disputes over the extent of coastal waters remain common, and in the nineteenth century it was not unusual for kingdoms like Tripoli to authorize agents to act on their behalf in enforcing these claims.¹³ States unwilling to recognize Tripolitan claims subsequently label its representatives as pirates in order to deny them legal standing, casting them as subject to “violence, colonial occupation, and enlightened government,” as Amedeo Policante appraises.¹⁴ Few Anglophone scholars – Policante and Kōla Fōlayan are two exceptions worth noting – have been willing to recognize Tripolitan claims to Mediterranean shipping lanes or the country’s right to appoint agents to represent it.¹⁵ Yet what is not disputed, even in US scholarship, is that the United States agreed to a treaty with Tripoli in 1796 – to ensure the free passage of American-flagged commercial

vessels through Tripolitan shipping lanes – but then failed to meet the financial obligations of the treaty in spite of many demands sent through diplomatic channels by Tripoli’s ruler, Yusuf Qaramanli. Offended by the United States’ apparent willingness to pay tribute to Algiers, another Ottoman province, Qaramanli declared war on the United States in 1801.¹⁶

In the United States, there was widespread support for war with Tripoli. In 1800, a year before Tripoli declared war, the artist William Birch crafted *Preparation for War to Defend Commerce*, a hand-colored engraving showing the construction of the USS *Philadelphia* – ultimately captured by Tripoli in 1803 and then destroyed in Tripoli’s harbor in 1804 – to demonstrate the growing military capacities of the young republic.¹⁷ The same year, in a letter that circulated widely in newspapers, William Bainbridge, the captain of the USS *George Washington*, argued against the continued payment of tribute money by the United States as part of its North African treaties: “Did the




Figure 1.1 William Birch, *Preparation for War to Defend Commerce*. 1800. Library of Congress.

United States know the easy access of the barbarous coast called Barbary, the weakness of their garrisons, and the effeminacy of this people, I am sure they would not be long tributary to so pitiful a race of infidel.”¹⁸ Inflamed by militarist and anti-Islamic rhetoric and already in the possession of a small naval fleet built beginning in the 1790s, the Jefferson administration dispatched four frigates to the Mediterranean before even receiving word that Tripoli had declared war. Throughout 1803, Commodore Edward Preble attempted to maintain a blockade of Tripolitan ports and executed a campaign of raids and attacks against Tripolitan shipping.¹⁹ This strategy not only failed to force Tripoli to capitulate, but also resulted in the capture of the *Philadelphia* and its crew – including its new captain, William Bainbridge. As Folleyan observes, Tripoli was able to evade the blockade quite easily, growing both its economy and its navy during the war.²⁰

While the naval war was having limited success forcing Tripoli to capitulate, the Jefferson administration was considering new options – both to conclude the war and to ransom the crew of the *Philadelphia*, who were now being held as captives. William Eaton, former consul at Tunis, had recently returned to the United States convinced that the only way for the United States to ensure its commercial interests in the Mediterranean was to intervene unilaterally and overthrow the Tripolitan Government. He had been lobbying Secretary of State James Madison to this end for some time.²¹ Eaton justified this plan by claiming that Tripoli’s legitimate ruler, Ahmed Qaramanli, had been cruelly deposed by his brother. By helping to return Ahmed to the throne, the United States would be righting a wrong.²² The administration had enough faith in Eaton’s plan to appoint the former consul as navy agent to the North African regencies, sending him back to the Mediterranean along with Captain Samuel Barron, who was to take over command of the fleet from Preble.²³ The navy provided Barron with 20,000 dollars for expenses related to the ongoing operation against Tripoli and vague directions for helping Eaton to carry out his mission.²⁴

On the USS *Argus* in the Mediterranean, Eaton took command of a detachment of US Marines led by Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon. They traveled to Alexandria and then Cairo, where Eaton met with the Egyptian viceroy.²⁵ Ahmed Qaramanli had taken refuge in Egypt among the former rulers of the country, the Mamluks, who opposed the viceroy and the Ottoman sultan whom he represented. Once Eaton secured a

firman – a kind of executive order – from the viceroy assuring Qaramanli's safe passage out of Egypt, the party returned to Alexandria. On March 4, 1805, the two men signed a treaty stipulating the future relationship of the United States and the new Tripolitan Government.²⁶ At Alexandria, they also recruited a group of about 500 mercenaries, including Greeks, Arabs, Albanians, and Britons.²⁷ This US-led force marched 520 miles across the desert and, following a brief battle preceded by a naval bombardment, occupied and raised the US flag over the city of Derna. Meanwhile, Tobias Lear, consul general in Algiers since 1803, concluded a treaty with Yusuf. After seven weeks of occupation, US forces, including Ahmed, his inner circle, and a group of Greek mercenaries, were evacuated aboard a navy frigate. The remainder of the mercenary army was left behind.

Back in the United States, Eaton was well received, but he publicly condemned Lear's treaty – and thus Jefferson's policy. Further, he claimed he had not been properly reimbursed for the expenses occurred in his campaign to overthrow the Tripolitan Government.²⁸ Eaton may have felt Jefferson had treated him as a mercenary, but he was not the one abandoned, unpaid, in Derna. Though many embraced him, Eaton nevertheless rejected a future in party politics and shortly became embroiled in the Aaron Burr affair – he was among the first to whom Burr appealed for support in his attempt to seize Spanish territory in North America. Though Eaton was ultimately cleared of any role in the affair, at least one nineteenth-century scholar reports, "suspicions remained in the minds of some, that he had listened too favorably to the seductive propositions of Burr."²⁹ Eaton drank heavily after all this and died in 1811. Perhaps the greatest irony of war is that between 1796 and 1801 – the treaty years – Tripoli only captured one US ship, and its crew was quickly ransomed.³⁰ Besides the crew of the *Philadelphia*, who were waging war against Tripoli, no other Americans were taken captive. The war was now over, but it was far from a great victory.

The Nineteenth Century

REMEMBERING FOR EMPIRE

As Jill Lepore observes in the context of King Philip's War in colonial New England, the terms of memory are not fixed, but set by

memorialists who define what is to be remembered as well as setting the tone for how to remember.³¹ In the case of the war with Tripoli, Robert Allison reveals that Americans were already remembering the war as a display of manly republican virtues even as it was still taking place.³² Allison describes a review written by Washington Irving – the only surviving account – of the lost play *The Tripolitan Prize, or, American Tars on an English Shore* (1802). The play concludes with a naval battle between the United States and Tripoli fought in the English Channel; as the two sides fight, a crowd gathers to witness the battle. This scene – Americans demonstrating their power to the English – was an important plot element because the United States and Great Britain remained at odds in North America; just twelve years later British forces burned Washington to the ground. As Allison concludes, very early on Americans established a plotline for the war that would be repeated over and over: “the Americans beat the Tripolitans because the Americans were true blue; the American sailors were enterprising as well as courageous, intelligent as well as strong.”³³ The point of the play was that the militarized American body was superior to Tripoli, and strong enough to take on other opponents as well.

After 1805, the Battle of Derna was also likewise committed to memory, depending almost exclusively on Eaton’s description of the campaign, including some journal entries and a series of letters written for Commodores Preble and Barron and Captain Isaac Hull preserved in the William Eaton papers at the Huntington Library and in Volume IV, V, and VI of *Naval documents related to the United States wars with the Barbary powers* (United States Government Printing Office, 1942 and 1944).³⁴ Though he probably never saw *The Tripolitan Prize* – he was in the Mediterranean from 1798 to 1803 – Eaton drew heavily from the same exceptionalist narrative of national identity that animated Irving’s play in his own correspondence and writing.³⁵ The preservation and repeated use of Eaton’s letters and journal entries to account for the events on the road from Alexandria to Derna in 1805 has ensured that Eaton’s perspective remains the dominant version of events: fierce, pro-US, and manly. Derna may not be the origin point of US exceptionalism, but it has remained an important national lesson – more important, perhaps, than the war itself. The regular exhumation of Eaton’s body is nothing if not a national ritual, performed whenever US exceptionalism is challenged.

Across the nineteenth century, Eaton figured prominently in national memory. Even before he died, his biography – and the mercenary encounter at Derna – were widely known. For example, in 1807 the literary journal *The Polyanthos* published “Sketch of the Life of General William Eaton,” detailing Eaton’s role in US policy during the war with Tripoli and the aftermath of the Battle of Derna.³⁶ After Eaton’s death in 1811, the Harvard-educated newspaper editor Charles Prentiss – a Federalist – was among the first to curate Eaton’s legacy. Prentiss anonymously compiled Eaton’s letters as well as some brief commentary in *The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton* (1813), and acknowledged that “some things are perhaps omitted which many would deem of more importance than others which are inserted.” But, he concluded, “to please all was an impracticable task.”³⁷ Not everything Eaton said was included. Still, it was Eaton speaking. Prentiss also helped to establish the tone for remembering the Battle of Derna, as he somberly concluded his compilation with an 1808 ode by prominent Bostonian Robert Treat Paine and an 1812 poem by the Unitarian John Pierpont. Both Paine and Pierpont praised Eaton, but neither writer credited the mercenary army for the victory at Derna. Likewise, in this early stage of remembering, neither Paine nor Pierpont gave the US Marines or Christian Greeks any special role in the battle.³⁸ Eaton, apparently, was the only person who mattered.

In 1838, Eaton was once more revived and given an extended treatment in Cornelius Felton’s *The Life of William Eaton*.³⁹ Felton dedicated thirty-five pages of the biography to essentially rewording Eaton’s own account of recruiting a mercenary army, marching across the desert, and capturing and occupying Derna. Felton’s text is one volume in the “Library of American Biography series,” edited by Jared Sparks. Felton and Sparks were both prominent scholars who eventually served as presidents of Harvard. Their role in ensuring that Eaton was remembered as a significant figure in US history should not be underestimated. Eaton, however, was not the only element of the Battle of Derna being remembered during the nineteenth century. Derna – or an Orientalist rendering of it – was also a significant element produced by memorialization.

The production of Derna as a site of memory in the United States – one setting from the larger assemblage of the “Barbary Wars” – is most obvious in one of the nineteenth century’s most popular memorializations

of the battle, the poem “Derne.” Written in 1850 by John Greenleaf Whittier, a Massachusetts Quaker poet and editor of the abolitionist newspaper *The National Era*, the eight-stanza poem includes a preface in which Whittier explains the origin of his verses:

The storming of the city of Derne, in 1805, by General Eaton, at the head of nine Americans, forty Greeks, and a motley array of Turks and Arabs, was one of those feats of hardihood and daring which have in all ages attracted the admiration of the multitude. The higher and holier heroism of Christian self-denial and sacrifice, in the humble walks of private duty, is seldom so well appreciated.⁴⁰

The poem, however, is not simply about Eaton or the Battle of Derna. Whittier invoked Christian heroism in a context that would be very familiar to his US audience in 1850 – slavery. Whittier’s poem celebrates the release of the crew of the *Philadelphia* from captivity in order to highlight abolitionists’ desire to free a different group of captives: enslaved Africans in the United States. Whittier’s comparison of Barbary captivity to chattel slavery in the United States was a common abolitionist tactic and subject to significant criticism.⁴¹ Nevertheless, Whittier’s take on captivity and slavery, as well as the poem’s Orientalist geography, are worth a closer look.

As Edward Said observes, Orientalist writers “restructured the Orient by their art and made its colors, lights, and people visible through their images, rhythms, and motifs.”⁴² In the case of Derna, Whittier’s poem structures Derna as a penetrable, racialized space. The poem’s first verse establishes its exotic setting:

1. NIGHT on the city of the Moor!
 On mosque and tomb, and white-walled shore,
 On sea-waves, to whose ceaseless knock
 The narrow harbor-gates unlock,
 On corsair’s galley, carack tall,
 And plundered Christian caraval!
 The sounds of Moslem life are still;
 No mule-bell tinkles down the hill;
 Stretched in the broad court of the khan,
 The dusty Bornou caravan

Lies heaped in slumber, beast and man;
 The Sheik is dreaming in his tent,
 His noisy Arab tongue o'erspent;
 The kiosk's glimmering lights are gone,
 The merchant with his wares withdrawn;
 Rough pillowed on some pirate breast,
 The dancing-girl has sunk to rest;
 And, save where measured footsteps fall
 Along the Bashaw's guarded wall,
 Or where, like some bad dream, the Jew
 Creeps stealthily his quarter through,
 Or counts with fear his golden heaps,
 The City of the Corsair sleeps!

This description of Derna, occupied by Sheiks, merchants, dancing girls, pirates, and Jews, was already legible to Americans in 1850 thanks to the continuing popularity of stories and novels with settings on the Barbary Coast, including Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) and Alexandre Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo* (1845).

The essentially foreign – above all else, *Oriental* – space of Derna established, Whittier describes what is out of place in this scene: enslaved Christians from the United States. To do so, he collapses North African geography and relocates the captive sailors from the city of Tripoli to Derna, which will soon be liberated:

2. But where yon prison long and low
 Stands black against the pale star-glow,
 Chafed by the ceaseless wash of waves,
 There watch and pine the Christian slaves;
 Rough-bearded men, whose far-off wives
 Wear out with grief their lonely lives;
 And youth, still flashing from his eyes
 The clear blue of New England skies,
 A treasured lock of whose soft hair
 Now wakes some sorrowing mother's prayer;
 Or, worn upon some maiden breast,
 Stirs with the loving heart's unrest.

Whittier makes no distinction between these captives – the US sailors whose absence is written on the bodies of women in the United States – and chattel slaves in the United States. Each group is simply enslaved. By dissolving the historical and legal particularities of each case – the US sailors as prisoners of war, held by a legitimate sovereign, and the ownership of enslaved Africans and their future offspring in a system at the very heart of the Atlantic world and US history – Whittier succeeded in generating sympathy for the abolitionist cause.

In spite of its good intentions, Whittier's poem others North African Muslims and situates their abjection as central to US exceptionalism; the Orientalist tropes in which Whittier traffics assume the supremacy of US manhood in the East. Whittier's portrayal of violence against North African Muslims in subsequent stanzas – "Vain, Moslem, vain thy lifeblood poured / So freely on thy foeman's sword!" – and the poem's promise of that violence as a solution to conflict, is a distinct example of American Orientalism. As it had been for Francis Scott Key early in the nineteenth century when he wrote a song celebrating the naval bombardment of an unnamed Tripolitan city – which "stain'd the blue waters with infidel blood" and become the basis for the national anthem nine years later – in Whittier the Oriental city remained a racialized site open to the penetration of masculinized violence; nationalist fantasies could be acted out on the historic stage of the war.⁴³ The Battle of Derna was figured as one of the nation's earliest post-revolution wars – and fought for a right cause, to free enslaved Christians – from which the country could draw the inspiration to end its own system of enslavement. And surely the comparison of North African rulers to American slave holders, as well as the threat of war as a liberatory device when negotiation fails, caused some readers to bristle.

Though he acknowledges the "motley array of Turks and Arabs" in his introduction, like nearly all US chroniclers of the Battle of Derna Whittier focuses on the abjection of Islam and valorization of Christian labor, keeping alive the myth of the United States as a nation constructed by the labor of Christians. Contrary to his positioning of the poem as the recounting of an expedition against Barbary captivity, the feat of "hardihood and daring" Whittier describes was above all an act of war meant to force the ruler of Tripoli to relinquish his claims over Mediterranean shipping lanes. By ignoring why the crew of the

Philadelphia was in the Mediterranean to begin with, Whittier presented war as humanitarianism just a decade before the US Civil War.

On the eve of Abraham Lincoln's presidential election in 1860, former New York Secretary of State Joel Headley published his own account Eaton's mission in a sixteen-page article in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. In it, Headley uses strong language to condemn US "intermeddling with the internal affairs of other states," while at the same time using the war to paint a picture of a strong national culture. He claims that the war with Tripoli accomplished very little, yet the Battle of Derna was worth recognizing because

for energy, high courage, indomitable resolution, as well as the scenery amidst which it was carried out, and the characters that formed it, it [Eaton's mission] stands alone among the marvelous adventures and expeditions with which the American annals are crowded.

Headley claims the events leading up to the Battle of Derna had never been fully detailed and places Eaton at the center of his attempt to remedy this oversight, emphasizing Eaton's racial superiority. He describes how "Eaton led an army of wild Arabs over an untrodden desert, and through barbaric tribes that had never before seen the face of a white man." Headley praised Eaton for his manly style of diplomacy, saying he "was of the Jackson type, scorning all diplomacy except the simple truth." Headley demonstrates Eaton's manliness by recounting how the former consul, like a true man of his time, whipped his French advisor in public and kicked a Jew down a set of stairs.⁴⁴ In addition to praising Eaton's manliness, Headley also focuses more heavily than previous writers on the trope of uncooperative Muslim mercenaries, who wanted to turn back, and the cooperative Christian Greeks, who stood side by side with Eaton and the Marines. This historiographical move could be read as an appeal to reluctant northerners to support the cause of abolition.⁴⁵

A caveat now: Why might the mercenaries in question have been uncooperative? First, not all of them were. Only a few members of the army threatened to abandon the expedition, and even then, most of the problems centered on pay and rations. In the end, of course, the bulk of these mercenaries that Eaton and Ahmed recruited went unpaid and

were abandoned in Derna, hundreds of miles from Alexandria. But rather than recognize the disputes over free labor and wages involved in the march, Headley chose to make these disputes racial and religious in nature. The mercenaries – except for the Greeks – are a “half savage, wild, and lawless crowd.” The Arabs are “picturesque, yet fierce looking riders” and “wandering savages” who have circled around a “compact little knot of Americans,” who are clearly “disciplined troops.” The “ample turbans, loose flowing robes, and disorderly movements” of the North Africans contrast with the “close-fitting uniforms and exact military movements” of the US Marines, leading Headley to conclude that the scene was “a perfect illustration of the different characters of the two races.”⁴⁶ These two races are marked by extreme difference, and this difference is embodied and militarized.

Headley claims that the United States succeeded because “Eaton was dogged and savage” and the Americans showed no patience for the “treachery, falsehood, and childish peevishness of their allies.” Describing one of the tenser disputes during the march, Headley writes:

The swarthy, wild-clad masses seemed able, by mere force of numbers, to crush Eaton and his few companions to the earth; but awed by the moral power of that handful of fearless, self-collected men, they paused and hesitated to advance further. For half an hour Eaton and his group of officers on one side, and that host of untamed barbarians on the other stood looking at each other without saying a word. It was a thrilling spectacle to see the Moslem and Christian thus standing breast to breast, and witness the silent, motionless struggle between civilization, backed by a handful of men, and barbarism, with a host to give it countenance.⁴⁷

Finally, and despite all these challenges to their manhood, the Americans arrived in Derna and “by four o’clock the battle was over, and the strange spectacle was witnessed of the American flag floating over a foreign fortress and a fortified city.” Headley adds that “time has not diminished the novelty of that event, and at this day it stands alone and unique in our history.”⁴⁸ His efforts to situate the Battle of Derna as the site of encounter between civilization and barbarism functions as a lesson in the need to be savage in dealing with savage races, exemplifying a particular

approach to colonialism and imperialism that stretches across European colonial history in the Americas, from Columbus's first encounter with the natives of the Caribbean to Benjamin Church's destruction of a Narragansett settlement and relentless pursuit of Wampanoag leader King Philip through New England swamps in 1676.⁴⁹

Headley's historical narrative ends with Lear betraying the interests of the United States in order to best Eaton, and Eaton breaking down, crying "*My God, what shall I do with the poor fellows who have followed my fortunes through the desert!*"⁵⁰ The government's failure to reimburse Eaton subsequently cuts short his life. Headley concludes that "men of such executive force and indomitable resolution are not so plentiful that they can be sacrificed to meanness and incapacity."⁵¹ There can be little doubt that Headley's article, published in one of the nineteenth century's most popular periodicals, was widely read. Indeed, after the Civil War ended, memorializations of Eaton and Derna continued unabated. For example, in 1871, Richard Hildreth's magisterial *The History of the United States of America* devoted six pages to an account of the attack on Derna by Eaton and his "motley forces."⁵² Yet many writers continued to fret that Eaton and Derna were being forgotten.

Edward Shippen's 1881 account of the Battle of Derna, published in *United Service: A Quarterly Review of Military and Naval Affairs*, styled Eaton a "forgotten general."⁵³ Like Whittier, Shippen deployed Orientalist tropes to describe Derna and establish the setting for the Eaton's heroics. "The streets of the town, which contains some good houses, are, like those of most places in Barbary, narrow, irregular, and filled with the filth and rubbish which seems indispensable to Arab comfort and happiness." The anachronism of Orientalism is further evident in Shippen's description. "So little do such towns change, that the traveler of to-day looks upon much the same scene as was presented to Eaton's eyes when he looked down upon the little city in the spring of 1805."⁵⁴ Shippen also commented on the mercenary army. "The ill-assorted *personnel* of the expedition appears to have caused difficulty from the very first, as might reasonably be supposed." No doubt Shippen, a professional soldier, was commenting on the perceived loyalty of mercenaries. And his claim that half the Christians threatened to mutiny is unique among all the accounts of the war that have been published.⁵⁵ Otherwise, Shippen followed convention, drawing extensively on existing accounts, even opening and closing his article with excerpts from Pierpont and Paine, just as Felton had in 1838. Fourteen

years after it was first published, *United Service* republished Shippen's article with no changes or additions, testifying to the popularity of repeatedly remembering the Battle of Derna with little or no critical reappraisal.⁵⁶ Still, a year after the original publication of Shippen's account, Charles Todd falsely stated in *Lippincot's Magazine* that the only history of Derna that had been written was a one-page account in Hildreth's *History of the United States of America*.⁵⁷ To authorize his history of Eaton and Derna, Todd claimed that "chance recently threw in the writer's way an old, time-stained copy of the journal kept by Eaton during this expedition." This was almost certainly the 1813 Prentiss compilation. Shippen went on to quote liberally from the journal and the other papers that were included with it, adding nothing.

For at least one member of the generation that fought in the US Civil War, the "forgotten Eaton" was a useful device for figuring the author's own relationship to US exceptionalism and militarism. In 1887, Charles Chaillé-Long – a Union Army veteran who subsequently worked as a mercenary in Egypt in the 1870s⁵⁸ – invoked Derna as a way of protesting his own treatment by the government, which he believed had overlooked his Egyptian service. Writing in "The American Soldier Abroad," published in *Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly*, Long used Eaton as one example of "indifference which has now grown into policy." Long hoped for a time "not far distant when the Government shall awaken to a better appreciation of its obligations and its duties to the citizen who has done the state a service."⁵⁹ Long, who was bitter because he believed that he had been denied government employment because of petty jealousies, concluded that Eaton's faith in the US Government was "misplaced." The government, Long said, had "turned him [Eaton] adrift to die of mortification and chagrin." Eaton, whom Long compared favorably to the filibuster William Walker, "added lustre to the American name."⁶⁰ Yet, Long complained,

such as these, in Europe, are accounted heroes, to whom pæans are sung and monuments constructed, to the end that a spirit of patriotism and national pride may be engendered and encouraged. In America, alas! The State owes them nothing, and, save a favored few, does not deign even the poor tribute of a monument upon which might be written: *Aux grands hommes la national reconnaissance*.⁶¹

But Eaton had not been forgotten, as Long claimed. While he may have been looked upon as an annoyance by some in the government, Eaton was well-remembered in formations of national memory before and after the Civil War. Likewise, over the course of the nineteenth century, the Battle of Derna was consistently remembered as a demonstration of US exceptionalism; American men – especially soldiers – were superior to others, the United States had humbled an Oriental despot, and the Mediterranean was a natural receptacle for US power.

The Twentieth Century

WORLD WAR II

The rhetoric of US exceptionalism continued to structure commemorations of the Battle of Derna in the twentieth century. In the *New England Journal* in 1928, John Hunter Sedgwick justified nineteenth-century US aggression against Tunis, Tripoli, and Algeria by describing them as “three bullies, who when a child passed with a little candy, pounced on it.” Sedgwick was equally unkind to the mercenaries who assisted the United States, describing them as “children of the desert” in contrast to William Eaton, who possessed a “New England conscience.”⁶² Remembering Derna would shortly take on additional meaning beyond simply valorizing Eaton and dismissing the sovereignty and labor of North African Muslims. Beginning in the 1930s, the United States identified a new trio of bullies: Germany, Japan, and Italy. In the years leading up to World War II, Americans recalled the Battle of Derna in order to draw the United States into conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe. In this section, I outline a series of historiographical debates and newspaper reports that situated the Battle of Derna as the first US intervention in what would become known to Americans in the coming decades as the “Middle East.”

In 1932, Francis Rennell Rodd, an English soldier, diplomat, and future president of the Royal Geographical Society, published *General William Eaton; the Failure of an Idea*. Rodd’s account of Eaton’s role in US Mediterranean policy between 1795 and 1805 drew on existent primary and secondary literature and was unremarkable in all but one way: with the British Empire and the colonial order threatened, Rodd desired Anglo-American unity to counter Japanese and German expansion in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere.⁶³ Rodd explained that he chose Eaton

(and therefore Derna), rather than the larger war, as the focus of his book because Eaton's role "in the Mediterranean policy of the years 1795–1805 has not been properly recognized even in America."⁶⁴ Rodd deployed language strikingly similar to that of Joseph Conrad in *Heart of Darkness* in order to connect Eaton's mission to Western imperialism in general. "Eaton was the figure that really mattered because he had an idea. It was a great and ambitious idea, but it failed."⁶⁵ As with Kurtz in the Congo, the idea alone redeemed Eaton's adventures in Tripoli. Eaton's idea, of course, was the invasion and occupation of Tripoli and the installation of a puppet government under US influence. Rodd followed earlier writers who blamed the failure of this intervention on US officials' refusal to act in good faith to satisfy Eaton's plan and install Ahmed Qaramanli as the head of state in Tripoli. Rodd appears to have believed that the contemporary United States suffered from a similar weakness: too much committed to diplomacy, too little committed to war. In his review of Rodd's book in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London*, the eminent Orientalist A.S. Tritton echoed this point: "Eaton had a policy; one can hardly say as much for the American Government and its commanders in the Mediterranean."⁶⁶ The British desire for a strong US role in 1930s geopolitics would shortly become less veiled and more urgent as German and Italian military capabilities expanded, posing a threat to the United Kingdom.

In the United States, some authors resisted using Tripoli as an example of why intervention in foreign affairs was sometimes beneficial. The British penchant for sustained occupations, born from a long period of colonialism, appeared misguided to American reviewer Charles Lee Lewis, a historian at the United States Naval Academy, who argued that Rodd's nationality made him incapable of understanding the United States' disinterest in empire. Lewis drew a different lesson from the war with Tripoli:

One might take issue with the author's statement . . . as follows: "If Preble had continued in command, the dream of a Barbary prince under American control: a Protectorate perhaps: a sphere of influence certainly: might have come true – and with these, a great career for Eaton." This is the interpretation to be expected from an Englishman; but in Eaton's case, not the slightest evidence is produced by the author [to] prove that Eaton's "great idea" was

anything other than a plan for hastening the close of the war with Tripoli with honorable terms of peace for his country.⁶⁷

Lewis's conclusion that the Battle of Derna was not about US empire relies on a reading of history in which Eaton only wished to provoke a diplomatic solution to the conflict with Tripoli, rather than establish a strong presence in the region. This reading is not supported by documentary evidence of the war and depends on the denial of empire that often flows out of the rhetoric of US exceptionalism. Eaton certainly desired a US-friendly regime in Tripoli, and the Jefferson administration was willing to go to some lengths to make that happen. By continuing to position the war with Tripoli as one of self-defense against an abject aggressor violating US rights on the high seas rather than a US-led invasion of a sovereign territory, American commentators were able to disavow the nation's imperial tendencies and preach isolationism. Exceptionalist narratives of the war, however, could just as easily be flipped to justify geopolitical intervention.

In Europe, North Africa, and elsewhere, war continued to smolder, burning through the fantasy of isolationism in the United States. By 1936, the Battle of Derna had been retooled as the preeminent guide for the upcoming war against Italy and Germany in North Africa and the struggle for global hegemony that would follow. A May 10 feature on the making of America in the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* detailed the events leading up to the 1805 battle.⁶⁸ "Stars and Stripes to Victory in North Africa" described the successful capture of the city by US forces, introducing readers unacquainted with the Tripolitan War to the Barbary Coast of North Africa, a morally suspect stretch of coast dominated by piracy and slavery. The article repeated the standard account of the battle, focusing on Eaton's march across the desert and the heroics of the few Americans who fought in the battle, while ignoring the significant role of the mercenaries who accompanied the expedition. The *Tribune* also juxtaposed its account of the Battle of Derna with Whittier's "Derne" – Rodd had similarly concluded his book with the poem in 1932 – reinforcing for readers that theirs was not the first generation to draw powerful lessons from the war.

In just six years, the United States would find itself once again engaged in a war in North Africa. In the lead-up to and in the midst of this large military campaign, many Americans embraced the war with

Tripoli as a historical precedent for US intervention and brushed aside the fact that most of the soldiers fighting in the Battle of Derna on the side of the United States were not Americans. The labor of Muslims from across the Ottoman world was displaced in favor of the well-recognized trope of US exceptionalism and heroic white masculinity. Congress recognized the significance of this ascendant narrative as early as 1934, when it authorized the creation of an archive of documents related to the war with Tripoli. In 1939, the Government Printing Office published the first of six volumes of *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. The final volume was released in 1944, at the height of the war in Europe.⁶⁹

In 1941, the *Los Angeles Times* compared the British campaign against Italy in North Africa to the US war with Tripoli.⁷⁰ And in October 1942 – just one month before Operation Torch landed US troops in North Africa – *Scientific American* published an account of the 1805 “attempt to clean out this nest of pirates and slavers” in which Thomas La Fargue announced that the current war had “focused its great searchlight upon the North African shores of the Mediterranean,” where William Eaton once led “a motley army of Americans, Italians, Greeks and Arabs.”⁷¹ In the days following Operation Torch, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* both used Derna as a historic reference point for Americans seeking to understand events in North Africa.⁷² And a year later – as the United States fought in Tunisia – the *Los Angeles Times* described William Eaton as a man with a “MacArthur flair,” in deep contrast to the mercenaries, who were a “polyglot band of rabble.” Author Victor Boesen encouraged Americans to accept no less than “total victory” this time, claiming that the Battle of Derna had not been entirely successful because Americans had to return later to finish the job.⁷³ Of course, this is not true – the second “Barbary War” involved Algeria, no actual combat, and a very different set of geopolitical circumstances.

Like the war with Tripoli, the war in Europe, Africa, and Asia ended. What followed was a new set of circumstances for remembering Derna. In Julia Macleod and Louis Wright’s *The First Americans in North Africa; William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805*, published shortly before hostilities in Europe ceased, the storyline of Derna remained much the same as it had for more than 100 years: “the first adventure of American forces on North African soil

occurred in 1805,” against “the corsairs who from time immemorial had preyed on Mediterranean commerce and exacted tribute from all nations.”⁷⁴ Here, “time immemorial” designates the anachronistic space of North Africa, which the United States finally mastered – before Europe – because of the exceptional character of the nation.⁷⁵ Reviews of *The First Americans in North Africa* were mixed.⁷⁶ An anonymous reviewer in the *Pacific Historical Review* complained, “there are notes, but the authors apparently do not think much of them. They are economical in character, and, doubtless with a view to preserving unsullied the book’s popular tone, they are concealed in the back pages and denied even the dignity of keying by call numbers.”⁷⁷ But reviewers in *Military Affairs*, the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, and the *American Historical Review* all recognized the book’s contemporary relevance, which could not escape anyone familiar with the quick realignment of colonial power in postwar Africa and the Middle East.⁷⁸ While the Battle of Derna had been relevant in the lead-up to World War II because it was a precedent for US overseas intervention, after World War II Derna became useful in figuring the Cold War because it could be used to demonstrate the disinterest of the United States in colonialism – one more exceptionalist myth.

THE COLD WAR

Derna was relevant to World War II because it was a precedent for US geopolitical engagement, which Woodrow Wilson and others had rejected following World War I. After 1945, Derna became useful in figuring the Cold War. The assault and short occupation of the coastal town was easily cast as an example of US exceptionalism; because US forces only occupied the city for a short time, there was no lingering colonial presence at Derna. This historical narrative was especially useful for disavowing US imperialism in the context of repeated US interventions around the world during the Cold War. The commemorative ceremony that I described at the beginning of this chapter helps begin to illustrate the uses of Derna during the Cold War.

Following World War II, it briefly seemed possible that the United States might reduce its military capabilities. Total active-duty military personnel declined, and the number of US bases outside the United States dropped from nearly 2,000 in 1945 to just over 1,000 in 1947. By 1949, the number had dropped to less than 600. But after 1950,

the trend reversed and the number of US bases overseas began to rise. By 1953 the United States was operating 815 bases abroad, a number that would rise to over 1,000 by 1967.⁷⁹ At the same time that it professed its devotion to peace, the United States chose to expand its military capabilities, which it justified by claiming that militarization was necessary in order to protect capitalism from the global threat posed by communism and Third World revolutionary movements; democracy could only be protected if the United States was the strongest kid on the block.⁸⁰ After 1945, the United States undertook a strategy for global domination that had been outlined in the prewar years, beginning with short-term occupations of former Axis nations, accompanied by capitalist development programs administered by a host of new global financial instruments.⁸¹ At the same time, the United States continued to spend lavishly on military technologies at home, including weapons systems, education, and bureaucracy.⁸² Ultimately, and in spite of the economic approaches taken elsewhere, US engagement with Libya was primarily military. This decision to approach a key site in the Arab world with the sword rather than the dollar produced troubling results.

In 1950, Libya, the nation the *New York Times* would shortly label the world's poorest, did not yet exist.⁸³ Libyan unification came after a long period of fiercely resisted occupation, beginning when Italy invaded the former Ottoman province in 1911. In *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, Ruth First describes the thirty-two-year Italian occupation as "the most severe occupation experienced by an Arab country in modern times."⁸⁴ After Italy and Germany lost North Africa due to the war, what materialized were three provinces: Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, administered by the British, and Fezzan, administered by the French. But across Africa, continued colonial rule was challenged by independence movements. The will of the General Assembly of the United Nations was also against colonialism. In spite of independence, as Matthew Connelly points out, the Maghreb "region's location ensured that it was always a factor in European defense planning."⁸⁵ Libya was one of the first nations to establish independence; yet, of European and NATO schemes to continue exercising power after decolonization, Connelly concludes, Libya "was also the first of many to pass under more informal methods of imperial management that had been revived from an earlier era to suit anticolonial sensibilities."⁸⁶ As the United Kingdom and France began

to shift their imperial strategy from direct rule to embedded liberalism, a form of domination based on economic rather than military instruments, the British adviser to the Cyrenaican Ministry of the Interior thought that staging a commemorative ceremony at Derna would be a good way to draw US attention to the region and demonstrate the ongoing interest of the Western powers in the region.⁸⁷

Following the end of World War II, then, North Africa was important not just because of its significance to the American past but also because it was significant to the American future, with the decline of British power and the inauguration of the Cold War. The Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and Middle Eastern oil were all imagined as threatened resources which needed protection from falling into the “wrong hands” – those of the Soviet Union, but also socialist and nationalist movements across the Third World. Thus the United States had significant interests in North Africa, but preferred the British and French to handle day-to-day administration and policing in the region. Paul Zingg quotes Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Allen, who identified the “the so-called colonial powers” in Africa as allies in the global struggle against communism.⁸⁸ And, as Connelly observes, the United States “alternated between exploiting [the Maghreb] as both a fallback position and platform for airpower to merely denying it to the Soviets.”⁸⁹ In the charged atmosphere of the Cold War and facing down decolonization movements across the world, the Marines’ march through Derna in 1950 demonstrated that the United States had clearly assumed a leading military role in the postcolonial world.

Half-a-world away from Korea on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, the United States had no intention of occupying Libya, but did want to remain influential with the new country’s government. It was in this context – and under the pretense of commemoration – that US Marines once more arrived in Derna. The official British description of this ceremony, useful because it provides a unique perspective on the demonstration of US power, comes to us secondhand in a dispatch to the British Foreign Office from E.A.V. de Candole, the British Resident in Benghazi, who regretted he had not arrived in Cyrenaica in time to witness the ceremony himself.⁹⁰ Candole provided an account of the 1805 battle that made it seem more heroic and the occupation longer-lived than they actually were; he claimed that in 1805 the Americans had captured Derna from pirates who used the city as a base, and that

following an agreement with Ahmed Qaramanli the American occupation force had remained in control for several years. He was either unaware of or chose not to mention the mercenary army that helped effect this occupation.

As Erika Doss notes, memorials are “presentist in their aims and ambitions,” and in spite of missing the ceremony and being unclear about the details of the battle and occupation in 1805, Candole was very aware of the contemporary politics of the site of the commemoration.⁹¹ Of this present state of affairs, Candole reported that the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enthusiastically received British advances to come to Cyrenaica to commemorate the capture of the city. Candole goes so far as to speculate that Sherman wanted a “shrine” in the Mediterranean for the Marine Corps. In the context of Cold War militarization, in which Sherman and his contemporaries were deeply invested, shrines, memorials, and commemorations were all important technologies of memory used to recall the past but also to shape the future.

The ceremony at Derna is one example of the forward-looking nature of memorialization. As Doss writes, “at the most basic level, memorials are designed to recognize and preserve memories. They are typically understood as acts and gifts that honor particular people and historical events.” Yet memorials also produce expectations for the future. “Memorials, like most things in capitalist and commercial economies, are informed by systems of production and reception, by expectations of change and reciprocity.”⁹² In Derna, the British invitation to the United States was meant to ensure continued Western influence in the region.⁹³ Indeed, in December 1950, less than six months after the US show of force, Sayyid Muhammad Idris, Emir of Cyrenaica since 1916 and a strong ally of the Western powers, was elected King of Libya by the National Constituent Assembly of Libya.⁹⁴ Thirteen months later, Cyrenaica joined with Tripolitania and Fezzan and they declared themselves free from British and French colonial rule as the United Kingdom of Libya. But, as First appraises, “Libya had political sovereignty but little else beside.”⁹⁵ Libya, despite its independence, remained wedded to the Western powers.

At Derna, the ceremony that helped to secure a Libya friendly to the United States depended on many layers of colonial and imperial power. De Candole describes the setting as “a small, circular bastion on a

convenient hill close to but separate from a square wall alleged to be a fort (due to become a reservoir) [that] was rapidly cleared of rubbish with the active assistance of the Acting Commandant of Police." Once the site was prepared, the Marines, led by the Cyrenaican police bagpipe band playing Scottish reels, marched through the city and assembled at the hilltop site. Orray Taft, the US consul in Tripoli, and Muhammad Sakizli, the Cyrenaican prime minister, gave speeches. Sakizli, who went on to become prime minister of all of Libya, expressed his desire that "so long as Great Britain and the United States together continued to take a close interest in the Mediterranean and to keep forces there, the peoples of its shores could hope to live in safety and peace."⁹⁶ Commemorating the fort, then, was a means of securing Libya's place in the future interests of the United States and Great Britain. But exactly what kind of "ancient American fort" stood at the site of this memorial ceremony, standing in now for the foundation of US power in the region?

Over the years, many commentators have claimed that during the occupation of Derna a new American fort was built above the city on the ruins of an older fort. But Eaton's own account from 1805 – the only firsthand account that we have – contradicts these claims.⁹⁷ The fort to which Candole alluded (which was not where the ceremony actually took place) was a battery of eight guns in Derna nearest the sea where the local governor lived.⁹⁸ In a letter to Commodore Barron, Eaton described the capture of this battery:

Mr. O'Bannon, accompanied by Mr. Mann of Annapolis, urged forward with his marines, Greeks, and such of the cannoniers as were not necessary to the management of the field piece; passed through a shower of musketry from the walls of the houses; took possession of the battery; planted the American flag upon its ramparts, and turned its guns upon the enemy; who, being now driven from their out posts, fired only from their houses, from which they were soon dislodged by the whole fire of the vessels.⁹⁹

Following the capture of the city, Eaton wrote, "I have fixed my post in the battery; raised parapets and mounted guns toward the country to be prepared against all events; though I have no serious apprehension of a counter revolution."¹⁰⁰ The "American fort," then, was the headquarters of the US occupation force in Libya, long before the Italians arrived in

1911. And it was from this American fort that Eaton and the Marines withdrew just two months after they arrived – not two years, as Candole claimed – leaving behind the mercenaries they had recruited to help them affect regime change. Along with the town's population, these mercenaries were subject to the foul shift of winds that follows failed occupations.¹⁰¹

Even before the United States appeared in British-administered Cyrenaica in 1950 to commemorate its invasion and occupation, the British preserved the memory of the American fort in the geographic archive of imperialism. UK Hydrographic Office admiralty charts, nautical charts for sea navigation, labeled a field of ruins above Derna as the ruins of an American fort well into the twentieth century.¹⁰² Yet in many ways, both the placement of a commemorative plaque at Derna in 1950 and the presence of the American fort on admiralty charts were old technologies, having more in common with the poems and anthems of the past than with the technologies of memory available to cultural producers in the 1950s. Admiralty charts reached a narrow audience, to be sure. And because it took place far away and out of sight of most Americans, the influence of the commemorative ceremony at Derna – which did nothing to commemorate the role of the mercenaries who helped secure the fort for the United States – on attitudes in the United States during the Cold War was likely negligible. Instead, the ceremony is evidence that US planners were hopeful that by drawing a historic link between 1805 and 1950 they would demonstrate to potential allies that the US vision of geopolitical power was not colonial in nature. The ceremony at Derna was intended for skeptical (or hostile) future Libyans, and registered in a tone many Americans would not have understood. Yet while I agree with historians like Zingg, who says that in the 1950s North Africa was “shrouded in exotic mystery to most Americans,” I do not agree that Americans “only knew of the area as the place either where the United States launched its first offensive of World War II or which served as the setting for a Humphrey Bogart film.”¹⁰³

Americans were probably just as aware of North Africa, or at least Derna, as they had always been. That first offensive of World War II, as I have shown, was contextualized across media by the memory of the 1805 offensive. Furthermore, Derna did not disappear from media in the United States after the war. In November 1950, for example, the

New York Times illustrated the history of the United States with a collection of images of the US flag being raised over a series of locations, beginning with Fort Moultrie in 1776, then Derna in 1805, and ultimately Pyongyang in 1950.¹⁰⁴ The sites of memory that appears in the *Times* illustration – including Santiago de Cuba, which would shortly fall into communist hands – celebrated US responses to what the paper presented as cases of unprovoked aggression. For example, the *Times*' caption described Derna as "a pirate town," dismissing Tripolitan claims to injury.¹⁰⁵ But the feature only allocated a few square inches to the image of Marines raising a US flag over the ruins of Derna in 1805, hardly impactful in a country dominated by film and television. It was therefore critical that the memory of Derna be updated in order to convey meaning in a new moment of crisis, and cultural producers swiftly fashioned a new visual archive of the war that drew on the already existing textual universe of the encounter at Derna, which was synonymous with both the Orient and the Barbary Coast.

Just four days after the *New York Times* published its low-tech illustration, Paramount released a popular cinematic account of the battle of Derna: *Tripoli*, a film that paired Maureen O'Hara and John Payne and took significant liberties in describing the events around the Battle of Derna. *Tripoli* abandoned many of the elements that typically accompanied retellings of the war, including piracy, the long naval blockade, captivity, and the role of William Eaton. Instead, the film is a lesson in Cold War gender roles set in the anachronistic space of the Barbary Coast. Rather than making the claim, as many sources do, that Derna was the turning point of the war, *Tripoli* insists that Derna *was* the war. The film's ahistorical script recalls the 1802 play *The Tripolitan Prize, or, American Tars on an English Shore* and was a sharp departure from typical accounts of the war, which were fashioned with at least a degree of historical realism. In the film, the navy appears to serve only as support for land operations, which glosses over the core issue in the conflict – control of sea routes. Instead, the film is organized around a competition for control of a woman's body. Rather than commerce or captives, then, *Tripoli* portrays gender and sex as the most important properties of the Tripolitan War.

Tripoli begins with credits rolling over a map of the Mediterranean. Audience members who were not already familiar with



Figure 1.2 *Tripoli*. 1950. Paramount Pictures.

the North African coast might at least recognize its proximity to Sicily and the Italian boot, familiar because only eight years earlier the United States had invaded both in the war against Italy and Germany. To this geography, the film's title sequence adds a brief historical context:

The United States was at war. The Tripoli pirates had challenged our right to the freedom of the seas, attacking our merchantmen and demanding tribute for safe passage. Our answer was to send warships to blockade the enemy's capital port of Tripoli, bottling up the pirate fleet. The USS *Essex* was in its sixth month of such duty when suddenly came a promise of action.¹⁰⁶

The war is about rights, piracy, freedom, and warships, but in the story that the film tells, most of the action takes place between a man and a woman.

The film stars John Payne as Marine Lieutenant O'Bannon, who commanded the small contingent of US Marines that accompanied Eaton across the desert, and Maureen O'Hara as a French exile, the Countess D'Arneau, a fictional character contrived for the film. Payne and O'Hara had played antagonistic love interests four years earlier in the widely acclaimed *Miracle on 34th Street*.¹⁰⁷ In much of *Tripoli*, Payne, who had a long career playing masculine leads, and O'Hara, who had a reputation as a strong female character, remained similarly antagonistic. A year earlier, O'Hara had played a Bedouin princess in *Bagdad*, and many of her future roles would be playing opposite John Wayne on the frontier landscape of the American West. As Cynthia Enloe points out, "the militarization which sustained Cold War relationships between people for forty years required armed forces with huge appetites for recruits; it also depended on ideas about manliness and womanliness that touched people who never went through basic training."¹⁰⁸ The characters that Payne and O'Hara embodied in *Tripoli* and other films played a vital role in the gendering of US Cold War culture.¹⁰⁹ Released just five months after the start of the Korean War, at a moment when the United States was no longer the only atomic power in the world, and in the shadow of the McCarran Internal Security Act, which established the legal framework for registration and persecution of communists and subversives in the United States, *Tripoli* harnessed the Battle of Derna to do significant cultural work.

With O'Bannon and D'Arneau as the central characters, there is little room in *Tripoli* for Eaton. He appears briefly in the beginning of the film to describe the plan to unseat Yusuf Qaramanli and install Ahmed in Tripoli, but his most important role in the film is to validate the sexual purity of O'Hara's character. As the Americans dine with Ahmed in

Egypt before departing for Derna, O'Bannon is surprised to see a white woman appear in the room. Following dinner, Eaton informs O'Bannon that the woman is a member of the displaced French bourgeoisie, "chased out of France after the revolution." D'Arneau is simply out of place in North Africa – a French refugee who depends on the kindness of another royal figure, rather than a member of Ahmed's harem. After sharing this vital information about D'Arneau with O'Bannon, Eaton departs on a ship and does not reappear until the end of the film. Shortly after the invasion force departs Egypt for Derna, the filmmakers further clarify D'Arneau's sexual purity in a scene with Ahmed, who expresses his desire for her; he has not yet had her, and it is clear that he is willing to go to any lengths to do so. The dichotomy of vital masculinity, embodied by Payne, and sexual purity, embodied by O'Hara, which often constitutes the West's image of itself, is set against the racial and gender uncertainty of the Orient, embodied by Phillip Reed playing Ahmed Qaramanli. With the characters present and the colonial stage set, O'Bannon and Qaramanli compete for D'Arneau's affection as they march across the desert.

In *Tripoli*, the desert wasteland between Alexandria and Derna becomes a backdrop for rehearsing racial difference at the opening of the Cold War, figured through the lens of desire. The film distinguishes between each man's ability to subordinate his desires to the demands of war and the necessity of controlling the circulation of women's bodies. While Ahmed is unable to control his desire for D'Arneau and thus offers little resistance to her demand to accompany the expedition across the desert, O'Bannon does everything he can to keep her from accompanying the war party. He fails because she conspires with Ahmed to deceive him. The film, then, suggests a certain logic: Ahmed (the Arab) fails to understand why the Frenchwoman belongs at home – because she is white (and the French, embattled in Algeria and their colonial empire, must withdraw); O'Bannon recognizes that North Africa is no place for women – white women, at least – and that war is a homosocial space meant for men. In this case, naturally, "men" means American men who will not suffer the same humiliations as the French as they take their rightful place as masters of the North Africa. The parallels of this cinematic logic to the very real colonial reordering taking place in North Africa in 1950 are striking.

The film recognizes, too, that the colonial contest is not just a struggle between men. Despite O'Bannon's resistance to the presence of a white woman in a war party, D'Arneau succeeds in accompanying the expedition; she has a strong enough resolve and enough influence over Ahmed to stay close to power. Throughout the film, D'Arneau acts out this desire to retain her connection to wealth and opulence, the sins that forced her to flee from revolutionary France to the Orient. The film, therefore, acknowledges Western women's agency and influence – or at least their demands. At this early moment in the story, however, D'Arneau's racial conscience remains undeveloped. She suffers for her early misrecognition; though she succeeds in refusing to embrace the preeminence of racial over economic bonds – she accompanies the expedition against O'Bannon's demands – she is nevertheless forced to submit to the gendered logic that she travel along with the Arab women, who are responsible for meeting the men's domestic needs. D'Arneau chooses to remain close to her Arab benefactor; however, it is not the luxurious life of the elite harem that awaits her, but a gender-segregated space of labor.¹¹⁰ D'Arneau's embrace of O'Bannon at the end of the film owes at least as much to this element – the humiliation of domestic labor she suffers – as it does to Ahmed's betrayal of O'Bannon and the Americans when the mercenary army arrives at Derna. It takes a march across the desert for the Countess to recognize that if she truly desires a privileged space in the world, it must be outside the war zone, in the racialized space of the domestic in the West, where the commitment to militarization is nevertheless totalizing. D'Arneau subordinates her economic desires to her racial obligations the moment she resolves to warn O'Bannon of Ahmed's betrayal of the Americans to the defenders of Derna, saving O'Bannon from almost-certain death. D'Arneau's embrace of the racial and gender logic of Western imperialism preserves her sexual purity as well, for she finds that unlike the Oriental prince Ahmed, O'Bannon, the white hero, will not take her against her will.

Tripoli ends with O'Bannon and D'Arneau embracing one another on the collapsed ruins surrounding the tower on which the US flag has been raised, the US militarized body intertwined with the daughter of prerevolutionary France, suggesting a particular kind of securitized worldview in which the power of the state is constituted by an alliance between the social elite and the military.¹¹¹ Ahmed is no longer a factor in this new world. He simply disappears from the film because he is

guilty of failing to recognize the preeminence of race over gender, mistaking wealth for power and assuming the Countess will stay loyal to him because of his riches. Ahmed erred when he trusted D'Arneau with his plans to betray O'Bannon and the Americans because he underestimates the bonds of whiteness; he fails to see that D'Arneau has *no choice* but to betray him because she must retain her racial dignity at all costs, even if it means the loss of her class privilege. In the context of the Cold War, the hierarchies of the film appeared essential to national survival. What this nationalist rhetoric conveniently overlooks is that United States only captured Derna because it successfully exploited the labor of a mercenary army composed mostly of Arab Muslims.¹¹²

While ceremonies like the one I describe, as well as historical and cultural representations like the film *Tripoli*, have situated the Battle of Derna as one act of a discrete episode – the war with Tripoli – in the history of the nation, at least one government agency during the Cold War recognized that the war was part of a larger history of naval operations in the early republic. In 1953, the United States Navy acknowledged the relationship between the war with Tripoli and the 1798–1800 Quasi-War with France by creating *The Naval Wars with France and Tripoli, 1798–1805*, a twenty-six-minute educational film produced by Creative Arts Studio, Inc.¹¹³ *The Naval Wars with France and Tripoli* placed the two wars within the larger context of militarization in the early republic. Decidedly low-tech, the film features animated storyboards with overlapping dialogue from two narrators. The first narrator maintains the authoritative tone of an elder historian, while the second speaks in a more colloquial tone and restricts his role in the dialogue to questions and moral appraisals about the people and events that are described to him. The film begins with the second narrator asking about the importance of conflicts that are “mighty far away and long ago.” The importance of these conflicts, the first narrator responds, is that they “were the proving grounds for the great fleets to come.” The film goes on to focus on US naval operations in the Caribbean and then the Mediterranean, leaving only a few minutes at the end to describe the attack on Derna. But it is the attack on Derna, closing with the US flag flying over the city, that appears to end the war.

The film parallels the history of the early republic with the development of its navy. The film begins by boiling down the challenges faced by the early republic to a weak central government, leading to a

shortage of tax dollars, without which the United States cannot adequately defend its commerce. This lack of revenue and defenselessness leads to unemployment and Revolutionary War veterans losing their homes and farms. Many respond by moving west or, worse, engaging in rebellion. The solution to all these national tragedies – especially aggression against US commercial vessels – is a strong federal government with the ability to raise tax dollars and construct a naval fleet. If the historical narrative of the film is to be believed, then, it is a strong military that holds the republic together. No doubt, the producers of the film worried that demilitarization in the wake of World War II might weaken the nation. And while the Quasi-War with France was an important component of this development, the film emphasizes that the conflict with the French was but a preface to the more important test of American character during the war with Tripoli. As soon as the treaty with the French is signed, the film's music shifts and Thomas Jefferson steps forward to challenge the "Barbary corsairs." By the time Eaton arrives on the scene, the standard elements of the naval war have been rehearsed. Eaton, however, appears as a gray-haired old man, and it falls to O'Bannon and the Marines to lead a contingent of – predictably – howling Arab mercenaries into the city. The battle ends with O'Bannon standing over the city receiving the adorations of a crowd, with the US flag flying in the background.

The educational film finishes with a montage of the war's most memorable moments, while the second narrator wonders, "Well, did the war teach us anything?" The first narrator answers, "Yes, commerce needs naval protection." But beyond merely economic benefits, he explains, the war also produced less-tangible results: the United States "humbled the proud rulers of Barbary and gained prestige in the eyes of the world." In the context of the Cold War, the war with Tripoli mattered to the producers of the film because "America made it known at home and abroad that to keep a peace and to keep honor, there must be ships that can fight and men who can lead." In its willingness to situate the war with Tripoli within a wider historical context, the navy documentary comes closer to providing a full account of the war than Paramount's film. But it also reads as an argument for continued funding and maintenance of a large military force. Indeed, a sharp increase in military spending between 1950 and 1953 was followed by only a brief dip after the end of the war in Korea.¹¹⁴

Yet *The Naval Wars with France and Tripoli*, like its Hollywood counterpart, misleads. The war did not end because of great American men empowered by US naval power. As Fölyan demonstrates, it ended because the United States was never able to gain the upper hand. The naval blockade proved ineffectual, and the US was in no position to widen the scope of the conflict. Tripoli actively resisted the United States. The country was not simply a den of pirates but a legitimate government, deeply involved in the wider Mediterranean economy and skilled at negotiating the political terrain of the day. Without support from neighboring states, its livestock trade with the British in Malta during the Napoleonic Wars, and the strength of its navy, Tripoli might have been in a much more precarious position.¹¹⁵ The Jefferson administration, by empowering Lear to come to terms, drew back from total endorsement of Eaton and others' pursuit of empire in North Africa. The war ended because of diplomacy, not in spite of it. And if the United States momentarily appeared victorious at Derna in 1805, it was not because the country and its mercenary army were welcomed as a liberating force but because once the flag went up over the fort the United States "turned its guns upon the enemy," the defenders and inhabitants of the city, to force them into submission. Joined by a renewed bombardment from the navy, Eaton used mercenary force to take possession of the entire town within a few hours.¹¹⁶

None of this is apparent in *Tripoli*, in which Commodore Barron turns to Eaton on the deck of the USS *President* and exclaims, "Something to tell our grandchildren about, General. The first time over foreign soil."¹¹⁷ Here, the filmmakers sanction their representation of the past by attributing its production to the demands of great men; those who helped to win the war desired that future generations should know of the labor that they performed under the flag of the United States. However, not everyone's labor is as important in retellings of the story. Following the elevation of the US flag, the Arab, North African, and other mercenaries who performed the bulk of the labor in the battle are forgotten. The names of their dead go unrecorded and they are positioned as outside of the national project by virtue of their religion. In the Hollywood version of Derna, the Marines ride into the city unopposed and accompanied by the Greek mercenaries. The camera pans to O'Bannon and D'Arneau as they consummate their union with a passionate kiss. As soon as the Countess acknowledges his authority by

freely embracing him, O'Bannon declares the city secure. But what does all this flag-waving and Franco-American coupling mean for Derna? What does it mean to declare a city secure? In the film, these questions go unanswered, but there are clues about what comes next. The US Marines are shown disarming the city's defenders at gunpoint. It is unclear if the population of the city will be put into chains and sold into slavery as a way to pay for the costs of the war, or if these prisoners and casualties of war will be allowed to remain and serve their occupiers.¹¹⁸ Once US forces consolidated control of the town, what followed was occupation, no matter how short-lived it was. But neither the documentary nor the other sources I examine here are concerned with the realities of occupation. There are no civilian casualties; no torture; no social unrest, food shortages, or reprisal killings. In the exceptionalist narrative of the battle and its aftermath, there are no further difficulties beyond having to defend and then evacuate the city following the peace treaty. The questions of what comes next would regularly go unanswered after multiple US interventions across the Cold War.

This exceptionalist narrative of Derna, which overshadowed the very real consequences of its ongoing production for people in North Africa, continued to appear at regular intervals across the Cold War. In 1956, it was no less than C.S. Forester who authored a children's book about the war.¹¹⁹ In 1958, the *Titusville Herald* compared the recent arrival of the US Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, "to protect American lives and property," to the arrival of the US Marines in Derna in 1805.¹²⁰ And in 1962, Paramount rereleased *Tripoli* with a new title – *The First Marines*. As the Cold War continued and the United States increased the frequency of its extralegal schemes to manipulate affairs in places it deemed strategically important to its interests, Eaton's reputation held steady. He was frequently described as the American Lawrence of Arabia and his assault on Derna situated as the precursor to clandestine interventions around the globe.¹²¹ Samuel Edwards, for example, set America's Lawrence in deep contrast to the "band of rogues" who accompanied him across the Libyan desert; to the North African nomads that Eaton encountered, he was "Eaton Pasha, the protected of Allah."¹²² Edwards went so far as to claim that during his march across the desert, Eaton formed "a new, special unit" to respond to the guerilla attacks that he encountered. This unit, with Eaton as its head – no doubt a Vietnam-era fantasy recalling the Green Berets – put an end to guerilla warfare by

capturing eleven men and five teenage boys, who were all “put to the sword.”¹²³ Edwards also claimed that Eaton executed two of his mercenaries for insurrection, shooting one in the head and the other in the chest.¹²⁴ No doubt, this claim echoed in Nguyễn Ngọc Loan’s execution of Nguyễn Văn Lé in Saigon in 1968.

Derna was an especially important reference points among members of the military and their supporters. Writing in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in 1976, Trudy Sundberg repeated Edwards’s claim, but said Eaton beheaded both mercenaries.¹²⁵ Edwards and Sundberg’s brutal descriptions of North African life and of the methods necessary for achieving victory against insurrections and maintaining order among soldiers reflected US anxieties about empire and certainly share something in common with Cornelius Felton’s claim in *Life of William Eaton* that

the reader will be struck by the manly tone of his official correspondence in relation to the Barbary powers, and the true policy to be adopted toward that nest of pirates. He will also feel humiliated that his country, in common with the rest of Christendom, submitted so long to the exactions of barbarous hordes, equally contemptible in character, strength, and resources.¹²⁶

This violence projected backward against North African Muslims – recalling also the language Samuel Barron used in 1805 – reflects the shift in US policy toward Libya later in the Cold War.

The United States maintained its fiction of benevolence toward Libya for some time, however. As First points out, Libya was an ideal location for basing long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.¹²⁷ Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli was briefly an important forward-operating site for nuclear bombers – First says the United States had already spent \$100 million developing Wheelus, its first African air base, before the war even ended – and the United States signed a long-term lease with the Libyan Government under King Idris in 1954.¹²⁸ But the Libyan political landscape changed drastically after the discovery of oil in 1959. The wealth disparities that followed – as well as Israel’s occupation of Sinai at the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967 – fueled the rise of Muammar Gaddafi and Arab nationalism in a 1969 coup d’état

leading to a steady decline in US–Libyan relations.¹²⁹ When the lease expired in 1970, the United States withdrew from Libya. In 1986 the United States mobilized the threat of terrorism, rather than piracy, as a pretense for bombing Tripoli; in a twist of fate, the United States bombed its former air field during the raid. The previous year, the US Marine Corps had published a collection of patriotic illustrations that included what has become the most well-known image of the Battle of Derna. In this painting by Charles Waterhouse, eleven Americans charge forward, seemingly unstoppable, with a few of the “band of restive Arabs and Bedouins” trailing behind. This image encapsulates exceptionalist narratives of the battle. Perhaps some of the pilots from the US aircraft carriers *America*, *Coral Sea*, and *Saratoga* who participated in the bombing raid on Libya reflected on Waterhouse’s image of US exceptionalism at Derna as they prepared for their mission. After all, the collected images in the book were intended to “be framed and hung in such areas as recruiting stations, unit offices, recreation rooms, mess halls, and clubs.”¹³⁰ All this long before the war with Tripoli was recast, beginning in 2001, as the United States’ first war on terror.



Figure 1.3 Charles Waterhouse, “Derna.” 1975. US Marine Corps.

The War on Terror

After the end of the Cold War, the Battle of Derna was not forgotten. In July 1991, historian James Field Jr. published an updated version of his 1969 book *America and the Mediterranean World*, adding “From Gibraltar to the Middle East” to the title. In his new preface – written one month before the coup d’état that led to the final collapse of the Soviet Union – Field compared the recent invasion of Iraq during the first Gulf War to Eaton’s assault on Derna, concluding that “its aims were the same and it accomplished the same end.”¹³¹ The book also repeated Field’s 1969 claim that Derna was “the first step in the spread of the American way.”¹³² Post-Cold War articulations of Derna in the absence of a communist threat would increasingly be shaped by the new focus of US planners: the Middle East. And as Melani McAlister points out, beginning with the Iran crisis in 1979, Islam became “the dominant signifier of the region.”¹³³ Not surprisingly, then, in 1993 Michael Kitzen asserted that the United States had gone to war against Muslim pirates who were terrorizing Christian Europe in 1801, ignoring the political and economic context of the war as well as the much more complicated history of Islam and Christianity in both Europe and North Africa. According to Kitzen, the war with Tripoli culminated in the “superhuman feat” of attacking and capturing Derna. Kitzen claimed that Islam enabled piracy, which was useful for helping to maintain the foundations of the US–Israeli relationship and overt American hostility toward Iran, both vital components of US policy in the Middle East.¹³⁴ A few years later, Kitzen went further, arguing that “Eaton’s words of outrage and disgust reflected the feelings of many of his contemporaries and later generations regarding American policy of acquiescence in the demands of pirate governments of North Africa.”¹³⁵ By laying the blame for the Tripolitan War at the foot of John Adams, whom Kitzen claims never understood the binary of Barbary relations – tribute or violence – Kitzen concludes that Jefferson inherited a mess and had no choice but to go to war. But this is not true; Jefferson could have met the demands of the 1796 treaty. Even after he went down the path of war, Jefferson also chose to pull back rather than commit to supporting a – probably impossible – total overthrow of the Tripolitan Government. In his appraisal of the war, Kitzen was simply echoing facile American exceptionalism. But he was also writing amid a new assemblage of

signifiers that would anchor the narrative of a new conflict: the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the designation of Sudan – the headquarters of al Q'aeda – as a state sponsor of terror, and the signing of the Oslo Accords.¹³⁶ All these events helped to establish the political and cultural landscape of war on terror less than a decade later.

During the war on terror, Tripoli and Derna were once more pressed into service, both in historiographical and popular realms. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (popularly shortened to "9/11"), writers worked to draw a strong connection between the pirate and the terrorist. Like the pirate, the terrorist was presented as a figure outside the bounds of law and as a natural target for US violence.¹³⁷ This script, the United States' exceptional struggle against figures who fell outside the social order, was widely embraced by conservative commentators and Islamophobes in the United States.¹³⁸ For example, a work of journalistic nonfiction like Joseph Wheelan's *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror 1801–1805* could assert that the war with Tripoli "was not so different from today's war on terror" because both were responses to crimes "prosecuted cynically in the name of Islamic 'jihadism.'"¹³⁹ As Wheelan explained, "fought for strong principles by an idealistic new republic, the Barbary War was an audacious action for a constitutional government scarcely twelve years old and twenty years removed from its war of independence."¹⁴⁰ In Wheelan's account, the war is significant in large part because it produces national heroes. But heroes are not what war produces. As Americans should recognize after more than twenty-five years of wars in the Middle East, war produces corpses, injured bodies, and psychic injury. Yet two years after 9/11 and on the eve of another failed occupation – Iraq this time – Wheelan's text sold well, and his book was followed by others making similar claims.¹⁴¹

On the cultural front, the narrative of heroic Christian manhood – a return to nineteenth-century rhetoric in some ways – made its way into novels like William White Jr.'s *The Greater the Honor: A Novel of the Barbary Wars*. White's novel is a typical homosocial romance that focuses on the life of seamen during the naval blockade of Tripoli. But in his notes at the end of the novel, White finds room to invoke the Battle of Derna and the specter of Oriental despotism that often serves as the US Other. White explains to readers that after Eaton departed, Yusuf killed the remaining inhabitants of the city as punishment for their

disloyalty.¹⁴² There is simply no evidence that this atrocity happened. An even more imaginative take on the war than White's was Brad Thor's *The Last Patriot*, which harnessed the Battle at Derna in a uniquely offensive way: in the novel, Thor describes a hidden document cache in which Muhammad admits he was not divinely inspired when he wrote the Qur'an. The contents of these encrypted documents are lost (or hidden) until 1805, when Thomas Jefferson sends a company of Marines to Derna to retrieve a mechanical device for decoding Muhammad's secret confession. It is the United States – the US Marines, no less – that uncovers the truth that Islam is a false religion premised on the writings of Muhammad, not the inspiration of Allah. Like Payne and O'Hara in *Tripoli*, the protagonist and his love interest in *The Last Patriot* are masturbatory white-supremacist figures – beautiful physically but also ideologically.¹⁴³ These books are offensive not because they present a counter-reading of historical evidence, but because they fabricate and falsify history for deeply destructive ends.

The final member of this overdetermined genre of Tripoli- and Derna-as-script for the war on terror that I want to examine is Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger's *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates: The Forgotten War that Changed American History* – a mass-market paperback from Sentinel, an imprint of the Penguin Group that describes itself as symbolizing “a tough-minded defense of America's fundamental values and national interests.”¹⁴⁴ In Kilmeade and Yaeger's account, at the turn of the nineteenth century the United States was “challenged by four Muslim nations” and the war with Tripoli is “one, that, in many ways, we are still fighting today.”¹⁴⁵ The authors' goal – beyond producing an anti-Muslim screed, apparently – is to “restore them [Decatur, Eaton, et al.] to American memory.”¹⁴⁶ Kilmeade, the cohost of *Fox and Friends*, and Yaeger, a sports journalist, are not scholars and this is clear from their lack of sources and critical reflection. At one point, the two regurgitate an old Lord Nelson quote about the destruction of *Philadelphia* by Americans in Tripoli harbor after it was captured – “the most bold and daring act of the age” – and then explain in a footnote that Lord Nelson actually might not have said it.¹⁴⁷ There is some debate over the possible utterance by Nelson, but few readers of the mass-market book are likely to refer to the footnote to see that they have been misled in the body of the text.¹⁴⁸ With regard to the events at Derna in 1805, the two authors fail to get the numbers right – they say

“four hundred men.”¹⁴⁹ Eaton – who was there – said about 500. But accuracy and context are not the point, as the authors are happy to admit. “Here in the twenty-first century, the broader story – the great confrontation between the United States and militant Islamic states – has a new significance.”¹⁵⁰ The claim that Tripoli was a militant Islamic state is specious, of course, and the two authors never say what that new significance is, exactly. The point is to unabashedly to celebrate militarism, and they conclude with perhaps the most worn-out patriotic rhetoric: “Without the Americans fighting in the trenches and on the seas, we would not be able to enjoy life as citizens of the world’s greatest economic and military super power.”¹⁵¹ This is memory and exceptionalism at their worst, and the nation’s institutions have hardly done better when it comes to the war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna.

Conclusion: “Real Americans” at War

In 2004, the Smithsonian debuted “The Price of Freedom: Americans at War,” a permanent exhibition at the National Museum of American History in Washington, DC. The exhibit occasioned strong criticism, much of it directed at the curatorial staff for their endorsement of militarism as well as for the privatization of public memory.¹⁵² Carol Burke summed up the exhibit’s tone: “reverential, promotional history, what used to be called propaganda.”¹⁵³ Amid all this criticism, what went unexamined was the curious absence of the war with Tripoli from the exhibit. Perhaps it was deemed too trendy in 2004 for inclusion in the pantheon of US wars that the exhibit haphazardly crafts.¹⁵⁴ After all, the exhibit opened just as a wave of journalistic histories were declaring that the war with Tripoli was “America’s first war on terror.”¹⁵⁵ The museum’s hesitance to include Tripoli as an enemy of the United States alongside Native America, Spain, Germany, and others might be understandable if the war with Tripoli was considered an insignificant event in the history of the United States that had only become fashionable to bring up in the context of the war on terror. But this is not the case; as I have demonstrated here, the war has been remembered frequently throughout the history of the nation.

Yet the Smithsonian did not adopt this script. Why? It does acknowledge the first Gulf War – along with the war on terror – but the

two are simply described as “new American roles.” Perhaps, at the height of the war on terror, curators chose to ignore the longer history of US imperialism in North Africa and the Middle East in order to avoid dealing with the role of mercenary force in US empire. Mercenaries, after all, are not exactly real “Americans at war.” Furthermore, the “motley crew” at Derna is unsettling because its multiracial and multiethnic character disrupts narratives of US exceptionalism from below.¹⁵⁶ In 1805, Eaton complained about this oversight in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, written while he was still in the Mediterranean:

When peace was finally resolved upon, what were the provisions made for the brave men who had fought our battles in the enemy’s country, and who had contributed in rendering *this moment propitious to such an event?* – Supplies, indeed are sent out for the *Christians* under my command; but the alternative left me to perish with the *Mahometans* under my command or desert them to their solitary fate and abandon my post like a coward! This is the first instance I ever heard of a religious test being required to entitle a soldier to his rations; and the only one of an ally being devoted to destruction with so little necessity and with so much cold blood.¹⁵⁷

Although he faced many issues during the mercenary army’s march across the desert, it appears that in the end Eaton recognized the labor of all the soldiers who served under his command. But the Muslims who fought for the United States at Derna have been marginalized or ignored. Meanwhile – with the exception of the Smithsonian – Eaton and the Marines have been well remembered. Their absence of the war with Tripoli from the Smithsonian exhibit is odd, but does little to diminish the war’s significance as an important historiographical device for sustaining an exceptionalist narrative of US empire.

What the United States described as piracy – North African claims of territorial sovereignty in the Mediterranean – continued until 1815, when the so-called Western powers established naval hegemony in the western Mediterranean. In the next chapter, I dig deeper into the archives to investigate the life of an American who worked as a

mercenary in the Ottoman world for both Egypt and the United States, helping to lay the foundations for the first treaty between the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul and the US Government in Washington. Outside of a few sweeping accounts, this mercenary encounter with the Ottoman world in the 1820s has been forgotten. Nevertheless, the discourses of sovereignty that it produced linger.

CHAPTER 2

SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG MEN AND NATIONS, 1815–28

Istanbul was Constantinople
Now it's Istanbul, not Constantinople
Been a long time gone, old Constantinople
Still it's Turkish delight on a moonlit night

– Jimmy Kennedy, 1953¹

In Chapter 1, I demonstrated that the war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna have been invoked in historical and cultural memory throughout US history as a precedent and justification for the exercise of US power, while simultaneously revealing the racial and gender logic of US exceptionalism at different moments in US history. Representations of the US-led invasion of an Ottoman province in 1805 were particularly important during the opening years of the Cold War. The Barbary Coast, however, was not the only anachronistic, Orientalized space circulating in popular culture in the 1950s. Four hundred years after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, Irish lyricist Jimmy Kennedy's song "Istanbul (Not Constantinople)" assured its Western audience that in spite of its name change, the city remained a space of sensual delight. Kennedy's song, written shortly after Turkey joined NATO, achieved widespread popularity and is evidence of the longing for anachronistic spaces that is so central to Orientalism and colonial representations.² Yet, while Istanbul was embraced in popular culture and by military planners, little attention was given to the history of US–Turkish

relations and the nineteenth-century mercenary encounter that helped to lay the foundations for them.³ For the United States, the stakes of this encounter were no less than the recognition of its sovereignty by the major powers in the Atlantic world. Ottoman recognition, in the form of equal commercial footing with Britain, France, and Russia in Ottoman ports as well as free passage through the Dardanelles strait, was highly desirable for the commercial and ruling class who dominated the foreign policy of the young republic.⁴ The stakes were also high for George Bethune English, a religious dissident from the United States who spent a significant amount of time in the Ottoman world. An outcast at home, the Mediterranean became a stage on which English sought recognition, laboring to prove himself a patriotic American. From 1815 to 1828, English was a key figure in US foreign policy in the region, although he has rarely been recognized as such.

In this chapter I argue that English's biography offers significant insights into the close links between sovereign power and mercenary force, in spite of the state's careful efforts to minimize and erase the mercenary labor performed on its behalf. Between 1815 and 1825, English traveled from the United States to the Ottoman Mediterranean at least three times. During his first visit, English left the Marine Corps to explore the Ottoman world and eventually participated in the Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in 1820. He published an account of his trip up the Nile in 1822 in London and then returned to the United States, also publishing the account in Boston. He traveled back to Turkey twice at the request of Presidents James Monroe and John Quincy Adams. Within the contours of rising anti-Islamic and pro-Greek sentiments, which complicated foreign policy and trade in the Mediterranean, English undertook state-sanctioned missions – quieter, though not entirely secretive – in an attempt to secure access to Ottoman ports and equal commercial footing for the United States. Ultimately, these missions led to their desired ends for the United States. For English, the results were less satisfactory. Adams abruptly dismissed him a few days before he was to return to the Mediterranean a fourth time, and he died shortly before his fortieth birthday in 1828.⁵

This chapter examines the archival remains of George Bethune English: the books and letters he wrote, as well as books and letters in which he was recognized and remembered by people he met, including travelers, missionaries, and diplomats. I begin with a brief biography of

English's life, leading up to and including his publication of *The Grounds of Christianity Examined* in 1813, which led to his ostracism from New England society and departure for the Mediterranean. I place English within the context of Egyptian history in the first two decades of the nineteenth century in order to establish the setting for his *Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sennaar* (London, 1822; Boston, 1823). Then I trace his career as he returns to the Ottoman world twice at the direction of the secretary of state and president. Finally, I analyze descriptions of English in the years following his death and how these descriptions – as well as English's own writings – negotiate the tension between personal and national sovereignty. Unlike William Eaton, George Bethune English is a marginal cultural figure and has not been well or widely remembered. Yet his archival remains are worth examining because they demonstrate the different ways in which “the East” could be written into existence by Americans, as well as the ways in which early Americans constructed, understood, and illustrated the borders between Christian- and non-Christian-majority countries, as well as Ottoman borderlands between Europe and Africa. Finally, English matters because, despite his disagreements with powerful Christian theologians, he remained an unapologetic American exceptionalist in his attempts to advance US economic and political interests in the Ottoman world even after he rejected Christianity.

In the twentieth century, scholars vacillated between describing English as a secret agent and as a mercenary – one a legitimate, if often unrecognized, agent of the state; the other a figure whose labor is performed outside the bounds of the nation. In his 1928 Princeton dissertation, *American Relations with Turkey to 1831*, Walter Livingstone Wright Jr. called English a “renegade” and the “ideal secret agent.”⁶ Renegade is a common appellation hurled against religious skeptics in general and converts to Islam in particular. But English does not appear to have actually converted to Islam, and describing him as a renegade works historically to marginalize his body of labor. Nor is it entirely accurate to describe English as a secret agent; his first trip to Istanbul as an agent to negotiate relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire was widely reported at the time, in spite of efforts to keep the mission a secret.⁷ Pierre Crabitès, an American who served on the Egyptian Mixed Courts from 1911 to 1936, described English as a soldier of fortune and mercenary in his 1938 account of Americans in the

Egyptian Army.⁸ In their preface to *The Papers of Henry Clay*, Mary Hopkins and James Hargreaves followed Wright's model and described English as a "secret agent."⁹ In *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East*, David Finnie returns to calling English a secret agent while labeling the Bostonian a representative of what he calls "a sort of early-American awkward squad."¹⁰ By 1983, English was remembered as a "prominent American Turkophile," a description that is somewhat problematic linguistically due to English's own admission that he did not read Turkish.¹¹ In 2007, Israeli historian Michael Oren called English a "young contrarian" – a fair characterization, perhaps – but then goes on to conclude that he was a "warrior-diplomat (in the cut of George W. Bush)," a comparison that defies understanding.¹² Whatever he was, or remains in the archive, English was instrumental in further establishing US sovereignty in the early years of the republic.

"A Solitary Man"

English was born in Boston in 1787 to Thomas English and Penelope Bethune. His family appears to have been well regarded, but of middling class at best.¹³ In 1807 he graduated from Harvard, where his talent for poetry gained him admission to the Hasty Pudding Club.¹⁴ He subsequently pursued and rejected the practice of law, though he never reflected in writing on this career.¹⁵ A year after he graduated, he sent a letter to Senator John Quincy Adams, who had probably been his teacher at Harvard, to apologize for asking for a reference without first notifying him. English had supplied Adams's name to the secretary of war "to corroborate my application to the Government of my Country for a military appointment." English – only twenty-one years old at the time – hoped that Adams's recommendation would help "to introduce me to that profession which is not only the object of my most ardent predilection, but is also sanctioned by parental assent."¹⁶ The appointment never went through – military expenditures declined during Thomas Jefferson's presidency and following the end of the war with Tripoli. Instead, English returned to Harvard, where he took an interest in Judaism. In 1812, he won the Bowdoin Prize for his thesis, titled "The Origin of Masoretic Points, and Their Subservience to a Thorough Knowledge of the Hebrew Language."¹⁷ He briefly trained as a minister but was unsuccessful and dissatisfied.¹⁸ Shortly thereafter,

he renounced Christianity and in 1813 he published *The Grounds of Christianity Examined*, which would forever change his life.

The Grounds of Christianity Examined is a comparative analysis of the Old and New Testaments that begins with a strongly worded statement about the importance of free public discussion and the singular character of the United States. In English's estimation, what made the United States exceptional was its secular character: "perfect freedom of opinion, and of speech are here *established by law*, and are the *birthright* of every citizen thereof."¹⁹ But beyond simply exercising his natural – and national – right to dissent, English wrote to defend Judaism, asserting that "the Christian system is built upon the prostrate necks of the whole Hebrew nation."²⁰ In fact, many of English's arguments were drawn from the *Chuzzuk Emunah* (The Strengthening of the Faith), written in Lithuanian in 1593 by Rabbi Isaac ben Abraham of Troki, a Karaite Jew. Working as a librarian at Harvard, English apparently discovered a Latin copy of the *Chuzzuk Emunah*, transcribed in Germany in 1681.²¹ His assimilation of the book's arguments led him away from Christianity and toward Judaism.

While *The Grounds of Christianity Examined* barely registers on most historians' radar, philosopher Richard Popkin says that at the height of the Second Great Awakening, the book's publication produced a "major controversy among New England Protestants."²² In Boston, the book was important enough, or perhaps dangerous enough, to merit a response from three significant figures in Unitarian theology at an important moment in the city's theological evolution, which began with the Puritans' Half-Way Covenant in 1662 and continued with the rise of Unitarian theology at Harvard in 1804. The Puritans had paved the way for English's infidelity by embracing congregational administration rather than a centralized theological body, opening the gates for the rise of Unitarian theology in many Boston churches and a general liberalization of the New England social order at the same time that a mercantile elite was developing.²³ Unitarians remained followers of Jesus Christ, whom they considered to be the Messiah, but they rejected the idea that he was the son of God. But while Unitarians rejected the Trinity and the theological dogma of the virgin birth, they were unwilling to tolerate English's public rejection of the New Testament as divinely inspired and his accusation that Jesus Christ was an imposter.²⁴ Equally offensive to many Unitarian theologians was English's defense of

Judaism – because he never rejected the authority of the Old Testament and its laws and prophecy, English was not simply criticizing Christianity but also defending the moral authority of Judaism. As one minister at the time put it, “Some answer to Mr. English’s book was thought by many friends of Christianity to be indispensable, before the public attention to that work had subsided.”²⁵

The first response to English’s book came on October 24, 1813, when William Ellery Channing – a 1798 graduate of Harvard, “the father of Unitarianism,” and the senior minister at Federal Street Church in Boston – preached two sermons on infidelity which were directed at English and subsequently published for circulation.²⁶ In his sermons, Channing never mentions English by name, but outlines the ways in which vice, pride, and ignorance lead to infidelity, presumably an insult to English’s character.²⁷ In a sermon that drew strongly on the tradition of the Puritan Jeremiad, Channing attributed the rise of infidels to decadent society: “They are seeds sown in every soil, and seeds which are peculiarly quickened by a prosperous and luxurious state of society.”²⁸ But beyond simply blaming social decadence for English’s infidelity, Channing offered a deeper spiritual explanation and characterized English as an individual who purposefully and maliciously insulted Christianity.²⁹ Subsequent criticisms from two other Boston theologians would amplify Channing’s attack and drive English out of Massachusetts.

Channing’s strongly worded criticism of English was echoed in a book-length review of *The Grounds of Christianity Examined* by the Reverend Samuel Cary. In November, Cary – who graduated from Harvard in 1804 before becoming a preacher at King’s Chapel in Boston until his early death in 1815 – published *A Review of English’s Grounds of Christianity Examined*.³⁰ Cary identified spiritual failings and assaulted English’s character, just as Channing had done.³¹ But Cary went further with his personal attacks and accused English of being an instrument of the Jews; antisemitism and Christian Zionism thread together his response.³² Cary charged that English should have listened to the advice of his friends and not published his book: “He would have avoided, what he must now be prepared to encounter, the just indignation of that part of the community, whose most sacred feelings and principles he has thus shamefully insulted.”³³ Cary further hinted that English had published his book not out of a

desire to seek the truth but as a reaction to his own failures, like a child acting out.³⁴

English subsequently published letters responding to both men's criticisms. His response to Channing is short. He excuses himself for presuming the sermons were directed at him and spends several pages begging pardon for any perceived slights of Channing.³⁵ But while he begs the pardon of Channing, he takes exception to Cary's criticism, asking, "Why am I stabbed in the back from the Pulpit?"³⁶ English accuses Cary of being the one guilty of shoddy scholarship:

It is perfectly clear to me, from this mistake, and from several others in your Review, that, notwithstanding the solemn complacency with which you pronounce your ludicrous decisions upon the merit of the works of that man, that you have never read them, and know nothing about them.³⁷

English blamed these oversights on the speed with which Cary had composed his reply to *The Grounds of Christianity Examined*: "Yes, sir, you must certainly have written and printed your book in four weeks."³⁸ English might have been on firm ground – in his copy of Cary's letter, Thomas Jefferson notes some of Cary's circular reasoning.³⁹ Still, the criticisms appear to have had real, material consequences for English. In the closing pages of his response to Cary, the last thing he would publish before disappearing from the scene for eight years, English recognizes the difficulties that lay ahead of him:

Mr. Cary you are easy in the world, and have many friends, and live respected. My situation is much the reverse, and I shall probably have to see much trouble in making my way through this world of fraud and falsehood. Yet so help me God! I would not change places with you; I could not have my cheeks crimsoned with the suffusion which now burns yours, for millions. You have insulted me, sir, with shameful and rancorous epithets, and malignant abuse, because I have acted as I ought in ceasing to affirm in the name of God what I believed was false; and you go on asserting in the name of the God of truth, things which you cannot prove; and relying upon your influence, your standing in society, and your imagined learning, and talents, have undertaken to crush a solitary

man, who has been so unfortunate as to have been imposed upon, and still more unfortunate in finding it out. You have even had the brutality to represent me, p. 36, as hung “upon a gibbet, to be gazed at with shuddering curiosity, to be pitied and avoided.”⁴⁰

English was clearly wounded by the Unitarian ministers.

The debate drew outside attention as well. On October 1, 1813, the *General Repository and Review* – a short-lived Boston quarterly edited by Unitarian Andrews Norton – published a synopsis of the debate surrounding *The Grounds of Christianity Examined*, which had “the bad distinction of being the first original works [the book and English’s letters to the ministers] of this character, ever published in New England.” The writer launched a series of ad hominem attacks against English: “Mr. English is one of the unfortunate class of men, who are continually subjecting themselves to ridicule, by the mistake of supposing, that what is new to them, is new to the whole world.” The article goes on to compare English to Quixote, “shrewdly suspecting windmills to be giants.” The writer concludes that in spite of his “remarkable deficiencies . . . we are not willing to give up the hope of Mr. English’s return to usefulness, and should be sorry to do anything to prevent it.” Nevertheless, the writer concluded, for the moment English had succeeded in “destroying his own reputation, blasting his own prospects, putting an end to his usefulness, cutting himself off from society of the wise and good.” The writer cites both Channing and Cary’s responses but only summarized Cary’s, saying that “the rational Christian will be gratified with the manliness with which the author [Cary] avows his opinions.” The *General Repository and Review* promised additional criticism to come: “As we have already mentioned, we expect a more complete answer to English’s book than has yet appeared, from a gentleman, whom we are gratified to speak of as one of our number.”⁴¹

In the intervening time, English sought out like-minded companions. One of these was Gershom Mendes Seixas, the hazzan of Congregation Shearith Israel in New York City, who English visited at least four times in the first half of 1814. In a letter to his daughter Sarah, Seixas, in his seventies and one of the most well-known Jews in the United States, recalled one of these visits: “You may depend there was no lack of conversation – he was here before dinner on Shabbat and was invited to Tea.” Seixas described English as “a poor looking undersized

man,” yet “a man of great reading – besides being a classical scholar – & well versed in the hebrew grammar [*sic*].” Seixas wrote that his son David also enjoyed these visits from English, wondering, “What will he say of our dr [dear] K? after conversing with him!” Here, Seixas refers to Sarah’s husband, Israel Kursheedt, a significant Jewish businessman and educator. Seixas reported that English had made plans to travel to Philadelphia and then Richmond to meet Kursheedt.⁴² A month later, Kursheedt sent Thomas Jefferson a copy of English’s book, as well as a copy of Cary’s review and English’s response. He told Jefferson that stationers had refused to sell the book “from a fear to offend” and that “a few copies” had been procured to “dispose of only to the liberal and enlightend” [*sic*].⁴³ It appears that English had found sympathetic ears among leaders of the Jewish community in the United States.

The more complete answer to English’s apostasy that had been promised the previous year was delivered in the second half of 1814 by Edward Everett, minister of the Brattle Square Church in Boston. *A Defence of Christianity against the Work of George B. English*, dedicated to the Reverend John Thornton Kirkland, is the longest (at 520 pages) of the three responses to *The Grounds of Christianity Examined*.⁴⁴ Everett drew extensively from the exchange between Cary and English and several times from Channing’s sermon and English’s response. Everett extended Cary’s accusation of plagiarism as well as echoing his appraisal of the condition of the Jews, although they occupy a less central role in his theological cosmology.⁴⁵ For the most part, Everett confines himself to pedantic criticisms of English’s scholarly rigor. It would be nine years before English responded to Everett. Later in this chapter, I position English’s response to Everett, *Five Pebbles from the Brook*, as a final effort to struggle for autonomy at home after he arrived back in Boston from the Mediterranean in 1823.⁴⁶

While individual ministers attacked him from the pulpit and in print, English also faced off against the Church of Christ as a whole. The church demanded an explanation and retraction from English in an initial interview, but he failed to reply to a follow-up letter sent to him on July 25, 1814. Subsequently, on November 3, a church committee voted to excommunicate English. Noting that he had refused to retract his statements about Christianity and that he had ignored further contact with its members, the committee concluded English “has publically and opprobriously assailed our holy religion” and

“violated his own solemn covenant engagements, renounced his Christian profession, scandalized the Christian name, and proved himself to be, not merely an apostate from the Christian Church, but an enemy to the Christian religion.” The committee notes indicate that English had left his father’s home in Brighton for Virginia, “not expecting soon to return.” The report concluded that English’s was an “unhappy and unprecedented case.”⁴⁷ Certainly this was true, for English was now labeled an apostate and enemy of Christianity – not small charges in 1814.

Because he challenged the liberal theology of Unitarianism that undergirded the Boston social order responsible for much of New England’s economic expansion, English found himself marginalized. Either willingly or because the influence of his friends finally had some effect, he left Boston and published nothing else in the United States until 1823. According to several sources English had some role in the Harmony Society’s Colony – a utopian community – after the publication of his book and subsequent attacks by the Boston theological establishment. Perhaps, then, Harmony, Pennsylvania, is the Western site where some sources claim he worked as a printer.⁴⁸ But for whatever reason, English gave up on utopia and the business of printing to return to another avenue that had not been closed off to him by Boston’s theological elite: military service. There was a need; while the Church of Christ was debating English’s membership and apostasy, the British were burning public buildings during their occupation of Washington. English must still have had at least some support in government, because in 1815 he finally received a military appointment – just as he had asked for in 1808. The *Senate Executive Journal* records that President James Madison nominated English as a second lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps on February 2, 1815.⁴⁹ But on February 16, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Ghent, which had been negotiated in part by US Ambassador to Russia John Quincy Adams, and by the time English was commissioned on March 1 and assigned to Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington, the war with Britain was over.⁵⁰ There was, however, still a need for marines on naval ships due to a brewing conflict with Algeria. During the war with Britain US–Algerian relations had suffered, and Algeria had captured several US-flagged ships. Once the war ended, the United States undertook a naval expedition against Algeria. English’s entry into military service was the

“return to usefulness” that would transform his stubborn autonomy into a tool of the state.

With the US Mediterranean Squadron and Ismael Pasha in Egypt

Shortly after being commissioned, English was assigned to the Mediterranean Squadron. By the time he sailed, though, US representatives had signed a treaty with Algiers.⁵¹ Nevertheless, following the end of the war, the Mediterranean Squadron – based at Port Majon in Minorca, a Spanish-controlled island in the Mediterranean – became a permanent feature of US military force overseas. Appraisals of English’s life in the Mediterranean must remain conditional, for he is largely absent from the archives from 1815 to 1818. But one biographer who knew English claims the life of a sailor agreed with him, as it “placed him amongst gentlemen, which was gratifying to his taste – and, it is said he was a favorite among them.”⁵² And as for life in the Mediterranean Squadron after 1815, one US sailor likened it to membership in a yachting club, as the fleet cruised from port to port.⁵³ But the Mediterranean offered more than the company of other men; it also gave English the opportunity to explore the contemporary theological and political landscape of the Levant, which had fascinated him for many years. Daniele Salvoldi says that English first arrived in Egypt in April 1818, staying until June, and that he had been in Istanbul and İzmir before that.⁵⁴ According to Andrew Oliver, English took an extended leave from the navy at Tunis in 1817 and subsequently traveled to Istanbul, İzmir, Alexandria, Cairo, and then back to Istanbul before returning to Egypt in 1820.⁵⁵ This timeline would seem to agree with English’s own statement to John Quincy Adams in 1823 that he had been “at Constantinople six years ago.”⁵⁶

There are a few other clues about English’s service in the Mediterranean. On February 10, 1819, a curious report appeared in the *Christian Messenger*, a Middlebury, Vermont, newspaper. An anonymous author claimed that English, a former minister and naval officer, had “embraced the Mahomedan faith at Constantinople.”⁵⁷ Whether this is true or slander directed at English by a detractor is impossible to know. It is important to remember that Edward Everett was also in Istanbul in 1819.⁵⁸ English might have even requested the

announcement himself, either as an act of true faith or rebellion. Regardless of the source, the announcement must have been inflammatory. While some of the founders imagined a space of citizenship for Muslims in the republic, popular opinion of Islam remained low following the wars with Tripoli and Algeria.⁵⁹ To “take the turban” was viewed in a very negative light, and the accusation that he had converted to Islam would haunt English even after death. In *The Blue Nile*, for example, the Australian writer Alan Moorehead summed up English’s life – and his flirtation with the Orient – concluding that when he arrived in Egypt “at once the East had swallowed him up.”⁶⁰ Yet English’s own archival remains complicate the simple story of the American who had “gone Turk.”

SWALLOWED BY THE EAST

In 1820, English was certainly in Egypt, where the political landscape was vastly different than in 1805, when the United States was able to recruit a mercenary army in Alexandria to go to war with Tripoli. In the intervening years, Egypt’s fortunes had shifted, and a series of social reforms had begun to reshape the Ottoman province. Mehmed Ali Pasha, an Albanian, arrived in Egypt in 1801 as part of a force sent by the Ottomans aboard British vessels to expel the French following Napoleon’s 1798 invasion. After the expulsion of the French and the departure of the British, Mehmed Ali stayed behind, consolidating power and going on to establish a militarized, modernizing state. When William Eaton arrived in Alexandria in 1805, shortly before Mehmed Ali was named viceroy, he had little difficulty locating mercenaries to participate in the US invasion of Tripoli – Egypt had far more mercenaries than it needed in the aftermath of the Anglo-Ottoman push to expel the French. Six years later, the viceroy relieved Egypt of its surplus of mercenaries and solidified his position by executing many of the remaining Mamluks, soldier-slaves who ruled Egypt for more than 700 years. At the same time that Mehmed Ali was establishing his authority over Egypt, he was exercising power elsewhere in the Ottoman domain. Nominally a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Ali, supported by his son Ibrahim, led the Ottoman invasion and reconquest of Arabia in 1814.⁶¹ With its successful termination of the campaign to suppress the religious and political revolt in Arabia, Egypt had become a force to be reckoned with in the Ottoman world.

In 1820, Ali's forces invaded the Sudan.⁶² According to Khaled Fahmy, rather than to simply claim sovereign power over new territory, the invasion was meant to accomplish multiple goals: first, Ali hoped to locate and eliminate any remaining vestiges of the Mamluks who had fled up the Nile; second, he hoped to secure access to the resources of the interior, including slaves and soldiers; third, he hoped to purge disagreeable Albanian elements from his army.⁶³ The military expedition traveled up the Nile River, not an easy task since the river was only navigable to Wadi Halfa, at the beginning of the second cataract of the Nile. Beyond Wadi Halfa, river transport was impossible. The territorial gulf created by the Nile rapids and the desert was frequently bridged by trade caravans, but it had been little affected by Ottoman power.

This campaign to pacify the Sudan and extract its resources was accompanied by at least three Americans, including George Bethune English, who was employed as an advisor to Ismael Pasha based on the recommendation of Henry Salt, British consul in Egypt.⁶⁴ English arrived at Wadi Halfa, for all practical purposes the edge of Ottoman Egypt, in October 1820. Five days after his arrival he suffered a bout of ophthalmia – a generalized inflammation of the eyes for which he took laudanum, a strong narcotic – and immediately fell a week behind the primary expedition.⁶⁵ *A Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sennaar*, English's opiate-fueled account of his trip up the Nile and one of the first descriptions of the Sudan by an American begins with a brief biography of Mehmed Ali and the troubles on the Upper Nile. The problem, as English describes it, is that Egypt suffers from brigandry, a form of piracy. The solution is sovereign power; English says Mehmed Ali will “subject these countries to his dominion.” This exercise of sovereign power – in effect modernization – required “the destruction or disarmament of the brigands, who have heretofore pillaged those countries,” giving way to order, tranquility, and security. Another decidedly modern effect of the expedition, according to English, is that it will open up the land to the geographer and eliminate the “uncertainty” and “obscurity” concerning the source of the Nile.⁶⁶ Though this quest for the source of the Nile ultimately became a dominant theme in narratives of African exploration by the middle of the nineteenth century, English shows little interest in this kind of adventure.

Far from home, English transformed the Egyptian landscape into a metaphor for his own troubles: "The Nile resembles the path of a good man in a wicked and worthless world." Long before Joseph Conrad described a trip up the Congo River as "like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world," English described the trip south into central Africa "as presenting an epitome of the moral history of man." He praised the ancient Egyptian and Nubian civilizations and credited Ethiopia as the originator of sciences and institutions transferred to Egypt, then Greece and Rome, and finally Europe, lamenting that "the people who now occupy the territories of nations extinct or exterminated, have profited neither by their history nor their fate. What was once a land occupied by nations superstitious and sensual, is now inhabited by robbers and slaves."⁶⁷ This inaugural account of the Sudan by an American, then, documents the opening moments of colonialism in the Sudan following hundreds of years of the trans-Saharan slave trade.

English's observations were pre-Hegelian, written before the "scramble for Africa," and put to paper before the rise of what V.Y. Mudimbe calls "new historical form and the possibility of radically new types of discourses on African traditions and cultures."⁶⁸ English's account of Africa was shaped by ideas about race, religion, and sex in which north and central Africa were more closely linked – to each other and to the Mediterranean world at large – than they would be for writers just fifty years later.⁶⁹ Rather than a well-developed racial typology, English's is an *a posteriori* formulation of race that depends less on skin color than other characteristics. The Ethiopians, who are Christian, are black, but are not Negroes. Along with dark skin, they have "the white man's physiognomy and long hair." The residents of Sennar, to the west – men who are "yellow, tall and well shaped" and women whom English says are the ugliest he has ever seen because they are engaged in so much drudgery – are "exceedingly avaricious, extortionate, faithless, filthy, and cruel."⁷⁰ In 1820, English lacks the necessary *episteme* – what Michel Foucault describes as an *a priori* apparatus – from which to draw on in order to produce the well-developed racial typologies of later mercenary encounters; it never occurs to him to make any comparisons to people of African descent in the United States. As Bruce Dain argues, at this point in the development of ideas about race in the United States, "blacks could constitute a distinct people, persistently black but still

human, capable of improvement and degradation, depending on circumstances.”⁷¹ Race was still a historical, rather than a scientific or biologic, subject.

Though he lacks the well-developed racism of Americans who arrived in the Sudan fifty years later, what English does have is a rudimentary – though surely advanced among Americans – understanding of Islamic practice and a well-developed misogyny. Religion, first, figures significantly in the ways English describes the people of Sennar. In Berber, at the Great Bend of the Nile, English recoils from the spectacle of Muslims who eat pork, while betraying a fascination with their practices of religious body modification. “We saw here three men, of about twenty-five years of age, who had been circumcised but five days past, a thing I had never known before to have occurred to the children of Mussulmans.” In a footnote, he explains the absence of circumcision from the Qur’an and its association with “the ancient Arabs from time memorial, as descendants of Abraham.” For Muslims, he says, it is optional but “undoubtedly conducive to vigour and cleanliness.”⁷² He notes the cross-denominational nature of this practice in the region, saying that Egyptian Coptic and Abyssinian Christians also practice circumcision, “because (say they) Jesus Christ was circumcised.”⁷³ Yet, while circumcision is a healthful practice for men, it is evidence of depravity in Muslim women. English observed, “Many of the women among the Mahommedans cause themselves to be circumcised, from fanaticism, by cutting off the labiæ of the pudendum muliebre.” Women surface infrequently in English’s writing, to be sure. But whenever they do, he seems to express little besides disgust.

In both Berber and Sennar, English is disappointed to witness prostitution, while commentary on slavery appears to be out of his reach. English complains that, among the Berbers, owners of black slaves would permit soldiers of the occupation to have sex with them for one dollar. But it is the prostitution that troubles him, not the ownership of black Africans. As a guest in the house of a local ruling-class family, English claims the mother offered to let him take one of the family’s two daughters – young and attractive but already married – to bed with him. Without revealing his own orientation, English scolds the mother, telling her that for a Muslim adultery is a crime as serious as murder. Yet English’s scolding does not appear to be that of a true believer. In a footnote he admits that if not for the effects of the sun he might have

lost his virtue. Recognizing the irony of his position, English recounted an episode in which a soldier berated a local man for the country's female promiscuity and male drunkenness, which the soldier swore the invading army, as representatives of the sultan in Istanbul, would soon correct; English pointed out that the soldier had just come from the other side of the river, where he had gone to seek out female entertainment.⁷⁴ English appears to have believed that there was something about women's bodies that causes men to act irreligiously. Of the Berber, he complained further, "If their women are accustomed to grant their favours to their countrymen, as liberally and frequently as they did to our soldiers, I should imagine that it must be difficult, in this country, for a man to know his father."⁷⁵ Women appear to be agents of disorder. English never thinks, though, to connect sexual servitude and the circulation of women's bodies in Berber with slavery in the United States or the Ottoman Empire.

When the Egyptians finally arrived at the capitol, there was no battle for the city. English lamented "finding this once powerful city of Sennaar [*sic*] to be almost nothing but heaps of ruins, containing in some of its quarters some few hundreds of habitable but almost deserted houses." After eighteen years of decline during the rule of Badi VII, the leader surrendered the city graciously to the invaders.⁷⁶ But this was not the "dark continent" or "wild Africa," lying entirely outside of human time. English describes the ruins of a great city with marble monuments and an impressive palace. The city was still inhabited and there were three markets in which Turkish coffee and Greek food were available following the arrival of the Egyptians. The only hostility English observed was widespread anti-Christian sentiment – probably owing to a long conflict with Abyssinia to the east – though most of the inhabitants had never seen a Christian, according to English.⁷⁷ Sennar was to be plunged into modernity with the intensification of the slave trade as well as the extension on Egyptian imperial power southward.

English had little in the way of ideology to connect his misogyny more closely to race and slavery, but he seemed overwhelmed by what was taking place around him. As with most invasions, what followed was widespread social disorder and violent atrocities. After his early success in penetrating the Sudan, Ismael waged a campaign of terror against the locals and was eventually murdered. It would take six years for Mehmed Ali to subdue resistance in the region.⁷⁸ English witnessed what

contemporary observers would recognize as a stream of war refugees and forced resettlement. In one passage, he reported the return of the *divan effendi* with 350 enslaved prisoners from east of Sennar. Among these were three chiefs, two of whom were impaled in the public square of the capital on the advice of the sultan of Sennar. English recoiled from this brutality, as one dying man chanted the *shabada* until he was too weak to do anything but spit at the invaders while the other chief repeatedly called the Egyptians “robbers and murderers.”⁷⁹ Here, again, is an instance in which men are described in more flattering terms than women. Like the beautiful “well-shaped” men that he describes elsewhere, these men stand out for their valor. Later, English observed Ali Cogia Achmet returning from an expedition ten days southwest into the mountains with 2,000 captured women and children who he says had been stripped of their gold. Disillusioned, English did not stay long before requesting to be sent back to Cairo due to his ophthalmia. On his return trip to Aswan, English crossed paths with Mehmed Bey Defterdar’s army, which was on its way to pacify Darfur and Kordofan in the western Sudan.⁸⁰

English was still in Egypt in 1821, when the Greek Revolution began with the massacre of Muslims and Jews across the archipelago. These outbreaks of violence were shortly followed by Ottoman reprisals in Turkey and Greece. The rebellion in Greece shifted relations among the Ottomans, British, French, and Russians and may have been one of the events that propelled English home. In September 1821, English met the German missionary Joseph Wolff on a boat from Alexandria to Cairo. The two appear to have been acquainted only for a few months, but English is a frequent topic of Wolff’s journals as one of the members of the circle of Europeans around Henry Salt. In an 1824 account of his missionary work in the Ottoman Empire, Wolff described his attempts to bring English back into the Christian fold, an endeavor at which he was unsuccessful. The two went their separate ways when Wolff left for Palestine in December.⁸¹ Along with the Greek Revolution, there may also have been a pay dispute with Mehmed Ali that compelled English to leave Egypt in 1822.⁸²

In March of that year, English departed for Malta, where he spent a month in the homosocial space of quarantine with, among others, the missionary Pliny Fisk. This encounter, one of the first between a US missionary and mercenary in the Ottoman world, is preserved in two

letters Fisk wrote, one to his sister and the other to English before the two parted company in May. Fisk ultimately returned to Egypt and then died in Beirut a few years later, while English went to London and then the United States. In the letter written to English, Fisk accuses him of “obstinate hostility to the truth,” calling his case “one of the most deplorable and dangerous that I have ever known.”⁸³ Beginning with Walter Livingstone Wright Jr. in 1928, scholars have used this passage to position English as a renegade. In a second frequently quoted passage, from the letter to his sister, Fisk refers only to “men of the world . . . who are destitute of vital religion . . . who have no adequate idea of what it is, or of what it requires of its professors.”⁸⁴ Scholars have read this passage, which does not refer to English by name, as evidence that Fisk believed English did not understand the importance of faith. Both these things may be true – English may have been a renegade and devoid of faith – but these two passages represent but a fragment of the two men’s intimate relationship. For example, in his first letter to English, Fisk expressed “unrestrained goodwill” toward English and lamented,

It has grieved me more than I know how to express to find you so fond of misrepresenting and distorting the doctrines of the gospel and [dragging] from them inferences and conclusions which evangelical men will unite in considering unfair and unjust if not monstrous and blasphemous.

It was not simply blasphemy that irritated Fisk, but the fact that English’s views caused him personal pain. Grieving from the loss of his missionary partner Levi Parsons in Alexandria, Fisk concluded his letter to English:

My dear Sir, I wish you may be happy. May you one day know what a broken heart is, and what the meekness of the gospel is. I wish and pray that you may die happy but O I should shudder at the thought of your dying as you are now. I shall often think of you and if my imperfect prayers may prevail you will, before the door of mercy is shut again to you, rejoin to bow before the cross and rest your hopes on the blood of Atonement.⁸⁵

English had once again flummoxed a Christian minister. In the space of the Ottoman world, English was able to exercise this kind of autonomy. Back in the United States, the situation was much more complicated.

RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Before he returned to the United States, English traveled to London, where the first edition of his narrative was published anonymously. The book was dedicated, “with affectionate respect,” to Henry Salt, Esquire, the British consul general in Egypt, whom English called his “fatherly friend in a foreign land.”⁸⁶ Salt, who had recommended English to the Egyptians, was consul general in Alexandria from 1815 to 1827 and responsible for collecting Egyptian antiquities and cultivating a relationship with the Abyssinians. At some point after he arrived in Egypt, English became acquainted with Salt, and this relationship was apparently useful in helping him secure the book contract. Though he published the first edition of his book anonymously, English was not unknown in London. In fact, he had been described in a recently published travel narrative by George Waddington. In 1820, Waddington had traveled up the Nile with Reverend Barnard Hanbury only to be turned back by Ismael at Merowe, where they met English.⁸⁷ In his account of their meeting, published in London in 1822, Waddington described English as a man with the “the grave and calm look of the Turks” who had “took the turban.” If this had been all Waddington had to say, English might not have objected. After all, English would later emphasize his ability to pass as Muslim, as he was seeking a job with the US Government. What English objected to was Waddington’s claim that he complained about the reception he received from the two men. Waddington concluded, “It is difficult to say what reception a renegade has a right to expect from those whose religion he has deserted.”⁸⁸ After his arrival in London, English wrote to Waddington to dispute this characterization of their meeting and Waddington’s unflattering portrait of him, saying, “Having been misled by the tongue of some mischievous enemy of mine, he gave an account of me not a little fabulous.”⁸⁹ In the first US edition of his narrative, English reported that he had received a written apology from Waddington.⁹⁰

By November 1822, English was once again in the spotlight in the United States. In an article titled “The Apostate,” the *Alexandria Herald*

of Virginia announced the return of the Bostonian “whose eccentric conduct has attracted so much attention,” and the publication of his interesting narrative in London.⁹¹ In February of the following year, Wells and Lilly in Boston published the first US edition of English’s narrative. The book was advertised several times by other publishers before Wells and Lilly published it, but apparently none of these publishers received enough subscriptions to make it profitable to publish the book. Besides the author’s identity, the American edition of English’s book added several features: first, a map, “from an English one”; additional footnotes, including an important note about his fellow Americans on the trip; and, finally, appendices containing descriptions of the Sudan from other travelers.⁹²

The publication of English’s mercenary narrative received much attention and, predictably, reviews were mixed. One reviewer said the book would “naturally excite considerable attention,” thanks to the “eccentric genius and extraordinary adventures of this young man, who is our countryman.”⁹³ It appears that in the ten years since his public dispute with the Unitarian elite of Boston, things had quieted down. Another, longer review expressed “a strong feeling of disappointment” and opined that the narrative “would not immortalize” its author, from whom the reviewer thought “something better was to have been expected, and we trust, will be accomplished.” This reviewer believed the narrative would appeal only to shameless readers “who prefer to behold Nature as she is in her most debasing forms, and that, which custom and delicacy usually seek to hide, stripped stark naked to the world.” Even more worrisome to this second reviewer was the negative impression of American literature that the book was bound to make on the British reviewers at the *Quarterly and Edinburgh Reviews*; the reviewer worried that the book would no doubt reflect poorly on views of American writing.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the narrative was excerpted in US newspapers. In Connecticut, English’s observations on Turkish habits were published, and in Maine, English’s descriptions of Berber and the Berber people appeared in papers.⁹⁵ Ten years after his run-in with three of Boston’s theological elites, it appeared English was momentarily welcome in the United States. In the service of the state, he would sacrifice much of the autonomy he enjoyed in the Ottoman world.

The Ottoman Mediterranean as a Gateway to National Sovereignty

In 1821, the year before English returned home, the United States failed in its initial effort to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire. John Quincy Adams, whose influence on James Monroe's foreign policy was significant, had sent Luther Bradish to negotiate in Istanbul, but Bradish found little success – like many Americans he was uncomfortable with the tribute system, and the Ottoman Porte was wary of negotiating with the United States, in part because of British advice, but also it suspected Americans of aiding Greek rebels.⁹⁶ In St. Petersburg, US ambassador Henry Middleton – a vehement anti-Ottoman – opposed quasi-diplomatic missions like these because they endangered US relations with Russia. But Adams was either willing to suffer reduced friendliness with Russia, abandon his Philhellenic allies in the United States in order to get access to the Black Sea, or ignore the possible consequences of the treaty on international relations. Before the Greek issue came to the forefront, the United States was already negotiating a thin line in balancing its relationships with Istanbul and St Petersburg, two empires that had fought three wars in the last fifty years. Following the beginning of the Greek Revolution in 1821, this balancing act became even more tenuous and Russia offered the United States a wide-ranging treaty, which Monroe and Adams thought was meant to draw the United States into the war against the Ottomans. The president and secretary of state both rejected this lure, professing interest in a treaty that would be strictly commercial rather than one involving political relations.⁹⁷ Yet in spite of widespread support in the United States for the Greek cause and opposition to relations with the Ottomans – Edward Everett, for instance, was a vocal supporter of the Greeks – the US executive branch continued to pursue relations with the Porte throughout the Greek Revolution.⁹⁸ English figured significantly in these negotiations.

“IN THE ORIENTAL DRESS”

In December 1822, English responded to a letter from Senator James Lloyd of Massachusetts, a fellow alumnus of Harvard to whom English had written for help in securing a government appointment. Though he had been severed from the Boston social order in 1814, English was not

without obligations and friends in the United States. He expressed both his desire to serve the United States and his need for money to care for his father, who is “fast advancing in years, and who has a right to look to me to make his old age as comfortable as possible.”⁹⁹ As a solution to both these problems, English considered several options. First, he could reenlist in the military, but admitted “it would not be easy” for reasons of which he said Lloyd was aware. He also considered a career in the diplomatic service, but recognized that the Barbary consul jobs, for which he was most qualified, were all taken. Finally, Turkey appeared out of the question: “I do not suppose that the Government will think of a mission to Turkey till the affairs of the East assume a more tranquil appearance.”¹⁰⁰ English was not entirely pessimistic, though. Where Bradish had failed, English saw an opening – both for himself and for the United States:

I have what I consider strong reasons to believe, that if I were sent to Constantinople and Egypt that I could obtain the *tacit permission* for our vessels to trade to Salonique-Alexandria-and the other ports of the Levant, on the same footing as they have long done at Smyrna. I say “tacit permission” because I well know that the British Ambassador at the Porte would use his utmost endeavours – and an account of the present situation of the Ottoman Empire with great effect too – to prevent a commercial treaty.¹⁰¹

If good words were needed to secure such a position, English counted former secretary of war Henry Dearborn of Boston among his supporters, but he placed the greatest faith in Lloyd, whom he trusted “to obtain an opportunity to employ myself worthily, and I tranquilize my anxiety as much as possible by the confidence I have in my most valuable possession – your friendship.”¹⁰²

English acknowledged an earlier letter in which Lloyd had apparently advised him not to rush into anything, but by March of 1823 English was in Washington. There, in a letter to John Quincy Adams, English proposed expanding American trade in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰³ Claiming that the Porte favored expanding relations with the United States based on its good experience with American traders at İzmir, English attempted to mobilize his mercenary experience – not merely as someone who could pass or move effortlessly throughout the Ottoman

world, but a person with real connections there – to secure a position negotiating equal commercial footing for the United States in Ottoman ports. In his account of the possibilities of Ottoman commerce, English claimed the Ottomans were increasingly drawn to the United States, especially since the 1812 war with Britain had demonstrated “the growing power and great importance of ‘The New Nation.’” Furthermore, and related to his own troubles in the past, English positioned the United States as a secular power, saying,

They are the more disposed to have a good understanding with us having been informed that our government have [*sic*] no *religious animosities* against them, and that by our institutions a Mussulman would be on the same footing in our country as a Christian.¹⁰⁴

In theory, at least, English was on firm republican footing. Denise Spellberg argues that the applicability of US law to Muslims and others was one yardstick by which the founders – or at least Federalist James Iredell – measured their success in formulating laws and institutions.¹⁰⁵ Secularism – in this case the triumph of commercial over religious affiliations, was both an ideology that English felt comfortable embracing and one that would serve the United States’ interests in the Ottoman world. As English explained, “European nations who monopolize at present the trade of those Ports are considered by the Ottoman Government as the natural enemies of the Empire and only withheld from falling on it [the Empire] by their jarring interests.” Commerce with the United States would ensure stable prices for the Ottomans when the nations of Europe were embroiled in war and US vessels were the only neutral-flagged ships in the Mediterranean.

English emphasized his vital connections to the Ottoman world as well as his exceptional ability to pass as a Muslim in order to claim that he was the best person for the job. Speaking in third person, perhaps out of respect for his old professor, English described his unique pedigree:

The Undersigned believes that the circumstances of the last six years of his life give him advantages over every other American citizen as a medium of obtaining such a privilege [*sic*] from the Ottoman Government. Having lived among the Osmanli for some years he is familiar with their character and customs, has many

acquaintances of high rank among them, has served in their troops, and contributed essentially to the glory of their arms: all which are circumstances obviously calculated to secure a favourable consideration of what he might propose to them.

English proposed traveling to Versailles “as an individual voyaging about his affairs without ostentation or pretense.” From France, he would continue on to Istanbul. “On my arrival at the Capitol of the Ottoman Empire by appearing only in the Oriental dress I should be lost among the crowds of the immense city and escape the notice of the Europeans who reside there.” If, as Anne McClintock demonstrates using Rudyard Kipling’s *Kim*, colonial passing can be used as a tool of surveillance, here is a case where passing is also a means of countering surveillance by suspicious colonial adversaries.¹⁰⁶ In Istanbul, English proposed that he would approach Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha, the kapudan pasha (the head of the Ottoman Navy and absolute authority in the empire’s ports). English outlined the benefits that would accrue to Hüsrev for facilitating a treaty: “He would gain for his country the good will of a people destined to become one day the most powerful of all the nations of the west and whose amity might *hereafter* be of *value to himself* [i.e. in a pecuniary way]” (brackets in original). For all this work on behalf of the United States, English asked for 2,000 dollars – enough, he said, to support a two- or three-month stay in the Ottoman capital.¹⁰⁷

Two days after he forwarded his proposal to Adams, English sent another letter clarifying his intentions to gain access for US-flagged ships to major ports in “European Turkey” and on the “Syrian Coast.” In addition, English suggested the US vessels could enjoy the same footing in Alexandria as they did in İzmir if only an official application were sent to the viceroy, from whom English had received a positive response through a minister in reply to his inquiry about American footing in Alexandria. English reported that at İzmir the Ottomans were struck by the Americans, and “pleased with such a proof of confidence affords to them, their rights and commerce the most ample protection.”¹⁰⁸ On April 2 Adams replied, approving English’s mission to Istanbul: “Sir, You are hereby authorized to proceed, on the Voyage suggested in your Letter of the 26th and 28th.” Adams apparently desired to keep the mission quiet:

You will inform me by private Letters of your progress and success, and will communicate as often as you shall have convenient and safe opportunities any information commercial or political which may come to your knowledge and which may be interesting to the United States.¹⁰⁹

Two days later, English was issued a passport and a payment of two 2,000 at the direction of President James Monroe.¹¹⁰

English set in motion the plan he had laid out to Adams and, after a sixty-day trip from New York, he emerged from quarantine in Marseille on July 18, 1823.¹¹¹ On August 6, English wrote Adams to update him on the state of the war between the Ottomans and the Greeks, which he believed favored the Ottomans. He reported that negotiations were ongoing to put the Greeks under a prince, as with Moldavia, while continuing to pay tribute to the Porte. Most important to the United States, English reported that he had come across a copy of capitulations granted to France by the Ottoman Empire.¹¹² The document was in Turkish, but English said he had located a competent translator and would send the translation on as soon as it was complete. He concluded with his assurance to Adams that he was going about his business discreetly and with the benefit of the nation in mind:

I did not doubt that you would approve of my delaying fifteen or twenty days at Marseille for the purpose of obtaining quietly and without observation translations of these Documents which may be of use to the Department of State in case the American Government should attempt to negotiate a Treaty with the Ottoman Emperor.¹¹³

English stayed in Marseille well beyond the “fifteen or twenty days” he suggested to Adams, departing for Istanbul eight weeks later. If he left the city to travel to Paris or elsewhere, English did not say. It is reasonable to speculate, though, that English spent much of these two months circulating in the homosocial world of mariners in one of the Atlantic’s busiest ports.

English finally arrived in Istanbul on November 6, 1823, after a forty-nine-day trip from Marseille, thirty-two of which he said were spent stuck in the Dardanelles due to strong north winds. English began

his mission by furnishing a small apartment. In a letter to Adams dated November 23 he described the city as tranquil, which he attributed to the end of the Ottoman war with Persia and a brief respite from the troubles with Russia.¹¹⁴ He reported that the Ottomans continued to resist Greek independence because they knew the Greeks were “destitute of money,” and “divided among themselves and discontented with their chiefs.” English’s faith in an eminent Ottoman victory seems to have failed, however, and he doubted assessments that the Greeks would shortly surrender. Ever mindful of his debt to Adams, a consummate academic, English reported that he had tried to procure a copy of the Ottoman codes by the “learned Orientalist Dohsson,” but advised Adams it would be cheaper to acquire the book in Paris. He remained confident that his mission to secure a commercial treaty would succeed, and cited promising news that Sardinian-flagged ships had recently gained access to the Black Sea. Finally, English cheerfully reported that Hüsrev, whom he had met six years earlier in Istanbul, would be arriving back from Greece soon.¹¹⁵

In the meantime, English continued to gather intelligence on the state of the Ottoman Empire. In another letter to Adams, English reported on the Egyptian contingent of the Ottoman Army, which had been extremely successful in the Aegean, killing 5,000 Greeks on Crete. But he decried the state of the war: “This detestable war is carried out by both sides with a ferocity shocking to humanity and which ruthlessly tramples under foot all those feelings and principles which distinguish man from the wild beast.”¹¹⁶ English observed that the war had produced additional tension between the British and Ottomans, which might be helpful to the United States; British consul general Lord Strangford had warned British merchants in Istanbul that a rupture might be imminent. English also described his intimate acquaintance with the librarian of the sultan and the dragoman of the Porte. As a translator for the Porte, the dragoman would have had significant diplomatic and cultural insights into Ottoman foreign policy with regard to the United States. The dragoman could help English to communicate with the reis effendi, the minister of foreign affairs, with whom English said he would attempt to negotiate if his efforts with Hüsrev were unsuccessful. According to the dragoman, it was widely rumored in Istanbul that the US began supplying the Greek resistance in retaliation for the failure of Luther Bradish, whom the

Ottomans believed was an official agent of the United States, not just – as Bradish claimed – a curious person making inquiries. The rumor was at least partly true. The US was supplying the Greeks with aid, or at least *Americans* were supporting the Greeks – not due to any particular loyalties, but because there was money to be made, and a tide of anti-Islamic and pro-Hellenic sentiment in the United States helped to justify merchants' extralegal behavior.¹¹⁷ The Ottomans did not accept the blurry line between the citizens and the government of the United States. The flag under which merchants sailed, after all, was what determined their relationship to the empire, its ports, and its rebellious territories.

English understood that these rumors meant he must be cautious and remain under cover; passing had become more important than ever. "I am I understand at present considered by the Europeans here merely as one who has traveled in the East and who visits Constantinople in an Oriental dress to have the greater facility to observe what is worth notice." English claimed his ability to pass even under these tense circumstances allowed him to go deeper into the Ottoman world than anyone else: "Under favor of this garb I penetrate almost everywhere and have opportunities of learning the mode of transacting public business of the Ottoman Porte which the European dress would infallibly exclude me." Indeed, English thought nothing strange about saying, "Among my neighbors I pass for an American Mussulman who has come from a far distant country to visit the Capital of Islam." By imagining an American Muslim in Istanbul, English was in many ways embodying the ideal vision of republican government and its applicability to white men of all religions imagined decades earlier. Unlike Kipling's *Kim*, however, English was not a fictional mimic man, and he recognized that passing was an anxious practice: "My situation is full of danger and disquietude, and nothing but my determination not to disappoint by my fault your expectations with regard to me is able to countervail the anxiety of the singular task I have imposed upon myself." English's passing was also constrained; it only shielded him from Europeans, and then only obscured his relationship to the state, rather than hiding it entirely from view. In the capital, few non-Europeans would have been fooled by English, and indeed he said that he was frequently denounced as a Greek spy on the streets. Under pressure, English worried about the unspeakable – death – and hoped that if he were killed, Adams would

“shield my father whom you knew in better days from the distresses which menace his declining years.”¹¹⁸ Acting as an instrument of mercenary force often produces these kinds of narrative positions for subjects.

After expressing his anxiety about death in this extended aside in the letter, English listed some of the details of US trade in Ottoman ports. France remained the most favored nation in the Ottoman Porte. In İzmir, Americans paid 15 per cent at custom house, instead of 10 per cent like Europeans. Besides lower customs rates, a treaty would mean the US could increase their secondhand export of coffee, sugar, indigo, cochineal, and dollars to Ottoman ports. In return, the US would have access to drugs, gums, dried fruits, fine copper, and luxury goods. English recognized that Ottoman hemp, cotton, wool, and finished silk were not much in demand in United States at the time. But English was thinking beyond import commodities: “By far the greater part of the profits derivable from a free intercourse with Turkey would consist in freight.” In other words, it would be from the transportation of goods, not their sale, that the United States would profit. Here, English invoked the already well-developed narrative of US naval exceptionalism, expressing his belief that the “superiority of American ships and sailors would give them an advantage over most of their competitors.” The only thing preventing the United States from enlarging its commerce in the Ottoman Mediterranean was European jealousy.

For these insights, English gave credit to David Offley, the US commercial agent in İzmir. For more information, English referred Adams to the agent’s upcoming report, “Commerce of Turkey.”¹¹⁹ Offley, a Presbyterian, was suspicious of English and sent a letter to Adams in January accusing the former Unitarian of having converted to Islam, which he said made English a subject of the sultan. Beyond his religious prejudices and desire to remain the pivotal figure in US–Ottoman relations, Offley must also have been uncomfortable with the unexplained appearance of English on his way to Istanbul. English complicated Offley’s longstanding business in İzmir; the day before English arrived back in İzmir from Istanbul, Offley had been questioned by the local pasha and forced to deny that he knew anything about English except that he existed.¹²⁰ Offley had been in İzmir since 1811, and had almost certainly met English before. He may even have been involved with the 1818 report of English’s conversion to Islam.

Offley was likely uncomfortable to see that the former mercenary was working as an agent of state, which might jeopardize the dominance of his commercial business – Woodmans and Offley – in the Ottoman port.

While Offley tended his business in İzmir, English made progress in setting the stage for future negotiations with the Porte in Istanbul. In a February 8, 1824, letter to Adams, he reported that in his final days in Istanbul, he was received by Hüsrev. Over coffee, English took a similar approach to Bradish, lying about his intent and telling the kapudan pasha that he was in the Ottoman capital on a pleasure trip, and that the government business was just a side bit – although perhaps this was true in some ways. Suggesting that the United States desired a “more intimate commercial relationship,” English wondered aloud what such a commercial relationship would entail. Hüsrev replied that no advances could take place until he investigated the Bradish affair. When they met again, Hüsrev claimed it was the influence of the British ambassador that caused Bradish’s failure. Nevertheless, at the time, Hüsrev believed it would be difficult to negotiate a treaty – probably because the Porte recognized the delicate state of the Aegean crisis and the perils of further endangering relations with the British over a small-fry treaty with the United States. Hüsrev, however, was willing to meet with the commodore of the Mediterranean Squadron if the United States was prepared to deliver specific conditions for a treaty, which Hüsrev could take directly to the sultan. The perceived advantages of this offshore approach to diplomacy was that it bypassed the step of sending an ambassador to Istanbul, which would have required the issuance of a passport and would almost certainly have stirred intrigue among the dragomans and diplomats in the capital. English admitted the Hüsrev’s conditions were not exactly the results that he promised to produce, but the best he could do at present. English concluded that the Greek cause was ultimately hopeless, and it would only be a matter of time before the Aegean crisis ended.¹²¹ Once things were back to normal in the Mediterranean – and Washington – a treaty would be less perilous to negotiate.

English returned to İzmir from Istanbul to find that none of the letters he had written to Adams had been forwarded to the United States. Offley held these letters, claiming that no vessel had sailed for the United States in the three months that English was in Istanbul.¹²²

In a brief letter summarizing his mission, English offered no comment on Offley's delay. It is unclear if he realized how much the commercial agent disliked him. Back in Boston, English forwarded the letters, attachments, and packet of books that he had accumulated during his ten months abroad and made plans to travel to Washington to meet with Adams in person.¹²³ While English was absent, Adams had continued to receive letters from Henry Middleton, and the Greek cause had grown stronger in the United States. Middleton was aware that Monroe and Adams had sent Bradish and English to Istanbul, and he opposed both missions.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the Monroe administration continued to see negotiating equal footing in Ottoman ports as an important foreign-policy priority. "All this is to be kept profoundly secret," Adams wrote in his journal in May 1824.¹²⁵

Adams and English met on May 6, 1824. Adams reported that English "asked me if he could flatter himself with an expectation of further employment, and said he had been for many years habituated to consider me his patron and friend." Adams replied, "I said it would always give me pleasure to serve him, but I could promise him nothing at this time. If any occasion should present itself of giving him a suitable occupation, I would not be unmindful of him."¹²⁶ For his part, English maintained that a treaty was still within Washington's reach. In a letter sent to Adams the next week, English once again invoked strong nationalist and exceptionalist language while continuing to advance his relationship with the kapudan pasha as a direct line to the sultan. A treaty between the Porte and Washington was possible, English explained, because the United States was "a great and flourishing nation that has no prejudices or enmities political or religious against the Ottomans." With or without his involvement, English genuinely seemed to believe that the treaty would be good for the United States. But, he noted, "it might still be well that I should be present for reasons which I trust are not unobvious." English also expressed his desire to give Hüsrev "an opportunity to exert himself in behalf of our commercial interests in the East."¹²⁷ Though he was embroiled in a bitter dispute with Boston's theological elite a decade earlier, English still aligned himself with the economic interests of their parishioners. Even if he could not influence the religious life of the nation, he could still exercise mercenary force in the interests of New England's merchant class. His service, though, was constrained by

the growing dependence of the merchant class on the state and its institutions.

It was not just recognition of the national sovereignty of the United States in Ottoman ports that had English concerned, but also his own autonomy. He looked to Adams as someone who might help shield him from economic suffering. At the end of one letter he addressed Adams as “a revered friend” and complained that he had arrived back in İzmir with only sixty dollars to his name. He hoped that the government would reimburse him for the expenses he incurred above and beyond his 2,000-dollar stipend. Echoing William Eaton’s complaints from seventeen years earlier, English wrote, “I doubt not that its [the government’s] just liberality will at least prevent my disregard of self in this instance from being the cause of embarrassment, to one in my circumstances of serious consequences.”¹²⁸ Adams’s response to English is absent from the archive – but the liberal government that English embraced appeared to view English as a contractor, rather than an appointed official or full-time employee. Four months passed before English once again approached the president and secretary of state about the Ottoman treaty.

While he waited and hoped for another government appointment, English returned to public life, publishing a number of important pieces on theology and social geography. First up was *Five Pebbles from the Brook*, a reply – which English claimed to have written while he was in Egypt – to Edward Everett’s 1814 criticism of *The Grounds of Christianity Examined*.¹²⁹ The book’s title, which refers to David’s selection of five smooth stones from the Sea of Galilee to slay Goliath, positioned English as the little man in the theological confrontation between himself and Everett. English’s self-published response was also timely – in 1824 Everett was embarking on a political career as a US representative from Massachusetts. Conflating himself with David also marked English as a defender of Judaism against Christian bullying, while putting him at odds with Adams, a political ally of Everett. It seems beyond the pale to think that English was unaware of the politics of a renewed confrontation with Everett. So what to make of this? Was English attacking Adams indirectly for not supporting him? Perhaps he was truly committed to his criticism of Christianity, but why risk further trouble?

In *Five Pebbles from the Brook*, English connected his exile in Egypt to troubles at home and issued some of his strongest words yet against Christianity in the United States:

This work was written in Egypt and forwarded to the U. States, while I was preparing to accompany Ismael Pacha [*sic*] to the conquest of Ethiopia; an expedition in which I expected to perish, and therefore felt it to be my duty to leave behind me, something from which my countrymen might learn what were my real sentiments upon a most important and interesting subject; and as I hoped would learn too, how grossly they had been deluded into building their faith and hope upon a demonstrated error.

Beyond the theological argument he presented, English also defended himself against the gravest of accusations:

This book is not the work of an Infidel. I am not an infidel; what I have learned and seen in Europe, Asia and Africa, while it has confirmed my reasons for rejecting the New Testament, has rooted in my mind the conviction that the ancient Bible does contain a revelation from the God of Nature, as firmly as my belief in the first proposition of Euclid.¹³⁰

English mixed the sacred with the secular, and finally triangulated himself by situating the United States in relation to the divine.

The question remained: if Christianity was so bad, then why was the United States so great? Because he rejected Christianity while continuing to embrace nationalism, English was forced to attribute US exceptionalism to republicanism rather than religion.

The good Christians of the United States, I do not use the term in sarcasm, for they are good, speak in their books and sermons of the Christian religion as if it were everywhere the same as in the grand, free, and liberal republic. But the Fact is not so. An American who reads the poems of Homer, or Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, laughs at the religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans as a ridiculous folly; but when he visits those countries in Christendom which are not Protestant, he will be inclined to regard their religion as a

blasphemy against the Most High. Go where you will in those countries, if you look into their churches, you invariably find “a molten image, or picture, and a teacher of lies.”¹³¹

Protestantism was successful in the United States because of the liberality of the republic, not the other way around. And US Protestants did not have a monopoly on republicanism, as English would demonstrate elsewhere.

On May 1, 1824 the *National Advocate* – a New York journal sponsored by Tammany Hall – published English’s report on the Jewish community in Istanbul. English was responding to a request by the editor of the *National Advocate*, to supply information on the lives of Jews in the Ottoman Empire. English positioned the Jewish community in Istanbul as a self-governing republic, quoting a French traveler who had described “the unique spectacle of a well ordered Republic, surrounded by Despotism, like a besieged city.” English continued to hold that the Jews had been the victim of multiple oppressors, always holding strong:

This people have given the world the astonishing spectacle of the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, openly when they could, and secretly when enslaved, for more than three thousand years, in spite of kings, conquerors, and nations, who have enslaved them so often, during that long period, and crushed them under a weight of oppression and opprobrium, sufficient to drive mad alike the wise and the foolish.

Jewish people it appeared to English, might be better off in the Ottoman Empire than they were in the United States.¹³²

This letter ties English to yet another strand of developing thought in the United States. Though he may simply have written the *National Advocate* article in return for payment, the magazine had an agenda of its own. The journal’s editor was Mordecai Noah, an influential Jew who had embraced both Christianography – Cotton Mather’s term for reading geography as “incarnation of scriptural precedent” – and the restoration of the Jews. As Hilton Obenzinger points out, Noah’s advocacy of these two projects made him responsible for the “injection of Christian Zionism into previously non-Zionist Jewish discourse.”¹³³ Noah and English’s lives

have several parallels. They both labored on behalf of the government in Washington, and each held tight to US exceptionalism. Both suffered as a result of national politics. Noah was an early supporter of the Democratic-Republicans, and appointed by Madison as consul to Riga and then Tunis in 1813. He was subsequently removed from his post by the State Department for overpaying to ransom eleven Americans held captive in Algeria, after which circumstances forced him to pursue journalism.¹³⁴ For his part, English appears to have never made a strong commitment to Judaism, and certainly never to restorationism or Zionism. Instead, his attention remained on securing another appointment to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Porte – perhaps out of a desire to support republicanism or assist the few friends he seems to have made in the commercial world.¹³⁵

In New York, English grew anxious about whether Monroe would move forward with treaty negotiations.¹³⁶ An appointment finally came through, but the Greek Revolution continued to complicate matters and push back his departure date. In August, English sent a letter to President Monroe from Gadsby's Hotel in Washington, a copy of which he forwarded to Adams, commenting that

the interference of some of our well meaning countrymen [American Philhellenes] in giving aid and support to a war with which they have nothing to do ... makes me feel very anxious about what may be the natural consequences of all this to our countrymen and to the interests of the US in the Levant.

English acknowledged the president's order to depart for the Mediterranean aboard USS *North Carolina* in two months, rather than on USS *Constitution* immediately. But he argued that Russia and Britain were unwilling to help the Greeks and that it was crucial for the United States to act quickly: "In this actual state of things, it is obvious that the US have now to take the measures to remain uninjured and uncompromised of their own interests in the Levant." He suggested it might be better for him to proceed to Gibraltar immediately in order to contact Hüsrev and alert him to the imminent arrival of the commodore of the Mediterranean Squadron with a letter from the president.¹³⁷ But Monroe apparently did not waiver from his cautious approach, and English was left waiting for his ship to sail for the Mediterranean.

English was alarmed by the delay. Three weeks later, on August 31, he wrote to Adams after talking to him earlier in the day, “I beseech you, Sir, to engage the President to prevent the mischief I apprehend.”¹³⁸ Three months later, English had still not departed, and he wrote another letter to Adams proposing a meeting the next day to ascertain if Monroe had decided to postpone his mission. English also expressed his hope that “if circumstances have rendered it inexpedient at present to give effect to what I have labored to accomplish for the advantage of the US I may yet be afforded some opportunity in your power to bestow of rendering service to my country.”¹³⁹ In a postscript, English added that he had spoken confidentially with Henry Dearborn, who was under the impression that English was to depart with *North Carolina*. English worried that someone might have been “indiscreet” [*sic*] and did not want the blame for a leak to fall on him. He assured Adams that he had never exchanged a word with the person from whom Dearborn got this information. English emphasized his sacrifices to keep the mission secret: “For months [I’ve] lived in as much seclusion as possible, to avoid questions which some of my good countrymen have frequently endeavored to get an answer to.”¹⁴⁰ By December 30, he was reduced to begging Adams for his pay in arrears for the last eighteen months – he hinted that he might be jailed if he did not meet certain financial obligations soon.¹⁴¹ The personal cost of his service to the nation had become a cross for him to bear.

“THE GREAT SHIP THAT CAME FROM THE NEW WORLD”

In January 1825, English received official instructions from John Quincy Adams to travel to Norfolk and report to Captain John Rodgers of the *North Carolina* and “perform such services as he may assign to you” as Commander of the Mediterranean Squadron. For his services as an interpreter, English would be compensated at the rate of 2,000 dollars a year, from which he would be required to pay for his own rations.¹⁴² A month later, English wrote Adams to inform him that he was set to travel to Norfolk to board *North Carolina* for the Mediterranean. He acknowledged a message he was carrying for the commodore, which was somehow related to the affairs of the Department of State. He promised to communicate the message “word for word as you have delivered it, though I doubt not that when you *have* ‘a successor’ to your present office, it will be in the way most agreeable of your friends – and

the best friends of our country.”¹⁴³ Adams had been elected president, but had not yet taken office and was still serving as secretary of state. Henry Clay would shortly assume that office in the new Adams administration.

By August, English was once again in İzmir. *North Carolina* had waited two weeks for the rest of the Squadron in Gibraltar and then proceeded to Paros and Turkey in order to obtain information about the state of the Greek Revolution as well as the location of Hüsrev. English reported the success of the Egyptian contingent of the Ottoman response to the Greek revolt: Ibrahim’s European-trained and -commanded troops were “irresistible in the Morea”; Napoli di Romania was the only place of any significance in Greek hands, and only because it was under the protection of the British. One of the unfortunate side effects of the ongoing conflict was an upsurge in Mediterranean piracy. But this time the threat did not emanate from North Africa; it came from the Aegean. In addition to preying on European vessels, English reported that the Greek rebels had pirated at least two US ships.¹⁴⁴

Providing protection to American ships around the Morea was just one of the reasons for sending the Mediterranean Squadron to İzmir. Another was to secure from Offley a copy of the Ottoman capitulations with the French, which would provide the basis for understanding the conditions under which negotiations of a commercial arrangement might take place. English took credit for enlisting Offley into the mission, explaining in his letter to Adams how he had convinced the commodore to be frank with Offley and take advantages of whatever services he could offer “and thus interest him in furthering a business which otherwise might *pique*, or envy might influence him to thwart.” English implied that Offley was a reluctant nationalist who needed to be convinced to value his country more than his own business. The commodore “laid such strong hands of hope and fear on Mr. Offley as will I believe make him zealous in aiding the commodore in the business he is charged with.” Finally, English reported that the appearance of the flagship of the US Mediterranean Squadron in an Ottoman port produced impressive results beyond suppressing Greek piracy or securing treaty documents. English commented on these more intangible results – the growing visibility of US power – describing the spectacle occasioned by visiting warship. “With liberality and great good sense,” the commodore opened the ship to anyone who wanted to

see it. Visitors included “Europeans-Turks-Greeks-Arminians [*sic*] and Jews, in short a large proportion of the population of Smyrna of all nations and both sexes.” English links masculinity, power, and performance to US imperialism when he says that “even the rigour of Oriental reserve has in this instance yielded to the irresistible cravings of female curiosity to see, to use their own expression, ‘The Great Ship that came from the New World.’” In English’s description of this encounter, the Oriental Other, in this case gendered as male, was overcome and feminized by the spectacle of US power. English concluded that the appearance of the squadron “contributed in no small degree to aggrandize the national character among the people of the Levant.” Yet the squadron’s most important mission – contacting Hüsrev – remained incomplete. Rodgers made plans to depart İzmir in a week to meet Hüsrev in Crete and then go on to Napoli di Romania to gather intelligence about the prospects of the Greeks.¹⁴⁵

By December, English appeared frustrated. Neither national nor personal sovereignty was being affected by his mission. While the commodore had finally succeeded in forwarding a letter to Hüsrev to establish an official channel of communications, English worried that support for the Greek cause would cause Adams to be indifferent to the Ottoman treaty. English argued forcefully that the United States could not alter the fate of the Greeks and that now was the best time to engage the Ottomans –

where national sympathy and compassion is unavailing to change the fate of those whose destiny we cannot mend it is at perfect liberty to push forward the interests of the United States in the Levant by bringing to a successful issue what has been commenced.

The Porte was “discontented with France, and highly exasperated against England.” English claimed that if Rodgers had been authorized to negotiate and had been provided with a treaty, he could have sailed to Istanbul and had it signed in forty-eight hours. English concluded by begging Adams to authorize Rodgers to negotiate a treaty, so that any response to the commodore’s letter might be promptly followed by an official agreement.¹⁴⁶

Nine months passed before English's next letter to Adams. Writing from the headquarters of the Mediterranean Squadron, English reported that negotiations were carried out in a "perfectly satisfactory" manner. The commodore and kapudan pasha met twice – in Tenedos (Bozcaada), at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and Mitylene, south on the island of Lesbos. Hüsrev promised to forward an account of these meetings to the sultan and address the matter further on his return to Istanbul in the autumn after the end of his campaign against the Greeks. English was hopeful that "should the Captain Pasha retain at the end of the present campaign the same favour and influence at the Port which he now enjoys, I think, Sir, that there is every reason to believe that the reply of the Sultan will be favourable as you could wish." Rodgers planned to send a ship to İzmir in November to receive the sultan's reply, which was to be delivered to Offley.¹⁴⁷

The Greek Revolution did not conclude, however, but dragged along for four more years. In February, Hüsrev informed Rodgers that the sultan was too preoccupied with military reforms to consider a treaty with the United States.¹⁴⁸ And while he still retained the sultan's favor, Hüsrev had been dismissed from naval service due to the influence of the leadership of the Egyptian contingent in the Morea, with whom he clashed. In Istanbul, he was given the post of *serasker*, or minister of defense.¹⁴⁹ As Rodgers noted in his letter, "unforeseen & unauspicious events" had delayed the negotiation of a treaty.¹⁵⁰ In the United States, English's old foe Edward Everett continued to support the Greek cause, along with political notables like Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, both outspoken supporters of Greek independence.¹⁵¹ English's dream of a truly secular nation was not shared by many of his countrymen, who concluded that religion alone was reason enough to side with the Greeks over the Ottomans. In Russia, Middleton continued to wish for the destruction and partition of the Ottoman Empire, at the same time that he was obligated to respect the Adams administration's agenda. When they met at his coronation in 1826, Czar Nicholas I asked Middleton if the United States had an agent representing it in the Porte. Middleton hedged and simply demurred that the United States had no success in negotiating a treaty with the Porte.¹⁵²

MORTIFYING DISAPPOINTMENT

English returned to Washington in July 1827. Meanwhile in Greece, France and Britain objected to the surging Egyptian military power and

hoped to keep the Ottoman Empire intact between themselves and the Russian Empire. At the Battle of Navarino on October 20, 1827, the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets were devastated by the combined forces of the British, French, and Russians, turning the tide of the Greek Revolution to the rebels' favor. A month later, surely disappointed by this development, English wrote to Secretary of State Henry Clay, asking for money he felt the secretary's office owed him based on his instructions from Adams in January of 1825 – the agreed-upon 2,000 dollars.¹⁵³

In April of 1828, English – who vacillated between secrecy and public performance – was forced to defend himself once more in print when he was drawn into the so-called Morgan affair. William Morgan, a vocal anti-Mason, disappeared from Batavia, New York, in September 1826 – probably drowned by Masons or possibly exiled to Turkey, where sightings of him persisted into the 1830s. In one report in the *US Gazette*, a writer suggested that a reported sighting of Morgan might actually have been English, the former Bostonian whom the writer claimed converted to Islam and went to live among the Ottomans. English bristled at the suggestion that he might still be in İzmir as well as the accusation that he was a Muslim, dismissing both as ill-informed: “By the editor's statement of which I am led to infer that his knowledge of me is not quite so great as his malicious impertinence appears to be.” English insisted that he had been in Washington since July 1827, but gave no hint of where he had been before that.¹⁵⁴ After a lifetime of defending himself against assaults on his character, English might have understood the political repercussions of giving away that secret.

In July 1828, Adams was prepared to send English to the Mediterranean with treaty papers to deliver to Commodore William Montgomery Crane, head of the Mediterranean Squadron.¹⁵⁵ At first, there was no sign of trouble; Adams signed all the necessary papers and went so far as to invite English to his office, where he read out loud his letter of appointment and instructions. In a journal entry, Adams recorded that English “received notice of his appointment with expressions of warm gratitude.” Samuel Southard, secretary of the navy, had already notified the USS *Fairfield* to be prepared to accommodate English on its voyage to the Mediterranean. Everything appeared ready for English to return to the Ottoman world. Yet two days later, after meetings with Southard and Daniel Brent, chief clerk of the

State Department, Adams resolved to send Edward Wyer to the Mediterranean instead. Adams wrote:

Life is full of disappointments, and among the most mortifying of them to me has been the misconduct of persons whom I have peculiarly befriended. This case of English is one of the most mortifying that have occurred. I have repeatedly procured employment for him in public service, and, notwithstanding his eccentricities, approaching to insanity, have continued to favor him till now. I can no longer sustain him.

Adams declared the verbal agreement with English null and void, because no letter of appointment or advance of money was handed over. Wyer was sworn to secrecy and told to be ready to depart in four days.¹⁵⁶ There is no hint of what transpired to cause Adams to reverse course – he was certainly aware of all the accusations leveled against English over the years. Without explanation, English was left without a patron and died of unknown causes two months later in Washington. Three years later, the United States finally agreed to a treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which the next chapter details.¹⁵⁷

Conclusion: The Sovereign Afterlife and the Archive

In life, George Bethune English helped lay the foundations of sovereign equality for the United States in the Ottoman Mediterranean. In spite of his professed devotion to a secular merchant state that would benefit greatly from equal footing with European nations in Ottoman ports, English did not receive the kind of recognition that would, perhaps, have sustained his life. Following his death, he was favorably and widely eulogized as a singular character in the history of the young republic. Several shorter obituaries with factual inaccuracies – typical for artifacts of this type and time – appeared almost immediately following his death. For example, a brief eulogy from the *Haverhill Gazette* recounts important points in English's life: he converted to Judaism, became a deist, and then became a Muslim. Finally, after meeting Joseph Wolff in Palestine, he embraced Christianity and returned to Washington.¹⁵⁸ There is no evidence that this conversion ever happened; after their last meeting, Wolff wrote that English had not returned to Christianity, and

in *Five Pebbles from the Brook*, published two years after meeting Wolff, English continued his criticism of Christianity.¹⁵⁹ Initial eulogies like this were followed by lengthier, more accurate renderings of his life. One of these eulogies, published in the *New York Commercial Advertiser*, became the basis for other reports of his death in republican-era newspapers. This eulogy, as it survives in the *Rhode-Island American*, described English as “one of the most eccentric men of the age, and possessed of uncommon powers of mind.” But the eulogist also cautioned readers that the life of George Bethune English was a “forcible lesson” for skeptics. Yet in spite of his rebellion against common law and Christianity, English was worth remembering because “never was there a man more honest in his deviation from the true path-way.”¹⁶⁰

The obituary goes on to describe details of English’s life. Unfortunately, as the eulogist pointed out,

the highest representatives of a republic generally pine in obscurity abroad, for want of means to live, and minor agents are left to supplicate for a miserable allowance on their return; and this is generally dealt out to them with supercilious grudging.

The obituarist’s criticism of the administration’s neglect of its agents cannot help but call to mind similar criticisms of the Jefferson administration and its treatment of William Eaton after 1805. But Eaton, though he drank himself to death six years later, had time to tell his side of the story. Autobiography was not a privilege that English had. The obituarist goes on to say that, in Washington, English was “a wretched solicitor for favour of any kind, and government did not seem to require his services.” This despite there being

one man in power, with whom the deceased was acquainted, that knows how to measure and how to value letters and science as well as any man in this country, and that man knows, too, how accurate was the information communicated by Mr. English.

However, the writer says,

it is vain to repine; it has often happened, and will again, to the end of time that hollow-hearted and empty-headed vanity, by

pertinacity and obsequiousness will snatch the *bread from men of understanding and steal away the favours intended for men of skill.*"¹⁶¹

Ever a renegade, the writer seemed to conclude, English deserved the recognition of the republic to which he was so committed.

The language of this obituary offers us some clues into the collapse of things between Adams and English, but not enough to come to any concrete conclusions about what caused Adams to turn against English so quickly. Samuel Lorenzo Knapp, the prominent author and former editor of the *Boston Gazette* who penned the obituary, went on to further attempt to preserve English in US memory.¹⁶² Four days after the publication of the eulogy, Knapp published a biographical sketch of English in the *Emerald and Baltimore Literary Gazette*. This eulogy includes additional information about English's religious beliefs at the end of his life, which Knapp presents as decidedly Judaic.¹⁶³ English's actual beliefs – which we do not know – aside, it was much easier for Knapp to present English as a Jew, rather than a Muslim; Jefferson and others may have been able to envision a Muslim citizen, but most Americans had trouble picturing a Muslim neighbor. Recall Samuel Cary, for example: in his 1813 response to English, he admitted that he knew some American Jews; he did not admit to knowing any Muslims, American or otherwise.¹⁶⁴

In 1833, Knapp published a slightly updated version of this obituary in *American Biography*.¹⁶⁵ That same year, the naturalist James Ellsworth De Kay found space to praise English, whom he had once met, in his description of Mehmed Ali in *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832*. De Kay recalled English's "Turkish immobility of feature," his ability to pass, and "the fund of anecdotes and information which his various wanderings in different parts of the world had furnished him with," all the intelligence that he had gathered as both a renegade and agent of the state. Like many of the early obituarists, De Kay lamented English's fate: he "failed through some unworthy jealousies on the part of his collaborators. While an applicant for office at Washington he died in great poverty."¹⁶⁶ In 1860, at the same moment Joel Headley was writing about William Eaton and the Battle of Derna, *The New American Cyclopædia* further built on English's ability to master the Orient: "At Marseilles he passed for a Turk with a Turkish ambassador who believed no foreigner could so perfectly speak his language and at Washington

he surprised a delegation of Cherokees by disputing with them in their own tongue."¹⁶⁷ These obituaries, eulogies, encyclopedic entries, and reminiscences ensured English's continued presence in the archive. English's own observations, however, were of marginal importance in establishing an image the Ottoman world in the United States. But as my next chapter shows, the results of his mercenary encounter with the Ottoman world were eventually felt in the realm of sovereignty, and the literary mercenaries who came after him continued to labor to present the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity, not a problem.

CHAPTER 3

LITERARY MERCENARIES IN ISTANBUL, 1831–53

There seems, indeed, to be a sort of republican equality between the richest and poorest Turk, an equality founded upon, and arising from, their religious creed, and kept up by their political system, which, unlike that of even the most liberal governments, disfranchises no one, and renders all alike eligible to the highest offices.

– James Ellsworth De Kay, 1833¹

Those who set themselves up as the standards of excellence, and as models to all nations in every circumstance and situation, are for the most part supremely ignorant block heads, or arrogant coxcombs.

– David Porter, 1835²

After waging war against two Ottoman regencies – Tripoli and Algeria – and subsequently staging a decade of often clandestine negotiations, a new era in US–Ottoman relations began on September 13, 1831, when David Porter was received by the Ottoman reis effendi as chargé d'affaires of the United States in Istanbul. Though Porter's post was officially sanctioned by the US Government – and therefore not mercenary – he would find that the new relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire encouraged, and perhaps demanded, mercenary force. As chargé d'affaires, Porter was tasked with

helping Americans to take advantage of the new economic opportunities offered by the treaty. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the new political economy of the 1831 treaty was accompanied by a strain of literary mercenarism – carried out by Porter and others – that labored to portray Istanbul and the Turkish people in a positive light.³ Porter recognized that the new relationship with the Ottoman Empire was hindered by anti-Ottoman sentiments, and literary mercenarism emerged as the solution to this problem.

Chapters 1 and 2 examine moments of war and negotiation between the United States and key figures in the Ottoman world. This chapter examines peace and its possibilities – embodied by two comprehensive treatments of Istanbul and the Ottoman Empire by American writers in the 1830s. When the Ottoman Empire recognized the sovereignty of the United States in 1831, giving equal footing to the United States alongside European nations throughout the Ottoman world, a moment of possibility emerged and a political project – intimacy with the Ottoman Empire – was undertaken with the needs of capital in mind. This new political economy of intimacy pressed up against a long tradition, inherited but also refined, that positioned Muslims – and especially “the Turk” – as outside of and often against American identity and the nation-state. Closer political, diplomatic, and economic/commercial ties, then, depended on a cultural project that could re-represent the Ottoman world and shift perceptions that had developed in the context of European Orientalism, Barbary captivity, and the Greek Revolution. Along with Porter – who wrote in both official and mercenary capacities – this chapter also examines the work of James Ellsworth De Kay. Both these writers buttressed the political economy of the new relationship with the Ottomans through their cultural production. Their legacy, only a few years after they published their major works, was already ambiguous.

A decade before the American Oriental Society began working to “expand the cultural horizons of the United States,” De Kay and Porter labored to align US political, economic, and cultural interests in order to build a commercially successful transatlantic partnership.⁴ In this chapter, I argue that, within the context of the new treaty and a growing literary culture in the United States, the books these two writers produced were a product of mercenary force. This framing of the writer as potentially mercenary developed across the eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries in conjunction with the rise of popular literature in England and the United States. Commercial and popular writing both came to be frowned on by the literati.⁵ For example, in 1795, a reader who wrote to the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* described the class of writers who were paid to write for their government, rather than for art, as “mercenary hireling, and intellectual prostitute, bartering this mental talent.”⁶ The implication of the terms “mercenary literature” or “literary mercenary” is that certain kinds of literary output are more valuable than others because of their artistic merit. Or, as Erik Simpson puts it, “mercenary writing involves the violation of independent sincerity.”⁷ Of course this strict divide between sincerity and mercenarism, a position strongly associated with people like Alexander Pope and Immanuel Kant, does not hold. Nevertheless, the two texts I examine in this chapter – even if they appear sincere – were not written strictly for the sake of literature but to profoundly influence public opinion in the United States. Neither of these books would ever find its way into the canon of American literature. But these are also not commercial texts produced simply for profit – although both authors surely profited from their work. Rather, De Kay and Porter’s literary labor was in the service of a kind of republican nationalism and the commercial class that benefited from increasing commerce with Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea. Their loyalties, then, were closely aligned with those of George Bethune English nearly a decade earlier.

The cultural project that these literary mercenaries carried out helped to pave the way for increased contacts between Americans from the United States and people in the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s and 1840s, as well as future engagements with people from distant lands, including Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth. The positive reception Kossuth received when he visited the United States in 1851, as Tim Roberts explains, was only possible because Americans were able to conceive of both the United States and the Orient “not as static societies but as permeable zones of exchange.”⁸ As Roberts shows, Kossuth was described as “Oriental” but simultaneously as embodying liberty by the Americans who encountered him. That Americans could associate the Orient with liberty was possible only because they had grown increasingly interested in and aware of difference across the Ottoman Empire, especially after 1830, as I argue here.⁹ This awareness of difference marked a return to the multivalent engagement with the

Orient popular in American periodicals in the 1780s and early 1790s. As Robert Battistini demonstrates, this approach was stifled by the troubles on the North African coast after 1794. Represented at first in diverse and ambivalent ways in the United States, by 1799 the Orient “had become exotic, and it existed merely to affirm the excellence of the traveler and his reader.”¹⁰ Battistini concludes that “although there is no one way that American magazine readers viewed Muslims, the movement from initial curiosity and even wonder toward a rhetoric of authority and objectivity reveals a proto-imperialist movement toward mastery of the Muslim Other.”¹¹ I agree that the general trend in US cultural history has been toward what Battistini calls “bigoted orientalism,” but as Roberts demonstrates, as late as the 1850s Americans were still able to imagine a complex Orient.¹² I would go further to argue that there have been moments where it seemed the tide might turn; in one of these potential futures past, Americans might have developed an affinity for identifying with the Orient, rather than the simultaneously emergent Occident – though exchanging religious intolerance for mutual understanding between empires is not much of a tradeoff.¹³ In this chapter I describe one of these moments, which brought a temporary shift in barbarous American attitudes toward the Ottoman world. What this new political, economic, and cultural assemblage ultimately produced was warships, enlightening but ambiguously received literature, and finally, the conditions for an extended mercenary encounter with Egypt in the 1870s and 1880s.

The Political Economy of the New Relationship

In the last six months of his presidency, John Quincy Adams undertook an aggressive effort to negotiate a treaty of commerce and friendship with the Ottoman Empire, replacing George Bethune English with Edward Wyer, who acted as courier to the Mediterranean with instructions for Captain William Crane and David Offley to negotiate a treaty. Twenty thousand dollars was set aside for the project.¹⁴ Ultimately this mission failed because Offley, in consultation with Crane, was unable to settle for a slightly elevated tariff; the United States wished to have most-favored-nation status at the same rate as France. When the Andrew Jackson administration undertook another effort a few years later, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren instructed the new

negotiating team to accept a higher rate if they had to – the value of commerce in Ottoman ports and the Black Sea was worth too much to settle for no treaty.¹⁵ Jackson's willingness to be flexible in the pursuit of a treaty – though the United States was ultimately put on equal footing with France – opened the doors for a collection of mercenary figures to build bridges between the two empires.

The economic justification for formalizing US–Ottoman relations had been laid out as early as 1819 by Henry Dearborn in *A Memoir of the Commerce and Navigation of the Black Sea and the Trade and Maritime Geography of Turkey and Egypt*. In his book, Dearborn repeated a story that was already familiar to many Americans by then: in 1800, Sultan Selim III affected a desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States; Sultan Mahmud II repeated this wish in 1810. With the Napoleonic wars in Europe being concluded, Dearborn reasoned, “a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Porte would not now be regarded with jealousy, or excite animosity, whatever might have been the effect of such a measure at some former period.” Following his brief history of US–Ottoman contacts, the rest of the book reads like a guide for doing business in the Ottoman world and the Black Sea, dedicated to “the merchants and navigators of the United States of America.” Dearborn consulted more than seventy-five monographs to report on the history, geography, and economy of the Ottoman world. Many of the economic opportunities he described were still off-limits to American commercial vessels beyond the Dardanelles Strait.¹⁶ Indeed, for the commercial class, this lure was provocative and pushed policy-makers in the United States forward; Luther Bradish, dispatched with ambiguous authority to represent the United States, traveled to Istanbul in 1820, the year after George Bethune English was reported to have converted to Islam there. Bradish made little or no progress on negotiations and, as I touched on in the previous chapter, the situation in Greece complicated the politics of the Mediterranean later in the 1820s. But the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino in 1827, followed by the arrival the French troops and the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the Peloponnesian in 1828 and then the occupation of Algeria by the French in 1830, created a new opening for the United States to finally negotiate a treaty of commerce and friendship with the Ottoman Porte.

The political economy of this new and developing relationship between two empires, as well as the cultural production that helped to

support it, have received little attention. Likewise, the role of mercenary force in all this has gone unexamined. In *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East*, David Finnie draws heavily from Walter Livingstone Wright to describe the negotiations leading up to the 1831 treaty and what followed. Finnie claims that “the first half of the nineteenth century saw a constant procession of essentially nonpolitical Americans to the Middle East.”¹⁷ Writing in a moment of exceptionalist historiography – 1967 – Finnie obscures the circuit between nation and citizen, thus contributing to the popular notion that the United States had no real history in the Middle East and other Third World and colonized spaces before 1945. Finnie contrasts these supposed nonpolitical approaches to the Middle East before World War II – which he describes as moral (i.e., religious) – with the new US stance after the war, which he says was political. But the relationship was always political, always about economics, and always represented and misrepresented culturally in the United States. Finnie also draws heavily from Bernard Lewis to support his claims about the Ottoman Empire, as he rendered it as the “sick man”: decadent, corrupt, and decaying.¹⁸ In the fifty years since Finnie followed Lewis, less-biased historians of the Ottoman Empire and its peoples, as well as scholars of Orientalism and imperialism, have increased our understanding of the political economy of empires across the nineteenth century. Their work has revealed the global scope of the revolutions in governmentality that effected colonial North America, Ottoman Turkey, and elsewhere in the early nineteenth century – in many ways making these revolutionary and modernizing spaces more similar to one another than different.¹⁹

1831

The new relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire that emerged in the middle of the long nineteenth century – and the encounters between people that it prompted – was based on a treaty document negotiated in the Mediterranean and agreed to by the Ottoman Government in 1830, but then only partially ratified by Congress in 1831 (a secret clause negotiated by Charles Rhind and attached to the treaty was rejected). In the aftermath of this rejection, Jackson and Van Buren settled on sending former commodore David Porter to represent the United States in Istanbul. Porter, who had been held captive for two years in Tripoli following his capture as part of the

Philadelphia debacle in 1803, would establish diplomatic ties while explaining to the Porte why the secret clause had been rejected. Van Buren explained to Porter that, based on one way of reading the language of the clause, "it might be insisted by the Sublime Porte that the United States were bound to build ships and supply timber for its use, instead of permitting their citizens to do so."²⁰ The intent of the secret clause seems to have been to help the Porte rebuild and continue to modernize its naval forces. But the United States was anxious to maintain at least an appearance of neutrality. To answer both these concerns, the Jackson administration devised an elaborate compromise. First, the appointment of Porter, one of the United States' most experienced former naval officers, was meant to assure the Porte that the Jackson administration would lend informal assistance. Second, even if the United States could not construct ships for the Porte, that did not mean its citizens could not. To this end, Van Buren composed a follow-up letter to Porter – who was already in the Mediterranean – explaining that the eminent naval architect Henry Eckford had constructed a fast sailing ship that he intended to sail to Europe for sale. It was also possible, Van Buren hinted, that Eckford might travel to Istanbul and sell the ship to the Ottomans. He warned Porter to keep an eye on Eckford and this transaction within the "shifting political situation of the world." Already negotiating in the thin space between more powerful empires, what might otherwise not be a violation of existing treaties with other nations could be rendered "questionable" by new political events.²¹ A ship sold by a US citizen to the Ottoman Porte might be construed as military aid from the United States by a party at war with the Ottomans. No doubt the slow movement of information across the Atlantic made a warning like this necessary, and even in 1831 technology was imagined as having shifting meaning in relation to different legal and political contexts.²²

In 1967, Finnie speculated that Eckford's departure and Porter's cooperation seemed to part of an executive-level conspiracy to evade the congressional rejection of the secret clause of the treaty, an argument Finnie was surprised previous writers had not made. In fact, Van Buren and Jackson both already knew that Eckford was headed to Istanbul when they issued the warning to Porter.²³ Perhaps in 1967, when Finnie was writing, it had become less impolitic to make such suggestions. Now the American public is accustomed to these kinds of covert acts.

In many ways, this subterfuge resembles the attack on Derna in 1805 – Jefferson never directly condoned Eaton’s plan, or did he? – as well as John Quincy Adam’s use of executive agents like George Bethune English to plant the seeds for the Ottoman treaty in the first place. In any case, Jackson was at least ambivalent about providing military aid to the Ottomans.

AMERICAN NAVAL ENGINEERS

Porter, aboard the USS *John Adams*, and Eckford, on his own newly constructed ship *United States*, arrived together in Istanbul on August 11, 1831.²⁴ During the twelve years that he was chargé d’affaires, and briefly minister, Porter focused on developing closer naval ties between the two empires. He received few directions from the secretary of state during his term, and these directives often scolded him for paying little mind to the needs of Americans in Turkey or elsewhere; Secretary of State Daniel Webster was especially upset that Porter neglected the needs of American missionaries.²⁵ Rather than missionaries, Porter focused on the American advisors who had accompanied him to Istanbul. While the Ottomans had employed advisors from outside the empire for some time, Americans were a new addition to its growing class of technocrats. Eckford, who quickly became one of these advisors after his arrival, had made his reputation in the United States’ 1812–15 war with the British and a confederacy of native American peoples. The significant naval action in the Great Lakes was profitable for Eckford and other shipbuilders. He subsequently developed a reputation as one of the most talented ship designers in the country, but a financial crisis in 1825 and subsequent attacks on his reputation led him to seek new sources of income. Sources disagree as to whether Eckford approached Andrew Jackson or if Rhind recruited Eckford for the scheme, but in any case Eckford seems to have been fully prepared to leave for Turkey by the time Congress approved the treaty in 1831. Later Eckford claimed that he was under the impression – via Rhind – that the Porte had already agreed to buy *United States*, and that whatever plans the Ottomans had for naval construction would be suitable “because my arrival in the Ottoman Empire is owing to the arrangements that have been made between the service of the Sultan and an American civil servant.”²⁶ Eckford was apparently drawn to Istanbul by not just commercial but also national forces.

Onboard *United States* were skipper George Coleman De Kay, about fifteen sailors and carpenters, Charles Rhind, Foster Rhodes, and James Ellsworth De Kay – who had once met George Bethune English. Since Rhind had played a leading role in negotiating the treaty in 1830, he had expected to be appointed first minister. Jackson and Van Buren thought different and appointed Porter instead.²⁷ There was some confusion when the two ships arrived in Istanbul, because at first the Porte thought *United States* was a gift from Jackson.²⁸ Eckford managed to sell the ship shortly, though Porter was left to deal with a legal mess after Eckford died unexpectedly.²⁹ Eckford only worked in the naval arsenal for a short time – he died fifteen months after arriving in Istanbul – and it is unclear if his role in the Ottoman naval arsenal was as significant as it has been made out to be by American historians. For example, Eckford did not build the Ottoman ship *Mahmoud*, as Finnie seems to suggest. Finnie cites De Kay, but in *Sketches* De Kay says the ship had been under construction before the Americans arrived – indeed, dry rot had already set in due to poor construction.³⁰ A more likely explanation is that Eckford and crew coppered and repaired the boat. As evidence that the Ottoman naval fleet was not in the state of disrepair that many writers claim, in April 1832 – after the *Mahmoud* had been refitted – Porter informed the secretary of state that his advice on naval matters would not be needed because the sultan's fleet was in fine shape.³¹ Eckford apparently saw room for improvement, and in a petition to the Porte claimed that if he were given the opportunity, he would be “capable of effecting a complete revolution in the construction of warships within three years.”³² In any case, after Eckford's death his foreman Foster Rhodes, another naval architect whom Eckford had known since the war of 1812, continued to work for the Ottoman Government. Finnie says Rhodes' career as an Ottoman naval engineer was successful and that he engineered ten ships before returning to the United States at the end of the 1830s.³³ These American naval architects represent only a few of the many commercial and military relationships that developed in the context of the new treaty.³⁴ For example, although the Department of State generally avoided commenting on Ottoman military matters in its instructions, the secretary of state did acknowledge the sultan's request for naval officers in 1837 by advising Porter that it was up to the navy and its commanders whether or not to take Ottoman sailors aboard its ships to be trained.³⁵ Clearly things

had changed, even if the depth of the changes did not involve Americans effecting revolutions in internal Ottoman affairs, as some scholars seem to believe. The literary output that momentarily opened up even more new possibilities during this period has received less attention than its political economy.

Cultural Movements, 1831–35

When Captain William Bainbridge was compelled by Algeria to carry its representative to Istanbul in 1800, his account of the Ottoman capital focused on the kind reception he received from the Ottomans, but little else about the city and its people. Excerpts from his letters were published in newspapers throughout the United States and then collected by Henry Dearborn in 1816.³⁶ In 1819, Edward Everett visited Istanbul while he was a student at the University of Göttingen in the German Confederation. He wrote less than Bainbridge. George Bethune English confined his reports from Istanbul mostly to government intrigue and the situation with Greece and Russia. When the United States established a formal presence in the capital of the empire in 1831, a new literary site for Americans to write from also crystallized. Here, then, I want to attend to two of the earliest accounts of extended stays in Istanbul that were produced by members of the cohort of Americans who arrived in the city in 1831. These accounts, published by James Ellsworth De Kay in 1833 and David Porter in 1835, are part of the increasingly popular genre of travel writing across the nineteenth century. But what makes these accounts most interesting is that their authors were writing from the position of the literary mercenary; both were written to generate positive public sentiment in the United States with regard to the Ottomans.

SKETCHES AND LETTERS

Among the initial arrivals in Istanbul in August 1831 was James Ellsworth De Kay, who served as a physician on Henry Eckford's ship *United States*; he was also married to Eckford's daughter Janet, and his brother was captain of *United States*.³⁷ De Kay spent nearly a year in Istanbul and published *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832* shortly after he returned to the United States. Few historians who have attended to Porter, Eckford, and other new arrivals in the Ottoman world give any

serious attention to De Kay's *Sketches*. Published in New York by J. & J. Harper in 1835, *Sketches* is a unique record of a new and developing relationship with the Ottomans. It also continues the work Henry Dearborn started in 1819; both texts were invaluable to Americans who might want to do business in Turkey and the Black Sea. Indeed, Americans wanted to do business in the Ottoman world. Offley and others like him had been at İzmir for some time, and of course American ships were no stranger to commerce in the Levant. But the 1831 treaty meant, for the first time, that Americans could freely transit the Dardanelles and become involved in the Black Sea trade. More information about this part of the empire from a reliable source – an American who had actually been to Istanbul – was certainly welcome. De Kay's book ranges across contemporary Turkey, attending to politics, of course, but also to Ottoman infrastructure and manufacturing, ranging from waterworks to tanning.

Two years after the publication of De Kay's *Sketches*, the Harper brothers published a second comprehensive account of contemporary Turkey: *Constantinople and Its Environs in a Series of Letters*.³⁸ The book was published anonymously, but it was no secret that the author of this two-volume collection of letters was David Porter, US chargé d'affaires in Istanbul. Porter already had a long career before he assumed his new post, which he would occupy till his death in 1843. He joined the Navy in 1798 at the age of eighteen and saw significant action against France and then in the Mediterranean before he was held captive for almost two years in Tripoli. He subsequently continued to serve in the US Navy for more than twenty years, until he resigned after a court martial for illegally landing marines in Puerto Rico. After his resignation, he served – in a mercenary capacity – in the Mexican Navy for three years. Finally, he was appointed US consul general to Algeria in 1830, but the French occupied the country before he could assume his consulship. After a life at sea, it seemed natural that he ended up at the headquarters of the US Mediterranean Squadron before he was appointed to the new Ottoman legation.³⁹ The letters collected in *Constantinople and Its Environs* detail the first two-and-a-half years of Porter's tenure in the Ottoman capital.

One possible explanation for the publication of *Constantinople and Its Environs* – the volumes' foreword claims the letters were not written with the intent of publication – is that Porter needed the money. According to the *Albany Argus*, the letters had been addressed to

James Kirke Paulding, who later arranged for their publication. The *Argus* promoted this “unvarnished” character of the letters as proof of their credibility.⁴⁰ But even before he arrived at his post in Istanbul, Porter was already complaining to the secretary of state about being broke.⁴¹ In Istanbul in declining health, these financial concerns persisted.⁴² Porter was already experienced in publishing, having produced two accounts of US naval expeditions with which he was involved.⁴³ He may have chosen to author the book anonymously for any number of reasons – to avoid sullyng his official position or perhaps to gesture to the also anonymously authored *Sketches*. The letters are written – or have been edited – from the third-person perspective; Porter often refers to the US minister (himself), whom he seems to be constantly accompanying.⁴⁴ Regardless of whether these letters were originally intended for publication, they do the important work of positively portraying Ottoman Turkey in conjunction with De Kay. A literary-studies approach to the political economy of these two books reveals much about what has been missed by historians.

As Laura Doyle points out, aesthetic forms have a “foundational entanglement in a multilateral and sedimented geopolitics.”⁴⁵ Yet De Kay’s *Sketches* has long been treated as a novelty. Scholars have either mentioned it in passing as evidence of “what happened” or dismissed De Kay’s interpretations of Turkey as extremely inaccurate.⁴⁶ Porter’s *Constantinople and Its Environs* simply appears in footnotes to support positivist statements about past events.⁴⁷ Scholars fail to appraise the contents of the letters critically or to take into account the context of their production. Whether the material and judgments laid out in each are truth or fiction is not what I want to focus on here. Rather, it is important to understand what these historical documents did – or could have done – which depends on the conditions of their production and circulation. The sedimented geopolitics to which Doyle refers are especially evident in each writer’s acknowledgement of existing stereotypes about the Ottoman Empire, as well as their treatment of Muslims, the Turkish people, the space and landscape of Istanbul, and British foreign policy. De Kay and Porter intended to bring other Americans around to their worldview, which demanded a new intimacy with all these elements. The mercenary work of these texts, therefore, was to attempt to realign public opinion in the United States in order to support the political economy of the new

relationship with the Ottomans, a relationship from which some Americans stood to profit.

De Kay and Porter carried on the tradition that Bainbridge had inaugurated in 1800 by describing the warm reception they received from the Ottoman Government and its representatives. Informal encounters with the sultan were especially noteworthy for Porter, since he received no formal reception until he was appointed full minister in 1839. In a letter to the secretary of state – not the popular literary audience he would later reach with his monograph, but his audience nonetheless – Porter described one of these encounters he and some visiting Americans had with Sultan Mahmud II at the Okmeydanı in 1832. Upon observing the party of Americans in the same park in which he was practising his archery, the sultan had the Imperial Guard offer the party carpets to sit on, as well as ice cream and coffee.⁴⁸ This account – accurate or embellished – does more than simply show how welcome Americans were by the Ottomans. It also demonstrates Ottoman sovereignty and the power of the sultan in Ottoman domains. The Americans could have refused the invitation, perhaps. But by acting diplomatically – something the United States learned to do, in part, through its interactions in the Ottoman world – the American representatives also witnessed the sultan's prowess in this symbolic field of battle.⁴⁹ Porter was not simply reporting these events to the new secretary of state, Edward Livingston, but inculcating him as well.

Porter and De Kay both acknowledged that they were writing against a backdrop of bigoted Orientalist writing, which they hoped to correct in order to establish new relationships between Americans and Turks. As Edward Said observes, “the actualities of the modern Orient were systematically excluded” through the citational work of Orientalist writers. But in De Kay and Porter there is a citational impulse that is meant to construct an entirely different *topos* of the Orient as a site of future national growth.⁵⁰ On the very first page of his introduction, De Kay demonstrates that he is aware of stereotypes about Istanbul by recalling and then dismissing – based on his own experience – the frequently repeated warning that a man must always be ready to defend himself with a sword on the streets of the city. De Kay explicitly positions his book and its account of the Ottoman capital against “tourists, who seem to have taken a marvelous pleasure in exaggerating the vices and suppressing the good points of Turkish character.”⁵¹ Porter also

recognized that bigoted Orientalist writing was citational, pointing out that that it was also often antique. He countered,

I am collecting material. I shall give you what I see. I shall not quote musty old authors long forgot. I shall not scrape up the rubbish of antiquity to look for what Constantinople was. I shall show you what it is. Give me time, you shall see all. A *Camera Lueida* [*sic*] shows but one object at a time, but it shows it correctly.⁵²

Writing like Porter's and De Kay's is striking because the tradition they were writing against – the Orient as other – maintained its hegemony and voices like theirs remained in the minority. But at this moment, the opening of the 1830s, it was possible that the United States might develop its own relationship with the Ottoman Empire that would have been very different from that of the French and British.

To create the cultural conditions for this promising new relationship, both writers actively worked against negative perceptions of the Ottomans – often referred to derisively by as “the Turks.” Two encounters that De Kay writes about illustrate this work that *Sketches* was meant to accomplish as well as the relationship of literature to political rhetoric in the United States. Both encounters take place shortly after the *United States* rendezvoused with the *John Adams* inside the mouth of the Dardanelles. On one side of the straits – the European – the country appears cultivated. On the other – the Asiatic – the country is wooded. Going ashore on the wooded side to hunt game, the men encounter a peasant who offers them all the free melons they can carry, even after learning that they possess no local currency. Of another farmer they meet De Kay observes, “we saw nothing in his instrument, or the manner in which he handled it, different from an American farmer.”⁵³ When considered in the context of the cultural politics of the Early Republic in the United States, these two figures would have appeared legible to American readers at the time as ideal yeoman farmers. Some readers, perhaps more familiar with recent events in the empire, might even image that revolutionary governance in Turkey – the reforms being carried out by Mahmud II – would soon transform these yeoman farmers into the kinds of republican figures that Americans were often fond of imagining as the ideal citizen.

In describing Ottoman character, Porter was often more critical than De Kay, but nevertheless he consistently worked against what he deemed widespread anti-Ottoman sentiments. Early on in his letters, he simultaneously establishes his authority to accurately represent the Ottomans, as well as offering an implied critique of other Orientalist writers:

I had got into an entire new world. I had seen the Turkish character in a new point of view, the film had dropped from my eyes, and I saw things with my own optics, not as described by others. The few hours I was among them were worth volumes of the creations of the imagination of book-making travelers [*sic*].⁵⁴

Porter's claims are problematic, of course, but he was actively working to construct a different model of the Orient for his audience in the United States. Along with one letter, he attached a list of books published recently in Turkey, to demonstrate that "the Turks are not so illiterate as they are represented."⁵⁵ And over the course of the two volumes, he includes seven extended biographical sketches of important contemporary political figures. Ultimately, the impression a reader is left with recalls the epigraph that began this chapter: Istanbul and the Ottoman people are different but not inferior. And the country's government is vital, not sick. From Porter's perspective, embracing exceptionalism was not useful for crafting intimate foreign relations.

These efforts to recraft the image of the Ottoman people carry over to De Kay and Porter's descriptions of the space and landscape of Istanbul. The labor that each writer does to challenge existing biases against the city is apparent in their descriptions of stray dogs and frequent fires, two of the popular motifs in travelers' accounts of the city. In his initial description of Istanbul, De Kay describes and then deconstructs the typical, and still popular, rhetorical move that lambastes foreign cities by describing how they are filled with stray dogs. Says De Kay, "They were, it is true, occasionally to be seen; but they were perfectly harmless, and if struck ran yelping away."⁵⁶ Several years later, Porter adopted a different approach to the dogs – which he said were not as numerous as they once were, but still they outnumbered the dogs in New York ten to one – by attributing the presence of so many of them to the piety and kind nature of the people of Istanbul:

Such is the consideration of the Turks for these unclean animals, that you will find earthen pots placed by the pious in almost every corner about the city, filled with water for their use. They make it a religious duty to divide, even with the dogs of the streets, this blessing which they receive from the bounty of God.⁵⁷

De Kay and Porter are able to gesture to the citational *topos* of the stray dogs, and then reroute the circuits through which those dogs had been used as evidence of Oriental otherness to transform them into mere symbols of French and British writers' ignorance of the larger social scene of Ottoman life and custom.

Likewise, fires are a topic of concern that both writers use as evidence of Ottoman difference, rather than inferiority. De Kay writes,

It has been customary with travellers [*sic*] to advert to the frequency of fires at Constantinople, and to draw from it inferences unfavourable to the Turkish character. It cannot be denied that fires often occur, and when they take place, they must necessarily be of a very destructive character.

But, he asks, "Are such fires peculiar to Turkey?" He answers in the negative and then goes on to analyze the causes of the frequent fires in the city, praising the ways the population and government respond to them. Later, he hints that some of the fires are purposefully set in protest of new domestic policies.⁵⁸ This second point, about the protest of government policies, further demonstrates the heterogeneity of the city's inhabitants, as well as the resistance Mahmud II faced as he instituted his reforms. Porter, more mindful than De Kay of the need to address the frequency of these fires – he reported nine in his first few months in the capital – and their relevance to the presence of Americans in the city, described these fires in the contexts of urban reform and his ability to advise the sultan on schemes for improvement. Somewhat wryly and in the third person that characterizes his descriptions of events, he comments, "The spirit of improvement is wide awake here and I foresee that if his life is spared, the Commodore is destined to do much good here."⁵⁹ Rather than wishing for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire or its continued existence only as a bulwark against Russia, both these

accounts envisioned a role for Americans from the United States in an Ottoman future.

The discussion of fires in the city also opens up space to criticize the British and others more explicitly for their mistreatment of the Ottoman people. Porter's affectation of US disinterest in European maneuvering around Ottoman vulnerabilities led him to establish the first US legation in San Stefano, where it endured till his death, rather than Pera, the diplomatic quarter of the city. In *Constantinople and Its Environs*, he returns to the topic of fire to describe the European palaces that were "swept away by the sea of fire which lately rolled over this modern Gomorrah."⁶⁰ The fire that leveled a square mile of Pera in 1831 also resulted in a swelling of anti-Ottoman sentiment that De Kay addresses in *Sketches*. De Kay critiques claims that he says were made in European newspapers that the Ottomans took delight in the destruction of European property:

I cannot well understand why they should have evinced any pleasure on this occasion, for independent of mosques, colleges, and other public buildings, nearly every house, except those belonging to the foreign ambassadors, was Turkish property. That many ruffians, who are to be found in all large cities, displayed a savage and ferocious exultation cannot be questioned, any more than that robberies of the most daring kind were also perpetrated during this distressing period. In these robberies the Maltese and Greeks of the Ionian Islands were the most conspicuous. We conversed freely with many of the Frank sufferers; and they assured us that in no instance had a single article been lost which they had intrusted [*sic*] to the care of a Turkish porter.⁶¹

The rhetoric De Kay addresses here – that European diplomatic and commercial communities in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere often suffer the predation of their hosts – would contribute to the rise of humanitarian imperialism across the nineteenth century.⁶²

Frequently, De Kay accuses the British of purposely misleading Americans and Ottomans about each other. He relates an encounter with the aide to the pasha of the Dardanelles – De Kay tells the aide that Americans believe that Ottomans never smile, to which the aide replies that he had heard all Americans were savages. "‘But I suppose,’ [the aide]

added with a significant smile, ‘the mutual misrepresentations about each other may be traced to the same kind source.’” To further demonstrate this British malevolence toward the Ottomans, De Kay reports on the case of English counterfeiters at Syra and Hydra who justify their work by explaining that “a Turk is an infidel, and of course is everybody’s enemy.”⁶³ Against this anti-Ottoman bias, De Kay was anxious to recognize the role of the Orient-at-large in world history, pointing out that

the number of inventions for which we are indebted, without being aware of it, to the East, is prodigious. It would lead us too far to enter into details, but we may mention the compass, gunpowder, and paper, which of themselves alone have wrought such mighty changes in war, in navigation, and in science.⁶⁴

British malevolence toward the Ottoman Empire and its people, as well as the ignorance this had perpetuated among Americans, is an important theme in many of the mercenary narratives produced by Americans in the nineteenth century.

Ultimately, De Kay’s *Sketches* and Porter’s *Constantinople and Its Environs* helped to heighten readers’ awareness of cleavages in a dynamic Ottoman world. De Kay and Porter did not describe an empire approaching the end of its life, but one undergoing significant reforms. Whereas other writers spent copious amounts of time searching for evidence that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling, De Kay devotes an entire chapter to Ottoman libraries, language, and literature.⁶⁵ All this cultural production, he says, is by a people “who are considered as little better than barbarians by the rest of Europe.”⁶⁶ Porter is less praiseful than De Kay, but still manages to accept the Ottomans on their own terms rather than those of Europeans. Mindful of what he hopes to encourage in his audience – intimacy with the city and its people – Porter thought to include a significant itinerary for anyone who might visit Istanbul: the seven hills of Constantinople in seven days.⁶⁷ What is striking now about the cultural project of these early texts – few Americans had visited and written about Istanbul before the treaty was completed – is this explicit defense of the Ottomans as also belonging to modernity. This insight was also striking to reviewers of these two books in 1830s.

RECEPTION AND LEGACY

Both De Kay and Porter's books were well received in the United States, where literary and publishing culture were ascendant. Shortly after *Sketches* was published in 1833, a reviewer in the *North American Magazine* began their review by criticizing De Kay as unqualified to write the book and unjustly averse to the Greeks. Yet the reviewer went on to admit that De Kay deserved praise for a clever, comprehensive, liberal, and lucid book. As opposed to the "gross misrepresentation, exaggerates description, and mendacious dogmatism" of other writers, De Kay was described as careful, faithful and diligent. The reviewer concluded that readers would find the book instructive and entertaining; De Kay was deemed honorable and patriotic.⁶⁸ Other reviews were not so Janus-faced as this one.

American Monthly Magazine dedicated more than twenty pages to its positive review of De Kay's book over the course of three issues at the end of 1833. But the magazine also drew selectively from De Kay in order to mischaracterize and degrade the Ottoman people.⁶⁹ Fortunately, not all reviewers chose to take this approach and instead saw the book for what it was. The *Philadelphia Album and Ladies' Literary Portfolio* described *Sketches* as "one of the most interesting and instructive books of the day," while excerpting De Kay's descriptions of everyday life and the liberty that women in the Ottoman capital experience – "more than in the other countries of Europe or in America." The newspaper also noted De Kay's report on the popularity of American cotton in Istanbul and the immense size of the Ottoman dry docks.⁷⁰ Reviews like these probably helped readers decide if they should purchase the book for themselves. The reviews may even have encouraged some Americans to plan to travel to Istanbul.

Other reviews focused less on the content of the book than on De Kay's defense of Ottoman character. The *New York Spectator* drew a favorable comparison between De Kay and earlier writers, including Lady Wortley Montague and George Bethune English, whom the newspaper praised for their freedom from prejudice against the Ottomans. Whereas Montague had written accurately about the Ottoman upper classes, De Kay did the same for the middle classes. The newspaper lamented, however, that unlike English, De Kay did not speak Turkish – once again repeating this common error.⁷¹ The *Charleston Courier* likewise noted De Kay's lack of prejudice, informing

its readers that “he corrects many errors and removes many prejudices in relation to this much slandered, and, as he thinks, much injured people.” According to the newspaper, the Ottoman Empire was open for business and “the work before us contains many valuable details on commercial matters, and relative to the growing intercourse of this country with Turkey.”⁷² The *National Gazette and Literary Register* in Philadelphia likewise took notice of De Kay’s reappraisal of the Ottomans, noticing that De Kay took “a much more favourable view of the Turkish character that has been customarily exhibited.” The newspaper also excerpted “one of the most interesting chapters” of the book: the one detailing the terms and trouble with the secret clause of the 1831 treaty.⁷³

Sketches was advertised for sale widely and frequently appeared in circulating and lending libraries. In 1839, Carey and Hart, one of the nation’s most prominent publishers and book houses, was still selling *Sketches* alongside the more-recently published *Incidents of Travel in Greece, Turkey, Russia and Poland* (1839) by John Lloyd Stephens⁷⁴ Stephens’s earlier *Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and the Holy Land* (1837) was very popular, and according to the preface of the newer book, the writer was induced to publish it – about places that did not “possess the same interest with those in his first work” – because the everyday scenes in these places were “comparatively new to most of his countrymen.”⁷⁵ While it was true that Americans had read few firsthand accounts of Istanbul written by Americans, Stephens’ purpose was very different from that of writers like De Kay and Porter.

Stephens, who was in Istanbul in May 1835 to secure a firman for survey work in Palestine, had a very negative view of the city and its people. He claimed that it was only recently that Europeans had been welcome in the city – which he attributed to “bastard” reforms, but also to the humbling introduction of the steam engine. In other words, desire for power and power projected by Europe opened up Ottoman Istanbul to the West. Stephens, who does not appear to have been broadly familiar with Orientalist literature, falls back on the trope of a fundamentally premodern society affected by outside powers and their modernities. Stephens concluded that although “Turks” were prone to adopt new vices, European manners and customs would ultimately spell the end of the “Turk of Mahommed.” Stephens paid little attention to Ottoman politics and commerce, and he sarcastically acknowledged and purposefully avoided the “characteristic and American” style of shrewdly

observing business opportunities for Americans in travel writing.⁷⁶ Stephens's interests, and indeed his intimacies, were vastly different than those of the literary mercenaries who wrote early in the 1830s.

In Istanbul, Stephens encountered one of these mercenaries – David Porter. While Porter might have found cause to frown on Stephens's description of Istanbul and the Turks – “barbarians” and “mongrels” – as well as his preference for references from classical literature, Porter surely would have approved of his call for increased funding of the US diplomatic corps.⁷⁷ At this point in 1839, Porter was still only a *chargé d'affaires* and not yet a minister proper. It also would have pleased Porter to know that Stephens wrote about the success of Foster Rhodes as an American naval engineer in Istanbul – evidence that Porter had indeed helped accomplish what he was asked to when appointed to represent the United States and mitigate the negation of the secret clause of the new treaty in 1831. But Stephens's report on Rhodes's success signified nothing about the Ottomans and was simply self-congratulatory US exceptionalism – “an honourable testimony to his countrymen of the success of American skill and enterprise abroad.”⁷⁸

Porter's own account of Ottoman Istanbul, *Constantinople and Its Environs*, had not approached its subject with the same sense of exceptionalism. When it was published in 1835, it received from reviewers much the same reception as De Kay's book had several years before. Almost immediately after its release, the *Daily National Intelligencer* revealed that the anonymous author of the book was doubtless Porter, given the “shrewdness, fearlessness, and vivacity, as well as intelligence” of the letters. In the newspaper's judgment, Porter had produced a more veracious account of the empire than other writers.⁷⁹ When American traveler Sarah Rogers Haight visited Istanbul with her husband a few years later, Porter gave them a copy of his book.⁸⁰ Harper & Brothers subsequently published Haight's book, as it had De Kay's and Porter's. But Haight failed to follow the lead of her two predecessors, instead adopting Stephens's rhetoric, and she looked forward to a millennial fantasy in which “the Turk and all the Moslem race will ere then have disappeared.”⁸¹ Later, on her second visit to Istanbul, Haight speculated that it would be less than 100 years before Christian nations extinguished Islam.⁸² Porter probably would have been horrified if he read this, seeing as he spent the last twelve years of his life trying to bring the United States and the Ottoman Empire

closer together. But Porter's alternative future does not appear to have experienced the lasting popularity that Stephens's and Haight's did in the United States.⁸³

A decade after its publication, De Kay's *Sketches* at least remained visible and continued to be advertised for purchase in newspapers in the United States. In 1845, *American Penny Magazine* published De Kay's account of an Ottoman reservoir, pointing out that "it should be a characteristic of our nation, to look upon all other countries with a desire to improve, in every possible way by their examples." Yet De Kay's *Sketches*, clearly meant to encourage Americans to become more intimate with the Ottomans, was received in the context of an undercurrent of bigoted Orientalism. Just a few pages earlier in its description of Mehmed Ali, *American Penny Magazine* had described the "Turkish sloth and magnificence" in which the Egyptian ruler lived.⁸⁴ And in spite of the book's continued availability, De Kay seems to have been of little interest to members of the American Orientalist Society. *Sketches* is mentioned once in an appendix of voyages, travels, and other works related to the Orient in John Pickering's first address to the society in 1843.⁸⁵ But, as Recep Boztemur observes in his editorial note to the 2009 Turkish translation of *De Kay* by Serpil Atamaz, *Sketches* contains remarkable observations and a neutral stance on Muslims and Turkey that was uncharacteristic at the time.⁸⁶ Unfortunately, the book has mostly been overlooked since the middle of the nineteenth century.

After De Kay and Porter

In 1829, George Jones – an Episcopalian who served as schoolmaster, secretary, and chaplain with the Mediterranean Squadron, but never visited Istanbul – felt inclined to apologize as he described the Ottomans he had encountered.

You will think me getting in love with the Turks: no; but I wish to give them their due. They have many dark traits, and I will mention some of them, too; but let us despatch the bright ones first.⁸⁷

Writing from the Mediterranean in the wake of the Greek Revolution and before the 1831 treaty with the Ottomans, Jones and his

contemporaries were already beginning to write from the mercenary position. De Kay's, Porter's, and others' intimacy with another site in the empire – its capital, Istanbul – further shifted American attitudes.

In 1833, De Kay felt no need to issue an apology for his positive portrayal of the Ottoman people. Porter, however, felt the need to preemptively defend himself from accusations of a pro-Ottoman bias in the concluding letter of his second volume. He explained that while he was no apologist for the empire, given the crusades, the Reconquista, Christian libel, and contemporary European foreign policy, the Ottomans were justified in feeling ill toward European powers. Porter felt positive that friendly policy could correct this, and the United States had an advantage in this regard. He repeated, "The prejudices of the Turks are in a great measure confined to the old world, and as yet do not extend to one from which they have received neither insult or injuries."⁸⁸ The future of US–Ottoman relations appeared bright to Porter.⁸⁹ But these relations never fully bloomed after they germinated in the 1830s.

What did grow was unhelpful in distinguishing US approaches from those of European powers. When Francis Schroeder visited Istanbul for several days in 1844 – on leave from the Mediterranean Squadron – Istanbul was familiar enough that he could write, "We diligently employed every day in Constantinople in visiting the most prominent and interesting scenes. Every body [*sic*] knows what are the principal wonders to be visited."⁹⁰ He observed, "We mounted steep and narrow alleys, populated with dogs and Turks; but the filth was not half so great as I had imagined, certainly not worse than towns in France, and cleaner than much of Smyrna."⁹¹ This rhetorical claim – Turkey is not as dirty as the writer expected – flourished after De Kay and Porter. Schroeder also thought nothing of wishing for the destruction of the empire by Russia, imagining that it would bring an end to slavery.⁹² Schroeder's prose betrays no sign of irony and, in spite of the new American intimacy with Turkey to which De Kay and Porter contributed, anti-Ottoman sentiments would continue to dominate descriptions of the city by later American arrivals.⁹³

A BURST OF ENERGY

At the end of the 1840s, there was a new burst of American commercial activity in Turkey. In the 1830s, Sultan Mahmud II had expressed an

interest in US ships. His son Abdülmecid, who took the throne following his father's death in 1839 and ushered in the *Tanzimât* era of Ottoman history, expressed a similar desire to take advantage of American experience in the production of cotton as he reorganized the empire, a wish that dragoman John Brown communicated to the Department of State.⁹⁴ The administration took this request seriously, and Secretary of State James Buchanan contracted two Americans – James Belton Davis and John Lawrence Smith – to travel to Istanbul in order to advise the sultan in this and other matters, including surveying and geological expeditions. Understanding that mercenary labor encompasses much more than soldiering, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that the United States, then, actively recruited mercenaries for service in the Ottoman Empire.

In 1846 – proceeding and then in the midst of the war with Mexico – Secretary of State James Buchanan advised the new US minister Dabney Carr, who took over after Porter died in 1843, to assist these two new arrivals in any way that he could.⁹⁵ Davis was the first to arrive, and the following spring, Secretary Buchanan acknowledged a letter in which Franklin Elmore, who had facilitated the contracts, inquired about passports for four enslaved Africans whom Davis's brother intended to send to the Ottoman capital as part of the cotton venture. Buchanan explained that this would not be possible, since slaves were not citizens. Nor could the department issue them a certificate stating their status vis-à-vis the United States, as could be done with free persons of color. Davis and his slaves were subject to the laws of whatever country or empire through which they transited.⁹⁶ Davis left few traces of his mercenary cotton venture in Turkey, but thanks to William Lynch, it is possible to speculate about what Davis was up to – and whether or not his slaves made it across the Atlantic.

In 1847, at the height of the Know-Nothing movement and in the middle of the war with Mexico, Lynch had selected a group of “young, muscular, native-born Americans, of sober habits” to travel to and survey the Dead Sea with the permission of the Porte.⁹⁷ In Istanbul briefly before setting out for Palestine, Lynch described the agricultural school at San Stefano – where the US legation had been during the Porter years – and its superintendent, James Belton Davis. Lynch reported that Davis had come from South Carolina to San Stefano accompanied by several enslaved Africans in order to institute the production of cotton.

Lynch used the presence of Davis and his slaves to gesture to the liberality of slavery in the Ottoman – he claimed no slave could be held for more than seven years – suggesting,

should the culture of the cotton-plant succeed in this region, many, very many thousands of additional hands will be required. In that event, the Ottoman Empire will present a most eligible field for the amelioration of the condition of the free negro of our own country.⁹⁸

While many American writers used the horrors of slavery as evidence of Ottoman barbarity – an exceptionalist move that usually ignored the reality of slavery in the United States – Lynch imagined Ottoman slavery, which he recognized was not modeled on US chattel slavery, as a solution to domestic problems in the United States. It is unlikely that Davis's slaves shared this vision of the future.

Contrary to Davis, whose venture left behind little evidence, the other American mercenary, John Lawrence Smith, left some recollections of his work in Turkey. Smith, a prominent chemist who was remembered in 1884 for having “opened up natural resources which have ever since added an important item to the revenues of the Porte,” was forced to remain longer than he wished in the country and ultimately embraced the bigoted Orientalism that was ascendant by the end of the 1840s, writing, “I am becoming more and more disgusted with this country and its people, and have my hands tied by their stupidity and ignorance.” Smith seemed annoyed that he was not allowed to travel unaccompanied about the country investigating its mineral resources.⁹⁹ The frame of international relations helps us to understand why the Ottomans did not want to publicize – let alone exploit – the nation's mineral wealth in the context of an already-tense articulation of power in the Levant. It was the ongoing negotiation of these articulations in the geopolitical frame that ultimately stunted the growth of US–Ottoman relations.

HUNGARY, ALEPPO, CAMP DELAWARE

Naturally, the mercenary energy of the 1830s and 1840s found its way back to the United States. The same year his comrade Lajos Kossuth caused such a stir in the United States, Galician-born Albin Francisco Schoepf – who was often described as Hungarian, though this is

disputed – emigrated to the United States. Schoepf attended an Austrian military academy as a youth and then participated in the Hungarian Revolution. After this he went into exile in the Ottoman Empire. Some accounts claim he served as a mercenary in Aleppo under Józef Bem, the Ottoman governor who was himself an exile following the 1848 revolution, but Miecislaus Haiman argues that Schoepf was probably confined to Kütahya in western Turkey with Kossuth and other failed revolutionaries. When he came to the United States in 1851, Schoepf worked for the US Coast Survey and then the Patents Office. He subsequently served in the Union Army, first as a field commander and then as the warden of the prison at Camp Delaware, where he was praised for his compassionate treatment of prisoners.¹⁰⁰

One of the officers who served under Schoepf at Camp Delaware was Charles Chaillé-Long. Long went on to work as a mercenary in Egypt less than a decade later, an encounter that I detail in the next chapter. Of his time at Camp Delaware, Long remembered, “General Schoepf, during my service with him, frequently recounted to me stories of his life in Aleppo, Asia Minor, and thus created in my mind an ardent desire to go the East.”¹⁰¹ But by the time Long was discharged from service at Fort Delaware, opinions toward the empire had changed for good. In 1853, the Crimean War shifted the politics of the Ottoman world. Just as Martin Van Buren had warned David Porter two decades earlier, geopolitics framed of US relations with Turkey – events could rapidly change the relationship. But in all actuality, the movement to develop closer ties to the Ottoman Empire had already largely failed to stem the rising tide of bigoted anti-Ottoman sentiment undergirded by Zionist and millennialist tropes of the “Holy Land.” By the time their Civil War ended, Americans were much less likely to identify and sympathize with the Ottoman Empire than they had been in 1851.

Conclusion: From Istanbul to Cairo

In 1912, Alexander Hidden published *The Ottoman Dynasty: A History of the Sultans of Turkey from the Earliest Authentic Record to the Present Time*. Among the American mercenaries who worked in the Ottoman naval arsenal in the 1830s and 1840s, Hidden’s father Warren had perhaps the longest and most intimate contact with the Ottoman Government. He arrived in Turkey in 1832, on the *Henry Eckford*, and worked in the

arsenal for seven years. In 1840, he took a position at the Imperial Ottoman Mint, where he continued to work for forty-five years.¹⁰² It seems somewhat ironic, then, that Hidden's is perhaps one of the least reliable accounts of the new relationship with the Ottomans after 1831, and structured by the same stereotypes that De Kay, Porter, and others worked hard to correct. In the revised 1912 edition of the book, Hidden writes,

The Turks are a race of Warriors. They are physically strong and capable of great endurance; the religion they profess has done much for their military training, for thereby they are taught implicit obedience and temperate habits, with the promise of unlimited pleasure in the next world as their reward.¹⁰³

But perhaps this description is not so ironic, given the shifting winds of US empire. In 1912, there was no longer any need for the United States to align itself with the Ottoman Empire it had once embraced. A new articulation of power would shortly set up the two powers as enemies in World War I. Yet the literary and other mercenaries of the 1830s and 1840s were not the last Americans to encounter the Ottoman world in the nineteenth century. Among the Americans who visited Istanbul during these early decades was physician Valentine Mott. More than two decades later, his son Thaddeus was responsible for helping to organize the mercenary force that established a new geography of relations with Egypt as the country maneuvered to escape the clutches of both Ottoman and Anglo-French power in the years immediately preceding the so-called "scramble for Africa."

CHAPTER 4

THE MONSTROUS GEOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL AFRICA, 1874–75

Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching,
Cheer up comrades they will come,
And beneath the starry flag
We shall breathe the air again,
Of the freeland in our own beloved home.

– George Root, 1863¹

In 1820, George Bethune English accompanied an Egyptian invasion force into the Sudan and produced an opium-infused narrative of his encounter. Along the way, English and his companions sang out “Hail, Columbia” as they crossed the Nile. After 1831, American writers increasingly focused on the Levant. Fifty years passed before the sonic register of the United States once again echoed in sub-Saharan Africa when Charles Chaillé-Long, a Union veteran of the US Civil War, presented a music box fashioned to play tunes including “Dixie,” “Tramp, Tramp, Tramp,” and “Johnny Comes Marching Home” to Kabaka Muteesa I, the ruler of Buganda, on behalf of the Egyptian Government. Long produced three book-length accounts drawing on this and other mercenary encounters in the Sudan. Long’s mercenary narratives, set on the southern edge of what was only nominally Ottoman territory, helped to develop a racial geography that remains popular in the United States. Beyond simply borrowing from Europeans, Long’s representations of a region he called “Central Africa” drew heavily

from the racialized landscape of the United States.² In both Central Africa and the United States, Long understood the presence of free black bodies as a threat to capitalist development – yet the Egyptian and international imperative under which Long was acting called for an end to the trans-Saharan slave trade once and for all. As Egypt moved to end the trans-Saharan slave trade in the Sudan, ivory, particularly desired and valued in Europe, became the most important resource extracted from the interior. Long's strategy for securing ivory – what Joseph Conrad would later describe as “methods” – involved the creation of strategic alliances with some native Africans in order to maintain control of resource streams.³ His account of developing this partnership is set against the fictive and monstrous landscape of Central Africa – pockmarked by violence and cannibalism and haunted by disease and death from which whites suffered greatly. Long was not the first to racialize Africa, but his accounts contributed significantly to the emerging field of ethnology in the United States and continue to influence contemporary treatment of the Sudans and Uganda. Long was also not the first American mercenary to work in Africa, but the form of colonial power that he embodies remains an epidemic across the continent.

In my first three chapters, I argued for the significance of mercenary force in shaping US attitudes and approaches to the Ottoman world and subsequently the Middle East using memory, sovereignty, and literature as my analytical lenses. This chapter turns to geography in order to further argue for the significance of US mercenary force in the Ottoman world. I argue that Long's mercenary narratives helped to establish a racial geography that continues to provide the backdrop for US imperialism in Africa. Rather than refer to any logical geography, “Central Africa” designates a space of representation invented and tailored for Western and US audiences. Long's account – contemporaneous with those of more famous explorers of Africa like Henry Morton Stanley – helped to bring Central Africa into being as an assemblage of social, political, economic, and historical meanings that figure US approaches to Africa in general. In this chapter I examine Long's accounts of his two expeditions in and around the Sudan. Long wrote repeatedly about these encounters, and my analysis focuses on two published accounts, *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People* (1877) and *My Life in Four Continents* (1912).⁴ In these books, Long offered

elaborate descriptions of the Central African landscape. He ignored the effects of the transatlantic slave trade on the interior of the continent, focusing instead on the transformation of trans-Saharan slave routes into ivory-trading networks. In spite of being enlisted, at least nominally, in an effort to eliminate slavery in Egypt's Sudan colony, Long did not lose sight of opportunities to extract additional human value from the interior of the continent through his ethnographic practices.⁵ I also reflect here on what Long's many criticisms of Christian missionaries in Africa reveal about his particular vision for the future. I conclude by analyzing how Long's monstrous geography contributed to military formations and securitization in the region during the Cold War and the war on terror.

Long was the first among a group of about fifty American mercenaries who worked in Egypt during the 1870s to publish an account of his Egyptian service.⁶ His first book, *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People*, published in New York in 1877, is the only American mercenary narrative from this period to deal at length with Egypt's Equatorial provinces, which today are part of South Sudan.⁷ *Central Africa* opens on February 21, 1874, the morning Long departed via train for Gondokoro with Charles Gordon, an English mercenary who had been appointed governor-general of the Equatorial provinces by Khedive Isma'il Pasha, the ruler of Egypt. From among the foreign mercenaries working in Egypt, Gordon selected Long as his chief of staff, though Long later claimed he had been sent on a secret mission by Isma'il.⁸ *Central Africa* details two expeditions Long made over the course of the next fourteenth months – one to Buganda and the other to the Bahr El Ghazal.⁹ Back in the United States a decade later, after the publication of his first book, Long gave numerous lectures and published many shorter essays about these expeditions. In 1884, Long wrote a widely read criticism of Gordon's administration of the Sudan. *The Three Prophets: Chinese Gordon, Mohammed-Ahmed (el Maabdi), Arabi Pasha* was published just a few months before Gordon's death at Khartoum and was not well received. One critic complained,

Most of the book is filled with rambling and confused accounts of the author's connection with Gordon in the Soudan, and of the Arabi rebellion. So exceedingly confused is it as to be

uncomfortable reading. It is very egotistic, and full of a certain tone of dislike and resentment toward Gordon.¹⁰

After Gordon's death, Long's popularity declined – Gordon was tremendously romanticized. Five years before he died, Long concluded his authorial career by penning a two-volume autobiography, *My Life in Four Continents*. This autobiography, published in London, is expansive, repeating and revising much of what he had already written elsewhere.

During his life, Long was recognized – beyond his criticism of Gordon – for confirming that Lake Victoria flows into Lake Albert via Lake Kioga.¹¹ And though he was not the only American to work in the Sudan on behalf of Egypt, some historians have been anxious to focus on Long's work.¹² This focus is, in part, due to Long's unabashed militarism. Historians William Hesselstine and Hazel Wolf, for example, contrast Long's expeditions with the scientific expeditions of the other Americans; they trumpet that these “were military and political; the only instrument of modern science he carried was an elephant gun.”¹³ In *The Farther Frontier*, a collection of short biographies of Americans in Africa, historian Lysle Meyer devotes a chapter to Long, concluding that it is unfortunate he is seldom remembered except for his attacks on Charles Gordon, because he was “an instrument of Egyptian expansionism on the eve of the European colonial partition and his activities comprise a fascinating story.”¹⁴ Indeed, while the papers of other American mercenaries who worked in Egypt in the 1870s are held in regional archives or nonexistent, Long was a significant enough figure in US history that his papers were acquired by the Library of Congress.¹⁵ But I disagree with Meyer's choice of words. Rather than fascination, I look upon Long's account of Central Africa with horror, for it is indeed a horrible story. I also recognize that Long's is a story that Westerners continue to retell as blackness and Africa are repeatedly conflated with degeneration and violence. As Achille Mbembe points out, “Africa is the mediation that enables the West to accede to its own subconscious and give a public account of its subjectivity.”¹⁶ Representations of African degeneration and violence, then, work to confirm the progress and peace of the West. While scholars like Walter Rodney have clarified the role of the West, including the United States, in the underdevelopment of Africa, in classrooms and books the dominant storyline is of a United States disinterested in the nineteenth-century “scramble for Africa.”

Similarly, the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, which established the framework for the partition of Africa, is often seen as an event that falls outside US history. This chapter demonstrates that scholars must not overlook the influence of US mercenary force in nineteenth-century Africa. The work it did continues to haunt the present.

Back to Egypt

Long's account of Central Africa is organized around the Anglo-Egyptian geography of the Sudan. Egyptian claims to this region originated with the invasion force that George Bethune English accompanied as far south as Sennar in 1820. Just south of Khartoum on the Nile, Sennar was the limit of Egyptian power on the upper Nile until 1869. That year, the khedive established Equatoria and appointed English mercenary Samuel Baker governor-general of the province. Baker made little progress implementing Egyptian hegemony and returned to Cairo in 1873. He was shortly thereafter replaced by Charles Gordon.¹⁷ Accompanying Gordon into the heart of Equatoria at Gondokoro, Long had plans to go even further and extend Egyptian influence farther south, toward Buganda – with its capital near modern-day Kampala on the shore of Lake Victoria.¹⁸ Later, after he returned to Khartoum, Long participated in the administration of the Bahr El Ghazal, west of Equatoria and a significant shatter zone in a dynamic region bordering Darfur. Egyptian expansion in Africa in the 1870s, however, belied the decline in Egyptian fortunes after the 1820s and 1830s.

In the years following English's mercenary service in the Sudan, Egypt had fallen on hard times. The 1820 Egyptian expedition to Sudan was, at least at first, a failure. Mehmed Ali's son Ismael was killed by opposition forces and the Egyptian struggle to gain a foothold in the region lasted until 1833, when Ali finally established an enduring capital at Khartoum.¹⁹ But even as he expanded south, Ali remained a subject of the sultan in Istanbul and obligated to assist the Empire in its war against Greek separatists. In 1827 at Navarino in the Aegean, Egypt's naval forces were destroyed when they were cornered, along with the Ottoman fleet, by a combined French, Russian, and British task force. After Navarino, tensions remained high between Cairo and Istanbul as Mehmed Ali increasingly defied the Porte and pursued additional territorial gains in the Levant. If Egyptian forces had not been

forced to turn back by Britain and France in 1833, they might have captured the Ottoman capital. In 1840, Mehmed Ali very nearly achieved independence but once again encountered a formidable coalition of powers opposed to his plans. Having secured little beyond hereditary control of Egypt, he died in 1849.

There were no more dreams of capturing Istanbul, but in 1863 Ali's grandson, Isma'il, became ruler of Egypt and embarked on an ambitious redevelopment of the country.²⁰ In addition to the European powers, Egypt also had a relationship with the United States and the khedive looked to the country for strategic reasons. Even as he was presiding over the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Isma'il was already recruiting American mercenaries, following in the footsteps of his uncle, Ismael, who had welcomed at least three American mercenaries, including English, into his invasion of the Sudan. Well acquainted with the political situation in the United States and the surplus military labor accrued after four years of war, Isma'il appears to have envisioned many possible roles for his American mercenaries, even if independence from the Ottoman Empire ultimately slipped from his fingers. In 1861, two years before he became the ruler of Egypt, Isma'il had put down an insurrection in the Sudan, signaling his intention to maintain Egyptian control of the Nile south of Wadi Halfa. This move was welcomed by both Britain and France, who continued to exercise significant influence on the Egyptian Government. The Sudan represented a valuable investment opportunity for both Egypt and Europe. Isma'il also intended to further Egypt's claim on the coast of the Red Sea by invading Abyssinia. This invasion was a failure, as I explain in the next chapter, and in 1877 the Egyptian debt crisis brought Isma'il's expansion and modernization efforts to an end. In 1878, he was removed from power by the sultan. After Isma'il was replaced as khedive by his son Tawfiq, only a few Americans remained in Egyptian employ; several others remained in the country, however, and the mercenary world of the American mission, of which they were a part, endured until 1882 when the British occupied Egypt.²¹

In 1938, Pierre Crabitès concluded,

America may well be proud of the work done by her sons in helping to win this empire for Egypt. Both the men who had fought in blue and grey, had worked together as brothers. They had been comrades in arms under a Muslim prince.²²

In Egypt, these former soldiers were knit tightly, as Crabitès says – “united under one flag” after the end of the Civil War.²³ After the end of their Egyptian service, their contributions to geographic societies continued to bond them together. Many of the sources I examine in this and the next chapter were based on addresses given in front of geographic societies in cities ranging from Paris and Cairo to New York and Saint Louis. It should come as no surprise that so many former soldiers occupied the field of geography; in many ways, geographic science is central to military practice. After the Civil War, it was natural that geography would unite these former combatants. Hesseltine and Wolf recognized the significance of their mercenary reunion in Egypt as part of the emergence of US imperial power overseas at the end of the nineteenth century, calling them “the vanguard of many thousands who, in the next three-quarters of a century would carry American knowledge, skill, and imagination to the far reaches of the earth.” And it was Long’s expedition to Central Africa that Hesseltine and Wolf identified as the “high watermark” of the mission.²⁴ Long’s is one of the more colorful accounts of this American mission, and reads more like a travel narrative or adventure story than a memoir or history. It is perhaps because of these characteristics – personal flair and the popularity of the adventure genre – that Long’s has been one of the careers that writers of the American mission have been most anxious to recount.²⁵

From Maryland to Central Africa via Alexandria

Charles Long was born in Princess Anne, Maryland, in 1842.²⁶ Though he eventually served in the Union Army during the Civil War as a captain in the 11th Maryland Volunteers, Long’s upbringing in the Eastern Shore of Maryland surely had a significant effect on his later attitudes about race. Although most of the state outlawed the slave trade in 1783, it remained legal on the Eastern Shore, which included Princess Anne, the county seat of Somerset County.²⁷ There is little evidence that Long had any significant role in the Civil War. Sometime after 1865, he began using the prefix Chaillé to gesture to his Huguenot ancestors. His embrace of this French ancestry aligns very well with his anti-British politics later in life.²⁸ Writing in 1912, Long recounted how he, like many veterans, worked odd jobs after the war. He served a three-year stint in the cotton-cloth industry and, after failed attempts at poetry and

drama, Long remembers, "I finally withdrew in disgust, convinced that my vocation lay with neither of the Muses I had invoked but with Mars."²⁹ He also claimed to already have a theater of violence in mind, recalling that, as early as 1865, "I had quite decided in my own mind to seek my destiny in the Orient."³⁰ In 1870, he was one of the first Americans to arrive in Egypt. Later, he claimed that he had written a letter to the khedive requesting a job.³¹ Long's claim to have been a pioneer in Egyptian service may or may not be true – most of the American mercenaries were recruited by a transatlantic network that drew on the advice of US general William Sherman, the highest-ranking military official in the United States. Many years after the last American left Egypt, Long claimed that "the main object of our service in Egypt, whilst ostensibly to reorganize the Egyptian army, was in reality to prepare that army for revolution, 'to break the Turkish yoke and establish the independence of Egypt.'"³² The likelihood of being involved in combat, he says, "caused many who had assumed it to be a pleasure tour to abandon the idea."³³ While Long was less experienced militarily than many of the American mercenaries who took jobs in Egypt, he was particularly skilled in the public self-promotion of his career there. In this regard, Long merits a comparison to George Bethune English, who also seemed to find his way into public controversies.

Long's most significant contribution to the khedive's expansion of Egyptian power was the work he did in Central Africa, attempting to establish Egyptian state control over the ivory trade in the areas of present-day South Sudan and Uganda. This commercial development required material support – guns and soldiers – but it also required representational support – images and words – to help naturalize and justify the exploitative character of the extraction of resources from Africa using indigenous labor under Western regimes of management. While capitalism's effects were already felt widely across central Africa as a result of the slave trade, abolition did not spell the end of capitalist extraction of wealth from the continent.³⁴ Over the course of the nineteenth century, ivory became one of the region's most important export commodities and Long's presence south of Khartoum is intimately related to new developments in the global economy, as Isma'il attempted to substitute money for slaves as the currency of choice in ivory trading.³⁵ Long's account of Central Africa at this moment of capitalist development helped to maintain "an image of Africa" – to

borrow from Chinua Achebe – as a racialized space of violence from which commodities must be extracted using the irregular methods of mercenary force.³⁶

Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People

Long's initial account of his two African expeditions on behalf of Egypt, *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People*, was published in New York in 1877 and drew from his July 1875 address to La Société de Géographie de Paris, of which he was a corresponding member. In his preliminary remarks to the society, Long quoted the secretary general of La Société: "Egypt attaches Africa to the civilized world" and "is now the last portion of the civilized world which awaits at the hands of the Europeans the salutary yoke of legislation and culture." Long explains in the book that he chose to publish an extended account of his address, "in the crude language of a soldier," in order to more faithfully recount his expeditions, describe the true nature and customs of Africa and Africans, and pay tribute to Isma'il Pasha, the khedive of Egypt, in whom he had great faith for the regeneration of Africa.³⁷ Long's account of Central Africa is intimately connected, then, to *la géographie humaine* that developed in nineteenth-century France following the French invasion of Egypt. Human geography drew connections between landscapes and ways of life and its intellectual and political context were closely related to the colonial agenda. Long almost certainly encountered human geography during his own education, which would have included instruction in the geographic ideas of the day.³⁸

In writing, Long's purpose was to establish a human geography of Central Africa that demonstrated the need for constant Western intervention and management. Long began his narrative by rejecting romantic accounts of Egypt, accusing travelers and missionaries of being unfaithful in their representations of Africa.³⁹ He rejected "that grand and magnificent spectacle depicted by the pens of more enthusiastic travelers, who would make, to willing readers, a Paradise of Africa." In reality, he claimed, Africa was "a grave-yard to Europeans."⁴⁰ As the source of these misrepresentations, Long singled out one source in particular: "the quaint and uncertain histories of that great Arab traveler, Ibn Batuta [*sic*], had become a model . . . where the naked truth would perhaps have been coldly received." According to Long, Battuta was

followed by writers whose desire for “fame and reputation” prompted further descriptions of “delight and ecstasy” in Africa.⁴¹ Long used Battuta to establish an intermediate moment – a period of Islamic penetration and influence – between the turbulent colonial present and a racially ordered past. The Arabs who came to Central Africa after Battuta, Long says, were not seeking mystery but gold, slaves, and ivory. He locates this history on the bodies of Africans, describing a process of amalgamation that led to “a change in the colour, and the typical characteristics of the negro of Central Africa.”⁴² This new population existed side by side with native Africans, according to Long, who observed, “Among these people, however, I have noticed that there are many of the real negro type.”⁴³ Rather than a landscape of pleasure, to which he claimed Muslim writers had succumbed, Long’s Central Africa was a racialized landscape that tested his manhood – a dangerous rather than a sensuous place.⁴⁴

Translated accounts of Battuta’s *Ribla*, a kind of travel narrative dictated to the writer Ibn Juzayy in 1355, only became available in English in the nineteenth century. Perhaps Long had read Samuel Lee’s 1829 English translation, which still circulates today.⁴⁵ The accuracy of the Battuta’s *Ribla* is suspect, of course; inconsistencies in the text were long thought to be due to Battuta’s advanced age and the trouble he had remembering his long trip. Recent scholarship, doubting the authority of texts in general, has lent credence to the idea that at least some of the text is imaginative or drawn from other sources.⁴⁶ This applies equally to Long’s narrative, which, too, is often imagined and borrowed. How interesting, then, that Battuta’s account of Africa, so different from European travelers of the nineteenth century, is generally positive in its reporting of Africa. Long’s strong reaction to Battuta’s positive appraisal of Africa is not just about a difference of opinions, but about the different purposes of each author. The Africa that Long found in Battuta’s writing resembles early European accounts of the continent as a paradise – a place where people might desire to settle. But Long’s Africa is no paradise; it is a site from which to extract resources through the application of mercenary force to racialized bodies.

In terms of the racial logic applied to Central Africa, there are significant differences between the language Long used to racialize Africans and the language George Bethune English used fifty years earlier. In 1822 English used the language of the slave market to describe

Africans – a bare capitalist approach to black bodies, typical of someone familiar with transatlantic commerce. It was the value of Africans as commodities or as objects of desire that mattered, not their value as evidence of one ethnological theory or another. In 1874, Long had access to a much wider repertoire of racial language for describing and dehumanizing Africans drawing from Hegel and others. In 1822, English could see the circumstances that left people degraded; Long could only see Africans as never-been and never-will-be civilized; they were, as Hegel claimed, outside history.⁴⁷ Before the Arab invasions, Long presumed, they were at least not out of place.⁴⁸ The racial problems that Long conjured were the central obstacle to the easy extraction of resources from Central Africa.

Long's sensational account of the racial geography of Central Africa opens with his departure for the Equatorial provinces, describing how his friends in Cairo came to see him off, knowing full well that a trip to Central Africa was "a path of glory that led but to the grave."⁴⁹ Long traveled with Gordon first by train to Suez. There, even before leaving Egypt proper, Long offered a less-than-favorable assessment of the conditions on the edge of the Egyptian frontier, disparaging the British Hotel, with its "dirty Indian servants and abominable 'cuisine.'" Nevertheless, Long saw the Suez as "a jumping off point from civilization" – in short, better than what lay ahead in Africa.⁵⁰ After a three-day boat trip from Suez, the party arrived at Sawakin, where, with a keen eye for commerce, Long noted the large amounts of gum arabic moving through the city. On the borderlands of Egypt and Africa, Long also offered a description of the local people – saying that they resembled gazelles with bushy hair that they attend to "with greatest care and vanity." He emphasized the fungibility of these racialized bodies, concluding that "a description of one will answer for all."⁵¹ Long failed to reflect that the same could be said of mercenaries. Instead, he positioned himself as the heroic figure in the midst of all this, repeatedly quoting Lord Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*:

But midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men,
To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess,
And roam along, the world's tired denizen –
With none who bless us, none whom we can bless.
... This is to be alone; this, this is solitude.⁵²

These were to be the terms of Long's encounter with Central Africa – Africans, all the same, versus Long, the Byronic hero.

After Sawakin came an eight-day camel trip, taking the same path as English fifty years earlier. Long and Gordon arrived in Berber and promptly took a boat to Khartoum. Not entirely ignorant of the Egyptian imperial project into which he was entering, and conscious of Egypt's history in the Sudan, Long recalled Ismael Pasha's fate as the party sailed past Shendi, arriving in Khartoum four days later.⁵³ In his description of Khartoum, the central city in the region since 1824, Long mocked the abolitionists and reformers who would champion Africa and Africans. Long predicted that a railroad to Shendi and steamer connections to Khartoum "will soon give [Khartoum] importance, not alone to its commerce, but will place a point heretofore remote within easy distance of an army of sightseers, sacred to them perhaps as a horrid slave depot."⁵⁴ Long sees a racial lesson for abolitionists at the end of the rail line:

Europe, thus brought unceremoniously to the front door of Central Africa, may then, face to face with the negro fresh from his African home, compare him with the picture of "Uncle Tom," or the sentimental portraits that have depicted him as he ought to be, and not as he is.⁵⁵

After only a few days at the very edge of Central Africa, Long already considered himself an authority on Africa and Africans.

Yet Long traced his authority over black bodies further back than Shendi or even Sawakin. At a banquet given before his departure from Khartoum to Gondokoro, Long recalled his childhood in the "sunny south," when he "stole away from the parental eye to Uncle Tom's cabin, there to revel in childish delight in the dance, banjo, and plantation melodies of the happy Sambo." He followed, injecting the melancholy of *Childe Harold* into the Reconstruction-era landscape of the United States.

The fiddle and bow of "Old Uncle Ned" is silent now, and these scenes have "gone glimmering through the dream of things that were," to give place to the busy wheel of progress, that has crushed beneath its iron pressure the bonds of slavery in America, and made the slave, if a wiser, by no means a merrier man.⁵⁶

Abolition, then, appeared to represent a kind of loss in Long's version of history, both for himself – deprived of childish delight – and for African Americans, who remained “slaves” in Long's monologue – free, but less happy than they were under the paternal bonds of the peculiar institution. Chattel slavery in the United States had functioned for Long as a kind of laboratory in which he could learn about the nature of Africans. Now he was anxious to apply what he believed he had learned in the United States to Africa.

After a short stay in Khartoum, Gordon and Long departed together for Gondokoro, where they arrived twenty-six days later, passing through Fashoda along the way. While Gordon quickly returned to Khartoum three days later, Long stayed in Gondokoro, then continued southward, following, in reverse, John Hanning Speke's path as he traveled from Lake Victoria to Khartoum in 1862 in order to verify the source of the Nile. Long writes that his goal was to explore the region of Lake Victoria and further clarify the source of the Nile, which he called “the Eldorado of Central African explorers.” Long was deeply invested in the Western preoccupation with determining the source of the Nile and wanted to validate Speke and disprove Samuel Baker's claim that Lake Albert was the river's source – Long intensely disliked Baker. Ultimately, Long verified both Speke and Baker by locating and navigating a body of water that he called Lake Ibrahim (Lake Kioga), a body of water between Lake Victoria and Lake Albert.⁵⁷ In the pages of *Central Africa*, Long described his departure from Gondokoro at the end of April 1874 using several popular military metaphors. First, he said “the die had been cast,” drawing on a well-known phrase attributed to Julius Caesar. Second, he quoted a familiar aphorism that he attributed to Abraham Lincoln: it was “too late to swop [*sic*] horses.”⁵⁸ Finally, he once more quoted Byron:

Now Harold found himself at length alone,
And bade to Christian tongues a long adieu.
Now he adventured on a shore unknown,
Which all admire, but many dread to view.
His breast was arm'd 'gainst fate, his wants were few;
Peril he sought not, but ne'er shrank to meet.
The scene was savage, but the scene was new;
This made the ceaseless toil of travel sweet.⁵⁹

With this referential framing, Long highlighted his own bravery and situated Central Africa as a militarized space in which to set his mercenary narrative.

BUGANDA: ESCALATING VIOLENCE

After two months of trekking, Long arrived near the site of present-day Kampala and was received by representatives carrying the flag of Buganda, and then by Kabaka Muteesa I at his capitol on Lubaga Hill. Long appears to have known little about Buganda's past, except bits and pieces about the country from Baker. In fact, Long arrived at the moment that Buganda was in the ascendancy over Bunyoro, a declining kingdom responsible for chasing away Baker in 1872 after he unilaterally annexed the kingdom to Egypt. Muteesa welcomed Long as a representative of the governor-general and the khedive, recognizing the benefit to Buganda of staying on good terms with the Egyptians while meanwhile continuing to export ivory to Zanzibar on the eastern coast of the continent. With the British pressing in on both sides of this equation, good relations with Egypt were useful so much as they helped Buganda against Bunyoro.⁶⁰

Long's narrative of the reception he received echoes typical colonial rhetoric. First, whiteness is a condition somehow immediately recognized by and laden with meaning for native peoples. Long styled himself "Mbuguru," which he translated as "white prince." He also claims to have sent a message to Muteesa before his arrival that said that "a great Prince would visit him, the great M'Tse, the greatest King of all Africa." Long adds, "I meant Central Africa," in order to further diminish Bugandan sovereignty.⁶¹ Upon his arrival, Long immediately located Central African violence – with which he already claimed to be familiar based on Speke's description of Muteesa – on the body of its leader: "from his large restless eye, a gleam of fierce brutality beams out that mars an otherwise sympathetic expression."⁶² In a confusing description, devoid of context, Long goes on to confuse political power with sheer brutality, claiming that thirty unsuspecting people were butchered at the welcome ceremony held in his honor.⁶³ Whether or not these executions actually took place is not the question of this study. The truth or falsity of the events does nothing to render Buganda any more or less civilized than anywhere else that violence occurs. In Long's text, the executions simply function to establish that Central Africa is a

violent, uncivilized place – the perfect place to demonstrate white supremacy. After the executions, an interpreter explained that Muteesa simply desired to impress them with his power – the executed could have been prisoners or criminals or enemies of the state for all Long knew. But Long continued to insist that Muteesa's actions were proof only of African brutality, not political sovereignty or, perhaps, a territorial monopoly over violence that Muteesa wished to illustrate.

Neither Islam nor the threat of sodomy figured in Long's appraisal of Muteesa, as they would for Catholic missionaries who arrived in Buganda in 1877. There is no indication that Long connected Muteesa's actions to Islam or homosexuality, as later arrivals did when they criticized similar executions carried out by Muteesa's successor, Kabaka Mwanga. Long's appraisal, derived from his experience with the racial logic of the United States, was that Muteesa was a monster simply because he was a black man with power.⁶⁴ Indeed, Long's monstrous depiction of Muteesa intensified over time. Among the objects Long reported to have carried as gifts to Muteesa in 1874 was "a large mirror, with gilt frame, [which] was an object of great curiosity."⁶⁵ By 1878, the mirror had become much more than a mere object of curiosity. It had become a means for Long to read the internal state of the "proud, vain, and cruel" king. In a lecture given in Boston, Long is reported to have said, "No tongue may depict the impression upon this savage King's face as he looked into a large mirror."⁶⁶ By the time he retold the story in 1912, Long described Muteesa as "a monster of the type of the famous King of Dahomey."⁶⁷ The blatant racism of Long's claim, and indeed the Dahomey metaphor in general – African life is brutal and cheap – is obvious; but Long does make a fair comparison, or at least an appropriate one if read in terms of the West's strategy on the continent. Constantly cited for the cruelty of its rulers, Dahomey was Europe's most valuable trading partner on the west African coast during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The King of Dahomey's cruelty was useful: first, for helping to line the pockets of all the parties who benefited from the slave trade, and then for justifying the colonialism and imperialism which followed, often in the name of ending the slave trade. Long's efforts to draw Muteesa into a relationship with Egypt were unsuccessful, but the methods the West encouraged and rewarded in Africa produced countless Dahomeys.

Rather than reflect on the nature and migration of violence across Africa due to the slave trade, Long used his story about the executions to criticize the missionary tradition in Africa. Long says the cruelty he witnessed on Lubaga Hill validates Speke's claims about Central African brutality against the slander of David Livingstone, who accused Speke of exaggerating in order to sensationalize. Long claims Livingstone minimized Central African violence in order to deceive people and encourage further missionary work in Africa. Once more, Long claimed intimate knowledge which others lacked:

I cite these facts in the interest of truth alone, yielding to none in the desire to ameliorate the condition of the African. But in heaven's name, let those whose province it is to be the pioneers in the work, speak of him as he is, without regard to those who attribute to him virtues and ideas, that, if possessed, would render him no longer a subject for our commiseration and sympathy.⁶⁸

Long rejected religion as a useful instrument of colonization in Central Africa and ridiculed Samuel Baker for suggesting that Africans might be regenerated by listening to Psalms set to bagpipe music.⁶⁹ Instead, Long insisted that it would be "utterly useless" to attempt to convert Africans since they have no concept of divinity.⁷⁰ Long's Central Africa has no space for God – like in Hegel's philosophy, it is racial spirit that is most important. Africa did, however, have space for mercenary force and military figures devoted to capitalism's mantra of development.

Like so many other white supremacist adventurers, Long attributed his success in blazing a path to Buganda in large part to his equestrianism.⁷¹ Among the technologies Long enlisted to travel up the Nile past Gondokoro to Buganda was a horse that he named Uganda. He had fond feelings for the horse, and claimed that it

kept me company in the long vigils of stormy nights that marked my absence and secured for me, doubtless on my entree as a Centaur at the palais of M'Tse, in Uganda, the honours of human sacrifice, accorded only to the equals of African kings!⁷²

Among slaveholders in the United States, horses were a potent symbol of power. Indeed, as Walter Johnson points out, geographic governance in

the South was determined by the range of slave patrols, which relied on horses. And “a horse added a fearful layer of wildness to the already volatile encounter of a white man and a slave on an isolated road.”⁷³ However, Long’s invocation of the trope of the horse as a decisive factor in his encounter certainly exaggerates the effect of the horse on the Bugandans. Lubaga Hill was not Tenochtitlán in 1519 or Kentucky in 1830. The Bugandans had seen horses and certainly would have removed Long from his mount if they had so desired. Muteesa tolerated Long’s belligerent display of riding, assuming it actually took place as Long describes, because the kabaka understood the imperatives of diplomacy and trade.

Long’s methods of diplomacy were based on his understanding of Central Africa as a landscape of violence. Along with the music box that I described earlier in this chapter, Long also presented Muteesa with several other gifts. Among these was a Reilly No. 8 elephant gun identical to the one Long carried throughout the expedition. Long also presented Muteesa with something he referred to as a battery. The mysterious device appears to have been some type of electrical condenser – a Leyden jar probably – capable of giving off a shock; Long claimed he demonstrated it by knocking the king and several dignitaries down with its current. He had put on a similar demonstration of the device in northern Uganda and concluded,

If I were an enthusiast in the idea of the quick regeneration of the African, I would suggest the use of the magnetic battery; it clothes the possessor with every attribute human and divine, and the negro yields a ready submission.⁷⁴

Long called this technological terror “Lubari,” based on his belief that the word signified “firmament” in many African idioms; firmament was as close as he said Africans came to divinity.⁷⁵ Along with the mirror, the battery reflected the Africans to whom it was applied in Long’s narrative: “I scarcely need add that each shock administered them (and they were by no means delicate ones), was received with shouts of laughter and Wah! wahs! of wonder and superstitious awe.”⁷⁶ Long concluded that “Lubari,” along with Uganda, were his talismans and won success where arms and soldiers would have failed. Later in life, reflecting on what he believed these technologies accomplished, he wrote that the

"battery raised me in the African mind to the dignity of *Lubari* – a sort of god – a *deus ex machina*! The Arab horse won for me the prestige of a centaur!"⁷⁷ Again, Long can only explain his good-natured reception by the Bugandans as evidence of Western superiority and African superstition.

In his sweeping appraisals of Buganda, Long painted the portrait of a place with no tradition beyond abject blackness. Once more, he channeled Hegel, saying that the Bugandans belonged to "a race which ever strives to forget and obliterate the past, rather than retain records of it."⁷⁸ Long insisted this lack of history produced chaos that marked Central Africa as outside the modern world. Long even went so far as to claim that Central Africa lacked landscapes – except on the shores of Lake Victoria, where he described "rolling and picturesque" country. But even as he dismissed Buganda's history and presence, Long described a productive economy. Here, in the purported violent chaos of the jungle, Long catalogued intensive banana, corn, sweet potato, sugarcane, and tobacco cultivation, failing to appreciate the significance of this agricultural production to Buganda's place in the world.⁷⁹ He was frustrated, too, by Muteesa's evasiveness on the issue of the ivory trade. Blinded by his strong hatred of Africans, Long, who obviously expected compensation for his own work, was unable to understand why Muteesa might desire to continue exercising control over trade in the Great Lakes region. Long had little real success bringing Buganda or the ivory trade under Egyptian control; all he could manage was to write dismissively of the king: "like all Africans he was a great beggar and was never appeased."⁸⁰ Buganda exemplified the antebellum landscape that Long so frequently recalled – agricultural and tended to by black bodies – yet he was enraged by the fact that the people in charge were not white planters.

Long did at least depart from Kampala on reasonably good terms. After his monthlong stay in Buganda, he set out to seek a connection between Lake Victoria and Lake Albert. In his description of traveling along roads through the jungle, Long exclaimed ironically, "Here, indeed, is the Africa of my boyish fancy! A hell on earth, whose rich vegetation and flowers, like the upas tree, breathe poison and death!"⁸¹ By once more invoking this wild landscape, as well as his own upbringing, Long was able to move almost seamlessly from abjecting blackness to endorsing white supremacy; Long attributed his survival in

this harsh climate to a “natural instinct,” which he said “seems to acknowledge the supremacy of the white man.”⁸² Long had demanded to be allowed to navigate Lake Victoria, but Muteesa demurred. The lake was not under Bugandan hegemony. Muteesa only allowed Long onto the lake briefly to take limited measurements. In his description of the Bugandans’ preparations to go out on the lake, Long again recalled Byron’s *Harold*:

Childe Harold at a little distance stood,
And view’d, but not displeased, the revelry
Nor hated harmless mirth, however rude;
In sooth, it was no vulgar sight to see
Their barbarous, yet their not indecent glee.⁸³

Long’s 1877 account of this brief trip onto Lake Victoria appears almost muted. Later, in 1912, he claimed that Speke had withdrawn his claim to have navigated the lake in 1862. Long concluded this meant he was “the first white man to sail upon the Victoria Nyanza.” The honor, he said, was “purely sentimental” given that credit for the discovery of the lake still belonged to Speke.⁸⁴

Navigating Lake Victoria was not the climax of Long’s account of his visit to Buganda. Rather, the climax of the trip was an incident which Long used to demonstrate the power of white mercenaries and their allies to navigate life and death in the colonial world. On locating the outlet that leads to modern-day Lake Kyoga, Long says he and his companions were engaged by a group of Bunyoro soldiers in a short battle on the river. Long’s account of this encounter carefully manages his superior position among the combatants. Long recalled the moment when one of his Sudanese guards, Abd-el-Rahman, raised his rifle to take the first shot at the attackers: “Throwing off the horror of my position for the moment, I cried, ‘If you shoot, I’ll kill you.’ His arm immediately fell in obedience. I told him that upon the first shot depended our lives: and I claimed it.”⁸⁵ In this rendering, Long is not only the most skilled combatant – on whose aim lives depend – but he is also the best manager; Long utilizes Africans, in this case his Sudanese guard, to demonstrate his own manliness. This clash might have been avoided, though. In the first place, Long should not have been surprised by the attack; he refused to ask for permission or to give a reason for wanting to

travel down the river – the early stirrings of the Nile were in Bunyoro territory – when met by the kingdom's representatives. Long was also well aware that Baker had already stirred the pot in Bunyoro five years earlier. Instead of recognizing his own tactical errors, Long used the incident to position himself as superior not just to Africans, but to the English mercenary Baker as well. If Long was superior to Baker, then obviously American methods for managing the racial geography of Africa must be superior to British methods, too.

Long applied many of the methods that he learned in the United States to Africa; on his expedition to Buganda, Long punished a disobedient soldier with fifty lashes delivered by the two Sudanese soldiers who accompanied him. As this transplantation of American racial violence to central Africa demonstrates, the violent legacy of chattel slavery in the United States knows no borders. But it was not intimate knowledge of the inner lives of Africans that helped Long in Central Africa. Nor was it the particular technologies with which he armed himself – rifles and horses were not all that new to this part of Africa. To give too much credit to intimate knowledge and technology in the expansion of capitalism into the interior of Africa is to fail to understand the significance of the two Sudanese soldiers who accompanied Long on his two expeditions – Säid Bagarrah, from Fashoda, and Abd-el-Rahman, from Darfur.⁸⁶ As Walter Rodney points out, “sustenance given by colonies to the colonizers was most obvious and very decisive in the case of contributions by soldiers from among the colonized.” Säid Bagarrah and Abd-el-Rahman's military experience, probably more extensive than Long's, was invaluable in the confrontations in which the three were involved during the process of helping to open up Central Africa to capitalism. As Rodney observes, “Colonialists were viciously using African soldiers as pawns to preserve colonialism and capitalism in general.”⁸⁷ In Egypt, itself a colonial power, Sudanese soldiers were essential in the military. In 1863, 447 of these soldiers were sent to Mexico to fight alongside the French for four years.⁸⁸ By 1874, seven years after they returned to Egypt, these troops were stationed as far south as Foueira, a remote military outpost in the Sudan where they formed a key component of the *zeriba* system. Originating in the 1850s, this system of extracting wealth from the interior was organized around remote trading posts occupied by traders and supported by military detachments, a very similar arrangement to

that of the western frontier in the United States.⁸⁹ The work Long performed for the khedive did nothing to suppress the exploitive system of the zeriba. Rather, in the narrative of his second expedition, which he undertook after returning from Buganda, Long imagined ways in which mercenary force might help to keep the zeriba system running efficiently.

After he arrived back at Gondokoro, where Gordon listed all the Europeans who had died while he was gone, Long concluded that these events were “proof positive that Africa, by some decree of nature, was marked as the exclusive home of the negro.”⁹⁰ In his account of their reunion, Long writes, “[Gordon] stared at me with ill-concealed horror, grasped my two hands in cordial welcome and said tenderly: ‘Come, let me photograph you; the world should know what it cost to solve the Nile source problem.’” In both Long’s estimation and Gordon’s photograph, it was a white body that made Africa visible. This parallel mapping between human bodies and racial geography remained important to Long many years later. In *My Life in Four Continents*, Long includes the photo, calling it “a precious souvenir of those days, and the reader must agree that it bears the trace of the physical and mental suffering indicated by Gordon’s exclamation.”⁹¹ By reading his own image as evidence of the cost to whites of knowing Africa, Long effectively reversed the development of Western imperialism; instead of suffering from European incursion and violence as a result of the extraction of its resources, Central Africa was instead responsible for sapping the life from Europeans who dared to enter. Long – styling himself a god, a centaur, and a Byronic hero – presents himself as, just barely, the exception to this rule.

“MAKRAKA”: CANNIBALS AND COLLECTING

On January 31, 1875, after a brief period of recuperation in Khartoum following his expedition to Buganda, Long departed for a place he called “Makraka” – likely the Bahr el Ghazal – about 350 miles west of Lado. Long was optimistic that Makraka was an “Eldorado of health in Central Africa.” In other words, it was a place where soldiers might be stationed without suffering from tropical maladies. From Makraka, these soldiers could effectively administer the westernmost of Egypt’s Equatorial provinces. Long’s explanation for the expedition, then, was simple: in order to exploit the country’s resources and affirm the authority of the

Egyptian state, Makraka was to be occupied and colonized. But Long had other motives beyond simply securing the ivory trade in the region. In addition to the sovereign and commercial benefits, the invasion and occupation of Makraka would also produce ethnographic knowledge, he said, “unfolding the mysteries of the Akkas or Ticki-Ticki, and other strange people, whose existence vaguely signaled by both ancient and modern travelers, was still left, in a Gulliverian sense, in the realm of fiction.”⁹² Indeed, Long did return human specimens to Cairo, but his most significant contribution to the emerging practice of ethnography was his descriptions of a group he called the “Niam-Niam.” In Long’s narrative, the Niam-Niam are Central African cannibals whom he enlists in his mercenary endeavor.

Long’s mission in Makraka extended beyond securing the ivory trade through mercenary force and included the collection of living persons, “antiqua,” that he would present to the khedive in Cairo.⁹³ In *Central Africa*, Long recalls his “surprise and delight when Achmet Agha [a local trader] announced to me that he could give me a full-grown woman.” Long refers to his first acquisition, whom he says was an Akka from the southwest, as “Ticki-Ticki.”⁹⁴ Another of Long’s acquisitions was “Goorah-Goorah.” Unlike Ticki-Ticki, who had been enslaved for some time, Long claimed Goorah-Goorah was the “daughter of Munza, King of Monbutto.”⁹⁵ Ticki-Ticki and Goorah-Goorah, along with others whose names Long never gives – including an infant girl whom he claimed was also an Akka – were intended as types that Long

hoped to present to his highness in the interest of ethnographic study, that might perhaps, establish, whether by type or language, that mysterious link in the origin of the human race, which want of tradition with the negro has committed to a most impenetrable mystery.

The “history, language, customs, and arms [of Central Africa] were illustrated by them, bringing what had been fiction or romance into the realm of reality.” Long claims that Ticki-Ticki, for example, was “the first adult ever presented to the civilized world from a race vaguely mentioned by Herodotus, but whose actual existence now was no longer left in doubt.”⁹⁶ For these attempts to conjure up myths, Long would

eventually be recognized by one of the preeminent ethnological institutions in the United States.⁹⁷

Twice in *Central Africa*, Long refers to this practice of collecting people as being “in the interest of ethnographic study.”⁹⁸ By the nineteenth century, ethnography was already well established as a method of study focused on describing the different races of mankind. More than just the present order of things, ethnographers hoped to reach farther back into history. In 1834, for instance, *The Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge* hoped that “a series of anthropographies, of different epochs, would form the true basis of ethnography.”⁹⁹ While early ethnographers produced mostly pseudoscientific accounts on the origins of cultural and biological difference, modern linguistics offers more precise insight into the relationship between naming and power. For example, while “Niam-Niam” is often said to be derived from Dinka for “great eaters,” Paola Ivanov traces “Niam-Niam” back to the “Lamlam/Damdam/Namnam” of the early Islamic period. Ivanov notes that by the fifteenth century, “the notion of savage cannibalistic fringe peoples became associated with the traditional geographical Arab dogma concerning the source of the Nile and the links between the African river systems.” The lexical component of this dogma “represented not much more than a vague notion of peoples who were practically unknown, but felt to be extremely ‘savage,’ located beyond the explored areas or even in the deepest interior of Africa at places favored for mythical creation.” Ivanov concludes that in European reports from the nineteenth century, “the ‘Niam-Niam’ idea was hardly different, despite claims to positivistic thinking.”¹⁰⁰ Ivanov goes on to accuse Long of holding “what is even for his time an extremely disparaging attitude to the Africans.”¹⁰¹ But a closer reading of Long’s take on the man-eating myth reveals not just racism but also an embrace of these “cannibals” as important allies in the extraction of ivory from the region. As opposed to the missionary, who might find himself being “cooked in a pot,” Long presents himself as a man who could find common ground with the cannibal, coming to an arrangement that benefited the best interests of Egypt and the West.

In Long’s account of the expedition to Makraka, the people he referred to as Niam-Niam cannibals are probably Azande people. Long’s description of cannibalism among the Azande occupies a relatively small portion of his narrative, and he is careful to restrict the language of his

report to the authoritative tone of the ethnographer, rather than a mere sensationalist. Long never claims cannibalism was common or accepted. Rather, he claims that the people west of the Nile ate human flesh only because they had been overpowered and robbed, or because their cattle had been the victims of poisonous weeds.¹⁰² Long even hedges at times, describing some of the women whom he handed over to his occupation force as only “slightly anthropogenic.”¹⁰³ Long’s case weakened further when he insinuated that one group must be anthropophagic because they devote their resources to growing yams, sugar cane, dourah, millet, watermelons, and vegetables in the rich soil rather than raising cattle.¹⁰⁴ Apparently Long could not understand how agriculturalists could get enough protein without resorting to eating human flesh. Colonial misunderstandings like this, of course, are common. In seventeenth-century New England, English colonists linked property rights to enclosure – specifically for raising cattle – and interpreted Native Americans’ lack of domestic cattle as proof of their inferiority.¹⁰⁵ Two hundred years later in Africa, Long would interpret successful agriculture in the absence of cattle – and in spite of the violence of the ivory and slave trade – as evidence only of savagery. Nevertheless, he imagines cannibalism was undertaken with “intuitive shame” and that only “those slain in battle, infants or the aged” were eaten.¹⁰⁶

Long’s 1877 account of Niam-Niam cannibalism exemplifies the archetype of the Western encounter with the cannibal that Peter Hulme describes as “bereft of actual cannibals.” Hulme points out, “The primal scene of ‘cannibalism’ as ‘witnessed’ by Westerners is of its aftermath rather than its performance.”¹⁰⁷ Cannibalism works, then, to establish a clear line between the colonizer and the colonized. In Long’s narrative, boundaries were especially important because of the close martial relationship that existed between himself and the cannibals. This simultaneous intimacy and distancing are apparent in an incident in which Long and his Sudanese escort provide heavy cover fire when the Niam-Niam attack a group Long calls the “Yanbarri.”¹⁰⁸ According to Long, the Niam-Niam subsequently pursued the Yanbarri, burning twenty of their villages and capturing thirteen women and children. Long reported that the Niam-Niam returned to camp at sundown that day, but remained at a distance from Long and his escort. Long sets the scene:

That night, at places without the cordon of sentinels, fires were burning whose fitful flame and glare proclaimed the presence of more inflammable matter than wood, even if an odour of burnt flesh did not indicate it more plainly to the olfactories.

It dawned on Long that he should have known to expect cannibalism: "Horresco referens! The meat that I had promised them was, without a doubt, the unlucky Yanbarri 'potted' that day." But Long never actually witnessed the cannibalism, explaining that "I did not care to investigate the matter closely, appreciating the delicacy of their retirement from camp, and as well feeling here the force of the maxim, that 'where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise.'"¹⁰⁹ In his 1877 account, the smell of burnt flesh was the closest Long came to actual cannibalism. A missionary might try to reform these cannibals; Long concentrated on making them into Egyptian allies for the extraction of ivory from the region. Neither a missionary nor an abolitionist, Long was concerned with upholding the Egyptian claim of sovereignty over the Bahr El Ghazal.

An alliance with cannibals was one component of Long's strategy for establishing Egyptian hegemony. Another part was supporting the allies Egypt already had. As part of his description of the plan to abolish the slave trade and establish authority over the ivory trade, Long describes a scene reminiscent of the plantation economy of the United States. When the expedition arrived at a friendly zeriba in Makraka, Long found that the Arab trader running the station had a collection of 300–400 young women, appraising that they "could not be considered slaves, since they remained by their own free will." In spite of this – their "free will" – Long "took possession of them as refugees."¹¹⁰ But freedom from slavery did not mean these women were free from their obligation to the state. Liat Kozma, for example, demonstrates that the Egyptian state continued to police these women's bodies after the passage of the 1877 Anglo-Egyptian Convention, which was intended to combat the slave trade more aggressively.¹¹¹ And, as Eve Troutt Powell observes of formerly enslaved Africans from the Sudan, "their first journeys were violent and forced. Subsequent voyages, undergone when they were free, had to be made in secret or under the aegis of missionaries who could negotiate for their passport documentation with Ottoman, Egyptian, or European authorities."¹¹² In this case, although they were initially

classified as refugees, Long shortly distributed the women for marriage among the soldiers of his occupation force.¹¹³ Long's deep desire for the antebellum racial order – expressed elsewhere as the longing for the anachronistic space of the slave quarters – was fulfilled by distributing captured women among his soldiers in order to establish the foundations of a new African workforce. The reproductive tangles of chattel slavery haunt Long's approach, and his actions echo the "phallic power" exercised by slave owners who labored to reproduce enslaved bodies in the United States and elsewhere.¹¹⁴

In an 1887 article in *Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly* – after Gordon's death but before Herbert Kitchener's reconquest of Khartoum – Long reflects on his paternal act: "What has become of my military colony among the Niam-Niam during these last ten years no one has been able to tell me."¹¹⁵ In the same article Long also slightly alters the story of his encounter with cannibals, saying that

in the vicinity of my camp there were significant piles of human bones and skulls. Many of these were the remains of those who had died of smallpox, but horrible to relate, the most of them were the relics of a feast!¹¹⁶

And 1887 was not be the last time Long added details to satisfy audiences hungry for tales of African violence. In his 1912 account of the expedition to Makraka, Long told an entirely different story. Thirty years after he led an invasion and occupation force into the Bahr El Ghazal, Long had to contend with a hardened tradition of misrepresentations of Africa and Africans. From Tarzan to Theodore Roosevelt, "Wild Africa" and "the Dark Continent" had become the foundational site for the formation of potent white masculinity; Long could no longer afford to hedge about cannibalism. Now, he describes the human geography of the region quite simply: "the Ticki-Ticki, like Niam-Niam and tribes west of the Nile, are cannibals." No longer was cannibalism a dire necessity resulting from want of food, but rather human flesh was "a delicacy," though "not to be had every day." Long not only claims more responsibility for the destruction of the Yanbarri – "I reluctantly burned their villages and inflicted great loss upon them in order to open the road" – but also claims to have witnessed cannibalism firsthand: "Curious, I approached and

beheld the Niam-Niams greedily feasting upon their roasting rivals.”¹¹⁷ Central Africa was even more monstrous in 1912 than in 1877.

Long also once again conjures the racialized space of the American plantation to describe the wedding ceremony that followed his transfer of female property from slave traders to the military:

Rude it certainly was, but in striking resemblance to the dances of the old plantation in the days before the war of the States, and when the fiddle and bow of “Old Uncle Ned” was a characteristic feature in the life of the once picturesque negro.

In retrospect Long draws a stronger comparison between the racial landscape of the United States and Africa than he had in 1877, saying that he witnessed in the Sudan the “giddy gyrations and eccentric evolutions of a dance strangely like the cakewalk of the Afro-American.”¹¹⁸ Long claimed Central Africa was the evolutionary home of African Americans, but it was not any specific African cultural tradition that Long could identify that connected the two places – only his own racial consciousness, haunted as it was by the memory of the racial order of antebellum South Shore Maryland. Driven by genealogical urges, Long and others like him were early pioneers in the practices of racial typology and collecting.

After collecting people, planting an Egyptian occupation force, and destroying the Yanbarri, Long made his way back to Lado with 600 elephant tusks carried by his new allies. He shortly thereafter departed from the Equatorial provinces, “to regain the life [he] left behind in Central and Oriental Africa.”¹¹⁹ He would do further work for the khedive as a surveyor in preparation for the Egyptian invasion of Abyssinia in 1876, but found very little worth recounting on that expedition. In a summary of his time spent in the Equatorial provinces, Long concludes,

Central Africa is no Paradise, but a plague spot – and that the negro, the product of this pestilential region, is a miserable wretch, often devoid of all tradition or belief in a Deity, which enthusiastic travelers have heretofore endeavoured to endow him with.

He continues,

the humanitarian may pause to consider the cost at which he sends his emissaries, in the laudable effort to humanize and civilize a country, where nature has placed a barrier, not alone in the poisoned arrow of the savage – but in the more deadly poisoned air.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, the logic of capitalism dictated that commodities continue to be extracted because of their monetary value, and Long's account offered a blueprint for this at a minimum cost to outsiders.

One of Pierre Crabitès's claims in *Americans in the Egyptian Army* in 1938 was that the American mission, of which Long was an important member, helped to end slavery in the Sudan.¹²¹ Crabitès was responding to the claims of historians who credited Europeans for bringing an end to slavery in Africa. He positioned the United States as a more important participant in the "civilizing mission" in Africa than had been previously acknowledged. But how to understand Crabitès's claim if Long's narrative is to be believed? Crabitès relies on a positive assessment of the impact of Western power on Africa, yet what is recorded in the pages of Long's narrative is kidnapping, killing, and theft. If anything, the antislavery discourse of the West and the logic of intervention worked to install a new system of exploitative labor every bit as insidious as slavery. Managing racial difference was a key component of this system, which was focused on extracting nonhuman wealth from the continent. In the Sudan, the extraction of nonhuman capital was pioneered by Samuel Baker. Baker's operation – which helped to militarize the Sudan in ways that are painfully apparent to contemporary observers – was costly and contributed to the Egyptian debt crisis, which plays a key role in the next chapter. Despite Long's sarcastic description of Baker's methods – the bagpipes – Baker was not the missionary that Long made him out to be; Baker was a wealthy adventurer before he was a mercenary. And though Baker and his replacement Gordon were apparently both more affected by the Gospel than Long was, all these men were hired hands. Each was an important broker of capitalist exchange, and it was Long's experience with US racial governmentality that shaped his attempt to make the Equatorial provinces profitable.

Long envisioned mercenary force as an important component of the scheme to extract wealth from Central Africa. Since the landscape he wrote into existence was a wasteland inhospitable to outsiders – even the Sudanese troops from the north – Central Africans would need to be enlisted in the extraction of commodities from the interior. For this labor, Long singled out a group he called the “Dongolowee.”¹²² He described these perfect Central African mercenaries as “eminently fitted for the hard and arduous service . . . the Bedouin of Upper Nubia, without traditions and without a country, save the jungle of Africa.”¹²³ The Dongolowee were unhappy subjects of Egyptian colonial power, but Long estimated that

under a proper regime of discipline, and the selection of good men that I know among them, I regard them as the great future civilizing element for the redemption of this country since the white man and the Arab cannot permanently dwell in its pernicious climate.¹²⁴

The only problem Long could find with his scheme was that the Sudanese soldiers viewed themselves as superior to the Dongolowee, who “could not but look with displeasure upon [their] dispossession.” Long claimed that the removal of the Arab agents of the ivory trade might provide the Dongolowee with some relief, but unfortunately the removal of the Arab agents was impossible, for their harsh management of the Africans was “an element that is almost a necessity in the occupation of that country.” Long lamented that so far Egypt had failed to find a way to exploit Dongolowee labor. “Certainly in the great trade in its ivory they could have been made an instrument of progress and civilization; for, with all their faults, these rude children of the jungle have many generous qualities, and are exceedingly tractable.”¹²⁵ Just 100 years earlier, men like Long might have rewarded Africans like these for their slave-raiding trips into the interior of West Africa. Now, Long and others like him were hatching schemes to “civilize” nomadic peoples in order to enlist them as laborers in the extraction of resources. While the resources were different 100 years earlier – ivory versus humans – the methods remained essentially the same.

Even with African collaborators, Central Africa would not be an easy place to manage. Long once again drew on his experience in the

United States in order to express his anxiety about the complicated labor market of a postslavery Sudan. Long drew a link between political economies on both sides of the Atlantic – in the United States and Central Africa, Africans and their labor represented a potent force, either aiding or threatening economic expansion. Long, it seems, was not as enthusiastic about the end of slavery as Crabitès supposed. In fact, Long claimed all the Egyptian labor trouble began when the khedive issued a firman outlawing slavery and that “freedom is interpreted by the negro as a license to laziness.”¹²⁶ He predicted that the government’s attempt to care for freed slaves would be a burden. “Like the Freedman’s Bureau at Washington, [the ‘Freedman’s Bureau’ at the Saubat] promises to be in the future a source of great expense to the Government of Egypt when it may become generally known that they are ‘emancipated.’”¹²⁷ Yet Long concluded his 1877 narrative on a positive note; the Sudan Railway and steamship service would make Khartoum “the front door of Central Africa, the radiating point of civilization, through trade and commerce.”¹²⁸ It should be the Dongolowee, he said, not “costly foreign expeditions,” whose labor accomplishes “the regeneration of Central Africa.”¹²⁹ It was capitalism and mercenary force, then, not religion, that Long believed would serve to make Central Africa a worthwhile place.

Conclusion: The Racial Geography of US Imperialism

After he returned to the United States, Long lectured widely about Central Africa. A reporter for the *New York Times* described one 1885 lecture that he gave in front of several hundred people at Steinway Hall in New York City. The lecture, which lasted more than two hours, incorporated stereoscopic images projected onto an “immense screen.” Harnessing the power of the image, Long’s lectures were among the first public displays of photographs of Africa in the United States. Based on these images and Long’s descriptions of his expedition, the *Times* reporter concluded that Long had “penetrated into the country of savages who knew nothing of civilization or of God. They worshipped whatever tickled their fancy.” An Africa devoid of God deserved little sympathy as European nations were busy carving up the continent in Berlin. Besides, according to Long, violence was the only language Central Africa understood; as the reporter observed, Long had “gained the respect and

friendship of one of the Kings in that country by knocking him off the throne with a current of electricity.”¹³⁰ In another lecture, Long underscored the relationship of capitalism and mercenary force in Africa by appearing side by side with Alexander Henriques, chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. The two spoke at length about Egypt and Uganda at Chickering Hall in Boston.¹³¹ These kinds of reports on Long’s encounter with Central Africa were typical, helping to form an image of Africa in the United States. Central Africa was a savage place, but a place that provided something the West needed.

Nearly twenty-five years later, in 1909, the American Geographical Society recognized Long as an important Africanist by awarding him the Charles P. Daly Medal. And in 1915, Oric Bates, the first curator of the Department of African Ethnology and Archeology at the Peabody Museum of Harvard University, wrote Long, calling him a pioneer in African exploration, a person capable of “appreciating the valuable results which ought to accrue from the science of ethnology through the pursuit of African studies.” Bates explained that he was putting together “a small collection of documents relating to the history of African studies and African exploration” and he hoped that Long would be able to contribute some of his papers, as well as a signed photograph to be hung alongside other famous Africanists. In a postscript, Bates also intimated that Long might have more to give – “additional material either documentary or ethnographical.”¹³² There is no response to Bates among Long’s papers, which found their way into the Library of Congress.¹³³ In the decade preceding Bates’s letter, however, Long felt he had been overlooked. In his attempt to remedy this concern, he went so far as to write a fourteen-page letter to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903, which included eight enclosures. In the letter, Long complained that he had been denied a diplomatic or consular position for over twenty years due to the dishonesty of officials at the State Department. Echoing Eaton and English from the previous century, Long hoped, “I may at least be guarded through your energetic and patriotic power from further injury.”¹³⁴ Long feared growing old and being forgotten.

But – returning for a moment to the analytical lens of memory – even if Long is mostly forgotten, the racial geography that he helped to establish through his mercenary labor continues to do work. Long’s accounts of cannibalism survived for many years as part of the emerging fields of ethnology and anthropology. Though he called Long’s report of

Azande cannibalism “little more than conjecture” in 1960, Edward Evans-Pritchard – famous for his work among the Azande – continued to believe that the Azande had once been cannibals, because “there is no smoke without fire.”¹³⁵ Cannibalism was so sacred among anthropologists that many of them attacked William Arens in 1979 after he concluded in *The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy* that accounts of Azande and other cannibalism were “evidence of nothing more than repeated plagiarism.”¹³⁶ Of Africa, Arens argues that since no African cultures condoned cannibalism at the end of the twentieth century, it was unlikely that any had condoned it 100 years earlier. Arens reasoned that

those who believe that a few decades of ineffective European rule by a relative handful of administrators and missionaries were sufficient to eradicate what they assume was an ingrained custom know little about the continent beyond the cultural material contained in film.¹³⁷

Based on Arens’s conclusions from the late seventies – which unfortunately brush aside the wide-ranging impacts of colonialism – it might be tempting to think that the man-eating myth has come to an end. Yet representations of Central African violence and cannibalism continue to shape not just anthropology but also US imperialism.

In 1998, Arens reaffirmed that “the ever-present cannibals on the horizon of the western world are the results of intellectual conjuring.”¹³⁸ Indeed, the United States has made an effort to conjure cannibals, monsters, and other figures of terror in order to justify harsh methods. This has held especially true in the Sudan and Uganda. Held in deep suspicion by the White House and the State Department, Sudan loomed large in US foreign policy following a coup in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1992. In 1998, the United States launched cruise missiles to strike at sites in the Sudan that it claimed were chemical-weapons plants. At the same time, the US struck at “terrorist camps” in Afghanistan. The common denominator was Osama bin Laden. Widely described as a monster, Bin Laden was expelled from the Sudan in 1994 after four years of residency, a result of outside pressure; had he not been expelled, it might have been the Sudan that the United States invaded in 2001, rather than Afghanistan. Today, the United States remains

skeptical of the relationship of Sudan to both Iran and Palestine. Following a 2006 referendum, the new nation of South Sudan became an ally. It appeared to be enough that President Salva Kiir was a Christian and constantly wore a cowboy hat given to him by George Bush. Characters like Kiir appeared to fit nicely within the mercenary order of things in Central Africa. The presence of large oil reserves in South Sudan played no small part in Washington's embrace of the new nation.

The United States maintains an equally fraught relationship with Uganda. Arens's dismissal of African cannibalism came in 1979, the same year that President Idi Amin was deposed in Uganda. Throughout the 1970s, rumors of Amin's cannibalism were widespread. In the 1981 film *Rise and Fall of Idi Amin*, the last word out of Amin's mouth before he ingests the flesh of his murdered friend is "Allah."¹³⁹ In one monstrous act, the film linked Africa to Islam more effectively than generations of travel writers. Similarly, a BBC obituary of Amin stated quite simply that Amin, who professed to be a Christian, was accused of cannibalism, as easily as the newspaper might have suggested he was from Mars, another claim with no real evidence to back it up. Being from Central Africa was enough, however, to arouse suspicion. The same holds true today.

Following Amin's departure and exacerbated by longstanding ethnic and colonial animosities, northern Uganda suffered widespread social disorder. In 2011, US Green Berets were dispatched to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic with relatively little fanfare to assist in a manhunt for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group.¹⁴⁰ A few months later, Joseph Kony and the LRA became household names in the United States thanks to the work of a US missionary organization, Invisible Children.¹⁴¹ Thereafter, the deployment of US forces enjoyed widespread support. One reason for this support was that the "enemy" the United States claimed to be facing off against provoked little sympathy, and appeared also to violate the West's most sacred myth. Savvy observers will recognize Long's anthropophagi in the descriptions of forced cannibalism that appeared in accounts attributed to survivors of the LRA's campaign of child abduction and revolutionary indoctrination.¹⁴²

Joseph Kony and the LRA posed no threat to the United States and expressed no desire to attack US interests, and the group was Christian,

not Islamic. Still, the US justified the deployment as part of its broad, ongoing war against terror, provoking the Ugandan journalist Angelo Izama and other skeptical commentators to claim that the deployment of US forces to track down Joseph Kony was a self-serving move to secure the oil reserves that had been discovered in Uganda a few years before.¹⁴³ But Uganda was not an isolated outpost in the war on terror, nor was 2011 the first time US forces had operated out of the country. Since 2006, the United States had used Uganda as a forward operating base in its covert actions against al Shabaab in Somalia following the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union.¹⁴⁴ The United States provided support for the mission, but the war was fought largely using African soldiers and mercenaries.¹⁴⁵

US securitization of the continent – the ongoing obsession with Somalia, which can be traced back to the end of the Cold War, and the hunt for Joseph Kony, which takes place in the shadow of the war on terror and the increasing influence of China in Africa and elsewhere – is now being organized by AFRICOM, the US military command that assumed responsibility for military operations carried out in Africa, excepting Egypt, beginning in 2008.¹⁴⁶ In outlining the twenty-first-century US mission in Africa, policy-makers and military planners were quick to note that the success of AFRICOM would depend on establishing legitimacy with local governments. In a report submitted to the US Army War College, for example, Diana Putman of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) concluded that, “to win” in Africa, AFRICOM leaders must recognize the “deepening political maturity” of African leaders and convince these leaders that they share vital interests with the United States.¹⁴⁷ These efforts, to build close relationships with African leaders – cast as naughty children – in order to secure Africa are eerily similar to the methods Chaillé-Long embraced in *Central Africa*.¹⁴⁸ As I have demonstrated in this chapter, mercenary force helped to establish the racial geography that makes these mercenary approaches to Africa possible.

CHAPTER 5

MERCENARY DIPLOMACY ON THE NILE, 1869–82

I am well aware that this country is too far away and that our interests here are too small to give the same importance in the United States to the details of what is transpiring as is given to them in Europe.

– Elbert Farman, 1879¹

The American name indeed in the Nile Valley is hallowed by time.

– Charles Chaillé-Long, 1912²

In 1876, three years before he complained that the United States neglected Egypt, US consul general Elbert Farman asked Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to send a cypher to Cairo so that he could encrypt his diplomatic dispatches to the United States. After spending just seven months in Egypt, Farman recognized the seriousness of events in the country and was concerned about sending unencrypted diplomatic correspondence over European-operated lines.³ Nominally a territory of the Ottoman Empire but greatly under the influence of – and in debt to – Britain and France, Egypt was at a crossroads. Suffering due to a widely felt debt crisis, native-born officers and soldiers joined in a social revolution that threatened the management of the country's foreign debt. The British reacted by invading the country and establishing a colonial administration. In the United States, the occupation of Egypt by the British was understood, in part, through the lens of mercenary

diplomacy. During the 1870s, about fifty US soldiers had worked for the Egyptian Government helping to modernize the Egyptian Army. After they returned home, these mercenaries spoke out about their experience and against British imperialism. The intimate nature of this mercenary diplomacy helped make it possible for the African explorer Chaillé-Long to claim more than thirty years later that the American name was hallowed along the Nile.

So far I have charted the outcomes of US mercenary force in four encounters with the nineteenth-century Ottoman world: 1) cultural and historical memory of the 1801–05 war with Tripoli and the Battle of Derna, invoked throughout US history to prepare Americans for wars in North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere; 2) personal and national sovereignty between 1815 and 1828, an important period in the development of US social and political culture; 3) mercenary literature of the 1830s that attempted to establish a new relationship between Americans and Ottomans; and 4) the racialized geography of Central Africa following the end of the US Civil War, an imaginative landscape that continues to exercise much power over contemporary discourses about Africa. This chapter charts the outcome of a fifth encounter with the Ottoman world: the mercenary diplomacy performed by the members of the 1870s American mission to Egypt. In 1912, Chaillé-Long used this phrase – “the American mission” – to describe the collection of about fifty Union and Confederate officers who went to work as mercenaries for the Egyptian Government. While few commentators besides Long have seemed willing to grant them any kind of legitimacy – which is what makes them mercenary – the members of American mission had strong ties to elites in the United States and maintained close relationships with important figures in the US Government and military throughout their lives; some officers were even excused from active-duty military service in the United States to serve in Egypt. Far from living as isolated soldiers of fortune in Cairo and elsewhere, these mercenaries circulated among a wide range of people who lived, worked in, and visited Egypt. While historical accounts of the decade-long American mission to Egypt tend to focus on military matters – including the Civil War experience of the various officers whom the Egyptians employed, the professionalization of the Egyptian Army, survey expeditions, the war with Abyssinia, and the rise of ‘Urabi Pasha⁴ – it remains to be shown how the American mission

played an important role in domesticating Egypt for audiences in the United States.⁵

I argue that in their efforts to communicate the meaning of their encounter with Ottoman Egypt to audiences back home, the members of the American mission produced a collection of texts that simultaneously embraced an exceptional national narrative of the United States following the end of the Civil War, criticized European nations for their role in imperialism, and embraced a fantasy Egypt – imagined as an ideal, modern partner. Contrary to, and sometimes complicit with, a body of knowledge being produced and widely disseminated about ancient Egypt in the United States, these mercenary narratives sought to impress upon their audiences the modernization of the Egyptian state, first militarily under Mehmed Ali, and second imperially under Isma'il Pasha. Yet the modernization of Egypt was not the only subject addressed in these texts. Besides the exceptionalism and anti-imperialism that thread through them, there is also a deep concern with forms, practices, and management of gender in both Egypt and the United States. The collective desire of the American mercenaries to somehow wed Egypt to the United States was an ongoing theme of their writing when they returned home. Another byproduct of the American mission, beyond its domestication of Egypt, was its militarization of US–Egyptian relations. Just as Long had imagined Central Africa as a heavily policed space in which African ethnic groups were played off and against one another, so too was Egypt imagined as a strategic bulwark against the expansion of European power into Africa and the Middle East; Egypt was America's solution to weak Ottoman rule. The United States, already a world power, had much to gain from a version of Egyptian modernity in which the army – trained by Americans – was the central force in this vital region. When this dream failed to reach fruition, the disappointment among the member of the American mission was palpable.

This chapter begins with an explanation of mercenary diplomacy. I proceed with a brief outline of the history of the American mission. At the center of this mission was Charles Pomeroy Stone, a former Union general who lived and worked in Egypt for over twelve years. I contrast Stone's measured output following his return to the United States – he never published a full-length account of his experience – with descriptions of Egyptian service written by other members of the

American mission. Stone's publications, all written after the occupation of Egypt, attempt to reconcile Egypt and the United States at the level of the domestic. The publication of his daughter Fanny's "Diary of an American Girl in Cairo During the War of 1882" in the *Century* magazine in 1884 marks an important moment in Stone's efforts. Fanny's diary also works as an important statement of the gendered logic of the American mission. I also examine the career of Elbert Farman, the US consul general who devoted significant attention to events in Egypt during the years of the American mission and again at the beginning of the twentieth century. Farman also falls prey to US exceptionalism and Orientalism, as he devotes four chapters of a book meant to be about modern Egypt to describing his role in the acquisition of "Cleopatra's Needle," an ancient obelisk, for the United States in 1879. These popular and widely read texts – each a product of the mercenary force at the heart of the American mission – were vital in the formation of US attitudes toward Egypt. I conclude by reflecting on a mercenary encounter between Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and US president Ronald Reagan in Washington, DC, in 1988.

Mercenary Diplomacy

Infrequently, the term *mercenary diplomacy* has been used to refer to the practice of arming or supporting a foreign force in a particular country or region without acknowledging it as an ally.⁶ In this sense, the members of the American mission qualify as mercenary diplomats, given the tacit acknowledgement and support given to their activities by significant political and military figures in the United States. But while political and cultural diplomacy are widely held to be central and essential to the negotiation of relationships between modern nation-states, mercenary diplomacy is considered illegitimate – mercenaries, after all, are imagined as antithetical to the modern nation-state, which places certain restraints on violence. Political and cultural diplomats are *appointed* or *asked* by top government officials and perform a ceremonial and public role in their assignments abroad. Mercenaries are *hired* and their work is often obscured, for reasons I have detailed throughout. But as the previous chapters demonstrate, forms of mercenary force often play an important role in the construction, maintenance, and imagination of the United States and what it means to be an American. And mercenary

diplomacy – like political and cultural diplomacy – is not strictly outwardly directed. Diplomats of all stripes tend to return to the United States, and often speak out about their work and desires for future relations with the countries in which they served. Discussions of diplomacy often fail to account for how diplomatic narratives reconstruct the encounter for audiences in their home country. In the United States, political diplomats frequently influence foreign-policy debates, and cultural diplomats contribute to the popular understanding of the world beyond the imagined borders of the United States. Mercenary diplomats do similar work. Certainly, though, none of the three forms of diplomacy that I touch on here – political, cultural, and mercenary – are as unrelated as they are often made out to be; diplomats in general have intimate relations with one another, working together to organize knowledge of distant places and channel that knowledge into everything from economic policy to popular culture. Indeed, throughout this chapter, I rely on evidence that might seem at first to not fall cleanly within the bounds of mercenary diplomacy, but with each piece of evidence I examine, I argue for a strong connection between mercenary force and the state.

THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN MISSION TO EGYPT

The arrival of American mercenaries in Alexandria in the 1870s was closely related to cotton, slavery, and the Civil War. In *River of Darkness: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom*, Walter Johnson tells part of this tripartite story from the perspective of capitalist development in the Lower South of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. But Johnson's book ends abruptly. In one paragraph, the United States defeats the Confederate States of America and "the reconstruction of the history of the Civil War as a national story" begins.⁷ But what happened next? Did the political economy of cotton simply vanish? And how is this all related to Egypt? To answer these questions and finish the story that Johnson begins, I must briefly return to the beginning of the war – before American mercenaries arrived in Alexandria – and to the transformation of the global landscape of cotton production.

Johnson is not the first to connect US cotton and the Civil War to events outside the borders of the United States. In 1916, the American historian James Scherer built on the work of Charles Adams in order to place US cotton production and the Civil War within a global frame.⁸

A few years later, W.H. Himbury, a manager with the British Cotton Growing Association, could still observe that “few people have ever thought of cotton as a world power.” Citing Scherer, Himbury argued that Egypt’s importance to Great Britain after 1861 increased in the face of shortages caused by first the US Civil War, and then increased demand in the United States after the war. British imperialism in Egypt was, in part, the British Empire’s response to the perception that a cotton famine existed in the United Kingdom during the war, as well as the threat of rising US consumption after 1865.⁹ British imperialism in Egypt, then, was one result of the US Civil War. Himbury was, unsurprisingly, a proponent of the British Empire, stating,

Mr. Chamberlain once asked the British people “to think Imperially,” but the Council of the B.C.G.A. [British Cotton Growing Association] have gone one better and “acted imperially”; in fact, they are the only body who have made a practical attempt to develop the Empire’s huge resources.¹⁰

By the time Himbury wrote, the Sudan in particular was looked upon as a valuable site for cotton production. He describes a fantasy Sudan as the center of Great Britain’s new cotton kingdom, cooing that

the population, however, is small, but with a Government appreciated by the people, and consequent settled conditions, time will remedy this difficulty, as natives from other parts of Africa will be attracted, and with the absence of slavery and war, quickly multiply.¹¹

Himbury goes on to explain that cotton production in the Sudan had been initiated by Herbert Kitchener. He even describes failures as successes, as these showed not only where cotton could be grown, but also where it could not be grown.¹² He concludes that, “generally speaking, we [the British] are creating a new trade, and enabling the natives to produce a product for export in the centre of Africa on a new basis, without being exploited.”¹³ Such is the arc of Himbury’s progressive narrative.

Less than ten years later, American Edward Earle would describe this arc of events differently; the cotton famine helped to transform Egypt

from a self-sufficient country, to one dependent on import products. Because of the quality of its cotton, prevailing labor conditions, and the lack of a native cotton industry (Egyptian linen production centered on flax), Egypt was better suited than India to help replace the cotton from the US South – and these advantages became Egypt's undoing.¹⁴ Though he disagreed with Himbury about the impact of British imperialism on Egypt and the Sudan, Earle agreed that the "cotton famine" – a result of the US Civil War – played a central role in Britain's decision to bombard, invade, and occupy Egypt in 1882.¹⁵ As Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts pointed out in 1995, "whether the famine was a supply crisis, a cyclical business crisis, or some combination of the two, the cotton famine of 1861–1865 was one of the industrial world's first raw material crises." Prices rose, mills closed, and unemployment among factory workers skyrocketed. Isaacman and Roberts describe the significance of the cotton famine for Africa: "The late nineteenth-century development of European interest groups promoting cotton cultivation in Africa forms a central part of the story of European imperialism and African colonization."¹⁶

In 2004, Sven Beckert added that the Civil War "brought to a climax the tensions within global capitalism."¹⁷ When, after 1860, US cotton exports dropped and fears of a cotton famine began to gain steam, British capital flows increased to India, Brazil, and Egypt – or at least into the pockets of confidence men and others with even a vague connection to these places. Beckert argues that, supported by infusions of European capital, cotton producers "invented in those years a new system of mobilizing non-slave labor, characterized by cultivators enmeshed in debt, share croppers burdened by crop liens, and rural producers with little political power."¹⁸ This system of production and labor indebtedness would spread to the United States after the end of the war. In Egypt, where cotton had been grown for some time, production increased from 50.1 to 250.7 million pounds over the course of the US Civil War. Although cotton production fell to 125 million pounds after the end of the war, by 1872 exports from Alexandria to Europe amounted to 200 million pounds.¹⁹ Beckert notes, "The new empire of cotton production demanded new forms of state intervention, both in order to expand its scope as well as to secure its new ways of extracting labor."²⁰ Ultimately, state intervention meant that

the systems of mutual dependence and personal domination that had characterized the countryside of Berar, Egypt, the American South, and elsewhere before the Civil War gave way to a world in which creditors backed by the state coerced cultivators to cultivate agricultural commodities for world markets.²¹

One of the top priorities of this new economic order was the enclosure of capital in nation-states. In Egypt's case, Britain moved not only to enclose but to secure and manage Egypt as both a resource and a strategic outpost of its global empire. Given the stakes of Egyptian cotton production, it should be no surprise to find American mercenaries on the streets of Cairo during this period in the ebb and flow of global capital movements. In 1805 mercenary force was an integral component in the conclusion of US efforts to ensure free passage for its commercial vessels in the Mediterranean, and in the 1820s and 1830s mercenary force helped to ensure mutual recognition between the Ottoman Empire and the United States. In the 1870s, mercenary force once again manifested in Alexandria, this time as a response to economic developments in the country.

When the first American mercenaries arrived in Egypt in 1869, the British occupation was more than a decade away, and the members of the American mission praised the modernization that had followed the development of the cotton economy in the 1860s. But what exactly did the Americans mean when they described modernization? Judging from their extended descriptions of the country, what they appear to have meant was militarization and an imperial logic of expanding territory and technology. For as the Egyptian economy grew, so too grew the Egyptian Army – from 20,000-strong in 1865 to 90,000 by 1875. By 1876, the army accounted for 10 per cent of the Egyptian national budget.²² In order to be modern, these soldiers needed rifles. In 1860, Egypt had 80,000 rifled muskets and a nascent firearms industry that even offered to sell 47,000 rifles to the United States during the Civil War.²³ By 1870, the balance of trade had shifted. Now it was Egypt buying rifles from the United States. In 1867, Şahin Pasha, the Egyptian minister of war, met Remington salesman Samuel Norris at the Paris International Exposition, where E. Remington & Sons won a silver medal for firearms; Egypt subsequently ordered 60,000 rifles from the company two years later.²⁴

Soldiers and rifles were two of the key elements of Egyptian modernity as it filtered through the lens of the American mission. The third element of an Egyptian modernity was the ability to successfully use those soldiers and rifles to produce a profitable outcome—strategy and tactics, in short. To fulfill this third requirement, Khedive Isma'il Pasha, the Ottoman-backed ruler of Egypt, recruited military officers from the United States, many of whom had fought in the US Civil War, a conflict that is often positioned as a preeminent marker of US modernity. Starting in 1869, at the direction of the khedive, Thaddeus Mott of New York recruited former Union and Confederate officers to support Egypt's planned expansion south into Africa. Mott already had strong ties to the Ottoman world – his father had spent significant amounts of time in Turkey, his sister was married to the Ottoman ambassador to the United States, and he had worked as a mercenary for several years in the Ottoman Army before accepting Isma'il's request to serve as his recruiter in the United States.²⁵ In the United States, Mott contacted William Sherman, commanding general of the United States Army, who recommended a number of former and a few current officers. Historians William Hessestine and Hazel Wolf describe the American mercenaries who worked in Egypt from 1869 to 1882 as “something more than the traditional and romantic soldiers of fortune who appear on the battlefields of the world,” yet they were “something less than a military mission loaned by one state to another.” Hessestine and Wolf do observe that Sherman went “beyond the bounds of strict propriety” in recruiting. But they claim – with no evidence cited – that a House of Representatives inquiry at the time concluded that there was no problem with the service of the Americans in Egypt.²⁶ For the two historians, the conclusions of a congressional inquiry are enough to erase the bonds between these mercenaries and the state.

While historians have been unwilling to grant any legitimacy to the American mission, its members took their Egyptian service seriously. In “The Forgotten American Mission to Egypt,” an unpublished short manuscript which formed the basis for his autobiography, *My Life in Four Continents*, Chaillé-Long summed up his and his countrymen's accomplishments in Ottoman Egypt, concluding that “the American Mission to Egypt added prestige and honor to the American name in Egypt and Africa.” Yet Long worried that “the Mission had no historian and its achievements have been methodically ignored by the writers of

the history of Modern Egypt and Africa,” calling this absence from official histories “a gap which should be filled.”²⁷ Long went so far as to claim that the accomplishments of the American mission were talked about in the cafés of the North African coast alongside the exploits of veterans of the war with Tripoli like Samuel Barron and Stephen Decatur, demonstrating a deep desire for recognition of his contribution to the United States. Long recalled his comrades, “all of whom are dead save four.” He continued, “Five repose beneath the sands of Egypt and Africa,” where “no tablet or stone mark their forgotten graves.”²⁸ Finally, he responded to critics who questioned the relationship of the American mission to the United States, claiming that

ten of the officers subsequently sent on General Sherman’s special recommendation were officers of the United States army and detached on one year’s leave of absence for the purpose of entering the Egyptian army. This fact of itself lends to the mission an official status which any other but the Government at Washington, at that time, would have been eager to acknowledge.²⁹

Long and the other members of the American mission would surely object to historians’ characterization of them as “something less” than legitimate state actors.

CHIEF OF THE MERCENARIES

In *My Life in Four Continents*, Chaillé-Long recalled his arrival in Egypt and the warning he received about the dangers of working as a mercenary. Long writes that after he described the elaborate reception he received from Isma’il to newly arrived former Confederate generals William Loring and Henry Sibley, Hakkekyan Bey – whom Long characterized as “a distinguished Armenian, long resident in Egypt, a graduate of Oxford, engineer by profession but scholar and orientalist by practice” – replied by reciting Plutarch’s account of the life of Agesilaus II. Once the king of Sparta, Agesilaus accepted employment in Egypt only to be appointed Chief of the Mercenaries, a humiliating post. Hakkekyan warned Long and the others to be sure “that the Egyptian Ismail does not treat you as the Egyptian Tachos treated the Spartan Agesilaus.”³⁰ Ultimately, it was not Long but Charles Pomeroy Stone who would, in fact, become chief of the

mercenaries. Far from humiliating Stone, serving as chief of the mercenaries restored his reputation after a disappointing career during the US Civil War.

Born in Massachusetts in 1824 and a graduate of and instructor at West Point, Stone was described by a biographer as “descended from a Puritan line of ancestors who had taken part in every war in which the American people had been engaged.”³¹ Stone served as a lieutenant in the Mexican–American War and then worked as an engineer and surveyor in Lower California and Sonora for the Mexican Government. In 1860 he returned to Washington, where he published *Notes on the State of Sonora*. He subsequently enlisted as a colonel in the Union Army and organized the defense of Washington. Five months later he was a brigadier general and active in important campaigns.³² Stone, however, was no abolitionist and ordered escaped slaves in Maryland returned to their owners. This stance caused him to become embroiled in a dispute with Governor John Andrew and Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts.³³

By October, Stone was serving under Major General George McClellan. At the Battle of Ball’s Bluff in October 1861, sitting US senator Edward Baker, who was acting as a colonel under Stone, made a series of tactical errors while leading a regiment and was killed. In the immediate aftermath of the defeat, both Stone and McClellan blamed Baker for the defeat. Yet the hearings that followed resulted in Stone’s arrest at the request of the secretary of war Henry Stanton, and maybe even President Lincoln. Stone was held without charges for almost two months at Fort Lafayette, where Confederate prisoners were held, and then for five more months at Fort Hamilton. Finally, Stone was released thanks to a new law requiring officers charged with crimes to be tried within thirty days of their arrest. McClellan and Joseph Hooker both immediately requested Stone’s service – he was still a general in the Union Army, since no charges or court martial had been pursued. Both requests were declined by the secretary of war. It was not until 1863 that Stone was finally able to hear the testimony against him and answer it, officially clearing his name. He subsequently served in the Siege of Port Hudson, the Red River Campaign, and then – after being demoted to colonel by the secretary of war – in the Siege of Petersburg. He resigned before the war ended, convinced that he would never be treated fairly by Stanton.³⁴

After the war, Stone worked as an engineer in Virginia before he was recommended to Mott for Egyptian service by Sherman. In Egypt, Stone was quickly promoted to chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian army, a newly created department.³⁵ Organized around French principles, the *État Major* was composed of a staff college supported by an arms museum, a library, two military journals in Arabic, and a collection of maps. Although the General Staff appeared to be well-organized and funded, it only served to exacerbate the existing division between officers of the staff – mostly non-Egyptians – and officers of the line.³⁶ The members of the American mission formed the core of the General Staff, though officers of many nationalities served in the staff.

In “An American Fracas in Egypt,” John Dunn provides an account of the early years of this American mission, demonstrating the ways in which Mott and US consul general George Butler sought to profit personally from growing relations with Egypt by organizing the import of Winchester firearms and US-brand cartridges from the United States.³⁷ A power struggle subsequently developed between Mott and Stone for control of the American mission. Mott was usually absent from Egypt and not a member of the General Staff; Stone was supported by Şahin Pasha, who had organized the Remington contract, and Mott was supported by Butler. As the conflict escalated, Butler wrote to Secretary of State Fish in the United States:

Charles P. Stone is the Brigadier General Stone who lost the Battle of Balls Bluff and was imprisoned for a long period of time in a charge of treason. He is now an avowed enemy of the United States and American interests in Egypt and has used his influence to degrade or remove American officers to make room for Russians, Danes, and French.³⁸

The situation continued to escalate and one month later, in July 1872 at the Hotel d'Europe, Butler – a vocal anti-Confederate – and two partners got into a gunfight with three former Confederate officers who were in Egypt working for the khedive.³⁹ The incident proved embarrassing, with the *New York Times* describing it as “disgraceful affray.”⁴⁰ Dunn concludes that

the “Butler Affair” aided Stone in his efforts to gain mastery of the foreign mercenaries, but it also revealed the extreme lack of unity among these men. While several made names as explorers, or published interesting memoirs, their primary goal of serving as military advisors was always impaired by this division.

Elsewhere, Dunn describes the American mission as “fractionalized and insubordinate.”⁴¹ On closer inspection, it is unclear what disunity and division Dunn is talking about.

After Butler’s departure – he was dismissed by the president – the American mission was fundamentally American, rather than divided between former Confederate and Union officers. Following the shootout between the diplomatic and mercenary factions, there were no further incidents and mercenary and political diplomats often dined and came together to receive visiting Americans. While they may have had their disagreements, their own accounts suggest unity more than discord. Nearly all the accounts of their work in Egypt agree. Raleigh Colston, a former Confederate general, recalled that

those who had worn the blue and the gray were about equal in number, and never, so far as I know, was there the least unpleasant feeling between us on account of our late struggle. Away from home, we felt that we were all Americans, and were proud to be so.⁴²

This process of reunion did not require the shedding of regional identities. Though he developed close relations with Long and Stone, both Union veterans, Loring’s choice of a title for his 1880 book – *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt* – suggests that identifying as an American did not mean that one could not also identify as a Southerner or even as a Confederate.⁴³ In this regard, Egypt functioned as an example of what Nina Silber calls a site of reunion.⁴⁴ In the years following the Civil War, there was a social and cultural push to reconcile the former adversaries. This movement, which was deeply invested in gender and manhood, peaked in the United States in the 1880s. But in the 1870s, in Egypt, the reunion was already well under way among some of the country’s most experienced soldiers. The American mission to Egypt, then, must be remembered as an important site of national reconciliation abroad as

well as a site of knowledge and power production at a vital moment in the nation's history.

The members of the American mission were unified by their status as citizens of the United States as well as their intimacy with organs and individuals of government in the United States. Former secretary of state William Henry Seward visited in 1869 along with General Nathaniel Banks. William Sherman visited in 1872; George McClellan visited in 1874; and Ulysses Grant visited at the beginning of 1878 and passed through Egypt once more on his return trip to the United States from India. At Cairo, Grant was met by both a political and a mercenary diplomat, who were accompanied by the khedive's representative.⁴⁵ Along with politicians, the Americans received cultural figures as well; at the end of 1872, for example, Ralph Waldo Emerson arrived in Egypt. And when Richard Dana visited Cairo in 1876, the first two people to whom he introduced himself were the British consul and Stone. Stone subsequently introduced him to the "military, engineering, and commercial problems of the country."⁴⁶ Stone also shared his observations on Egypt with important figures outside the country. In letters to George Bancroft, Stone described Egypt "struggling to be more civilized and liberal than any of them" (the European powers). He predicted, "In a few years that region [the Sudan] will be pouring its wealth in cotton sugar and ivory into the Mediterranean and civilization will wake up after its long sleep in old Nubia."⁴⁷ Stone also observed – in opposition to the so-called "Eastern Question" and the notion of the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" – that recent legislative moves in Istanbul in relation to the khedive in Egypt were "one of the best signs we have seen of what vitality remains in Turkey" Of his own role in all this, Stone concluded, "We will soon have an army to be really proud of – Inshallah!"⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government also continued its relationships with US companies. In the United States, Remington had procured loans to enlarge its production facility to fulfill Egypt's 1869 order of 60,000 rifles. Ten thousand rifles were delivered, but the balance was canceled and diverted to France. In 1874, Egypt ordered 55,000 more rifles, and by 1880 Remington had shipped a total of 250,000 rifles to Egypt.⁴⁹ Samuel Remington was even gifted a Cairo block, where he built a house that became the company's regional sales headquarters as well as part of the winter social scene for members of the American

mission.⁵⁰ By 1877, in the midst of its debt crisis, Egypt owed Remington a million dollars. In his capacity as consul general, Elbert Farman ultimately negotiated a settlement in which Egypt paid Remington 66 per cent of the balance due.⁵¹

What were all these rifles for? As I demonstrated in the last chapter, many were used to help establish tighter control over the Sudan and the Equatorial provinces under Baker and then Gordon and Chaillé-Long. Many more were meant to help the khedive expand eastward – or to at least clarify Egypt's Red Sea borders with Abyssinia.⁵² While Egypt maintained at least some control over the Sudan until 1885, its eastward expansion into Abyssinia was a total failure.⁵³ In two battles at Gura, the Egyptians suffered terrible losses. In these engagements, the army was led by Minister of War Rateb Pasha, with Loring serving as chief of staff with no executive power, in merely an advisory role.⁵⁴ Even before the losses at Gura, the expedition had an ugly tone to it. When the Egyptians captured Colonel John Kirkham, a British mercenary working for Abyssinia, they treated him as a prisoner of war; meanwhile, the Americans wanted him tried as a spy – an accusation with much more serious consequences. In 1927, Arthur Robinson claimed – probably correctly – that the Americans were abusive and showed contempt for the Egyptian officers. In one widely cited example, American William McEntyre Dye struck a fellow Egyptian officer. At Gura on November 6, 1874, 13,000 Egyptians were surrounded by 60,000 Abyssinians with rifles the Egyptians did not expect them to have. Of the tactical errors that put them at such a disadvantage, Robinson says, “the accounts of the American officers are silent on the point; but it is said that Rateb Pasha allowed his views to be overruled by Loring Pasha.”⁵⁵ Colston chose to place the blame for the debacle squarely on a lack of motivation among the rank-and-file – “What is the Khedive to the Egyptian soldier but a Turkish oppressor, who takes his last piastre for taxes and forces him into the army against his inclination and prejudices?”⁵⁶ Most writers have followed Robinson, though, placing the blame for the loss on Loring.⁵⁷ Whether Loring really is to blame or Robinson's claim is merely colonial mudslinging is unclear, but whatever the case the Egyptians suffered a severe defeat in the field and then additional losses during a siege on March 8 through 10, 1875. Even after the French helped to negotiate a ceasefire, raiding continued for months as the Egyptians withdrew to the coast. As a grim conclusion to the campaign,

Kirkham was found drowned in the harbor at Massawa under suspicious circumstances.⁵⁸ Writing about the Abyssinian war in 1959, Czeslaw Jesman concluded that after the end of hostilities

the Americans lingered on through the hottest months on the Red Sea [at Massawa] and then proceeded to Cairo to endure endless frustrations and humiliations for almost two years. Thus ended for them one of the more incredible episodes of Khedive Isma'il's imperialist policy – the employment of a large number of American military in his service.⁵⁹

Dunn attributes the Egyptian loss to Isma'il's failure to realize that mercenaries should never occupy command positions. "Men like Stone, or Gordon, often had agendas that fitted their personal needs for glory or justice, and then formed these into strategies that supposedly served Egypt." Dunn concludes, "Whether American, Circassian, or Armenian, these Neo-Mamluks often provided bad advice that took Egyptian forces far from home, into imperial ventures that, even if crowned with victory, would hardly have returned any profits."⁶⁰

The American mission was limited in its success, certainly, by its own ambitions, but also by the ongoing influence of the Ottomans, British, and French in Egypt. During the early years of his rule, Isma'il followed the example of his predecessor Sa'id and continued to spend lavishly on public works and other projects. But by 1870, US cotton production had recovered and surpassed the rest of the world. Prices dropped, and by 1875 Isma'il was deeply in debt and sold the remaining shares of his Suez Canal holdings. Isma'il was frequently reminded that he was not only a subject of the sultan in Istanbul but also indebted to London and Paris. In order to secure at least partial payment for the debts they were owed, European stakeholders came together to establish the Egyptian Mixed Courts, a sort of international tribunal through which non-Egyptians could bring claims against the Egyptian Government and each other. These courts were meant to simplify Egyptian law in the wake of modernization, yet they were oriented toward allowing foreigners and foreign corporations to make claims against Egypt and Egyptians, rather than the other way around.⁶¹ Isma'il was also unable to sustain the large army he had assembled. Among the first to go were members of the American mission. Egypt's European creditors had long opposed US–Egyptian military

cooperation. In 1870, the British Lord Richard Lyons, for example, warned Nubar Pasha, the Egyptian foreign minister, that “the road upon which His highness seemed to be launched was a bad road and could not lead to anything good.” France also opposed closer ties between the United States and Egypt; Ferdinand de Lesseps warned,

France . . . cannot support this policy, and will be compelled to side with England and the rest of Europe. America will be far away, and it is not Egypt or the Canal that will suffer, but the Khedive.⁶²

Ultimately, France and Britain won out. On July 3, 1878, Consul General Elbert Farman reported that all but two Americans had been dismissed from the service of the khedive. Aside from Erasmus Purdy, who died penniless in Cairo three years later, Stone was the only remaining American mercenary working for Egypt.⁶³ A year later, the sultan dismissed Isma’il at the urging of Britain and France. Isma’il’s son Tawfiq replaced his father as khedive, and Stone was retained as chief of the Egyptian General Staff. Some of the United States’ most experienced soldiers were, once again, out of work.

Before the Uprising

Upon arriving back in the United States, many of the former members of the American mission told their side of the story. The American public, however, was already aware of their exploits. In 1870, not long after they found their way into Egyptian service, the *New York Times* had published a list of the Americans, as well as their rank and pay in Egypt.⁶⁴ And in 1871, the *Times* returned to these “distinguished military officers,” describing their “talent” in modernizing the Egyptian Army while painting a flattering portrait of Isma’il and Nubar Pasha.⁶⁵ News of Chaillé-Long’s expedition to Buganda in 1874 gave the *New York Times* a reason to revisit the American mission. In 1871, the paper barely mentioned Charles Stone by name, but by 1875 it felt comfortable calling him “the most famous American officer in the service of the Khédive.”⁶⁶ In 1877, Long published *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People*.⁶⁷ Shortly before Charles Gordon’s death in 1885, Long published his second book, *The Three Prophets: Chinese Gordon, Mohammed-Ahmed (el Maabdi), Arabi Pasha*, an analysis of

Anglo-Egyptian policy in the Sudan.⁶⁸ In the intervening years, William McEntyre Dye and William Loring found outlets to explain their role in the Egyptian invasion of Abyssinia and the debacle at Gura. In 1880, Dye published *Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia; or, Military Service under the Khedive*. Four years later, Loring published *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt*. Beyond the specifics of the Abyssinian war, these mercenary narratives also commented widely on modern Egypt.

In 1881, Raleigh Colston, who spent six years in Egypt, produced "Modern Egypt and Its People," which attempted to tell the history of modern Egypt – the land of the Fellaheen and the Copts, he said – while describing the current state of affairs in the country. Colston, who saw few reasons for the army to remain loyal to foreign rulers and mercenaries, notes that

the soldiers are in fact the best and truest representatives of the people, from which they are drawn by conscription, and they are the most intelligent of the fellaheen masses, for they have acquired in the army new ideas which would never have occurred to them if they had remained in their villages.

He observed, "It is evident that they are waking up to a sense of their power."⁶⁹ Colston equated the professionalization of the military with modernization and national aspirations, yet he was just as strongly drawn to another, more familiar version of the country.

Accounts of Egypt produced by the American mercenaries who served there in the 1870s were not absent anachronistic, Orientalist landscapes. Take, for example, Colston's description of the occupants of the Arab quarters of Cairo, whom he compares to characters from the *Arabian Nights*:

The flow of life in these narrow streets is wonderful. Crowds of common people in long blue or white cotton blouses hanging to their feet, with a red tarboush (fez) surrounded by folds of white cotton as turbans. The women of the lower class wear nothing but a long, loose gown of deep blue cotton stuff, open from the throat to the waist, around which they wear no sort of belt or girdle. On their heads a long blue veil, tied above the eyebrows and hanging down the back to the heels, while another long, narrow

strip of blue or white hides the face, leaving nothing visible but the eyes which are frequently of marvelous beauty when found in well-matched pairs, which is not often the case.⁷⁰

As a whole, however, the narratives of the American mission focused more heavily on modern Egypt than comparable texts from the period did. Yet Colston's description above demonstrates that the members of the American mission negotiated two very different visions of the country; the anachronistic Oriental Egypt was often the Other of failed modernization. Furthermore, both visions of Oriental and modern Egypt were heavily inflected by gender.

In "Modern Egypt and Its People" – delivered to the American Geographical Society – Colston closed with a section on the "the fair sex." He began, "It is well known that in Moslem countries women hold an inferior position. They are kept strictly guarded, and among the wealthy classes they are never allowed to go out unattended by eunuchs."⁷¹ Though he claimed to have saved his reflections on the fair sex until the end of his lecture, Colston had been talking about gender much earlier in his paper, when he said that "the contrast of modern innovations and ancient barbarism is of continual occurrence here."⁷² His evidence for this claim harkened back more than two decades to the social world of the Alawiyya Dynasty in the years after the death of Mehmed Ali – whom Colston, like so many, viewed as the father of modern Egypt. This example is worth quoting at length, because it demonstrates the ways in which gender and modernity were often linked in the mercenary narratives of the American mission:

Just between the New Hotel and Shepard's Hotel, in the most frequented part of the European quarter stands a building whose history brings all the darkness of the Middle Ages in juxtaposition with modern civilization. It is a palace of Arab architecture, surrounded by a palm grove and enclosed with a lofty stone wall. In that palace, less than twenty-five years ago, lived the widowed daughter of Mohammed Ali – the widow of the famous Defterdar, who thought no more of cutting off a head than of slicing an orange. She was a beautiful and talented woman, but licentious and cruel, and many were the victims decoyed into her palace by her emissaries that never came out, except sewed up in a sack to be

thrown into the Nile. One of them, however, being well armed, killed four or five of his assailants and escaped. This princess whose power at court was very great, was one of the chief actors in the assassination of her nephew, Abbas-Pasha, in 1854. Said-Pasha – her brother – his successor, was afraid of his ambitious sister and sent her off to Constantinople, where she made herself so dangerous that she soon drank a cup of coffee which disagreed with her, an accident of frequent occurrence with troublesome characters in the East. The story resembles closely that of Margaret of Burgundy, wife of Louis X. of France; but that queen lived 600 years ago, when such deeds were not out of harmony with the times, while the present generation still remember the Princess Nuzla Hanum.⁷³

Like so many other accounts produced in the years leading up to the British occupation of the country, Colston's is rich with anachronism and deeply racialized and gendered language. In Colston's account, it is the presence of Europeans that makes Egypt modern. The lingering Arab influence – a world hidden from Colston's view by a "lofty stone wall" – is slowly being overtaken by modern ideas. Egyptian womanhood, in Colston's account, is menacing, to say the least. In the absence of the father – Mehmed Ali – Egypt appears capable of supporting archaic cruelty, which Colston's account takes for granted as having been long eliminated from the civilized West. The military guidance of the American mission appeared to be the force necessary to keep this particular gendered component of Egyptian identity suppressed. But with the failure of the American mission, modernization seemed impossible.

Modernity did indeed come to Egypt, however. Looking back in 1882, the *Sun* in Baltimore attributed the departure of the Americans to "a hostile pressure." The hostile pressure to which the *Sun* referred was the continued maneuvering of France and Britain to establish hegemony.⁷⁴ This maneuvering continued after the departure of the Americans, and France and Britain both responded with hostility to the intensification of a social movement that increasingly coalesced around a charismatic Egyptian named Ahmed 'Urabi. Calls of "Egypt for Egyptians" within the rank-and-file of the army had come to a head following drastic cutbacks in military spending – mostly salaries – as a

result of Egypt's agreement with the Porte and its European creditors. The American mercenaries had been in Egypt for less than a decade, but native soldiers had labored since the time of Mehmed Ali under the command of Turkish, French, American, and other officers who showed them little regard. Now they were not even being paid for this discourtesy. Seven years after the humiliation at Gura, 'Urabi protested continued foreign meddling in Egypt and rapidly ascended to the post of minister of war, being recognized by the sultan in Istanbul and the khedive in Cairo. He also continued to claim a higher authority – the Egyptian people. Forced to appeal for help when it appeared he might be deposed, Tawfiq found the British more than willing to step in where the Porte would not. As Juan Cole concludes, it was not widespread unrest that ultimately provoked the British intervention but the rise of a movement "that would end European privileges and threaten the security of European property and investments."⁷⁵ The British proceeded to move against the Egyptian opposition, first by sea and then by land.

On July 11, 1882, the British Navy bombarded Alexandria. Just before the British bombardment began, Chaillé-Long – who had returned to Egypt to practise law after attending law school at Columbia – along with Stone and the city's diplomatic staff, departed to boats a safe distance from shore; the civilians who remained in the city were left vulnerable to the British bombs. The British claimed the bombing was not targeted at civilians, but death and destruction were widespread.⁷⁶ Stone judged this attack by the British harshly, despite having worked in military service for over forty years. In the aftermath of the attack, Long was appointed acting US consul general and on July 13, 1882, US Marines once again returned to Alexandria. But rather than a brief stopover on their way into the Libyan desert – as in 1805 – this deployment took place in order to secure the US consulate, as well as property and neighborhoods in the diplomatic quarter of city. In a letter to President Chester Arthur, Stone praised Long for having returned so quickly to the city after the bombardment and raising the US flag over the city.⁷⁷ For all intents and purposes, the British attack and subsequent occupation ended Stone's career in Egypt. But while Isma'il, Stone, and Farman were able to breakfast together in Paris the following winter, the British exiled 'Urabi to British Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).⁷⁸ In 1901, Khedive Abbas II allowed 'Urabi to return to Egypt, where he

died in 1911. In 1914, the British deposed Abbas II and Britain continued to dominate Egypt until the successful Arab nationalist revolution of 1952.⁷⁹

After the Uprising

In the United States, the bombardment of Alexandria became the climactic moment used to frame the American mission to Egypt – and, in many ways, to deflect attention away from the mission's failure to achieve military success in the Abyssinian campaign or anywhere else. The manhood of the former Civil War veterans was at stake and played off against the decidedly unmanly actions of the British in failing to give proper notice before attacking Alexandria and then failing to render aid immediately after the bombardment. The mercenary narratives that the members of the American mission produced were rich with US exceptionalism and criticisms of Britain imperialism, but they were also weighed down by domestic discourses that prove crucial to understanding the wide-ranging outcomes of US mercenary force in the Ottoman world.

Domestic space was one of the most important undercurrents in the mercenary diplomacy that the members of the American mission practiced on their return to the United States, demonstrating how closely Americans drew themselves to Egyptians. But even within the confines of domestic discourse, there were differences among the mercenary narratives that the mission produced. For instance, for all its evaluations of the role of the military in Egyptian modernization, Colston's account could not escape the gendered logics of Orientalism. As he described Cairo, the seat of the Egyptian Government and the home of the General Staff, Colston attempted to find his way into the domestic spaces hidden from view – he could not resist the urge to demonstrate mastery of multiple aspects of the Orient. His is the standard fleeting glimpse of the harem as it passes him by:

One of the most picturesque and Oriental sights of Cairo is often beheld on a bright moonlight night. A great handsome carriage, drawn by a pair of large English horses and full of lovely, half-veiled, fair Circassian and Georgian women. Two mounted janizaries, with long pistols in their holsters and curved scimitars

at their sides, gallop some twenty yards in front. Behind come four syces, in pairs, with cressets full of burning light-wood, then two more syces with wands. At each side of the carriage rides a mounted eunuch, and a pair of them follow the carriage, and behind them, another couple of mounted janizaries. They pass you at full speed, the flashing of dark eyes mingling with that of diamonds. They are the wives of a prince taking a moonlight drive – but all the guards which surround them are unable to intercept the fiery yet wistful glances of eyes that were made for love, and must know only the slavery of the harem.⁸⁰

Colston's account of the gendered world of the Oriental harem – in which women are enslaved because he has no access to them – might seem standard for the time, but it is an entirely different account of the harem than would be produced just a few years later by Charles Stone when he returned to the United States.

After his return from Egypt in 1883, Stone contributed to a much more complicated explanation of Egyptian gender as he filtered the country through his experience as an insider among the military and diplomatic elite. For his part, Stone positioned himself as an expert on Egyptian affairs – not difficult since it was widely known that he had served much longer than other members of the American mission – while simultaneously speaking out against the British occupation of Egypt. In a paper presented to the American Geographical Society, Stone acknowledges that the venue is

not precisely the place for the discussion of political subjects, [but] I feel that should I, under present circumstances, fail to speak somewhat of the ex-Khédive Ismaïl I might be supposed to have joined the great army of the ungrateful, and I would not like to have that supposed of me.

Stone laments that

his enemies who drove him [Isma'il], against the will of his own people, from his throne, have had the opportunity to write the history of his reign in European languages for the moment, and to

create public opinion in the Western world to justify the infamous treatment he received from the governments of Europe.⁸¹

Support for Isma'il's reforms was a constant theme of Stone's writing until his death in 1887.

Stone's take on Isma'il's administration is interesting, yet his address is most remarkable because it begins with a thoroughly modern take on Egyptian gender politics and the role of the harem in Egyptian life. Contrary to Colston, who placed Egyptian women in an entirely subordinate position to men, Stone prefaces his remarks on Egyptian development by recognizing that the conditions for women in Egypt and the United States were, first of all, different. He observes that there were many women in the audience in New York; in Egypt there were no women at the meetings of the Khedivial Geographic Society. Yet, while American women were free to appear in public settings, women in Egypt had different but equally valuable rights, in his estimation. Most importantly, the portion of the home reserved for women belonged, inviolably, to them. An American husband might enter his wife's private chambers, but in Egypt that was a line a man could not cross. Here, Stone seems to echo positive-sounding appraisals of the Ottoman world by Americans like David Porter and James De Kay from fifty years earlier. Of course Stone's observation was based on his idealized notion of upper-class and urban Egyptian life, which secured these kinds of privileged domestic spaces in ways that most women in Egypt could not expect. And what Stone seemed to be selling as Egyptian women's agency sounds a lot like the cult of domesticity and the ideology of separate spheres in the United States.

By his own admission, Stone had no way to further intrude on the domestic space of Egyptian women. But he did feel comfortable commenting extensively on the space of Egyptian manhood – the army. A year after his presentation to the American Geographical Society, Stone was invited to present a paper before the Military Service Institution on Governors Island in New York. The society, which described itself as “an Institution which has the military interests of the country at heart,” was formed in 1878 as a means for present and former officers to network. Stone's presentation, subsequently published in the society's journal, offers further insights into how mercenary diplomacy worked to advocate for Egypt in the United States.⁸² The address also

offers valuable insight into how Stone viewed the work he did in Egypt, as well as the more abstract components of his labor.

Standing before the members of the institution, Stone once again proved that he was skilled at recognizing his audience. At the meeting of the geography society, he had acknowledged the women in the audience; at this meeting of former soldiers he acknowledged their shared domestic trouble. He begins by speaking of the “fatigues and hardships” of “hard frontier duty” for women in both ancient Egypt – more easily recognizable than modern Egypt for the military men in attendance – and the contemporary United States. Stone points out – probably to a few laughs – that

the luxuries and the instruments of music of those days, with which the Egyptian ladies were wont to charm their lovers and their lords, were much more easy of transportation than the grand pianos of to-day; were more easily protected from ruin and dust, and more easily arranged when “out of tune.”⁸³

Weaving together the frontier, the domestic, and the responsibilities of men and women to labor to reproduce civilization as it was embodied through courtship and performance, Stone appears to have a wide-ranging grasp of military life.

Stone’s address to the assembled soldiers helped to further cement a particular genealogy of modern Egypt in the United States. He traces the origins of modern Egypt to Mehmed Ali, whom he described as a “born leader of men.”⁸⁴ According to Stone, the mercenary army that Ali assembled was the first true Egyptian army in over 300 years. Further, Stone locates the defining moment of this mercenary army – an instrument of nationalism – not in the defeat of the Mamluks, but in the defeat of the British in 1807.⁸⁵ Here, his story resembles the exceptional narrative of the US Revolutionary War against the British. Egypt – or rather the Albanian mercenaries who ruled it – had prevented the British from establishing hegemony over the land. This revolutionary act – the defeat of the British – established a new colonial state in both places. Eventually, both states went on to become imperial powers in their own right: Egypt in Sudan and Syria, the United States across North America.

Stone was too young to have been part of the revolutionary generation in the United States. In Mexico and California he had worked as an

engineer, and his role in the Civil War was scapegoat rather than hero. But in Egypt, Stone found a mythos in which he could place himself. He traced his own lineage in the history of modern Egypt to a French mercenary, Colonel Séve, a veteran of Napoleon's army who went to work in Egypt after the fall of the First Empire. Stone describes Séve – who converted to Islam and took the name Süleyman Pasha – as “a soldier of severe principles and a high sense of the dignity of the military profession.” Mehmed Ali appointed Süleyman chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian Army, the same position to which Ali's grandson Isma'il appointed Stone in 1870. Stone goes on to credit Séve with the successful organization of the Egyptian Army in the 1820s and 1830s. Stone claimed this army was among the finest in the world at the time;⁸⁶ its fortunes, he said, failed after the 1830s due to no fault of Egypt's, but simply due to the poor odds the country found itself up against. Egypt's 1841 defeat was before “a coalition of nearly the same powers before whom Napoleon and the French army yielded in 1815, and the defeat cannot be considered as a disgraceful one for them.”⁸⁷ Isma'il and Stone failed, just as Mehmed Ali and Süleyman Pasha failed, because the odds were against them. In order to secure his reputation in the United, Stone transformed his position as Chief of Mercenaries into that of a loyal soldier in a lost cause.

Within the militarized narrative that Stone constructed to explain modern Egyptian history, Isma'il becomes praiseworthy because he worked to revive the Egyptian Army against all these odds – the British, the French, the debt crisis, and the Abyssinians. He dared to be like his grandfather, Mehmed Ali. Stone locates an exceptional role for the American mercenaries in this revitalization project – national, with a masculine genealogy. While Süleyman Pasha was exceptional because he converted to Islam and spent the remainder of his life in Egypt, he was not exceptional in the sense of being a French mercenary in Egypt's army. There were many of these – in fact, a whole *mission Française*, which the American mercenaries replaced. But unlike Süleyman, no members of the American mission ever professed in public to have converted to Islam. It was necessary, therefore, for Stone to explain the exceptionalism of the American mission by claiming that, excepting Süleyman Pasha, the members of the French mission always remained agents of the French emperor and consul general and never fully reliable. In contrast, Stone claims, “far from becoming an ‘American ‘Mission,’

[the American mercenaries] became in fact and deed, according to their grades, officers of the Egyptian Army.” Here, once again, mercenary force passes through the lens of US exceptionalism to appear as nonintervention.

It is important to be clear here; in 1884, a year after he left Egyptian service, Stone rejected the claim that the American mercenaries who went to Egypt composed an American mission. In 1912, Long professed a totally different opinion. Long embraced the American mission because he desired recognition at the end of his life. Stone severed the connection between the United States and its mercenaries in 1884 because that was the only way to prove, once and for all, that he was a loyal soldier – in short, a military professional. By claiming that a lack of national interest “increased their [the American mercenaries] proper influence with the Egyptian officers and authorities,” Stone also positioned himself as a valuable Egyptian asset, rather than a humiliated Agesilaus. In order to fully establish that the United States had no interest in Egypt – that the United States was exceptional, and somehow anti-imperial in the Ottoman world – Stone claimed that “no change of European politics could possibly touch the interests of Americans in the Egyptian service to render [them] antagonistic to Egypt.” Stone’s effort to claim an exceptional role for himself and the other American mercenaries seems somewhat disingenuous, however. The American mission, while not explicitly carrying out US policy, was at the very least helping Egypt to resist European policy as a way of increasing US influence in the Ottoman world. Mott and Butler used mercenary force in a blatant attempt to line their pockets. And though Stone did not see himself as an agent of US policy, let alone self-interested, he advocated for Remington and was on intimate terms with US consular officials.⁸⁸ Yet, in Stone’s estimation, the United States had no desire to influence affairs in Egypt, or was at least unable to exercise its desire through the bodies of the American mercenaries who traveled to Egypt to work for the khedive.⁸⁹ Stone insisted that both he and the government of the United States were acting in good faith.

Severed from all interest in the United States, Stone’s address goes on to give an overview of the deficiencies of the Egyptian Army in 1870 and the steps that were taken to modernize. Literacy campaigns were undertaken, coastal defenses were constructed, and cartridge factories were built. Well aware that the rank-and-file of the army were drawn

from the fellahin, who formed the agricultural backbone of the nation, leaves of absences were granted for soldiers to return to seed and harvest crops. Finally, maps, railways, and telegraph lines were used to help organize the militarized space of the modern nation. With these reforms undertaken, it was not long before "a letter dropped into the post-office in the center of Darfour, or in Gondokoro, or Berberah, with a five-cent stamp upon it, addressed to London or San Francisco, went safely and rapidly to its destination."⁹⁰ Stone, then, posits a modernity organized around the regimentation of time and space by the military. He claims that efforts to further modernize Egypt's military were hamstrung, though, when the creditors came calling. Under the influence of his European ministers, Isma'il cut military spending. Stone explains that the financial crisis was most acutely felt by soldiers. Schools for soldiers and their children were closed. No salary arrears were paid to soldiers, while huge payments were made to foreigners. Nevertheless, because they were loyal to the khedive, the officers of the army "spoke not of revolt through months of their oppression."⁹¹ According to Stone, these attempts by European powers to deny Egypt sovereignty by denying it an army eventually led to disaster at Alexandria and a rule even more arbitrary than Isma'il's.⁹²

Though he condemns 'Urabi and other nationalists, Stone describes the uprising as "the natural result of the action of the representatives of England and France and of those Governments." He singles out England in particular, accusing it of playing the role of "destroyer." In spite of British intervention – which came in on the side of Tawfiq against the nationalists and others – Stone continues to emphasize the loyalty of the army to the khedive: "the most intelligent part of the army remained faithful" and "the British Army had to fight only the body of the Egyptian Army, without its brains." Ultimately, though, Stone's sentiments in Egypt lay with the army, which he believed he had no small part in creating:

Let us hope, however, that the Egyptian Army, whose fortunes we have to-day followed through thousands of years, which we have considered in glorious successes and sad defeats, which has sometimes disappeared for generations and sometimes for centuries, and yet again reappeared and existed gloriously, may again, and that soon, within the time even of some of the elders

among us, reappear in renewed glory, to assure greatness and happiness in the beautiful land of the Pharaohs.⁹³

Serving as chief of staff for the Egyptian Army throughout the 1870s, as well as the intimate knowledge he claimed based on this experience, provided Stone with some social capital within the US military community.

In a footnote to Stone's speech, General Daniel Sickles thanks him for demonstrating the importance of the army to Egyptian independence. Yet Sickles deviates from Stone's take on the significance of contemporary events in Egypt, embracing instead the role of the West in civilizing the Dark Continent and the fantasy of ancient Egypt:

It seems as if African exploration, African discovery, African invasion, African spoliation, were now the favorite employment of European adventure and enterprise. No doubt the world, from the point of view of civilization, has much to gain from this movement, and yet General Stone touched a chord of sympathy in our bosoms, when he depicted the ancient glories of that great Empire to which civilization owes so much, and from which even the most enlightened nations derived much of the inspiration that guided their progress.⁹⁴

Sympathetic imperialism would continue to be an ongoing theme in the United States approaching the Spanish American War in 1898. But with the twentieth anniversary of the US Civil War approaching, Sickles seemed more interested in "the patriotism, zeal, and ability" that Stone showed in his defense of Washington in 1861. Redeemed – if he was ever really lost to begin with – Stone's next publication was an introduction to a firsthand account of the end of the American mission that has been widely misrepresented by writers and historians.

"AN AMERICAN GIRL IN CAIRO"

In June 1884, the *Century*, the widely read successor to *Scribner's Monthly Magazine*, published "Diary of an American Girl in Cairo During the War of 1882." The author was Fanny Stone, Charles Stone's daughter, who was seventeen when she recorded her experience.⁹⁵ The Stone family, like most of the General Staff, lived in Cairo, the center of the

Egyptian Government, rather than in Alexandria, a bustling port city. In the days leading up to the British attack, Charles Stone traveled from Cairo to Alexandria with his son John, leaving his wife Jeannie and their daughters in the care of the General Staff in Cairo. Father and son were among the Americans evacuated in the hours leading up to the bombardment on July 11. When the British subsequently landed an invasion force, virtually all connections between Alexandria and Cairo were severed.⁹⁶ In Cairo, the Stone women remained sequestered for about five weeks before they were able to leave Egypt via Port Said. The diary that Fanny kept during these five weeks – which she was probably keeping all along – is a record of impressions and opinions formed after more than a decade in Cairo.

Some writers have approached Fanny's diary as a straightforward account of "what happened" or as evidence of the threat the 'Urabi Uprising posed to the West, embodied by three white women holed up in Cairo. In one essay in her collection *Americans in Egypt, 1770–1915*, Cassandra Vivian claims that Fanny's diary offers insight into the effects of the British attack on ordinary people.⁹⁷ But was Fanny really ordinary? First of all, her father was the chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian Army. Fanny grew up in the foreign colony surrounded by Italian, French, and British colonists and probably spent most of her time at home, where her family was attended to by Egyptian servants. The family hosted significant military and political figures from the United States, including Sherman and Grant, and even received a visit from Ralph Waldo Emerson, to whom they "showed great courtesy."⁹⁸ Fanny was insulated from "ordinary life" in many ways. And when the inevitable humanitarian intervention followed the British assault, Fanny, her two sisters, and her mother were among its first priorities.⁹⁹

While Vivian fails to recognize the conditions that shaped Fanny's subject position, Michael Oren uses the diary to support a typical Orientalist reading of the uprising. In *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*, Oren misrepresents the contents of Fanny's diary to maintain the fiction of an Orient that threatens Westerners, especially women. Oren's errors are frequent and range from subtle to blatant. First, Oren cites Jeannie's plea that her daughters protect their virtue at all costs, including suicide, but he fails to mention that Jeannie made the girls specifically promise to "never let an Arab touch you." She continued, "When it comes to that, remember I expect

you to save yourselves by putting a bullet through your heart. Don't leave me to do it."¹⁰⁰ And no ululating women "pelted the house with rocks," as Oren claims. It is unclear if Oren is talking about the Arab women – in Fanny's words – "going through the streets to-night wailing and covering their heads with dust" as they mourn the dead, or Fanny's dubious secondhand report of Egyptian women's "cry of joy" after two European officials were chopped into pieces and fed to dogs. In neither case were rocks or stones involved.¹⁰¹ Oren is right that a small band of children (led by a man) stood outside the gate chanting. What they said, according to Fanny, was "Long live Arabi! God give him victory! Death to the Christians!" Of course Oren fails to tell his reader that the soldiers guarding the family promptly chased the children off with clubs and then demanded that the local police ensure there were no more protests, which they did.¹⁰² Contrary to Oren's claim that the family had no contact with their father while they were sequestered in Cairo, Charles Stone sent money and several letters.¹⁰³ Charles Stone did not have much to worry about, as Oren somehow reasons, because the women were guarded and respected by the military at all times. In his introduction to Fanny's diary, Stone is very clear about how well his wife and daughters were treated in Cairo during the uprising.¹⁰⁴ And despite her mother's warnings, Fanny agrees that the women were treated well. At one point – about halfway through their sequestration – Fanny described how the women started their days: "We take our walk every morning. It is like walking through an enchanted city of fairy tales. In the whole European quarter there is not a house open excepting our own."¹⁰⁵ Finally, it was not, as Oren claims, a daring and sensational carriage ride through the streets of Cairo that carried the women to Port Said; the women traveled to the Red Sea coast in a private, guarded train car provided by 'Urabi. They were allowed to store all their belongings before leaving, and took one servant and a cook with them.¹⁰⁶ While Vivian's account of the diary takes Fanny's claims at face value without any attention to the form of colonial women's travel writing, Oren's account deals loosely with what Fanny wrote, ignoring the ending of the diary and how Charles Stone's preface to his daughter's account places the reader in a sympathetic relationship with the Egyptians.

Given these terms – it was written by someone who had little experience with Egypt outside the insulated diplomatic bubble in which she lived and who had very little to worry about in Cairo following the

British attack on Alexandria – Fanny Stone’s diary provides insight into the domestic life of the American mission, a differently rendered account of the mercenary encounter than available in narratives written by men like William Loring or William McEntyre Dye.¹⁰⁷ While neither Loring nor Dye overlooks the existence or value of the domestic world, Fanny Stone recognizes better than either man the unique gendered demands placed on women in war.¹⁰⁸ Read at the level of gender and reproduction, Fanny Stone’s diary reveals the responsibilities and privileges of white women within the social order of Victorian domesticity, as well as the role of the Other in this fantasy world. Fanny Stone’s vision of white womanhood – as it plays out in Egypt – closely mirrors the domestic visions of US imperialism in general; the domestic space of US empire is always already imagined as threatened by the foreign. In Cairo, like elsewhere, the foundations of the domestic depended on a militarized regime of racial and sexual purity, which explains why Jeannie Stone made her children promise to protect their virtue from Arabs and cautioned them to “be brave and face death like good soldiers.”¹⁰⁹

The constantly threatened domestic world, dependent on the labor of women, is nevertheless commanded by men. Even when offered “as much money as she needed,” Jeannie Stone demurred that “I cannot leave Cairo until I have permission from the general.”¹¹⁰ She concluded that rather than fleeing Cairo – abandoning the domestic space she occupied, which would surely jeopardize her husband and son’s internal states – the three women would instead “stay at home like brave women, and live like Christians as long as we can.”¹¹¹ The demands of fidelity extended further: Jeannie concluded, “rather than obey an order or Arabi Pacha [*sic*] that would compromise my husband’s fidelity to the Khedive, I would let them kill me.”¹¹² Jeannie assured the girls, however, that “there never lived an Arab who could frighten me.”¹¹³ After several weeks of isolation in Cairo, Fanny wondered aloud about the lives of women who did not have it so good, writing, “I often think of what Jo said in ‘Little Women,’ ‘I wonder what girls do who have not a good mother.’”¹¹⁴ Fanny was reassured by the presence of her mother, who acted as an essential component of the domestic drama of the American mission. By performing a US-inflected domesticity in Cairo and then recounting this performance for the benefit of the *Century*’s audience, Fanny’s mercenary narrative contributed to the

cosmopolitanism of US culture as well as the racial attitudes that would influence future approaches to Egypt and the Middle East.¹¹⁵

Steeped in Orientalist tropes, Fanny's diary does not confine itself to rehearsing the domestic but also lays out a methodology for managing racial difference that bears a remarkable similarity to Chaillé-Long's methods in Central Africa. Stone begins by describing the refugees streaming in from Alexandria as "filthy, degraded women, and fierce, brutal men."¹¹⁶ Racialized subjects like these appear to deserve no protection. Fanny's account of the family's relationship with its servants might be drawn straight from body of romantic plantation literature in the United States. Jeannie constantly accuses them of being "faithless wenches," saying that she had fed and clothed them like a mother before they "turned traitors to her." She threatened violence unless these servants returned to work, threatening, "Go to your work, you miserable cowards, and the first time you *look* insolent I will have you thrashed. Never dare to threaten me again unless you are beyond my reach!"¹¹⁷ Some servants, however, remain loyal in Fanny's narrative. Repeatedly, Fanny describes the Egyptian General Staff as an obedient lot. In the opening pages of the diary, she claims the General Staff offered their allegiance to the family, saying, "We never had a friend until Stone Pasha came to Egypt. He took us from poverty and wretchedness, and made us what we are, happy, well-fed, well-dressed men, with our families living in comfort."¹¹⁸ Later, Fanny writes that the staff officers swore to the women, "General Stone is the father of the staff; we will protect you with our lives."¹¹⁹ Fanny claims that she played "Nearer My God to Thee" for the family's servants, and "when I told them how our dead President loved it, they begged me to play it again."¹²⁰ The trope of Egyptian devotion to the Chief of the Mercenaries and of servants as children functions as an avenue for criticizing 'Urabi. Fanny wonders what he and "his creatures would think" if they could see her playing "sacred music" for the two Muslims.¹²¹ All this is evidence of a bias in Stone's diary that Vivian and Oren ignore.

Scholars have devoted significant attention to understanding women's travel writing – of which Fanny's diary is a representative – as a form of knowledge production that coalesced in the nineteenth century. In 1982, Catherine Barnes Stevenson proposed a systematized analysis of women's travel writing that would include motives as well as more formal elements, including technique and accuracy. Based on a collection of

Victorian travel writing by women, Stevens argues for a gendered understanding of travel writing. Many of the leitmotifs Stevenson identified appear in Fanny's diary: hardship and domestic trials, for example. Yet Fanny's diary is not "calculatedly unheroic," as Stevenson concludes of her own case studies. And rather than opening up "new possibilities for the female self," Fanny focuses on the role of women in the creation and preservation of domestic, rather than public or cosmopolitan roles.¹²² In fact, Fanny appears to pathologize women who adopt public or cosmopolitan roles, ignoring the demands of the domestic economy. In an unpublished letter to her father, Fanny called Mary Custis, Robert E. Lee's daughter who had refused to attend the reception for Grant while she was visiting Egypt, "a horrible ugly old maid, and very *queer*."¹²³ Similarly, Fanny's diary appears to deviate from the model proposed by Sara Mills, who concludes that colonial women's travel writings "constitute counter-hegemonic voices within colonial discourse."¹²⁴ Fanny's diary is strongly pro-Egyptian, yes, but also critical of the leaders of the uprising. As Mary Louise Pratt points out in *Imperial Eyes*, far from being simply a form of empowerment for women, travel writing also functions as a form of imperial cultural production. Pratt's work led Laura Wexler to scrutinize this "equivocal story of the role of women" in her analysis of photojournalism and empire at the turn of the twentieth century, *Tender Violence*.¹²⁵ Fanny's diary, then, is rendered from such a perspective as to offer insights into nineteenth-century US middle-class white women's role in empire.

As part of a larger discourse of empire in the years leading up to the overseas expansion of US imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, Fanny's diary functioned as a kind of preface for other, equally significant cultural work. Fanny's diary, for example, was published just five months before the *Century* began publishing its immensely popular collection of Civil War reminiscences. The series ran for three years and featured the reflections of soldiers ranging from former Confederates, including General P.T. Beauregard and Colonel R.E. Colston – lately a mercenary in Egypt – to the Union Army, including General Grant and Colonel John Taylor Wood, who was on the *Merrimac* during its engagement with the *Monitor*.¹²⁶ The writers at the *Century* described the collection as a "a carefully organized continuation of the war articles which have appeared from time to time in the magazine since the

publication of the notable ‘Great South’ papers.” But something was different about this new series:

In popular interest as well as historical importance the papers to come, it is expected, will deserve wider attention than any other series ever undertaken by the magazine, and prove of lasting value to the history of the most eventful period of our national life.

The *Century* judged that

no time could be fitter, we think, for a publication of this kind than the present, when the passions and prejudices of the Civil War have nearly faded out of politics, and its heroic events are passing into our common history where motives will be weighed without malice, and valor praised without distinction of uniform.

The *Century*’s most important goal was to educate

the generation which has grown up since the war, to whom these papers will be opportune instruction, may now be taught how the men who were divided on a question of principle and State fealty, and who fought the war which must remain the pivotal period of our history, won by equal devotion and valor that respect for each other which is the strongest bond of a reunited people.¹²⁷

Broadly speaking, this genre of Civil War reflections helped to forge a strong connection between the Civil War and the experience of American mercenaries in Egypt. In this sense, the *Century* was one of many cultural organs that contributed to the cultural work of reunification that mediated and resolved the tensions between the former combatants of the north and south. Yet the *Century*’s juxtaposition of the Civil War and Egyptian service represents something more than a story about how the Blue and the Gray came together again. It also familiarized Americans with one corner of the modern world at a vital moment in the United States’ development as a world power.

The question of agency – of both white women and colonial subjects – has been a central concern of analyses of women’s travel writing.¹²⁸ Mills, in her study of women’s travel writing, concludes that the primary

difference between men and women's travel writing lies in "the way that women's writing is judged and processed."¹²⁹ Indeed, while a letter written from Flushing, Long Island, and published in the *Ann Arbor Courier* called Fanny's diary "the most notable article in the June Century," the *Courier* thought only to include a copy of Charles Stone's introduction to his daughter's account of the tense days in Cairo. Apparently the authorization of the account – and the political commentary it offered – were more important than the account of the women's tense days in Cairo.¹³⁰ Fanny's diary, published with her father's authorization, supports Mill's conclusion – and in a way that recognizes agency as not simply opposed to power, as Walter Johnson points out, but "thick with the material givenness of a moment in time."¹³¹ Fanny's diary can tell us some things about the lives of some women, but it can also tell us much about the forms and practices of US empire. Indeed, Charles Stone authorizes his daughter's account by narrating how the document is already subject to strict editorial criteria even beyond his paternal authority, writing in his introduction that "my daughter has corrected the proof of her diary which you sent her."¹³² He goes on to explain "the circumstances under which the diary was written," offering context and commentary beyond what the diary reveals, using his preface to blame the deaths of Europeans in Egypt on the British admiral Beauchamp Seymour's failure to notify Europeans living elsewhere in Egypt of his intention to bombard Alexandria after entering its open harbor as a friend. With little notice given even to the residents of Alexandria – the admiral's notice came late in the afternoon – a train full of refugees already on the way from Cairo, and all evacuating vessels directed to leave the harbor before noon, Stone firmly believes the British had blood on their hands:

This barbarous disregard on the part of the British of the lives of citizens of all other nationalities caused me, as well as thousands of others, fearful anxiety, and caused the horrible death of scores of Europeans – French, Germans, Austrians, and Italians.¹³³

Here Stone avoids blaming the Egyptians for the events in the days following the bombardment, instead focusing again on the British failure. Stone portrayed the failure to provide for the safety of neutral

citizens as a failure of manhood – Seymour should have acted as a protector, fulfilling both his martial and domestic obligations.

Stone also repeats his earlier criticism, concluding that if Seymour had given forty-eight – rather than just twenty-four – hours' notice, the British "would have been spared the frightful responsibility which now weighs upon them of causing the horrible death of European men, women, and children." He goes on to debunk inaccurate reports of what happened in Alexandria in the lead-up to the British bombardment: "During the so-called 'massacre' of June 11th, 1882, in Alexandria, European *men* were struck down by the infuriated populace, but not a woman or child was injured." Stone, who remained loyal to Isma'il – and held a certain fidelity to the Egypt he believed in – could not help but see the terrible irony of these inaccurate reports. "During the Christian bombardment of Alexandria scores of Egyptian women and children perished, and their husbands, brothers, and fathers wreaked vengeance, a little later, on the innocent and helpless Europeans at Tantah and Mehallet-el-Kebir."¹³⁴ What followed the bombardment, according to Stone, was the result of British disregard for women and children. British reports to the contrary were simply wrong.

Stone used these prefatory remarks to the diary as a way of situating his own manhood only a year after his return to the United States; his statement of faith in the office of the General Staff to protect his family is meant as a testament to both himself and Egypt. By remaining at his post and placing his family in the care of the Egyptian Staff in Cairo, he spared his wife and daughters "the horrors of bombardment."¹³⁵ As the British occupied Alexandria and campaigned against 'Urabi, Stone remained loyal to the khedive, conspicuously doing his duty, full well knowing that doing his duty meant additional danger for his family, who remained secluded in Cairo. Stone's ability to protect his family from the "horrors of bombardment" – to effectively domesticate them – was proof of his honor and of his manhood, the essential counterweight of the domestic in the gendered economy of the Gilded Age in the United States. Stone was careful to also credit Commander William Whitehead of the United States Navy ship *Quinnebaug* for helping to reunite him with his family; Stone described how Whitehead entered the Suez Canal and demanded that Stone's family be brought to him at Ismailia. 'Urabi happily responded to Whitehead's demand – in reality 'Urabi had been trying to send the American woman and her children

away for some time. Nevertheless, Stone leveraged his family's survival – really no miracle – as a way of vindicating his manhood and military professionalism. Stone's mercenary narrative placed the family at the center of this tangled web of exceptionalism, empires, and uprisings. But in spite of their anti-imperial tone, the Stone family was never kind to 'Urabi.

The disdain Charles and Fanny Stone held for 'Urabi differed significantly from the appraisal offered a year earlier by Augusta Lady Gregory, a significant figure in the Irish literary revival. In a letter published in the *Times* of London in 1883 – subsequently circulated as a pamphlet – Gregory defended 'Urabi by celebrating him and his embrace of the proper domestic scene. "Arabi and his household" compared the nationalist leader to Hamlet and described him as strongly built, gentle and humane, strikingly eloquent, and pious. Gregory recounted a visit she made to 'Urabi's home, where, contrary to published reports, the family lived a modest lifestyle. 'Urabi's wife wore a "pleasant, intelligent expression," but because she had birthed fourteen children, only five of whom survived, she looked "overcome with the cares of maternity, her beauty dimmed." 'Urabi's mother lived with the family and they had only one servant – fewer than the Stone family. In Gregory's account, 'Urabi's wife pleads, "We can't get on without the Christians, or they without us. Why can't we all live in peace together?" In the aftermath of the British attack, 'Urabi's wife was forced to seek refuge in the harem of a "high-minded princess." 'Urabi's mother was "hidden in a poor quarter of the town." The "simple, honest, hospitable" family is now "poor, hunted, in danger."¹³⁶ By harnessing these descriptions of a respectable domestic life threatened by British imperialism, Gregory hoped to effect many of the same ends as the Stone family. Ultimately, however, the publication of Fanny's diary worked to ensure that the Stone family in Cairo was remembered in the United States, even if 'Urabi's family was not.¹³⁷

By 1884, all these events that the American mission was witness to and involved with were beginning to fade into the past as public attention turned to the Mahdist siege of General Gordon at Khartoum.¹³⁸ In his final State of the Union address, delivered to Congress on December 1, 1884 – just six months after Fanny's diary was published – President Chester Arthur lamented the ongoing absence of US diplomatic representatives from Egypt.

The failure of Congress to make appropriation for our representation at the autonomous court of the Khedive has proved a serious embarrassment in our intercourse with Egypt; and in view of the necessary intimacy of diplomatic relationship due to the participation of this Government as one of the treaty powers in all matters of administration there affecting the rights of foreigners, I advise the restoration of the agency and consulate-general at Cairo on its former basis.

Arthur recognized that even though Egypt was not a nation in the conventional diplomatic sense, it was a place worthy of diplomatic recognition. Arthur therefore embraced a vision of US–Egyptian relations that acknowledged the ongoing interests of the United States in Egypt. This particular foreign-policy vision obliged the two nations to remain intimate. Arthur said,

I do not conceive it to be the wish of Congress that the United States should withdraw altogether from the honorable position they have hitherto held with respect to the Khedive, or that citizens of this Republic residing or sojourning in Egypt should hereafter be without the aid and protection of a competent representative.¹³⁹

It would be nearly a year before Arthur's replacement, President Grover Cleveland, appointed John Cardwell US consul general to Egypt during a recess of the Senate.

Following his endorsement of diplomatic relations with Egypt, Arthur turned to France:

The colossal statue of Liberty Enlightening the World, the generous gift of the people of France, is expected to reach New York in May next. I suggest that Congressional action be taken in recognition of the spirit which has prompted this gift and in aid of the timely completion of the pedestal upon which it is to be placed.¹⁴⁰

The construction of the pedestal, which Arthur asked Congress to fund, was being led by the former Chief of Mercenaries, Charles Stone.

Back from Egypt, Stone's engineering and management experience was being put to a familiar use in helping to assemble the monumental architecture of empire as chief engineer of the Statue of Liberty from 1883 to 1885.¹⁴¹ Assisted by Samuel Lockett, who had served under him in Egypt, Stone helped to design and construct the pedestal and subsequently served as master of ceremonies when the statue was dedicated. He became ill shortly thereafter.

Loring and Chaillé-Long were both by Stone's bed when he died in New York in 1887. In spite of having redeemed himself in Egypt, Stone's obituarist Fitz-John Porter, the former Civil War general, regretted that Stone had left his family in poverty.¹⁴² A year after he died, the *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* published Stone's final account of his role as Chief of Mercenaries for the American mission to Egypt. Stone reminisced about the US Civil War and included several items from his time in Egypt that he hoped the institution might wish to archive. Stone, then, in the end connected his experience in Egypt to his work as a soldier in the United States. The items he offered the institution were proof of the intimate relationship between the United States and Egypt, a relationship shaped by mercenary force and whose memory lives on in military and other archives.¹⁴³

In addition to being memorialized in the United States, Stone was also remembered by his colleagues in Cairo. In the *Bulletin de la Société Khédiviale de Géographie du Caire*, Onofrio Abbate Pasha, Italian-born but a resident of Egypt for nearly seventy years and vice president of the Khedival Geographic Society, described Stone's contributions to Egypt as germinal to the country's future development. Abbate also thought to point out that Egyptian geographical knowledge has expanded not only because of European- and American-led expeditions, but also thanks to the efforts of "les vaillants officiers indigènes" who served under Stone. Among these native officers was Mohammed Moktar Pasha, who had been among those to toast Stone when he left Egypt in 1883.¹⁴⁴ Moktar also eulogized Stone – in what he called the "Arab tradition" – calling him *père tender*, his tender father. Moktar remembered his father as "l'homme des combats, le prince des mathématiques, le protecteur des sciences, et le champion de la civilisation!"¹⁴⁵ Again, the relations in and among Americans and Egyptians appears filial. Indeed, along with his biographical sketch in the journal of the Khedival Geographic Society,

Abbate thought to include a letter from Jeannie Stone addressed to the khedive after her husband's death, in which she recalled he always tried to inspire loyalty to Egypt among his children.¹⁴⁶ These eulogies from Egypt – as well as other material from this chapter – demonstrate the centrality of domestic relationships to Egyptian ideas about modernity.¹⁴⁷

THE OBELISK AND THE BETRAYAL

The burst of mercenary narratives that the British occupation helped to produce and authorize was not the last that people in the United States would hear about the American mission. Following the British invasion and Stone's departure from Egypt, there was a significant and perhaps inevitable disinvestment in Egypt as anything but an object of ancient wonder and modern curiosity; no longer did the country appear as a possible ally and foil against both the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. Yet the significance of the British occupation of Egypt and the ongoing intimacy of Egypt and the United States was not forgotten by Elbert Farman, who, as consul general and a judge on the Egyptian Mixed Courts, had been closely associated with the nearly fifty American mercenaries who worked in Egypt. Farman was active not only in the political arm of US diplomacy, but also in its cultural arm. In 1879, he played an important role in securing an Egyptian obelisk – dubbed Cleopatra's Needle – for the city of New York. Farman returned to the United States after his stint in the courts and remained active in domestic politics.

In 1904, Farman wrote *Along the Nile with General Grant*, an account of Grant's 1878 visit to Egypt. Relating Grant's visit gave Farman the opportunity to talk extensively about ancient Egypt and the current state of Egyptology – a description he hoped might interest laymen.¹⁴⁸ It also gave Farman an opportunity to eulogize Charles Stone more than fifteen years after his death. Farman recalls that Grant told him that, along with General McClellan, Stone was one of "the two persons that were looked up to by the whole army." The two generals, Grant told Farman, "undoubtedly had the best military education, and were the two most informed men" in the army. At Ball's Bluff, Stone had been too loyal to McClellan to blame him for the disaster. Grant confided to Farman that Stone was the "most unfortunate man he had ever known, but that his misfortunes were no fault of his own."¹⁴⁹

Farman's report of Grant's praise was the best eulogy Stone could ever have received. But Farman was not done writing about the history of the American mission.

In 1908, more than a quarter-of-a-century after the British invasion, the former consul general published a corrective to what he described as misleading and "extravagantly laudatory" accounts of Lord Cromer's administration of Egypt.¹⁵⁰ *Egypt and Its Betrayal; An Account of the Country during the Periods of Isma'il and Tewfik Pashas, and of How England Acquired a New Empire*, positioned Egypt as an already modern and once-potential partner of the United States who had been taken advantage of by European powers. Perhaps because it constituted a significant part of his own legacy, Farman devoted four chapters of his book to the history, presentation, and transport of Cleopatra's Needle from Egypt to the United States.¹⁵¹ For Farman, the gift of the obelisk was evidence of the strong bond that had been forged between modern Egypt, no longer in need of such reminders of the past, and the United States: "Considering all of the circumstances, the Khedive could not have furnished a stronger proof of his respect for the Government and people of the United States than his gift of Cleopatra's Needle." While the British and the French had taken their obelisks as "return for favors and presents" and payment for "services rendered," the presentation of an obelisk to the United States demonstrated "the respect and kindly feelings of a sovereign toward a government and a people who had always been his friends, and who had no selfish designs to further against him, his subjects, or his country."¹⁵² The constant repetition of the United States' exceptional lack of interest in empire was a common theme among the members of the American mission. And perhaps, in many ways, Cleopatra's Needle illustrates many of the most problematic and enduring aspects of the US–Egyptian encounter. While Farman secured the obelisk thanks to the modern relationship between the two countries, the obelisk serves mostly as a reminder of the ancient Egyptian past, as well as the power of imperialism and colonialism to extract cultural artifacts from distant lands for the enjoyment of Western audiences. The object – deeply phallic – is also named for a woman. Cleopatra's obelisk was a piece of old Egypt, given to the United States by a new Egypt. But in spite of the intimate relationship between modern Egypt and the United States, the nation's cultural producers remained more committed than ever to the old Egypt as well as to a penetrable, feminized Orient.

By 1908, more than thirty years after the tumultuous decade of the 1870s in Egypt, the legacy of the American mission was fading. Farman reflected that

the leading Americans who were in the service of the Khedive (Generals Stone and Loring, Colonels Colston, Field and many others) have also disappeared. The same may be said of the prominent Americans who visited the land of the Nile in that period, and who were kindly received by Ismaïl: Grant, Sherman, Washburn, Maynard, and Noyes.¹⁵³

Nowhere did Farman mention Chaillé-Long, whom he had battled in the Mixed Courts and who had opposed the acquisition of the obelisk in 1876. But Long was still alive and lived ten more years, compiling and revising the materials I describe in this and the preceding chapter. That encounters of all types are about memory and recognition is perhaps no better illustrated than by Long, who, in the aftermath of US imperial growth at the turn of the twentieth century, concluded:

Such *in parvo* is the story of the Forgotten American Military Mission to Egypt – forgotten alike by Government and people. There is no record of its services either in the state, war, or navy departments in Washington. The records in the departments in Cairo were once replete with the achievements of our American Mission but recent books and publications on Modern Egypt and Africa are as bare of mention of Americans as the monuments after Ramses II had erased thereupon the cartouches of his predecessors. History repeats itself in Egypt.¹⁵⁴

Indeed, history does repeat itself. And true to mercenary form – like Eaton 100 years earlier – Long desired, above all, recognition.

Surely our Government would defend the work of its citizens who have added to its good name even its glory. Americans have the unfortunate disposition to fly kites for others and we are too often content, even proud, to be the tail of other kites. This disposition should be repressed. The day has come when we should fly kites of

our own and fly them beyond the clouds, if in so doing, it exalt our national pride.¹⁵⁵

For what, though, did Long want credit? The Bugandan princess – Kabaka Muteesa's daughter, whom Long repeatedly claimed was handed over to him to be educated in Cairo – was never able to return to home. And ultimately, Long's former boss Gordon was killed in Khartoum during the Mahdist uprising. The Somalian expedition, about which Long had promised to write at the end of *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People*, was uneventful, and after realizing that the Equatorial provinces were much more distant from the Indian Ocean than originally thought, the Egyptians heeded British advice at Zanzibar to turn back. The Abyssinian War that followed left a very bitter taste in the mouths of native officers and European creditors. The British occupation that followed the debt crisis – or “the betrayal,” as Farman later called it – marked the end of a particularly American version of modernity in the Middle East and Africa. Still, despite the failure of the American mission, Egypt continues to occupy an important role in the United States' image of the Middle East.

Conclusion: Our Man in Cairo

In remarks welcoming President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to the White House in 1988, President Ronald Reagan described Americans' fascination with Egyptian history. This history, he suggested, had reached its crescendo a decade earlier when Egypt recognized and subsequently normalized relations with Israel. In language that continues to echo in US policy in the region, Reagan reflected on this peace between its two allies – which he called “one of the monumental events of our era” – saying that “the first step toward ending the cycle of violence in the Middle East was as arduous, painstaking, and fraught with danger as any that a country ever made.” As a result of the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt's membership in the Arab League had been suspended. But on this occasion, Mubarak's seventh visit to Washington since becoming president in 1981, only Syria, Libya, and Lebanon remained opposed to Egypt's readmission. A few months after Mubarak's visit, Syrian and Libyan resistance collapsed and Egypt was

readmitted to the Arab League. Knowing that Egypt's readmission was imminent, Reagan praised Mubarak's "dynamic and responsible leadership" in the region.¹⁵⁶

Speaking in the East Room of the White House that day before a private meeting in the Oval Office with his Egyptian counterpart, Reagan also recalled Charles Pomeroy Stone:

In closing, I'd like to share with you a bit of history. Some may not realize that the U.S.-Egyptian collaboration on security issues goes back over 100 years. Shortly after the American Civil War, General Charles Pomeroy Stone and General William Wing Loring, together with some 50 other officers from the Union and Confederate Armies, went to Egypt to work with the Egyptian Armed Forces. They worked on military training, helped strengthen coastal defenses, and shared their ideas and their experience.

General Stone left Egypt in 1878, and his last job after his return to the United States provides a fitting symbol of our enduring relationship. Stone was asked to design and construct the base for a huge statue, designed and constructed by a Frenchman, presented to the United States by the schoolchildren of France. Stone went to work with his usual energy. He gave lectures on Egypt to help finance the project, and enlisted two of his former colleagues from his days in Egypt to help with drafting the plans and erecting the structure. So, Mr. President, when you look at the Statue of Liberty, you can be proud that those who built its solid base spent nearly a decade in the service of Egypt, building a base as well for our relationship.¹⁵⁷

For Reagan, the basis of US relations with Egypt was military collaboration – these relations were even responsible, in part, for the erection of the Statue of Liberty. As denatured as it is from the significantly more complicated situation in Egypt during the 1870s, Reagan's interpretation remains fundamentally correct. But whereas Americans had gone to work for Egypt in the Ottoman Empire 100 years earlier, after 1978, Egypt had gone to work for the United States in the Middle East.

Though he surely knew who the junior partner in this relationship was, Mubarak claimed that

this friendship is a lasting one, for it is based on mutual respect and a profound conviction that all nations, regardless of origin and decree, share a common interest in the preservation of peace and maintenance of security. Over the years, our American friendship has served as a force of stability and progress; today it remains a source of hope and promise. We are determined to deepen this friendship and intensify our cooperation for our common good.

He continued,

The Middle East is a region that requires special attention and top priority. It is confronted with great challenge and rising dangers. The United States can do much to help all nations of the Middle East to cope with these problems.

Both presidents' comments – on security and good relations – were set in the context of the ongoing Iran–Iraq War, which was entering its eighth year, and the First Palestinian Intifada, which had begun a month before the two men met. Mubarak urged the United States to help bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table and to end “occupation and oppression” in Palestine. Mubarak added, “African problems need greater attention, too.”¹⁵⁸ Mubarak embodied the ongoing salience of mercenary force to US imperialism. For \$1.3 billion in US military aid each year, he had become mercenary.¹⁵⁹ But he was not Chief of the Mercenaries – that title belonged to Israel, which received \$1.8 billion in US military aid in 1988.¹⁶⁰

While the Iran–Iraq War shortly ended, Palestine remains occupied. And the conflicts that followed Mubarak's 1988 visit – in the Gulf, in North Africa, and elsewhere – witnessed shifts in the landscape of mercenary force. The acceleration of neoliberalism in the 1990s and the proliferation of private military companies in the 2000s did not dissolve this trend in US imperialism of dependence on treacherous rulers and apartheid states in what was formerly the Ottoman world. Following a brief suspension in the aftermath of the ousting of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi in 2013, military aid to Egypt continues. Israel remains the focus and driver of US policy in the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia is poised to continue its management of Saudi Aramco – which someday may be privatized. And in places like Abu Dhabi and

South Sudan – once the southern edge of the Ottoman Empire – Americans like Erik Prince have once again gone to work as mercenaries for local governments. Meanwhile, Turkey maintains a tense relationship with the United States at present, one that deteriorated after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and which appears headed for further erosion under the Trump administration. Yet, to dwell one last time on Istanbul, it is worth observing that amid all this contemporary turmoil, former national security advisor Michael Flynn appears to have acted in a mercenary capacity on behalf of Turkish interests.¹⁶¹ While the courts will judge this mercenary force vis-à-vis US law, cultural and historical analyses should not overlook its historical antecedents, of which Charles Pomeroy Stone and the other figures that I have examined here provide one possible genealogy.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 25th anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 293.
2. Joseph Hopkinson, *Hail, Columbia* (Philadelphia: 1798).
3. *Talking Points*, Fox News, September 22, 2014, www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-oreilly-on-creating-mercenary-army-with-troops-from-across-world-to-fight-terror/. On the same episode of *The O'Reilly Factor*, US Naval War College professor Tom Nichols called the plan “terrible” and “morally corrosive.” See Jonah Goldberg, “A Defense Department of Lawyers,” September 26, 2014, *National Review*, www.nationalreview.com/article/388888/defense-department-lawyers-jonah-goldberg.
4. Written by Philip Phile but not published until 1793, and first performed with lyrics added by Federalist Joseph Hopkinson in 1798 at the Chestnut Street Theatre in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
5. George Bethune English, *A Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sennaar: Under the Command of His Excellence Ismael Pasha, Undertaken by Order of His Highness Mehemmed Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt* (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1823).
6. The Porte refers to the “Sublime Porte,” or the gateway to the Ottoman foreign ministry in Istanbul; the word is a metonym, like “the Pentagon” or “the White House,” that often stands in for the central Ottoman Government.
7. Useful criticisms of the limits of Said’s analytical framework include Reina Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity, and Representation* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Reina Lewis, *Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004); and Daniel Martin Varisco, *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).
8. Palmira Brummett, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space, from World History to Piri Reis,” in *Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*,

- edited by Virginia H. Askan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
9. Malini Johar Schueller, *U.S. Orientalisms: Race, Nation, and Gender in Literature, 1790–1890* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 8.
 10. A. Üner Turgay, “Ottoman-American Trade During the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of Ottoman Studies* III (1982).
 11. A.L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria: 1800–1901* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Hilton Obenzinger, *American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the Holy Land Mania* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Timothy Marr, *The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Heather J. Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Ussama Samir Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
 12. Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt*, 1.
 13. Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt*, 4.
 14. Suraiya Faruqi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 3.
 15. Marr, *Cultural Roots of American Islamicism*, 1–19.
 16. Erik Simpson, *Mercenaries in American and British Literature, 1790–1830: Writing, Fighting, and Marrying for Money* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 1–2. Simpson argues that mercenaries appear as examples of excess freedom during the revolutionary era.
 17. For an example of this divisive discourse, see Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), and Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). As Jacob Rama Berman points out, even Said emphasized “the displacing power of figurative language,” rather than “its capacity to create connections.” A generation of scholars followed; see Jacob Rama Berman, *American Arabesque: Arabs, Islam, and the 19th-Century Imaginary* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 9. Especially relevant to the field from which this project emerges is that, in a 2013 interview, Stephen Whitfield, a professor of American civilization at Brandeis University and opponent of the American Studies Association resolution calling for an academic boycott of Israeli academic institutions, described the current alignment of the Middle East as an “historically intractable conflict” that “is way beyond the focus of the ASA.” See Sean Savage, “American Studies Professors: Israel Boycott Antithetical to Values of Academia,” December 18, 2013, Jewish News Service, www.jns.org/latest-articles/2013/12/18/american-studies-professors-israel-boycott-antithetical-to-scholarly-pursuits. I argue that nothing could be further from the truth.
 18. Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Hin-Yan Liu, *Law's Impunity: Responsibility and the Modern Private Military Company* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).

19. The most popular definition of a mercenary in international law is exemplified by Article 7 of the Geneva Convention. But something is lost in the UN definition, itself drawn from earlier Organisation of African Unity efforts, since the Convention considers a mercenary to be someone who takes part in hostilities. Enlisting in foreign service or working as a soldier does not require that a hired hand necessarily participate in combat; a mercenary is as likely to be engaged in making maps as leading a cavalry charge.
20. Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 204.
21. Cynthia H. Enloe, “Mercenarization,” in *U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, edited by Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars (Boston: South End Press, 1978), 110.
22. Laura Doyle, “Inter-Imperiality,” *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014): 160.
23. Doyle, “Inter-Imperiality,” 161; Laura Doyle, “Inter-Imperiality and Literary Studies in the Longer *Durée*,” *PMLA* 130, no. 2 (2015): 337.
24. Augusto Espiritu, “Inter-Imperial Relations, the Pacific, and Asian American History,” *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (2014): 240; Anne L. Foster, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919–1941* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
25. Doyle, “Inter-Imperiality,” 165.
26. Emrah Şahin, “Sultan’s America: Lessons from Ottoman Encounters with the United States,” *Journal of American Studies of Turkey*, no. 39 (2014): 59.
27. Said, *Orientalism*, 290.
28. Benjamin Disraeli, *Tancred: Or, the New Crusade* (London: Henry Colburn, 1847), 167; Said, *Orientalism*, 5.
29. The contributions of Black Muslims from Africa in the United States have been recognized by scholars for some time. See Sylviane A. Diouf, *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
30. Suraiya Faruqi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 207.
31. Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
32. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 50.
33. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 159–60.
34. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament, Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Amy Kaplan and

- Donald E. Pease, eds, *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993); José David Saldívar, *Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage, 1999); Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Shelley Streeby, *American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of Popular Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); David Kazanjian, *The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
35. Streeby, *American Sensations*, 9.
 36. Even in the case of Tripoli, I am more interested in how the mercenary encounter at Derna has been remembered than in how the war was carried out.
 37. This holds true today with private military contractors. In March 2013, less than 2 per cent of the 108,000 contract employees working for the Department of Defense in Afghanistan were involved in security operations. See Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, "Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2013, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43074.pdf.
 38. Kaplan and Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, 3–21.
 39. J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, 3rd ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988 [1902]). Hobson, of course, was not a Marxist. For a collection of early Marxist texts analyzing imperialism (before Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1917), see Richard B. Day and Daniel Gaido, eds, *Discovering Imperialism: Social Democracy to World War I* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011).
 40. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1994), 125.
 41. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 130.
 42. Kaplan, *Anarchy of Empire*, 15.
 43. Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 6.
 44. Rosemarie Zagarri, "The Significance of the 'Global Turn' for the Early American Republic: Globalization in the Age of Nation-Building," *Journal of the Early Republic* 31, no. 1 (2011); Shelley Fisher Fishkin, "Crossroads of Cultures: The Transnational Turn in American Studies – Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, November 12, 2004," *American Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (2005).

Chapter 1 Memory and Exceptionalism at the Battle of Derna, 1805

1. Smithsonian National Museum of American History, "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War" (Washington, DC: Smithsonian National Museum of American History, 2004).

2. Kaplan and Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*; Kaplan, *Anarchy of Empire*; Malini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts, eds, *Messy Beginnings: Postcoloniality and Early American Studies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
3. Even recent and more thoughtful accounts of the war make this mistake; see James R. Sofka, "The Jeffersonian Idea of National Security: Commerce, the Atlantic Balance of Power, and the Barbary War, 1786–1805," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 4 (1997): 541.
4. Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 10.
5. Sturken, *Tangled Memories*, 122.
6. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 7.
7. Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (New York: Picador, 2003), 86.
8. For an unbiased account of this history, see Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005).
9. Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 8.
10. Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 16. More recently, S.E. Al-Djazairi argues that historians' continued reliance on biased and inaccurate sources has produced, "a thoroughly unbalanced presentation of the subject [the Barbary] which misleads even the best intentioned readership or audience." S.E. Al-Djazairi, *Barbary Pirates: Myths, Lies, Propaganda* (London: MSBN Books, 2017), 5.
11. For a recent analysis of Barbary captivity, see Moulay Ali Bouānani, "Propaganda for Empire: Barbary Captivity Literature in the US," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, no. 4 (2009).
12. Gerard W. Gawalt, "America and the Barbary Pirates: An International Battle against an Unconventional Foe," *History News Network*, accessed December 19, 2017, <http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/17128>; Richard Zacks, *The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805* (New York: Hyperion, 2005); Robert Manning, "Learning from the Barbary Pirates," Atlantic Council, November 24, 2008, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/learning-from-the-barbary-pirates.
13. Just to cite one example, since 1972 Somalia has claimed territorial jurisdiction over waters extending 200 nautical miles into the India Ocean, well beyond the twelve miles generally held to be the standard under international law. See Thilo Neumann and Tim Rene Salomon, "Fishing in Troubled Waters – Somalia's Maritime Zones and the Case for Reinterpretation," *ASIL Insights* 16, no. 9 (2012).
14. Amedeo Policante, *The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 146. For a history of modern Libya, see Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009).

15. Fölayan recounts many interesting details about the war that are often overlooked or minimized. For example, the “Barbary pirates” about whom the United States complained were actually Arab, Turkish, and European captains who sometimes performed diplomatic duties for the Tripolitan state in addition to their other work at sea. Most European countries recognized Tripolitan sovereignty and met their treaty obligations with the North African state: see Köla Fölayan, *Tripoli During the Reign of Yüsuf Pāshā Qaramānī* (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1979), 27–30. A few Americans understood the political and social realities of North African privateering and the economic stakes for European and other powers; Benjamin Franklin, for instance, is reputed to have once said, “I have in London heard it is a maxim among the merchants, that if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England’s while to build one.” See Paul Michel Baepler, “The Barbary Captivity Narrative in Early America,” *Early American Literature* 30, no. 2 (1995): 106. For a recent description of the US–Tripoli war from the perspective of an Ottoman historian, see Hale Şıvgın, “Amerika’nın Trablusgarp’a Askerî Müdahalesi: 1801–1805,” in *Abd’nin Askeri Müdahaleleri 1801’den Günümüze*, edited by Haydar Çakmak (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay, 2012).
16. Glenn Tucker, *Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the U.S. Navy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); Fölayan, *Tripoli*.
17. William Russell Birch, “Preparation for War to Defend Commerce. The Swedish Church Southwark with the Building of the Frigate Philadelphia,” Library of Congress, 1800, www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002718892/.
18. William Bainbridge, “Algiers, 10th October 1800,” *Alexandria Times*, April 29, 1801.
19. For a very useful overview of US naval operations, see Tucker, *Dawn Like Thunder*.
20. Between 1801 and 1805, the Tripolitan navy grew from eleven to twenty-four ships. Köla Fölayan, “Tripoli and the War with the U.S.A., 1801–1805,” *Journal of African History* 13, no. 2 (1972): 267–70; Köla Fölayan, *Tripoli*, 27–28.
21. Charles Prentiss (pseud. Anonymous), *The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton; Several Years an Officer in the United States Army, Consul at the Regency of Tunis on the Coast of Barbary, and Commander of the Christian and Other Forces That Marched from Egypt through the Desert of Barca, in 1805, and Conquered the City of Derne, Which Led to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and the Regency of Tripoli* (Brookfield: E. Merriam & Co., 1813), 260–8.
22. The real story is much more complicated and subtle. Ahmed had, in fact, recently been governor of Derna, but proved ineffectual as a ruler before departing for Malta and then Egypt. One source claims that Ahmed captured Derna in the spring of 1803 with the support of US naval forces, although this is not exactly true: Charles Chaillé-Long, “The American Soldier Abroad,” *Frank Leslie’s Popular Monthly* (October 1887): 4. Chaillé-Long appears to

- confuse Ahmed's governorship of Derna with the Jefferson administration's plan to send rifles, artillery, and 40,000 dollars to Ahmed in 1803. See James A. Field Jr., *From Gibraltar to the Middle East: America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (Chicago: Imprint, 1991), 350.
23. Dudley W. Knox, ed., *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers: Naval Operations from April to September 6, 1804*, vol. IV, Office of Naval Records and Library (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 120, 152.
 24. Knox, *Naval Documents*, 153.
 25. At least one source claims that Eaton met with Mehmed Ali: Chaillé-Long, "American Soldier Abroad," 4. But Mehmed Ali had not yet been named viceroy by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul. Rather, Eaton met with Hursid Pasha. See Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 23–6.
 26. This treaty remains a contentious point among historians. For those who claim that Eaton was betrayed by the government, the treaty is a binding document of the United States. See Francis Rennell Rodd, *General William Eaton; the Failure of an Idea* (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1932), 187. Most historians take a more pragmatic view of US policy and suggest that Eaton may have overstepped his authority, or at least not realized the realpolitik at work. Fölayan (*Tripoli*, 37) recounts how Eaton forced Ahmed into signing the treaty by threatening to arrest him and take him to the United States. Eaton's treaty with Ahmed also contains a secret clause that Yusuf, his family, and chief admiral would be handed over to the US at the conclusion of hostilities "to be held hostage." See William Eaton and Ahmed Qaramanli, *Convention between the United States of America and His Highness Hamet Caramanly, Bashaw of Tripoli, God Is Infinite*, February 23, 1805, RG59 M466, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Tripoli, Libya, 1796–1885, National Archives, College Park, MD.
 27. Eaton said the army numbered about 500 men: 100 Christians and 400 Muslims. See Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 293.
 28. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 407.
 29. Cornelius C. Felton, *Life of William Eaton*, edited by Jared Sparks (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1838), 179.
 30. Fölayan, *Tripoli*, 35.
 31. Lepore, *Name of War*, 175, 181–2.
 32. Robert J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776–1815* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 187–206.
 33. Allison, *Crescent Obscured*, 188.
 34. Among the holdings of the National Archives are Eaton's letters written while he was a consul at Tunis, as well as other selected letters from his time in the Mediterranean. Eaton made copies of all the letters he wrote.

35. For a deeply instructive account of the ways in which Eaton gendered honor and slavery in his letters, see Lawrence A. Peskin, *Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785–1816* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 137–62. For a useful analysis of how patriarchal bias on the part of Anglo-Americans in their observations of North Africa led to a decline in women's economic and legal rights in the West, see Marsha Renee Robinson, *Crossing the Strait from Morocco to the United States: The Transnational Gendering of the Atlantic World before 1830*, Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006. Robinson's analysis of Eaton on pages 279–84 is especially useful for thinking about the transmission of these misconceptions about Barbary gender to the United States during the republican period.
36. "Sketch of the Life of General William Eaton," *Polyanthos* 5 (1807).
37. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, iv.
38. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*. Four years after he remembered Eaton, Pierpont published his famous *Airs of Palestine: A Poem*.
39. Felton, *Life of William Eaton*, ix.
40. John Greenleaf Whittier, "Derne," in *The Writings of John Greenleaf Whittier* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892).
41. Lotfi Ben Rejeb, "America's Captive Freeman in North Africa: The Comparative Method in Abolitionist Persuasion," *Slavery and Abolition* 9, no. 1 (1988).
42. Said, *Orientalism*, 22.
43. *Independent Chronicle*, December 30, 1805; Francis Scott Key, *Poems of the Late Francis S. Key, Esq.* (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1857), 34–6; Allison, *Crescent Obscured*, 205–206.
44. Joel Tyler Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 21, no. 124 (1860): 497.
45. After the war, Headley reflected, "To let slavery extend itself, and move *pari passu* beside freedom in the enlargement of the Republic, was revolting to civilization and Christianity, as well as clearly contrary to the purpose and expectations of the framers of the constitution" (Joel Tyler Headley, *The Great Rebellion: A History of the Civil War in the United States*, vol. I, Hartford: American Publishing Company, 1866, 35).
46. Joel Tyler Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 21, no. 124 (1860): 498–9.
47. Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," 503.
48. Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," 507.
49. David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Lepore, *Name of War*.
50. Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," 509–10 (emphasis in original).
51. Headley, "Eaton's Barbary Expedition," 511.
52. Richard Hildreth, *The History of the United States of America*, vol. V (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1871), 558–62.

53. E. Shippen, "A Forgotten General," *United Service: A Quarterly Review of Military and Naval Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1881). Shippen, the medical director of the US Navy, was a frequent contributor to the journal.
54. Shippen, "Forgotten General," 3.
55. Shippen, "Forgotten General," 13.
56. E. Shippen, "A Forgotten General," *United Service: A Quarterly Review of Military and Naval Affairs* 13, no. 6 (1895).
57. Charles Burr Todd, "The Capture of Derne," *Lippincott's Magazine of Popular Literature and Science* (1882); Hildreth, *History of the United States of America*, vol. V, 558–62.
58. See Chapter 4.
59. Chaillé-Long, "American Soldier Abroad," 2.
60. Chaillé-Long, "American Soldier Abroad," 5.
61. Chaillé-Long, "American Soldier Abroad," 9.
62. John Hunter Sedgwick, "William Eaton, a Sanguine Man," *New England Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (1928): 110, 114.
63. Rodd, *General William Eaton; the Failure of an Idea*. Rodd admitted his work was far from original, setting a precedent that is with us to the present day. In his foreword, Rodd rejected the doctrine that "Englishmen and Americans are further apart from each other than Englishmen are from Continental Europeans" (v).
64. Rodd, *General William Eaton*, vi.
65. Rodd, *General William Eaton*; Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 7.
66. A.S. Tritton, "Review of *General William Eaton* by F. Rennell Rodd," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London* 7, no. 3 (1934).
67. Charles Lee Lewis, "Review of *General William Eaton, the Failure of an Idea* by Francis Rennell Rodd," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 19, no. 4 (1933). Another review described Eaton's expedition as "thrilling," an appraisal that continues to the present day. See M.N., "Review of *General William Eaton: The Failure of an Idea* by Francis Rennell Rodd," *Geographical Journal* 81, no. 6 (1933).
68. John A. Menaugh, "Stars and Stripes to Victory in North Africa," *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, May 10, 1936.
69. This collection would become the basis for Glenn Tucker's *Dawn Like Thunder* (1963), one of the more exhaustive and accurate accounts of the war.
70. HGL, "Derna Recalls Our Early War," *Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 1941.
71. Thomas E. La Fargue, "America's African Odyssey," *Scientific Monthly* 55, no. 4 (1942): 369.
72. *New York Times*, "U.S. Force in 1804 Invaded Tripoli," November 9, 1942; *Washington Post*, "Shores of Tripoli," November 10, 1942.
73. Victor Boesen, "An Early Yank in North Africa," *Los Angeles Times*, March 24, 1943.

74. Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod, *The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), v.
75. France occupied Algeria in 1830.
76. O.M. Dickerson, "Reviewed Work: *The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* by Louis B. Wright, Julia H. Macleod," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 32, no. 3 (1945); D.P., "Reviewed Work: *First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* by Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod," *English Historical Review* 62, no. 242 (1947).
77. *Pacific Historical Review*, "Reviewed Work: *The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* by Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod," *Pacific Historical Review* 14, no. 3 (1945).
78. Thurman Wilkins, "*The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* by Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod," *Military Affairs* 9, no. 4 (1945); H.A. Wieschhoff, "*The First Americans in North Africa* by Louis B. Wright; Julia H. Macleod," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 243 (January 1946); Ray W. Irwin, "*The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805* by Louis B. Wright; Julia H. Macleod," *American Historical Review* 51, no. 2 (1946). On this vital period, 1935 to 1948, see Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
79. James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New York: Praeger, 1990).
80. See, for example, Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.
81. On the geography of mid-century US expansion, see Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). To argue that these occupations ever ended, is to overlook the continued presence of US military bases in places like Italy, Germany, and Japan. All three became important US outposts after World War II.
82. Chalmers A. Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2004).
83. *New York Times*, "Grim Independence Attained by Libya," December 5, 1951. The Greeks had previously used *Libyē* to refer to the Mahghreb, and the Italians had applied the name to the territory of the three provinces beginning in 1911.
84. Ruth First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), 45.
85. Matthew James Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43.

86. Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution*; Adrian Pelt, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations; a Case of Planned Decolonization* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
87. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55–6.
88. Paul J. Zingg, “The Cold War in North Africa: American Foreign Policy and Postwar Muslim Nationalism, 1945–1962,” *Historian* 39, no. 1 (1976): 54.
89. Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution*, 43. Following World War II, the United States competed against France and Italy for commercial and military hegemony in North Africa. The US was especially interested in maintaining control of its only African military outpost, Nouasseur Air Base in Morocco. Beginning in 1951, the United States deployed nuclear bombers there as part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The base was closed at the request of the Moroccan Government in 1963.
90. Correspondence from E.A.V. de Candole to Ernest Bevin, July 14, 1950, FO 371: JT file 1211, Foreign Office, National Archives, Kew, Richmond, UK.
91. Erika Doss, *Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 206.
92. Doss, *Memorial Mania*, 7.
93. First argues that the War in Korea forced the United States to take the political situation in Libya more seriously (*Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, 67).
94. *New York Times*, “Cyrenica’s Ruler Named Libyan King,” December 4, 1950.
95. First, *Libya*, 16. First reveals that France “dragged her feet to the end” over Libyan independence, since French geologists had caught “a smell of oil in the Saharan air” (69).
96. Correspondence from de Candole to Bevin, July 14, 1950.
97. For example, Rodd, *General William Eaton*, 238; Menaugh, “Stars and Stripes.”
98. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 337.
99. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 339.
100. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*.
101. In a letter to Commodore Rodgers, Eaton describe the mercenaries’ realization that Ahmed and his US backers had departed, and their subsequent panic and flight into the desert: Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 363–4.
102. Rodd, *General William Eaton*, 238.
103. Zingg, “Cold War in North Africa,” 40. It is true, however, that before the Cold War the visual archive of the battle was somewhat limited; while scenes from the larger war had appeared in the form of etchings, maps, paintings, and ephemeral performances executed in the 150 years that followed the end of the war, the visual record of the events at Derna were limited to maps and drawings of Eaton. An image of Eaton accompanied Prentiss’s collection of Eaton’s letters in 1813, and in 1936, a drawing of Eaton and two maps of the Barbary Coast accompanied the description of the war with Tripoli in the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* in 1936.

104. *New York Times*, “O, Say, Can You See!” November 5, 1950. Between Tripolitania in 1805 and North Korea in 1950, the flag was illustrated appearing over San Juan Hill in 1898, Fort Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine in 1918, and Iwo Jima in 1945.
105. *New York Times*, “Not Evil, but Good,” May 6, 1898; *New York Times*, “Third Anniversary,” June 25, 1953. In 1898 the *Times* had similarly characterized the Spanish as dirty old villains who abused their children, and in 1953 the newspaper of record called the Koreans communist puppets. In each case, the United States had supposedly gone to war in order to defend the liberty of oppressed people: victims of pirates, abusive parents, and communists. And in each case, occupations or military bases were necessary to protect nascent democracy. US forces may have only stayed in Derna for seven weeks, but they were in Santiago de Cuba for sixty years and have been in Korea for longer than that. One could also argue that by continuing to occupy the naval base at Guantánamo, the United States never surrendered its Cuban colony.
106. Will Price, dir., *Tripoli* (Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1950). A year earlier, the film *The Barbary Pirate* had offered a fanciful account of the war, doing away with Derna altogether. The film ends with Major Thomas Blake – a secret agent sent to Tripoli by Jefferson and played by Donald Woods – storming the Bey’s palace and killing him in a sword fight. See Lew Landers, dir., *The Barbary Pirate* (Hollywood: Columbia Pictures, 1949).
107. *Tripoli* also resembled *To the Shores of Tripoli*, a film that used contemporary Marine Corps bootcamp as a backdrop for a romance between Payne and O’Hara. That film had to be reshot to take into account the events at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. H. Bruce Humberstone, dir., *To the Shores of Tripoli* (Hollywood: 20th Century Fox, 1942).
108. Cynthia H. Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 5.
109. O’Hara observed later in life that films like *Bagdad* and *Tripoli* were “tits and sand” films: Maureen O’Hara and John Nicoletti, *Tis Herself: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 130.
110. The film portrays Arab women’s lives unproblematically. For a more thoughtful meditation on gender, Islam, and patriarchy in the Maghreb, see Robinson, “Crossing the Strait.”
111. In the context of the Cold War struggle between France and the United States for preeminence in North Africa, the film’s ending also imagines France yielding to US demands.
112. In addition to the film’s commentary on the proper ordering of gender, sex, race, and class, other fragments of the securitized worldview of the Cold War appear in *Tripoli*. Among the supporting cast is Howard Da Silva, playing Captain Demetrios, a character probably meant to represent Luco Ulovix, who commanded the Greek mercenaries that accompanied the US across the desert. As in nearly every account of the US expedition, the Greeks are portrayed as loyal to Eaton because they are Christians, as opposed to the Muslim

- mercenaries who accompany the expedition and are consistently described as traitorous and undisciplined. The irony of this casting decision was that Da Silva was named as a communist sympathizer and blacklisted four months before *Tripoli* was released in 1950. See *Counterattack, Red Channels; the Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television* (New York: American Business Consultants, 1950), 43–4.
113. US Navy, *The Naval Wars with France and Tripoli 1798–1805* (Washington, DC: US Navy, 1953).
 114. Brad Plumer, “America’s Staggering Defense Budget, in Charts,” *Washington Post*, January 7, 2013.
 115. Fqlayan, “Tripoli and the War,” 261–70.
 116. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 339.
 117. Neither Baron nor the *President* were present at the battle. Eaton, of course, was in Derna.
 118. There are multiple precedents for the enslavement of subjugated peoples in US history. According to Robert Allison, seven captured Tripolitans had been displayed in the United States in 1805. Furthermore, Eaton’s treaty with Ahmed aimed to indefinitely detain Yusuf, his family, and chief admiral. See Allison, *Crescent Obscured*, 33; Eaton and Qaramanli, *Convention*.
 119. C.S. Forester, *The Barbary Pirates* (New York: Random House, 1953).
 120. *Titusville Herald*, “Marines in the Middle East,” July 25, 1958.
 121. Samuel Edwards, *Barbary General: The Life of William H. Eaton* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 234; Jay Scriba, “His Name Made Barbary Pirates Tremble,” *Milwaukee Journal*, February 28, 1968; Glen D. Adkins, *America’s Lawrence of Arabia: William Eaton*, Ph.D. dissertation, New Mexico Highlands University, 1969.
 122. Edwards, *Barbary General*, 188.
 123. Edwards, *Barbary General*, 189–90.
 124. Edwards, *Barbary General*, 192.
 125. Trudy J. Sundberg, “O’Bannon and Company,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1976. No reputable sources appear to repeat the claim. In 2007, in *Valiant Virginian* with John K. Gott, Sundberg revised himself, claiming, as Edwards had, that the mercenaries were, indeed, both shot. Trudy J. Sundberg and John K. Gott, *Valiant Virginian: Story of Presley Neville O’Bannon, 1776–1850, First Lieutenant U.S. Marine Corps, 1801–1807* (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 2007), 23.
 126. Felton, *Life of William Eaton*, ix.
 127. First, *Libya*, 61.
 128. First, *Libya*, 62.
 129. First, *Libya*, 18.
 130. Charles Waterhouse and Charles R. Smith, *Marines in the Frigate Navy* (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, 1975).
 131. Field, *Gibraltar to the Middle East*, v.

132. James Field Jr., *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 67; Field, *Gibraltar to the Middle East*, 67.
133. Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 200.
134. Michael L.S. Kitzen, *Tripoli and the United States at War: A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785–1805* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993), ix, 1.
135. Michael L.S. Kitzen, “Money Bags or Cannon Balls: The Origins of the Tripolitan War, 1795–1801,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 16, no. 4 (1996): 601.
136. In 1993, this list was short but telling: Libya, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea.
137. On the long history of the figure of the threatening Muslim, see Deepa Kumar, *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012).
138. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror, 1801–1805* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003); Andrew G. Bostom, “America’s First War on Terror,” May 4, 2006, *FrontPage*, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4574>; Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Joshua E. London, *Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Built a Nation* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005); Zacks, *Pirate Coast*; David Smethurst, *Tripoli: The United States’ First War on Terror* (New York: Presidio Press, 2006).
139. Wheelan, *Jefferson’s War*, xxiii. In *Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013, 146–8, 301), Denise Spellberg shows that jihad was indeed invoked by Tripoli, but not in the very limited sense of war and totalitarianism that Wheelan and many others claim.
140. Wheelan, *Jefferson’s War*, xxiv.
141. Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, and London, *Victory in Tripoli*, were further additions to this genre. By 2010, during a period of increasing “piracy” off the Horn of Africa, the war with Tripoli was used as an example of how to deal with pirates, bringing the mobilization of the war for imperialistic purposes full circle. See Martin N. Murphy, *Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). A recent account of Derna that resists Islamophobia is Chipp Reid, *To the Walls of Derna: William Eaton, the Tripoli Coup and the End of the First Barbary War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval University Press, 2017). Reid’s account is notable for its considered approach to Tripolitan politics, though Reid renders the war in exceptionalist terms and fails to interrogate many sources – especially those concerned with Presley O’Bannon.

142. William H. White, *The Greater the Honor: A Novel of the Barbary Wars* (Easton, MD: Tiller Publishing, 2003), 284.
143. Brad Thor, *The Last Patriot* (New York: Atria Books, 2008).
144. Penguin Random House, “Sentinel: Overview,” accessed November 4, 2017, www.penguin.com/publishers/sentinel.
145. Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates: The Forgotten War That Changed American History* (New York: Sentinel, 2015), xv.
146. Kilmeade and Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates*, xvi. It should not be surprising that the most competent account of the war – Allison’s *Crescent Obscured* – appears in the bibliography but appears to have been ignored, since it is nowhere cited in a footnote (226).
147. Kilmeade and Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates*, 153, 221.
148. Frederick C. Leiner, “Searching for Nelson’s Iconic Quote,” August 2012, www.usni.org/magazines/naavalhistory/2012-07/searching-nelsons-iconic-quote. In 1957, Godfrey Fisher (*Barbary Legend*, 14) observed that Nelson was ignorant of the regencies, and acted outside the national interests in his utterances.
149. Kilmeade and Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates*, 181.
150. Kilmeade and Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates*, 203.
151. Kilmeade and Yaeger, *Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates*, 213. With wild prose like this, it comes as no wonder that Kilmeade’s more recent book on Andrew Jackson has been praised by US President Donald Trump (Twitter, December 7, 2017, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/938756989542457344>).
152. Edward Rothstein, “Drawing Battle Lines in Museum View of War,” *New York Times*, November 11, 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/11/11/arts/design/11free.html?_r=0; Carol Burke, “The Price of Freedom Is Truth,” *Radical History Review*, no. 95 (2006); Scott Boehm, “Privatizing Public Memory: The Price of Patriotic Philanthropy and the Post-9/11 Politics of Display,” *American Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2006); Kristin Hass et al., “What Is the Price of Freedom? A Critical Exploration of Militarist Narratives at the National Museum of American History,” in *The Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association* (Baltimore: 2011); Kristin Hass et al., “The Price of Freedom App: Discussing a Collaboratively Produced Alternative Tour of the Smithsonian’s History of American Wars,” in *The Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association* (Washington, DC: 2013).
153. Burke, “Price of Freedom,” 243.
154. The exhibit is organized primarily around the War of Independence, the War of 1812, the Eastern Indian Wars, the Mexican War, the Western Indian Wars, the Spanish American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and something the curators call “New American Roles.”
155. Wheelan, *Jefferson’s War*; Smethurst, *Tripoli*.

156. For an examination of the revolutionary spirit that animates motley crews, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 212–13.
157. Prentiss, *Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton*, 384.

Chapter 2 Sovereign Equality among Men and Nations, 1815–28

1. Jimmy Kennedy, “Istanbul (Not Constantinople),” recorded by the Four Lads. Los Angeles: Columbia Records, 1953.
2. The Four Lads’ recording of the song reached number ten on the US Billboard chart and spent thirteen weeks on the charts. Since then, the song has remained popular and has been covered or referenced countless times. Turkey and Greece both joined NATO in 1952.
3. Focused on the Manichean, forward-looking logic of the Cold War, many writers focused on the history of the new Turks, not the old Ottomans. In these cases, the biography of Atatürk functioned for historians in many of the same ways that Mehmed Ali functions: as the embodiment and father of the modern nation state. Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920–1950* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951). As one reviewer of Bisbee’s book pointed out, what was important was that the Turks “had discarded the fez and the veil” (Mary Ellen Ayres, “Timely Book Describes Growth of ‘New’ Turkey,” *Washington Post*, May 27, 1951). In 1985, Melvyn P. Leffler could still complain that Turkey had been left out of studies of the Cold War: “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and Nato, 1945–1952,” *Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985). The same holds true for English. Similarly, I find no historiographical references to English between 1938 and 1962. In 1938, Pierre Crabitès only cites two sources and reports very little beyond that: *Americans in the Egyptian Army* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1938), 23–8. In 1962, Alan Moorehead describes English’s reporting of the invasion of Sudan and his encounter with Waddington: *The Blue Nile* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), 205–10.
4. While the end of the war with Algeria in 1815 secured free transit through the Straits of Gibraltar and across the Mediterranean for US commercial traffic, there remained barriers to US trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Equal standing between nations or states is an important aspect of the principle of sovereign equality and a core component of international law.
5. Samuel Lorenzo Knapp, “Biographical Sketch,” *Emerald and Baltimore Literary Gazette* 1, no. 26 (October 11, 1828).
6. Walter Livingstone Wright Jr., *American Relations with Turkey to 1831*, dissertation, Princeton University, 1928, 94–5. Wright says Adams had been grooming English for some time but provides no evidence of this grooming.

7. For example, see, *Boston Commercial Gazette*, February 9, 1824, 4.
8. Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*.
9. Henry Clay, *The Papers of Henry Clay: Volume 1, The Rising Statesman, 1797–1814*, edited by Mary W.M. Hargreaves and James F. Hopkins (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1959), 827.
10. David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 53, 271.
11. Harold E. Bergquist, "Henry Middleton as Political Reporter: The United States, the Near East, and Eastern Europe, 1821–1829," *Historian* 45, no. 3 (1983): 361; correspondence from George Bethune English to John Quincy Adams, August 6, 1823, Reel 462, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
12. Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 102, 583. In Chapter 4, I debunk some of Oren's more fantastic claims in *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*. In *U.S. Orientalisms* (28), Malini Johar Schueller describes him as a traveler, but English was actually contracted as a soldier in an invasion force – no mere traveler.
13. J.L. Weisse, *Records, Genealogical Charts, and Traditions of the Families of Bethune and Faneuil* (New York: Henry Ludwig, 1866), 8. Penelope's grandfather was a banker who had immigrated from Scotland. A short obituary published when Penelope passed away in 1819 identifies her as the daughter of George Bethune, Esq., who was a loyalist merchant; see James H. Stark, *The Loyalists of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the American Revolution* (Boston: W.B. Clarke Co., 1910), 125. Thomas and Penelope were married February 11, 1874, according to City of Boston, *Documents of the City of Boston for the Year 1902*, vol. IV (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 1903), 411. Thomas appears to have been the captain of a boat owned by George Bethune. No records suggest he ever attained much wealth, and in a letter to John Quincy Adams, English mentions needing to care for his father in his old age. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 22, 1822, Reel 457, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
14. Henry Lee Shattuck, Barrett Wendell, Jr., and William Bond Wheelwright, eds, *Twelfth Catalogue of the Officers and Members of the Hasty Pudding Club* (Jamaica, NY: Marion Press, 1902), 12.
15. Knapp, "Biographical Sketch."
16. Correspondence from English to Adams, April 7, 1808, Reel 406, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. Adams was Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory from 1806 to 1809.
17. Harvard College, *A List of Winners of Academic Distinctions in Harvard College* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard College, 1907), 21.
18. Knapp, "Biographical Sketch."

19. George Bethune English, *The Grounds of Christianity Examined by Comparing the New Testament with the Old* (Boston: Printed for the Author, 1813), ix (emphasis in original).
20. English, *Grounds of Christianity*, xviii.
21. Richard H. Popkin, *Disputing Christianity: The 400-Year-Old Debate over Rabbi Isaac Ben Abraham of Troki's Classical Argument*, ed. Peter K.J. Park, Knox Peden, and Jeremy D. Popkin (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2007), 12–16. Like English's book, the *Chuzzuk Emunah* itself contained repackaged arguments.
22. Popkin, *Disputing Christianity*, 7.
23. Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955).
24. This would have been especially provocative to American Christians who had been exposed repeatedly to the rhetoric of Muhammad as imposter. See Marr, *Cultural Roots of American Islamicism*; Spellberg, *Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an*.
25. Samuel Cary, *Review of a Book Entitled "The Grounds of Christianity Examined, by Comparing the New Testament with the Old, by George Bethune English, A.M."* (Boston: Isaiah Thomas, 1813), 3.
26. William Ellery Channing, *Two Sermons on Infidelity Delivered October 24, 1813* (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1813). This book is in the John Adams Library at Boston. In a written response, English acknowledged that he knew the sermon had been directed at him. An article in *The General Repository and Review* supports this assumption; George Bethune English, *A Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary* (Boston: 1813); *General Repository and Review*, "Article 9," issue 4, no. 2 (1813).
27. Channing, *Two Sermons on Infidelity*, 8–13.
28. Channing, *Two Sermons on Infidelity*, 7.
29. Channing, *Two Sermons on Infidelity*, 13.
30. Cary, *Review*. Also in the John Adams library.
31. Cary, *Review*, 32.
32. Cary, *Review*, 33.
33. Cary, *Review*, 35.
34. Cary, *Review*, 128–9.
35. George Bethune English, *A Letter Respectfully Addressed to the Reverend Mr. Channing Relative to His Two Sermons on Infidelity* (Boston, 1813), 6–7; English, *Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary*.
36. English, *Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary*, 9.
37. English, *Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary*, 29–30.
38. English, *Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary*, 103.
39. Jefferson received his copy of the book from Israel Kursheedt.
40. English, *Letter to the Reverend Mr. Cary*: 117–18.
41. *General Repository and Review*, "Article 9." Published before Cary's response to English, the writer must have had advance access to Cary's tract. The writer also appears prescient, writing "We have no doubt that he is sincere in one

- [faith], and was sincere in the other [infidelity]; and with his sort of mind, if he were to happen to get engaged in the history of Mahomet, we should be not at all surprised, if he were to suffer a new change, as extraordinary as any that have proceeded."
42. D. de Sola Pool, "Gershom Mendes Seixas' Letters, 1813–1815, to His Daughter Sarah (Seixas) Kursheedt and Son-in-Law Israel Baer Kursheedt," *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* 35 (1939): 202–205.
 43. Israel B. Kursheedt, correspondence to Thomas Jefferson, June 24, 1814, *National Archives: Founders Online*, <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-07-02-0321>.
 44. Edward Everett, *A Defence of Christianity against the Work of George B. English, A.M.* (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1814). Interestingly, Everett also won the Bowdoin Prize in 1812, alongside English. Everett wrote about "The Art of Printing" (Harvard College, *List of Winners*, 21).
 45. Everett, *Defence of Christianity*, 11.
 46. George Bethune English, *Five Pebbles from the Brook: A Reply to "A Defence of Christianity"* (Philadelphia: 1824).
 47. Stephen Paschall Sharples, ed., *Records of the Church of Christ at Cambridge in New England, 1632–1830* (Boston: Eben Putnam, 1906), 393–4.
 48. For example, Clay, *Papers*, 827; Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 102.
 49. *Senate Executive Journal, A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774–1875*, vol. 2 (Library of Congress, 1815).
 50. US Navy, *Naval Register* (Washington, DC: Weightman, 1815).
 51. Mark L. Evans, "Independence," April 15, 2015, US Navy, www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/i/independence-ii.html; Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Documents 1–40: 1776–1818*, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1931).
 52. Samuel Lorenzo Knapp, "George Bethune English," *Rhode-Island American (New York Commercial Advertiser)*, 1828, 1.
 53. Craig L. Symonds, *The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 64.
 54. Daniele Salvoldi, "American Presence in Egypt: 1775 to 1856," August 22, 2011, <http://earlyexplorersegypt.blogspot.com/2011/08/american-presence-in-egypt-1775-to-1856.html>.
 55. Andrew Oliver, *American Travelers on the Nile: Early US Visitors to Egypt, 1774–1839* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2015), 73.
 56. Correspondence from English to Adams, November 23, 1823, Reel 463, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
 57. *Christian Messenger*, "George Bethune English; Gospel; Massachusetts; Mahomedan; Constantinople," February 10, 1819.
 58. Edward Everett, "An Account of Some Greek Manuscripts Procured at Constantinople in 1819, and Now Belonging to the Library of the University

- at Cambridge,” in *Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Cambridge: Hilliard and Metcalf, 1818), 409–15. In this account, Everett justifies the removal of ancient Greek manuscripts from Ottoman territories by European travelers so that they can be “collated and made known to the world.”
59. Thomas S. Kidd, *American Christians and Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1–36; Spellberg, *Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an*.
 60. Moorehead, *The Blue Nile*, 205. *The Blue Nile* was the follow-up to Moorehead's immensely popular *The White Nile* (1960). *The Blue Nile* was not as popular, perhaps because, as one reviewer noted, it featured “no heroes on the scale of Burton and Speke, Livingstone and Stanley”; Dorothy Middleton, review of *The Blue Nile*, *Geographical Journal* 139, no. 1 (1973).
 61. This invasion culminated in the execution of Abdullah ibn Saud in Istanbul, an event that continues to influence events in the Middle East. Despite the Ottoman (re)conquest of Arabia, Saudi Wahhabism proved durable and remains the dominant branch of Islam in Saudi Arabia. Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 62. Henry Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Mubammad 'Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967 [1932]); A.J. Arkell, *A History of the Sudan: From the Earliest Times to 1821*, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone Press, 1961 [1955]); Richard Hill, *Egypt in Sudan: 1820–1881* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).
 63. Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002). Conscription of Sudanese soldiers was initially based on enslavement. It was not until 1822 that conscription of the fellahin, a movement linked closely to nationalism and land, began to take form. Emad Ahmed Helal observes that the end result of these and other movements in the 1820s was an Egyptian army in which most of the soldiers were Sudanese slaves and conscripted fellahin till the end of the nineteenth century. Emad Ahmed Helal, “Muhammad Ali's First Army: The Experiment in Building an Entirely Slave Army,” in *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Mediterranean*, ed., Terence Walz and Kenneth M. Cuno (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 17–42.
 64. In a note in the first US edition of his book, English gives the names of the other two Americans as Khalil Aga and Achmed Aga.
 65. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 5.
 66. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, vii–xi; Deborah Manley and Peta Rée, *Henry Salt: Artist, Traveller, Diplomat, Egyptologist* (London: Libri, 2001). English's narrative appears to have been entrusted to William John Banks for publication. Banks collected Egyptian antiquities and was exiled from England in 1841 with the support of the Duke of Wellington; he was facing execution, accused of buggery.

67. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 60–3; Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, 33.
68. V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 1.
69. Jonathan S. Adams and Thomas O. McShane, *The Myth of Wild Africa: Conversation without Illusion* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 11.
70. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 110, 142–3.
71. Bruce Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 41.
72. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 18.
73. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 18, 89.
74. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 89, 93–6. Ten years earlier, English had expressed similar sentiments about prostitution when he said that the only true offenses Christ committed were that he respected adulterous women and presented John the Baptist as Elias.
75. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 94.
76. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 125.
77. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 125–32.
78. Dodwell, *Founder of Modern Egypt*, 52; Hill, *Egypt in Sudan*, 16–21; Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali*, 54; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 86–8, 92.
79. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 55–6, 135–7.
80. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 146–8, 201.
81. Joseph Wolff, *Missionary Journal and Memoir of the Rev. Joseph Wolf, Missionary to the Jews*, ed. John Bayford (New York: E. Bliss & E. White, 1824), 123, 176.
82. Knapp, “George Bethune English,” claims that the amount of the dispute was twenty thousand dollars. If this is true, it would make sense that English later aligned himself with Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha, who had been imprisoned at one point by Mehmed Ali. Andrew Oliver confirms that in a letter to the French consul general in Egypt English claimed he was owed 2,200 piastres: Oliver, *American Travelers on the Nile*, 77.
83. Pliny Fisk, correspondence to George Bethune English, May 1822, ABC 16:5, Volume 1: Communications from the Mediterranean, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831”; Field, *From Gibraltar to the Middle East*, 94; Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 104; Hilton Obenzinger, “Holy Land Narrative and American Covenant: Levi Parsons, Pliny Fisk and the Palestine Mission,” *Religion and Literature* 35, no. 2/3 (2003): 257.
84. Pliny Fisk, *Memoir of the Rev. Pliny Fisk, A.M., Late Missionary to Palestine* (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1828), 203.
85. Correspondence from Fisk to English, May 1822.
86. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*.
87. Moorehead, *Blue Nile*, 204–205.
88. George Waddington and Barnard Hanbury, *Journal of a Visit to Some Parts of Ethiopia* (London: John Murray, 1822), 114–15, 117.
89. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 47–8.

90. English, *Narrative of the Expedition*, 47–8.
91. *Alexandria Herald*, “The Apostate,” November 25, 1822. The *Herald* attributed the story to the *Philadelphia Union* but it might have originated in the *Boston Palladium*.
92. English (*Narrative of the Expedition*, 15–16) said he was accompanied by Khalil Aga, an American from New York, and Achmed Aga, born in Switzerland but naturalized in the United States. English claims that Achmed Aga – who is not mentioned in the London edition of English’s narrative – died on the third Cataract of the Nile, poisoned by a Greek because of a fight. The London edition also fails to include the narrative that opens this book – the three Americans singing “Hail, Columbia” on the banks of the Nile.
93. *Columbian Star*, “Literary,” issue 2, no. 8 (1823): 15–16.
94. S., review of *Narrative of the Expedition, New-England Galaxy and United States Literary Advertiser*, no. 280 (1823).
95. *Connecticut Mirror*, “An Account of a Turkish Camp from English’s Narrative,” February 24, 1823. *Hallowell Gazette*, “Extracts from English’s Expedition,” June 25, 1823.
96. Americans were certainly aiding the Greeks, and the Porte was suspicious of the distinction Bradish, Offley, and others tried to make between US citizens and the United States Government. For the Ottomans, sovereignty was premised on sovereignty over something. US rhetoric appeared to reverse this relationship; sovereignty over self was said to be the most important aspect of US republican liberty. The Ottomans might have wondered why Americans, who appeared insubordinate to their government, should receive treatment in Ottoman ports equal to that of European nationals who were expected to subordinate themselves to their rulers.
97. Bergquist, “Henry Middleton as Political Reporter,” 358–61.
98. Edward Mead Earle, “American Interest in the Greek Cause, 1821–1827,” *American Historical Review* 33, no. 1 (1927); William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free; the Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
99. English never married, closing off one of the possible avenues of care for his aging father. Penelope, his mother, passed away in 1819, while English was still in the Mediterranean.
100. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 22, 1822.
101. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 22, 1822. It is also useful to note that for English, as for other Americans at the time, the Levant was a fluid space and more expansive than contemporary definitions that include only Palestine, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. English’s Levant stretches from Greece to Egypt, distinct from Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco – the “Barbary states.”
102. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 22, 1822.
103. Correspondence from English to Adams, March 26, 1823, Reel 459, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society Boston.

104. Correspondence from English to Adams, March 26, 1823.
105. Spellberg, *Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an*, 161.
106. Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 69–71.
107. Correspondence from English to Adams, March 26, 1823. Hüsrev was a former slave from Georgia and raised in the household of Hüseyin Pasha, who served as kapudan pasha from 1792 to 1803. Following the Egyptian crisis in 1801, Hüsrev and Mehmed Ali became lifelong adversaries. Hüsrev was also involved in Ottoman military reforms before the Tanzimât era. In 1840 he was imprisoned, charged with corruption and embezzlement. Still, his household ultimately produced more than 30 Ottoman generals. Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali*, 12–26, 93–4, 110, 112; Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009), 144–56.
108. Correspondence from English to Adams, March 28, 1823, Reel 459, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society Boston. It is unclear, though, if English still enjoyed the support of Mehmed Ali after his departure from Egypt.
109. Correspondence from John Quincy Adams to George Bethune English, April 2, 1823, Reel 459, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
110. George Bethune English, “Receipt for Expence Money from the Department of State” (Washington, DC: Adams Papers, 1823).
111. The plague still troubled Mediterranean port cities; less than 100 years earlier it had killed half the residents of Marseille, and in 1814 and 1815, Malta – an important hub in the Mediterranean – had experienced an outbreak of plague. Outbreaks of yellow fever also occasioned quarantine. It was especially common for European nations to quarantine travelers coming from North Africa and the Levant. John Macauley Eager, *The Early History of Quarantine: Origin of Sanitary Measures Directed against Yellow Fever*, United States Yellow Fever Institute (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1903), 23–5.
112. Ottoman capitulations were not concessions made to European powers, but unilaterally revocable “grants of privilege” made to foreigners. Feroz Ahmad, “Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations 1800–1914,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, no. 1 (2000). The most recent Ottoman capitulations to the French were simply reaffirmations of previous capitulations, so English hadn’t really stumbled on anything groundbreaking. It is also unclear what happened to this copy of the capitulations, since English advised Adams to ask Offley for a copy several years later.
113. Correspondence from English to Adams, August 6, 1823.
114. The Ottomans and Russians had gone to war five times in the previous century, and as recently as 1811. The Russians, like the Americans, were supplying the Greeks, and war between the Ottomans and Russia would break

- out again in 1828. Correspondence from English to Adams, November 23, 1823.
115. Correspondence from English to Adams, November 23, 1823.
 116. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 27, 1823, Reel 463, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society Boston.
 117. Earle, "American Interest in the Greek Cause"; Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece," *Journal of the Early Republic* 13, no. 1 (1993).
 118. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 27, 1823.
 119. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 27, 1823. Offley was appointed US consular commercial agent at İzmir in 1823, helped to negotiate the 1831 treaty between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, and in 1832 became US consul in İzmir, where he is buried.
 120. Correspondence from David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, and February 27, 1824, RG59, M46, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
 121. Correspondence from English to Adams, February 8, 1824, Reel 464, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. Aware of the importance of military intelligence, English also included a summary of the Ottoman naval arsenal.
 122. Correspondence from English to Adams, April 23, 1824, Reel 464, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. Offley's claim is difficult to confirm.
 123. Correspondence from English to Adams, April 23, 1824.
 124. Bergquist, "Henry Middleton as Political Reporter," 361.
 125. John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848*, vol. VI, edited by Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 358.
 126. J.Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, 320.
 127. Correspondence from English to Adams, May 14, 1824, Reel 464, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
 128. Correspondence from English to Adams, May 14, 1824. A shortage of funds is a common theme in State Department communications across the period of this book.
 129. English, *Five Pebbles from the Brook*.
 130. Euclid's *Elements*, a third-century BCE treatise, anchors contemporary systems of geometry and logic.
 131. English, *Five Pebbles from the Brook*, 63.
 132. George Bethune English, "Jews in Turkey," *Eastern Argus* {*From the National Advocate*}, November 25 [May 1], 1824.
 133. Obenzinger, *American Palestine*, 25.
 134. Jonathan D. Sarna, *Jacksonian Jew: The Two Worlds of Mordecai Noah* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 15–33. Interestingly, Noah – owing to

his diplomatic experience in North Africa – wrote a play about the war with Tripoli titled *Yusef Caramalli, or the Siege of Tripoli* in 1820. Critically acclaimed as the best of the four plays Noah wrote, the text of the play has been lost.

135. Nor would have aligning himself with Judaism distanced him from Islam. As Spellberg notes, Muslims, Jews, and Catholics were all considered outsiders by most US Protestants. Spellberg, *Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an*, 184.
136. Correspondence from English to Adams, July 8, 1824, RG59, M46 May 3, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
137. Correspondence from English to Adams, August 11, 1824, Reel 465, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
138. Correspondence from English to Adams, August 31, 1824, Reel 465, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
139. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 9, 1824, Reel 466, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
140. Two days earlier, Dearborn had written a cover letter for a request from a group of wealthy Boston merchants who wanted the secretary of the navy to order the Mediterranean Squadron to cruise the archipelago in order to protect US commerce there. Dearborn wanted the squadron to go one step further and port at Alexandria to establish relations with Egypt (Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 106). English’s seclusion might also have been influenced by the publication in New York of Joseph Wolff’s missionary journal, which might have inflamed the apostasy controversy from a decade before.
141. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 30, 1824, RG59, M46, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
142. Correspondence from Adams to English, January 3, 1825, Reel 467, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. A month later, Adams was inaugurated the sixth president of the United States. In contrast, William Eaton, who was appointed a naval agent in 1804, received the rations of a lieutenant on his mission to the Mediterranean.
143. Correspondence from English to Adams, February 9, 1825, Reel 467, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
144. Correspondence from English to Adams, August 30, 1825, Reel 471, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
145. Correspondence from English to Adams, August 30, 1825.
146. Correspondence from English to Adams, December 30, 1825, Reel 473, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
147. Correspondence from English to John Quincy Adams, September 16, 1826, Reel 477, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. English concluded his letter to Adams by excusing the infrequency of his reports, saying that he had not been writing as often as he should because he was

- forbidden by Commodore Rodgers from doing so. Apparently, Rodgers was exercising what is today called “strict operational control” over the mission. In a dispatch sent to the secretary of state in July, Rodgers worried that rumors of US-backed support for the Greeks would cause the Ottoman Porte to doubt US neutrality. Henry Clay, *The Papers of Henry Clay: Volume 6, Secretary of State, 1827*, edited by Mary W.M. Hargreaves and James F. Hopkins (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1981), 201.
148. Clay, *Papers: Volume 6*, 827.
 149. C.E. Bosworth et al., eds, “Khosrew Pasha,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 35–6.
 150. Clay, *Papers: Volume 6*, 827.
 151. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 57.
 152. Bergquist, “Henry Middleton as Political Reporter,” 364.
 153. Correspondence from English to Adams, November 16, 1827, Reel 483, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
 154. George Bethune English, “Washington, April the 28th, 1828,” *Essex Gazette*, May 10, 1828.
 155. J.Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, 60.
 156. J.Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, 62.
 157. By contrast, the United States did not recognize Greek independence until 1837.
 158. *Haverhill Gazette*, “George Bethune English,” October 4, 1828, 2. In fact, English had met the missionary in Alexandria and traveled up the Nile with him.
 159. Wolff, *Missionary Journal*; English, *Five Pebbles from the Brook*.
 160. Knapp, “George Bethune English.”
 161. Knapp, “George Bethune English.” A version of Knapp’s eulogy also appeared as “George Bethune English,” *Salem Gazette*, October 7, 1828.
 162. Knapp had his own connections to “the East” and to the institution of the Presidency. In 1818, he authored *Extracts of a Journal of Travels in North America* under the pseudonym “Ali Bey.” And in 1826, he delivered the eulogy for Thomas Jefferson and John Adams at First Church in Boston. Arthur Mason Knapp, *The Knapp Family in America: A Genealogy of the Decendents of William Knapp* (Boston: Fort Gill Press, 1909), 36.
 163. Knapp, “Biographical Sketch.”
 164. Cary, *Review*.
 165. Samuel Lorenzo Knapp, *American Biography* (New York: Conner & Cooke, 1833). Knapp’s obituary was again used in James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds, *Appleton’s Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, vol. II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1887).
 166. James Ellsworth De Kay (pseud. An American), *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832* (New York: J. & J. Harper, 1833), 488. In the same footnote, De Kay claimed that Khalil Aga, one of the other Americans who accompanied English to Sennar, was still alive in Egypt. In the United States De Kay was praised for his keen observations for Ottoman life, but also accused of having

- an anti-Greek bias; later, he was one of the candidates to negotiate a treaty with the Ottomans. A.C.D., "The Greeks and the Turks. Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832," *North American Magazine*, 1833.
167. George Riley and Charles A. Dana, eds, *The New American Cyclopædia: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge*, ed. vol. VII (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1860), 204.

Chapter 3 Literary Mercenaries in Istanbul, 1831–53

1. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 457–8.
2. David Porter (pseud. An American), *Constantinople and Its Environs in a Series of Letters*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835), 322.
3. For a Turkish perspective on the history of and trends in Ottoman–US relations, see Çağrı Erhan, "The American Perception of the Turks: An Historical Record," in *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, edited by Mustafa Aydın (Ankara: Research Centre for International Political and Economic Relations, 2000/2), and Çağrı Erhan, "Main Trends in Ottoman–American Relations," in *Turkish–American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, edited by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (Routledge: London, 2004).
4. Schueller, *U.S. Orientalisms*, 33–44.
5. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1961), 52–108.
6. *Gentleman's Magazine* "A New Political Institution Proposed," issue LXV, no. 3 (1795): 190. The term *literary mercenary* also appears to have been used in the context of increasing friction between secular and religious leaders, continued to be used across the nineteenth century, and still holds cachet today.
7. Simpson, *Mercenaries in American and British Literature*, 19.
8. Tim Roberts, "Lajos Kossuth and the Permeable American Orient of the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 5 (2015): 796.
9. Roberts, "Lajos Kossuth," 808.
10. Robert Battistini, "Glimpses of the Other before Orientalism: The Muslim World in Early American Periodicals, 1785–1800," *Early American Studies* 8, no. 2 (2010): 467, 468.
11. Battistini, "Glimpses of the Other," 447.
12. Battistini, "Glimpses of the Other," 448.
13. For more on the emergent Occident, see Saree Makdisi, *Making England Western: Occidentalism, Race, and Imperial Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
14. Correspondence from John Quincy Adams to David Offley, July 21, 1828; correspondence from John Quincy Adams to Captain William M. Crane, July 22, 1828; correspondence from John Quincy Adams to Edward Wyer, July 24, 1828: RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.

15. Correspondence from Martin Van Buren to Charles Rhind, David Offley, and James Biddle, September 12, 1829, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
16. Henry A.S. Dearborn, *A Memoir of the Commerce and Navigation of the Black Sea and the Trade and Maritime Geography of Turkey and Egypt* (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1819), iii, xi–xiv, xvii–xxv, xli. Dearborn's book is remarkable for being one of the least bigoted accounts of the Ottoman world ever produced by an American.
17. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 3.
18. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 101, 108, 173.
19. For a few recent examples of this work, see Christine M. Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Mostafa Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
20. Correspondence from Martin Van Buren to David Porter, April 15; 1831, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
21. Correspondence from Van Buren to Porter, April 22, 1831, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
22. Ironically, it was not the secret clause which ended up causing trouble between the Ottoman Empire and the United States, but rather Article 4, which had to do with jurisdiction over US citizens who committed crimes in Ottoman territories. Two incidents in particular fueled this trouble. The first involved two American mercenaries who had been recruited in a half-baked plot to overthrow the Egyptian khedive in 1868 and were subsequently arrested by Ottoman authorities in Syria. Then, in 1877, an American sailor from the USS *Vandala* killed an Ottoman citizen in İzmir and was subsequently spirited out of the country before he could be tried. The Ottoman foreign ministry continually sought to clarify Article 4 of the treaty, but the United States demurred until 1912, when the empire refused to allow a railway to be built by an American consortium until the matter was settled. Sînan Kuneralp, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the Controversy over the Interpretation of Article 4 of the Turco-American Treaty of 1830," in *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, edited by Mustafa Aydın (Ankara: Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2000–2002).
23. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 69, 305.
24. Correspondence from David Porter to Edward Livingstone, August 11, 1831, RG59, M46, Roll 4, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.

25. Correspondence from Daniel Webster to David Porter, July 2, 1842, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
26. Steven M. Selig, "Draughts: The Henry Eckford Story" (Scottsdale: Agreka History Preserved, 2008), 129.
27. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 63–7. In fact, George W. Erving was the first person nominated for the position of chargé d'affaires, but he never assumed the office. Correspondence from Van Buren to Porter, March 3, 1831, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
28. Correspondence from Porter to Livingston, August 17, 1831, RG59, M46, Roll 4, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
29. Selig, "Draughts," 84–7.
30. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 71; De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 311–12. Michael Oren also repeats this error, claiming that Americans built *Mahmoud*: Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 116.
31. Correspondence from Porter to Livingston, April 4, 1832, RG59, M46, Roll 4, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
32. Selig, "Draughts," 128.
33. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 75–81.
34. Another American, Charles Ross, may have also worked in the Aynalikavak naval yards, but little is known about him. Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828–1923*, translated by James Cooper (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 1.
35. Correspondence from John Forsyth to David Porter, May 16, 1837, RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
36. Henry A.S. Dearborn, *The Life of William Bainbridge, Esq. of the United States Navy* (1816).
37. De Kay had been originally been floated as a qualified negotiator for the Ottoman treaty, but Van Buren selected Rhind instead. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 58.
38. David Porter (pseud. An American), *Constantinople and Its Environs in a Series of Letters*, vol. I (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835); Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. II.
39. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 82–3.
40. *Albany Argus*, "Saturday Morning, July 11," July 14, 1835.
41. Correspondence from Porter to Livingston, July 11, 1831; correspondence from Porter to Livingston, August 15, 1832: RG59, M46, Roll 4, Records of

- the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
42. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 87–8.
 43. David Porter, *Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ocean* (New York: Wiley & Halstead, 1822); David Porter, *A Voyage in the South Seas, in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814* (London: Sir Richard Phillips & Co., 1823). Although the 1822 book was published by Wiley & Halstead, it was printed by J. & J. Harper, which published and printed *Constantinople and its Environs*.
 44. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 3. Of course, Porter did not hold the rank of minister till much later.
 45. Doyle, "Inter-Imperiality," 183.
 46. Finnie, *Pioneers East*; Dror Ze'evi, *Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 197.
 47. Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 84, 307.
 48. Correspondence from Porter to Livingston, September 19, 1832, RG59, M46, Roll 4, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD. This incident, from the perspective of one of the other Americans who was there, appears in Walter Colton, *Visit to Constantinople and Athens* (New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Co., 1836), 47–9.
 49. Mahmud II, in particular, is remembered as a skillful archer Jane Taylor, *Imperial Istanbul: A Traveller's Guide, Includes Iznik, Bursa and Edirne* (London: Tauris Parke Paperback, 2007), 192.
 50. Said, *Orientalism*, 176–7.
 51. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, iii. De Kay was quoting the French botanist Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, who issued his warning in 1718; Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, *A Voyage into the Levant: Perform'd by Command of the Late French King*, vol. I, translated by John Ozell (London: D. Browne, A. Bell, J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, R. Cruttenden, and T. Cox, J. Battley, E. Symon, 1718), 353. Tournefort's warning was actually about disorderly Greek marines in Istanbul, not the Turks.
 52. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 53.
 53. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 59–62. Later De Kay goes to some lengths to clarify for his readers that opium abuse is no longer widespread among the Turks (344–6). In contrast, Walter Colton claimed to have tried opium when he visited Istanbul in 1832: Colton, *Visit to Constantinople and Athens*, 78–84.
 54. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 32.
 55. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 146.
 56. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 76.
 57. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 101, 296–7. Porter's take on Turkish villages outside the city was more critical.
 58. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 6–89, 132–3.
 59. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. I, 52–3.

60. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. II, 106–107.
61. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 84.
62. For more on humanitarian imperialism, see Jean Bricmont, *Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War*, trans. Diana Johnstone (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006); Neda Atanasoski, *Humanitarian Violence: The U.S. Deployment of Diversity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013). Britain staged a significant “humanitarian intervention” in the midst of a debt crisis and social revolution in Egypt in 1882 (see Chapter 5 of this work).
63. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 63, 137.
64. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 124.
65. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 138–48.
66. De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey*, 141.
67. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. II, 36–110. For an account of some of these tourists and their practices in the Ottoman world, see Susan Nance, “The Ottoman Empire and the American Flag: Patriotic Travel before the Age of Package Tours, 1830–1870,” *Journal of Tourism History* 1, no. 1 (2009).
68. A.C.D., “The Greeks and the Turks.”
69. *American Monthly Magazine*, “Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832,” October 1833; “Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832,” November 1833; “Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832,” December 1833.
70. *Philadelphia Album and Ladies’ Literary Portfolio*, “Turkey in 1831 and 1832,” September 28, 1833.
71. *New York Spectator*, “Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832, by an American,” October 10, 1833.
72. *Charleston Courier*, “Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832 – by an American,” October 23, 1833. The paper said that this new relationship “was almost wholly due to the zeal and energy of our worthy and efficient representative, at the Court of the Sultan, Commodore Porter.”
73. *National Gazette and Literary Register*, “American Treaty with Turkey,” September 24, 1833.
74. *National Gazette*, “Voyages and Travels,” December 3, 1839; Rosalind Remer, *Printers and Men of Capital: Philadelphia Book Publishers in the New Republic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
75. J.L. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Poland* (Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839), 3.
76. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 45–6, 48.
77. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 48–51.
78. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 49–50.
79. *Daily National Intelligencer*, “Constantinople and Its Environs,” July 2, 1835.
80. Sarah Rogers Haight (pseud. A Lady of New York), *Letters from the Old World*, vol. I (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1840), 35.
81. Haight, *Letters from the Old World*, vol. I, 40.

82. Sarah Rogers Haight (pseud. A Lady of New York), *Letters from the Old World*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1840), 242–8. Berman has written about the ways in which Haight also rejected Egyptian modernity; see *American Arabesque*, 92.
83. A year after the publication of Porter's *Constantinople and its Environs*, Walter Colton's *Visit to Constantinople and Athens* appeared. Colton was a naval chaplain who had authored the anonymously published narrative *Ship and Shore, in Madeira, Lisbon, and the Mediterranean* a year earlier. Colton, who visited Istanbul – and met Porter and Eckford – in 1832, was no friend of the Ottomans. In a typical fashion, he described the Ottomans as having a dissembling, inconsistent character. The best he could do was an underhanded compliment: “Another redeeming trait in the character of the Mussulman, is that spirit of honesty which pervades his commercial conduct. His naked word is as safe as a bond, though guarantied [*sic*] by penalties severe as those exacted by a mercenary Jew of Venice.” He concluded, “Islamism is the grave of inspired truth and liberty.” Colton, *Visit to Constantinople and Athens*, 149, 153, 169–71, 181.
84. *American Penny Magazine and Family Newspaper*, “A Turkish Reservoir,” vol. 1, no. 36 (1845): 562, 569. The article on Mehmed Ali cited George Bethune English's account of the invasion of the Sudan (563).
85. Especially in its early years, the society seems preoccupied with religious tracts, rather than economic or natural history. The Society did take an interest in the writings of John P. Brown, an Ohioan who served for many years as dragoman of the legation in Istanbul. John Pickering, “Address at the First Annual Meeting,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 1, no. 1 (1843): 64. In 1979, De Kay is cited and then dismissed in a footnote by Carter V. Findley in his article on Sir James W. Redhouse: Carter V. Findley, “Sir James W. Redhouse (1811–1892): The Making of a Perfect Orientalist?” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99, no. 4 (1979): 590.
86. James Ellsworth De Kay, ed., *1831–1832 Türkiye'sinden Görüntüler* (Ankara: METU Press, 2009), ix.
87. George Jones (pseud. A “Civilian”), *Sketches of Naval Life, with Notices of Men, Manners and Scenery on the Shores of the Mediterranean*, vol. I (New Haven, CT: Hezekiah Howe, 1829), 243–4.
88. Porter, *Constantinople*, vol. II, 318–19.
89. Two years later, in 1837, a new biography of Bainbridge's life once again outlined the American visit to Istanbul in 1800 and the welcome reception the United States received there. Thomas Harris, *The Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge, United States Navy* (Philadelphia: Carey Lea & Blanchard, 1837), 43–62.
90. Francis Schroeder, *Shores of the Mediterranean; with Sketches of Travel*, vol. I (London: John Murray, 1846), 125–55, 134.
91. Schroeder, *Shores of the Mediterranean*, 127.
92. Schroeder, *Shores of the Mediterranean*, 132.

93. Marr, *Cultural Roots of American Islamicism*. There have been notable exceptions, of course; Kim Fortuny, *American Writers in Istanbul: Melville, Twain, Hemingway, Dos Passos, Bowles, Algren, Baldwin, and Settle* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009).
94. Correspondence from John P. Brown to James Buchanan, January 5, 1846, RG59, M46, Roll 12, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD. Brown played a significant role in the early years of the legation. For a recent look at the reorganizing effects of the Tanzimât, see Emre Erol, *The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia: Turkey's Belle Epoque and the Transition to a Modern Nation State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).
95. Correspondence from James Buchanan to John P. Brown, March 26, 1846; correspondence from James Buchanan to Dabney Carr, May 14, 1846; correspondence from Buchanan to Carr, August 18, 1846: RG59, M77, Roll 162, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Turkey, National Archives, College Park, MD.
96. Correspondence from James Buchanan to Franklin Elmore, March 8, 1847, RG59, M40, Roll 34, Records of the Department of State, Domestic Letters of the Department of State, 1784–90, National Archives, College Park, MD.
97. William F. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States' Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1849), 14.
98. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States' Expedition*, 59–61.
99. Benjamin Silliman, "Memoir of John Lawrence Smith. 1818–1883," in *National Academy of Sciences: Biographical Memoirs* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1884), 224, 227, 288.
100. Micislaus Haiman, "General Albin F. Schoepf," *Polish American Studies* 2, no. 3/4 (1945); James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds, *Appleton's Cyclopædia of American Biography*, vol. V (New York: Appleton and Company, 1888), 423.
101. Charles Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1912), 9–12.
102. Alexander W. Hidden, *The Ottoman Dynasty: A History of the Sultans of Turkey from the Earliest Authentic Record to the Present Time, with Notes on the Manners and Customs of the People*, Revised Edition (New York: Nicholas W. Hidden, 1912), 308–16; N.W.H., "An American Machinist in Turkey," *Scientific American Supplement* XXXIX, no. 1000 (1895).
103. Hidden, *Ottoman Dynasty*.

Chapter 4 The Monstrous Geography of Central Africa, 1874–75

1. George Root, "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp" (1863).
2. Contemporary definitions rarely place the Sudan within the region of Central Africa. Rather, both the north and south are regarded as part of East Africa.

3. Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, 57, 62.
4. Charles Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People. An Account of Expeditions to the Lake Victoria Nyanza and the Makraka Niam-Niam, West of the Babr-El-Abiad (White Nile)* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877); Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*.
5. One of the questions that remains inadequately answered is how involved merchants from the British colonies in North America and the United States were in the slave trade in the Mediterranean. More than most people recognize, surely. The position of northern Africa in the transatlantic slave trade has implications for the ways in which the war with Tripoli *should* be remembered. For a useful overview of the trans-Saharan slave trade, see Terence Walz and Kenneth M. Cuno, eds, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Mediterranean* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010).
6. Later narratives included William McEntyre Dye's *Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia; or, Military Service under the Khedive, in His Provinces and, Beyond Their Borders, as Experienced by the American Staff* (1880), R.E. Colston's "Modern Egypt and Its People" (1881), and, in 1884, William Loring's *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt*.
7. Though his is the only recollection set in southern Sudan, Long was not the only American mercenary to work in Africa. Eugene Fechet, Erasmus Purdy, Raleigh Colston, William Campbell, Alexander Mason, Horatio Reed, and Henry Prout were all involved in expeditions to Egypt's interior, including the regions of Berber, Darfur, and Kurdufan. William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, *The Blue and the Gray on the Nile* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 120–48.
8. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 67–8, 87.
9. *Central Africa* ends with a short postscript promising an upcoming narrative of an expedition Long made to Africa's eastern coast in September of 1875. His accounts of the Somalian expedition of 1875 are all very brief and contain scant few observations. The reasons for this failure to follow through will become clear in the next chapter.
10. *Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine*, "Briefer Notice," February 1885, 222.
11. Charles Gordon, "To the Editor," *New York Herald*, January 28, 1879; *New York Times*, "Tardy Recognition for Nile Explorer: Geographers Present a Medal after 36 Years to Col. Chaille-Long," February 16, 1910.
12. Long has also been described by geographer David Icenogle as "something of a dandy" and "a vain, foppish man." David Icenogle, "The Expeditions of Chaillé-Long" *Saudi Aramco World* 29, no. 6 (1978).
13. Hesseltine and Wolf, *Blue and the Gray*, 149–50.
14. Lysle E. Meyer, *The Farther Frontier: Six Case Studies of Americans and Africa, 1848–1936* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1992), 100.

15. Raleigh Colston's papers, for example, are housed at the University of North Carolina. Samuel Lockett's papers are at Louisiana State. Charles Pomeroy Stone has no archive devoted to him.
16. Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 3.
17. Alice Moore-Hall, *Egypt's African Empire: Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon & the Creation of Equatoria* (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).
18. Buganda and several other Great Lakes-area kingdoms were eventually incorporated as the British Protectorate of Uganda in 1894.
19. Hill, *Egypt in Sudan*, 19.
20. In 1867, Isma'il convinced the sultan to issue a firman granting him the right to use the title khedive. Beginning with Ali, the Alawiyya Dynasty had already been using the title, instead of the less significant Wāli, but its use was not approved by the sultan.
21. Chapter 5 is also concerned with the representations of modern Egypt that were circulated in the United States by members of the American mission to Egypt and deals more closely with the Egyptian debt crisis.
22. Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 272.
23. Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 3.
24. Hesselstine and Wolf, *Blue and the Gray*, 1, 174.
25. Long was also profiled twice – 1978 and 1984 – in *Saudi Aramco World*, the official magazine of Saudi Arabia's national oil company (published in Houston, TX): Icenogle, "The Expeditions of Chaillé-Long"; David Icenogle, "The Khedive's Cartographers," *Saudi Aramco World* 35, no. 5 (1984). Long also receives a passing mention in Moorehead, *White Nile*.
26. Icenogle, "Expeditions of Chaillé-Long."
27. Maryland Historical Society Library, "An American Tragedy," November 29, 2012, www.mdhs.org/underbelly/2012/11/29/an-american-tragedy.
28. He officially changed it in 1870 (Meyer, *Farther Frontier*).
29. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 12–14.
30. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 12.
31. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 15–16.
32. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 17.
33. Charles Chaillé-Long, "The Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," in *C. Chaillé-Long Papers, 1809–1918* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1912), 4.
34. It is better here to speak of abolition, rather than the "end" of the slave trade, which came later – or maybe never.
35. For brief overviews of the course of events in the Sudan in the 1870s, see Alice Moore-Hall, *Gordon and the Sudan: Prologue to the Mahdiyya, 1877–1880* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), and *Egypt's African Empire: Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon and the Creation of Equatoria*.
36. Chinua Achebe, "An Image of Africa," *Massachusetts Review* 18, no. 4 (1977).

37. It is unclear in the published account of the talk whether Long was quoting Conrad Malte-Brun, who founded the society, or his son, Victor Adolphe Malte-Brun, who eventually took over as its head. Both were significant figures in geography (Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, v–vi).
38. Martin S. Staum, "Human Geography, 'Race,' and Empire," in *Labeling People: French Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire, 1815–1848* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); S. Griswold Goodrich, *A System of School Geography, Chiefly Derived from Malte-Brun, and Arranged According to the Inductive Plan of Instruction*, 11th ed. (Philadelphia: Desiler, Thomas & Co., 1835); R.J. Johnston, "Human Geography," in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, edited by Derek Gregory et al. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 353.
39. For more on the romantic vision of Africa, which was subsequently displaced by the image of the Dark Continent, see Adams and McShane, *Myth of Wild Africa*, 3–23.
40. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 125.
41. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 88. For an examination of Battuta in Africa, see Ibn Batuta, Saïd Hamdun, and Noel Quinton King, *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, Expanded ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005).
42. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 119.
43. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 119.
44. Unlike English, Long does not admit to being tempted.
45. Ross E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta, a Muslim Traveler of the Fourteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 4.
46. Allouche Adel, "Ibn Battuta," in *Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Josef W. Meri (New York: Routledge, 2006).
47. Georg W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 91–9.
48. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*.
49. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 2. Gordon hired additional staff as well, but he, Long, and Hassan Wassif (an Egyptian officer) were the first to depart (Moore-Hall, *Egypt's African Empire*, 96). Another American, William Campbell, joined the expedition, but died of fever at Khartoum in October 1874. Correspondence from Richard Beardsley to Hamilton Fish, October 12, 1874, RG59, T41, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt, 1864–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD; Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 99.
50. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 3.
51. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 5.
52. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 8.
53. Ismael Pasha was burnt to death in Shendi shortly after George Bethune English returned to Cairo in 1822 (Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 4–11).
54. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 15.
55. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 15.

56. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 18.
57. In a letter written to his father from Gondokoro and subsequently published in the United States, Long concluded “Africa is a country accursed of God.” Charles Chaillé-Long, “A Letter from Africa,” *New York Times*, December 8, 1874.
58. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 35–6, 41, 50. “Too late to swap horses” had been around since at least 1840, but it has been attributed to Lincoln in multiple instances, including in the context of the debate over whether to replace General Hooker before Gettysburg.
59. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 24.
60. Later, the arrival of missionaries would lead to widespread unrest, with Protestant converts ultimately prevailing in a violent struggle against Muslims and then Catholics. Rita M. Byrnes, *Uganda: A Country Study*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992).
61. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*: 90–2.
62. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 103.
63. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 106.
64. Jean Brierley and Thomas Spear, “Mutesa, the Missionaries, and Christian Conversion in Buganda,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21, no. 4 (1988). For an analysis of the missionary position on a similar mass execution carried out by Mwanga, see Neville Hoad, “African Sodomy in the Missionary Position: Corporeal Intimacies and Signifying Regimes,” in *African Intimacies: Race, Homosexuality, and Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
65. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 114.
66. Chaillé-Long, “Egypt, Africa, and Africans.”
67. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 95. This comparison would have been widely legible at the time. For example, in 1864, the *New York Times* invoked Dahomey to criticize the conditions in a Confederate prison camp: “Even the King of Dahomey, when he would get rid of his prisoners, sacrifices them at once to his idols, or gives them as a prey for his guards to hunt. There is no slow killing going on for months; there is no gradual wasting of the bodily and mental powers by disease, and hunger, and want, and miasma, as under these Confederate savages.” *New York Times*, “The Lessons from the Rebel Cruelty,” December 4, 1864.
68. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 107–108.
69. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 125.
70. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 64, 310.
71. Accounts of the expeditions led by Hernán Cortés and Francisco Pizarro emphasize how each invader used horses to terrorize indigenous peoples. Writers from Bernardino de Sahagún to Jared Diamond have claimed that indigenous peoples had no idea to react when they saw a horse for the first time. These claims are dubious, though horses undoubtedly can lend a strategic edge in combat. Bernardino de Sahagún, *La Historia Universal De Las*

- Cosas De Nueva España* (1590); Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 76–7.
72. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 38.
 73. Walter Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2013), 222–3.
 74. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 82. A Leyden jar is a capacitor-like device – essentially a glass bottle filled with water – for storing a charge. Devices of this type had been around for more than a century and were capable of generating repeated, painful shocks.
 75. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 64.
 76. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 82–3, 114–15.
 77. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 90.
 78. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 121.
 79. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 125–6.
 80. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 132.
 81. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 149.
 82. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 149.
 83. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 138.
 84. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 100.
 85. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 176.
 86. Both men were also affiliated with Sir Samuel Baker's "Soudanieh Corps," which had made an initial foray into Uganda several years earlier.
 87. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Revised edition ed. (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982), 186, 188.
 88. Richard Hill and Peter Hogg, *A Black Corps D'élite: An Egyptian Sudanese Conscript Battalion with the French Army in Mexico, 1863–1867, and Its Survivors in Subsequent African History* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1995). Hill and Hogg's text includes an image of Captain 'Abd al-Rahmān Mūsā, who was responsible for Sudanese cavalry training. He may have been one of the two soldiers who accompanied Long during his two expeditions (Portrait Plate 14).
 89. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 40, 69; Paola Ivanov, "Cannibals, Warriors, Conquerors, and Colonizers: Western Perceptions and Azande Historiography," *History in Africa* 29 (2002): 100.
 90. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 210.
 91. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, xiii, 543.
 92. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 244–5.
 93. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 273.
 94. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 263–5.
 95. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 272.
 96. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 233, 263, 282, 303. Like material collected during the US Exploring Expedition (1838–42), the Mexican Boundary Survey (1848–55) and Pacific Railroad Survey (1853–55), Long's acquisitions

- would become part of institutionally sanctioned collections at the Egyptian Geographic Society and the Abdeen Palace archives.
97. Before he returned to the United States, Long presented his ethnographic and other findings to the Egyptian (Khedival) Geographical Society, which was founded in 1875 by Isma'il. Charles Stone, another American in Egypt, was president of the society from 1876 to 1882. Donald Malcolm Reid, "The Egyptian Geographic Society: From Laymen's Society to Indigenous Professional Association," *Poetics Today* 14, no. 3 (1993).
 98. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 282, 294.
 99. Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, *The Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*, vol. II (London: Charles Knight and Co., 1834), 97.
 100. Ivanov, "Cannibals, Warriors, Conquerors, and Colonizers," 93–5. The origin of "great eaters" appears to be an obscure encyclopedia entry. See Kwesi Kwaa Prah, "An Etymological Note on Nam, Nama, Nyam Nyam and Other Variations on the Word," in *Open Problems in Linguistics and Lexicography*, edited by Giandomenico Sica (Milan: Polimetrica, 2006).
 101. Ivanov, "Cannibals, Warriors, Conquerors, and Colonizers," 152.
 102. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 273.
 103. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 246.
 104. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 260.
 105. William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003).
 106. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 246, 260, 273.
 107. Peter Hulme, "Introduction: The Cannibal Scene," in *Cannibalism and the Colonial World*, edited by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2–3.
 108. Possibly elements of the Nyangwara people.
 109. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 287.
 110. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 259.
 111. Liat Kozma, "Black, Kinless, and Hungry: Manumitted Female Slaves in Khedival Egypt," edited by Terence Walz and Kenneth M. Cuno (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010); Liat Kozma, *Policing Egyptian Women* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
 112. Eve M. Troutt Powell, *Tell This in My Memory: Stories of Enslavement from Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 209.
 113. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 259.
 114. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*, 195.
 115. Charles Chaillé-Long, "The Black and Brown People of the Soudan," *Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly*, July 1887, 355.
 116. Chaillé-Long, "Black and Brown People," 366. By 1887, Long appeared to have forgotten about ivory, concluding that "for a fact, the study of man is the only vital interest which attaches to Central Africa. Neither its climate nor its

- traffic offers material inducement to the commercial spirit of the times.” Of the racial trouble presented by the Sudan, he said that “the black man, not unlike the redskin, disdains our civilization, not, perhaps, without an atom of reason, for it reaches him largely adulterated with rum” (358).
117. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 127, 134.
 118. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, 132–3.
 119. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*, xiv, 251.
 120. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 309.
 121. Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 31.
 122. Dongolawi is a northern Sudanese language group, so it is unclear exactly whom Long is talking about.
 123. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 48.
 124. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 311. In 1881, R.E. Colston either agreed with or simply repeated Long’s claim when he said that “the best regiments in the Egyptian service are those formed of negroes from Central Africa . . . There is a great deal more fight in these men, who probably were warriors in their own country, than in the fellaheen regiments” (Colston, “Modern Egypt and Its People”).
 125. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 48.
 126. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 311–13.
 127. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 227.
 128. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 314.
 129. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*, 314–15.
 130. *New York Times*, “An Illustrated Talk on Egypt,” January 23, 1885.
 131. *New York Times*, “A ‘Dual Lecture’ on Egypt,” December 5, 1885.
 132. Correspondence from Oric Bates to Charles Chaillé Long, June 2, 1915, C. Chaillé-Long papers, 1809–1918, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Bates was a prominent Africanist who authored *The Eastern Libyans* in 1914.
 133. These papers appear to have been self-curated for many years before they arrived at the library and are decidedly focused on Long’s own quest for recognition, rather than any serious attempt to pursue African development or ethnology. His general correspondence and other papers, composing three containers among the Library’s extensive holdings, include materials in six languages but focus on Long’s own production of Central Africa in the United States. Long maintained a presence in libraries and archives outside the United States, as well. Among the University of Khartoum’s holdings is a copy of *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People* as well as both volumes of *My Life in Four Continents*.
 134. Correspondence from Charles Chaillé-Long to Theodore Roosevelt, August 15, 1903, C. Chaillé-Long papers, 1809–1918, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
 135. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, “Zande Cannibalism,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 90, no. 2 (1960): 251.

136. William Arens, *The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 84. For a summary of the attacks on Arens, see Hulme, "Introduction: The Cannibal Scene," 10–12.
137. Arens, *Man-Eating Myth*, 96.
138. William Arens, "Rethinking Anthropophagy," in *Cannibalism and the Colonial World*, edited by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 40.
139. Sharad Patel, *Rise and Fall of Idi Amin* (Kenya/United Kingdom: Film Corporation of Kenya/Intermedia Productions, 1981).
140. Brian Bennett and Robyn Dixon, "U.S. Sending Military Advisors to Uganda," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/15/world/la-fg-us-uganda-20111015>.
141. Though Invisible Children was not shy about displaying the maimed bodies of some of the LRA's victims, the organization avoided making claims about cannibalism. Jason Russell, "Kony2012" (United States: Invisible Children, Inc., 2012).
142. The most extended treatment of anthropophagism among the LRA is Paul Raffaele's *Among the Cannibals*. The book recounts Raffaele's "quest" to locate contemporary cannibals. In the chapter devoted to the LRA, it is clear that Raffaele already knows what he will find in Africa, even before he arrives in Uganda: "Africa! Cannibals! This present journey was always inevitable; those two powerfully emotive words seem linked in the Western mind like pork and apple sauce." Raffaele, who has a close connection to the Smithsonian, never witnesses the butchering of a human body or anyone cooking or eating another person. He simply relies on secondhand accounts and admissions, concluding, "Why would they lie?" Paul Raffaele, *Among the Cannibals: Adventures on the Trail of Man's Darkest Ritual* (New York: Smithsonian Books/HarperCollins, 2008), 176–8, 255.
143. Ryan Deveraux, "Kony 2012: US State Department – We Have No Intention of Leaving Uganda," *Guardian*, March 9, 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/us-news-blog/2012/mar/09/kony-2012-state-department-uganda.
144. Nick Young, "Uganda: A Pawn in the US's Proxy African War on Terror," *Guardian*, September 25, 2010.
145. Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict," *New York Times*, August 10, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html.
146. The creation of AFRICOM consolidated territory once overseen piecemeal by CENTCOM, the United States Central Command, and EUCOM, the United States European Command.
147. Diana B. Putman, "Combating African Questions About the Legitimacy of Africom" (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2008), 1, 8.
148. As Faraj Abdallah Tamim and Malinda Smith show, security for the United States and African leaders does not necessarily mean security for Africans in general. Faraj Abdallah Tamim and Malinda Smith, "Human Rights

and Insecurities: Muslims in Post-9/11 East Africa,” in *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism*, edited by Malinda S. Smith (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).

Chapter 5 Mercenary Diplomacy on the Nile, 1869–82

1. Correspondence from Elbert E. Farman to Hamilton Fish, November 15, 1876, RG59, T41, Roll 3, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt, 1864–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
2. Chaillé-Long, “Forgotten American Mission to Egypt,” 1.
3. Correspondence from Farman to Fish, November 15, 1876.
4. For example, Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*; Hesselstine and Wolf, *Blue and the Gray*; John Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
5. This domestication, in many ways, mirrors the formations that Timothy Mitchell describes in *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
6. In the US Civil War, John L. Swift, *About Grant* (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1880), 12. In the war between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire, Linda Gordon, *Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth-Century Ukraine* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), 153–62. And in the war on terror, M.G. Chitkara, *Combating Terrorism* (New Delhi: S.B. Nangia, APH Publishing Corporation, 2005), 344.
7. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*, 420.
8. James A.B. Scherer, *Cotton as a World Power: A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1916), 261–9.
9. Himbury, “Empire Cotton,” 262.
10. Himbury, “Empire Cotton,” 275.
11. Himbury, “Empire Cotton,” 269–70.
12. Himbury, “Empire Cotton,” 270–1.
13. Himbury, “Empire Cotton,” 275. For more on cotton in the Sudan in the first half of the twentieth century, see Victoria Bernal, “Cotton and Colonial Order in Sudan: A Social History with Emphasis on the Gezira Scheme,” in *Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995).
14. Edward Mead Earle, “Egyptian Cotton and the American Civil War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (1926): 533.
15. Earle, “Egyptian Cotton,” 545.
16. Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts, eds, *Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995), 7–8.
17. Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 5 (2004): 1406.

18. Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire," 1415, 1422.
19. Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire," 1422.
20. Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire," 1428.
21. Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire," 1433. Beckert subsequently published a lengthy tome on the global history of cotton: Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Vintage Books, 2015). Beckert's work should be read in the context of Aaron Jakes and Ahmad Shokr's important review: Aaron G. Jakes and Ahmad Shokr, "Finding Value in *Empire of Cotton*," *Critical Historical Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2017).
22. Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 32.
23. Seward was unable to purchase the rifles, but after inspecting eleven of the prototypes thought enough of the workmanship to ask for assurances of the Egyptians that they would not sell the arms to the Confederates. Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 22.
24. Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 22.
25. Many sources claim Valentine operated on the sultan. Here, there is some disagreement because Dunn says it was Sultan Mahmud II and cites Hesselstine and Wolf. But Hesselstine and Wolf actually claim it was Abdülaziz I. In 1868, Samuel D. Gross, Mott's biographer, said that Mott had removed a tumor from the head of Abdülmecid I, who served as sultan after Mahmud and before Abdülaziz. According to James A. Field, Jr., the surgery on the sultan was just a rumor. See John Dunn, "'An American Fracas in Egypt': The Butler Affair of 1872," *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 42 (2005): 154; Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 181; Hesselstine and Wolf, *Blue and the Gray*, 18; Field, *From Gibraltar to the Middle East*, 169; S.D. Gross, *Memoir of Valentine Mott* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1868), 36.
26. The problem is that they provide no source for the claim and I have been unable to locate relevant archival documents to examine more closely. The recruitment story that Hesselstine and Wolf (*Blue and the Gray*, 22) tell provides the standard outline for many later accounts. See Clarence C. Clendenen, Robert O. Collins, and Peter Duignan, *Americans in Africa, 1865–1900* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966), 74–82.
27. Chaillé-Long, "Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," 1.
28. Chaillé-Long, "Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," 2.
29. Chaillé-Long, "Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," 8–9.
30. Chaillé-Long, *My Life in Four Continents*: 27, 34.
31. George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. From Its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890*, vol. II, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 1237.
32. Cullum, *Biographical Register*.
33. Bruce Catton, *Bruce Catton's Civil War: Three Volumes in One* (New York: Fairfax Press, 1984); H. Donald Winkler, *Civil War Goats and Scapegoats* (Nashville, TN: Cumberland House, 2008), 47–50.

34. Winkler, *Civil War Goats*, 47–56.
35. Correspondence from Charles Hale to Hamilton Fish, January 27, 1870; correspondence from Hale to Fish, July 7, 1870: RG59, T45, Roll 5, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt 1835–1873, National Archives, College Park, MD.
36. Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 48–9. The General Staff, composed of many Americans, was also involved with the Khedival Geographic Society, which was formed in 1875.
37. Dunn, “American Fracas,” 156.
38. Correspondence from George Butler to Hamilton Fish, June 23, 1872, RG59, T45, Roll 6, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Alexandria, Egypt, 1835–1873, National Archives, College Park, MD.
39. Dunn, “American Fracas,” 155–61. Butler’s uncle owned US Cartridge Company. The “fracas” is addressed from Butler’s perspective in correspondence from Butler to Fish, July 14, 1872, RG59, T45, Roll 6, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Alexandria, Egypt, 1835–1873, National Archives, College Park, MD.
40. *New York Times*, “Trouble between the United States Consul-General and Ex-Confederate Officers,” July 14, 1872.
41. Dunn, “American Fracas”; Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 4.
42. Colston, “Modern Egypt and Its People,” 150.
43. Loring, *Confederate Soldier in Egypt*.
44. Nina Silber, *The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 60.
45. Elbert E. Farman, *Along the Nile with General Grant* (New York: Grafton Press, 1904), 26. General Stone and his wife accompanied the former president and the consul general on a tour of the Pyramids and the Sphinx (38).
46. Richard Henry Dana, *Hospitable England in the Seventies: The Diary of a Young American, 1875–1876* (London: John Murray, 1921), 224.
47. Correspondence from Charles Pomeroy Stone to George Bancroft, February 20, 1873, Box 41, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
48. Correspondence from Stone to Bancroft, July 21, 1873, Box 41, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
49. Roy Marcot, *The History of Remington Firearms: The History of One of the World's Most Famous Gun Makers* (Guilford: CT Lyons Press, 2005), 50–1.
50. Dunn, *Khedive Ismail's Army*, 66.
51. According to a communication from Farman (May 10, 1878), Remington came to Cairo hoping to help collect his \$1 million, drew a sword in an Egyptian’s office, and was sent home by Stone. In their official company history, Remington claims that the company never recovered from the losses it incurred – it is unclear what exactly the successful firearms maker means by this (Marcot, *The History of Remington Firearms*, 50–1).

52. Richard Hill says these Remingtons were used at Darfur in 1874, in Abyssinia in 1875–1876, at Tell el-Kebir in 1882, by Gordon in the Sudan in 1883–1885, and by the Mahdists in 1896–1899 (Hill, *Egypt in Sudan*, 109).
53. Chaillé-Long's brief trip around the Horn of Africa, about which he promised much but wrote little, was a prelude to Egypt's move against Abyssinia.
54. Among the other officers on this expedition was Ahmed 'Urabi, working as a transport and commissary officer. 'Urabi was removed from duty.
55. Arthur E. Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War of 1874–1876," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 26, no. 103 (1927): 275.
56. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 145.
57. Dunn, *Kbedive Ismail's Army* 142.
58. Robinson, "Egyptian-Abyssinian War." Robinson also claimed – perhaps still suspicious of Britain's World War I ally – that the US mercenaries were paid directly through the office of the US Consul. He also says that the Ethiopians had purchased rifles from the French at Djibouti in exchange for ivory (268, 271).
59. Czeslaw Jesman, "Egyptian Invasion of Ethiopia," *African Affairs* 58, no. 230 (1959): 81.
60. Dunn, *Kbedive Ismail's Army*, 153–4.
61. Jasper Yeates Brinton, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). For a "brutally condensed" account of the ways in which the Mixed Courts helped to spawn a legal elite in Egypt and their role in Egyptian nationalism only to be displaced by military and technocratic elite at the middle of the twentieth century, see Amr Shalakany, "'I Heard It All Before': Egyptian Tales of Law and Development," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 5 (2006). Elbert Farman, who worked as US consul general from 1876 to 1881, subsequently served as a judge on the Mixed Courts from 1881 to 1884.
62. Lyons was referring to the large arms purchases that Egypt was making from the American company Remington (Crabitès, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 44–5).
63. Correspondence from Farman to Fish, July 3, 1878, RG59, T41, Roll 6, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt, 1864–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD; Correspondence from Elbert E. Farman to James G. Blaine, June 23, 1881, RG59, T41, Roll 9, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt, 1864–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
64. *New York Times*, "American Officers in the Service of the Khedive," August 26, 1870.
65. *New York Times*, "The American Officers in the East – Who They Are and What They Are Doing," *The* July 27, 1871.
66. *New York Times*, "American Officers in Egypt," January 19, 1875.
67. Chaillé-Long, *Central Africa*.
68. Chaillé-Long, *The Three Prophets: Chinese Gordon, Mohammed-Ahmed (El Maabdi), Arabi Pasha. Events before and after the Bombardment of Alexandria* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1884).

69. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 150.
70. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 139.
71. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 152–3.
72. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 141.
73. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 141.
74. *Sun*, "American Officers and the Egyptian Army," July 12, 1882.
75. Juan R.I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 17. Cole also clarifies the origins and scope of the violence in Alexandria in June of 1882 that preceded the British intervention (253–9). Nationalism was not the only possible trajectory of Egyptian political revolution. See Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).
76. Charles Royle cites Stone's figure of 700 Egyptians killed. Charles Royle, *The Egyptian Campaigns, 1882 to 1885* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1900), 74.
77. Correspondence from Charles P. Stone to President Chester Arthur, July 24, 1882, C. Chaillé-Long papers, 1809–1918, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
78. Elbert E. Farman, *Egypt and Its Betrayal; an Account of the Country During the Periods of Ismail and Tewfik Pashas, and of How England Acquired a New Empire* (New York: Grafton Press, 1908), 272.
79. In *My Life in Four Continents*, Chaillé-Long claims he visited 'Urabi on his way back from Korea in 1889 (392). This might be true. Arthur Dep notes that the exiles received many visitors, meaning that "Arabi was subject to intrusions, always not of a pleasant nature": Arthur C. Dep, *The Egyptian Exiles in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (1883–1901)* (Colombo: Arabi Pasha Centenary Celebrations Committee of the All Ceylon Muslim League, 1983), 17. For a broad overview of developments in Egypt during colonial rule, see Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
80. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," 140.
81. Charles P. Stone, "The Political Geography of Egypt," *Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York* 15 (1883).
82. Charles P. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* V, no. XXVIII (1884). This address was also translated into Spanish and published in Cuba as Carlos P. Stone, *Asuntos Militares En Egipto* (Habana: El Eco Militai, 1884).
83. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 155.
84. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 158.
85. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 158.
86. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 162. Emad Ahmed Helal disputes the widespread notion of Sève in establishing the modern Egypt, pointing to

- Ibrahim Agha and others as evidence that this work had already begun by the time Sève arrived in Egypt (Helal, “Muhammad Ali’s First Army,” 31–3).
87. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 165.
 88. Stone’s account of the American mission is also unique because he gives no names, only titles. He describes the actions of the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian General Staff, but never says it was him. When he describes Long’s Central African expedition, he says only that “in 1874 one of the American officers pushed through to Lake Victoria” (174).
 89. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 166–7.
 90. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 168–75.
 91. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 176–7.
 92. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 180–1.
 93. Stone, “Military Affairs in Egypt,” 181–2. In the wake of the 2013 coup d’état in Egypt, Stone’s desire for military rule seems prescient.
 94. Sickles was even more infamous than Stone. After killing Francis Scott Key’s son in a duel, he served as an antebellum congressman and then a Civil War general.
 95. Fanny, the middle of three daughters, was born September 10, 1864. Fanny and her younger sister, Jeanne, were born to Stone’s second wife, Jeannie. Hettie, the oldest of the three daughters, was born to Maria Louisa Clary, Stone’s first wife. See Louisiana Genealogical and Historical Society, *Be It Known and Remembered*, William Silford Sanders Bible, vol. 1, part 4 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Genealogical and Historical Society, 1998).
 96. In a telegram in which he reported that he had lost his personal effects and the diplomatic archives somewhere between Alexandria and Cairo, the US consul general reported “Egypt’s [*sic*] situation desperate.” The lost property was later relocated. Correspondence from N.S. Comanos to Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen, July 23, 1882; correspondence from Comanos to Frelinghuysen, August 3, 1882, RG59, T41, Roll 10, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cairo, Egypt 1864–1906, National Archives, College Park, MD.
 97. Cassandra Vivian, *Americans in Egypt, 1770–1915: Explorers, Consuls, Travelers, Soldiers, Missionaries, Writers and Scientists* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012). Vivian also mistakenly states that Charles Stone never shared his view about events in Egypt (249).
 98. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1820–1876*, vol. X (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), 406.
 99. The status of the Stone women in Cairo is mentioned in nearly every diplomatic communication sent from the consul general in Alexandria in the weeks following the attack.
 100. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 267; Fanny Stone, “Diary of an American Girl in Cairo During the War of 1882,” *Century*, June 1884, 291.
 101. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 267; F. Stone, “Diary,” 290, 294.
 102. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 267; F. Stone, “Diary,” 295, 297.

103. F. Stone, "Diary," 291, 297, 299.
104. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 266–7; Charles P. Stone, "Introductory Letter to: Diary of an American Girl in Cairo During the War of 1882," *Century*, June 1884.
105. F. Stone, "Diary," 297.
106. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 267; F. Stone, "Diary," 299–302.
107. Dye, *Moslem Egypt*; Loring, *Confederate Soldier*.
108. Dye described life in Egypt, which he said was "the Texas of Europe," in *Moslem Egypt* (19).
109. F. Stone, "Diary," 291.
110. F. Stone, "Diary," 292.
111. F. Stone, "Diary," 295.
112. F. Stone, "Diary," 296.
113. F. Stone, "Diary," 293.
114. F. Stone, "Diary," 296.
115. Kristin L. Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
116. F. Stone, "Diary," 291.
117. F. Stone, "Diary," 293.
118. F. Stone, "Diary," 290.
119. F. Stone, "Diary," 290–2.
120. F. Stone, "Diary," 294.
121. F. Stone, "Diary," 294.
122. Catherine Barnes Stevenson, *Victorian Women Travel Writers in Africa* (Boston: Twayne, 1982), 160–1.
123. Mary P. Coulling, *The Lee Girls* (Winston-Salem, NC: J.F. Blair, 1987), 189. Custis subsequently became close to Horatio Herbert Kitchener in Egypt.
124. Sara Mills, *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1991).
125. Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Laura Wexler, *Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 6.
126. Arthur John, *The Best Years of the Century: Richard Watson Gilder, Scribner's Monthly, and Century Magazine, 1870–1909* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 125–9. The series featured 230 former soldiers of all ranks along with 1,700 engraved illustrations.
127. *Century*, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," October 1884, 943–4; John, *Best Years of the Century*. In an advertisement published in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, the *Century* claimed the series would be composed of "a number of articles of especial interest to soldiers." See *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States V*, no. XVII (1885): 4.

128. Cheryl McEwan, *Gender, Geography and Empire: Victorian Women Travellers in West Africa* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000).
129. Mills, *Discourses of Difference*, 21–2, 51.
130. *Ann Arbor Courier*, “General Stone and the Bombardment of Alexandria,” May 28, 1884. By describing their days as tense, I do not mean to orient the women as existentially threatened because of any racial menace, but because most people in the midst of war face precarious circumstances.
131. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*, 9.
132. Stone, “Introductory Letter,” 288.
133. Stone, “Introductory Letter,” 288.
134. Stone, “Introductory Letter,” 288–9.
135. Stone, “Introductory Letter,” 288.
136. Victoria Alexandrina M.L. Gregory, Hon. Lady Welby, *Arabi and His Household* (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 1882). As a significant figure of Irish cultural nationalism, Gregory’s romantic nationalist praise for ‘Urabi makes sense. She wonders, “Why is it that one hears so often of Arabi’s mutiny, but never the first act in the piece which led to it?” She opines that few would speak up alongside her, because “a lady may say what she likes, but a man is called unpatriotic who ventures to say a word that is good of the man England is determined to crush.” Her description filtered into the colonies; for example, the *Argus* in Melbourne on January 6, 1883, and the *Southland Times* in Southern New Zealand on January 16, 1883.
137. Stone’s claims in his preface also prompted criticism and rebuttals in subsequent issues of the *Century*: C.F. Goodrich, “The Bombardment of Alexandria,” *Century* XXVIII, no. 4 (1884); Charles P. Stone, “The Bombardment of Alexander: Rejoinder by Stone Pasha,” *Century* XXVIII, no. 6 (1884); O.A. Batcheller, “The Bombardment of Alexandria. Comment by the Commander of the Galena,” *Century* XXVIII, no. 6 (1884).
138. Chaillé-Long capitalized on these events in the Sudan by publishing his second book, a highly critical analysis of Gordon: *The Three Prophets*.
139. Chester A. Arthur, “Fourth Annual Message,” December 1, 1884, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php.
140. Arthur, “Fourth Annual Message.” Arthur also noted, “Certain questions between the United States and the Ottoman Empire still remain unsolved. Complaints on behalf of our citizens are not satisfactorily adjusted. The Porte has sought to withhold from our commerce the right of favored treatment to which we are entitled by existing conventional stipulations, and the revision of the tariffs is unaccomplished.”
141. National Park Service, “General Charles Pomeroy Stone,” February 26, 2015, www.nps.gov/stli/historyculture/general-charles-pomeroy-stone.htm. On its website, the National Park Service does not mention Stone’s mercenary service in Egypt.
142. Fitz-John Porter, *In Memory of Gen. Chas. P. Stone* (Harvard College Library, 1887). Porter was Stone’s classmate at West Point, and a fellow member of the

- Aztec Club in Mexico and USMSI. Porter was a fine choice for the obituary. He had spent almost 20 years clearing his own name after a Civil War court martial, and he had once turned down a position on the Egyptian General Staff. Whatever the Stone family's economic condition after Charles Stone's death, it was not permanent. Stone's son John became a famous (and wealthy) scientist: George H. Clark, *The Life of John Stone: Mathematician, Physicist, Electrical Engineer, and Great Inventor* (San Diego: Frye & Smith Ltd., 1946).
143. Charles P. Stone, "Stone-Pacha and the Secret Despatch," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 8 (1888).
 144. Abbate-Pacha, "Le Général Charles Pomeroy Stone," *Bulletin de la Société Khédiviale de Géographie du Caire* II, no. 12 (1888): 673; Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
 145. S.E. Moktar Pacha, "Le Général Stone," *Bulletin de la Société Khédiviale de Géographie du Caire* II, no. 12 (1888): 680.
 146. Abbate-Pacha, "Le Général Charles Pomeroy Stone," 677.
 147. Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).
 148. Farman, *Along the Nile*.
 149. Farman, *Along the Nile*, 32.
 150. Elbert E. Farman, *Egypt and Its Betrayal*, vi. Cromer's account of modern Egypt was published the same year: Earl of Cromer [Evelyn Baring], *Modern Egypt* (London: MacMillan, 1908).
 151. Efforts to secure the obelisk had their origins in an erroneous report in a New York newspaper in late 1877 that the khedive had informed John Dixon, a contractor transporting a similar obelisk from Egypt to London, that the government would also like to present an obelisk to the United States. When Dixon immediately disavowed any such conversation with the khedive, the matter dropped out of the public eye. Grant visited shortly after and Farman broached the matter. Grant, no longer president, agreed that if an obelisk could be secured then one should be. The khedive was surprised when Farman brought up the subject, but agreed to consider it. At a party, M. de Lesseps, an intimate of the government, also agreed that that the presentation of an obelisk was a good idea. The khedive presented the obelisk to New York only a month before his abdication. Farman claimed that after the abdication certain Europeans attempted to prevent the removal of the obelisk, but the Council of Ministers considered it a done deal and by October the removal commenced.
 152. Farman, *Egypt and Its Betrayal*, 165–6.
 153. Farman, *Egypt and Its Betrayal*, 273.
 154. Chaillé-Long, "Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," 16–17.
 155. Chaillé-Long, "Forgotten American Mission to Egypt," 17.

156. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,” January 28, 1988, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36212.
157. Reagan, “Remarks.”
158. Reagan, “Remarks.”
159. Congressional Research Service, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” March 24, 2017, www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33003.html. In 1988, Egypt even began co-producing the US M1A1 Abrams tank with General Dynamics just outside Cairo.
160. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” December 22, 2016, www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161222_RL33222_278feba814b80351cda4e906fdd20fb6d057b8d5.pdf. Together, the two countries receive about 75 per cent of US military aid.
161. Congressional Research Service, “Egypt”; Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”; Samantha Gross, “The Saudi Aramco IPO Is a Game-Changer for the Saudi Economy,” Brookings Institution, June 6, 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/06/the-saudi-aramco-ipo-is-a-game-changer-for-the-saudi-economy; Eric Covey, “‘Frontier Risk’ and the Sino-American Scramble in the Sahel,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2017); Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf>; Asli Aydıntaşbaş, “Turkey-US Relations Locked into a Downward Spiral,” October 27, 2017, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_turkey_us_relations_locked_into_a_downward_spiral_7232; Zia Weise, “Turkey’s Torrid Love Affair with Michael Flynn,” November 25, 2017, *Politico*, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/25/michael-flynn-turkey-215865.

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